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… the human brain is evolved for sociality, for the capacity and necessity 
of living in groups, for the ability to grasp and respond to the mental states 
of others: human brains are both shaped by, and shape, their sociality.
Rose & Abi-Rached (2013, p. 22)
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Summary 
The discourse of educational neuroscience is a complex field of study, encompassing an 
intricate and interrelated network of discursive structures, relations, and practices within and 
between different discursive levels. This multifaceted dissemination makes educational 
neuroscience an interesting topic for research, and in my doctorial study I use a critical 
discourse analysis in order to investigate the development and impact of educational 
neuroscience as a discourse. Attention is on academic, public, political, and Norwegian levels
of the educational neuroscience discourse, as I address the four discourse analytical concepts 
of emergence, hegemony, recontextualisation over structural boarders, and recontextualisation 
over scalar boarders. 
In the first analytical part historical series of text from the 19th century and to the 
present day are analysed and discussed in order to elucidate the emergence and development 
of educational neuroscience as an academic project. I argue that educational neuroscience can 
be seen as a discipline emerging from a field of prior discourses by way of boundary 
problematization, transgression, and negotiation where old discursive elements are re-
articulated into new discursive facets. The academic level of educational neuroscience is also 
the focus of attention in the second part, where I consider discursive struggles, hegemonic 
relations, notions of dominance, marginalisation, and power dimensions. A chief argument 
herein is that an underlying struggle between the ‘robust’ neuroscience (viz. natural science) 
and the ‘softer’ field of education (viz. social science) can be seen reverberated in hegemonic 
notions of neuroscientific dominion and marginalisation of educational explanations and
educational practices within the field. In the third part attention is shifted from the academic 
level towards an analysis of how educational neuroscience is recontextualised in public 
media, in brain-based learning industries, in political documents, and in texts from 
intergovernmental interest actors. Attention is on the ways in which these different actors 
represent, appropriate, and have (or lack) dialogue with educational neuroscientific research. 
Also the forth analytical part considers educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation, 
although this time attention is across scalar boarders to the Norwegian level of discourse. My 
findings do at this level evince that there barely is any academic attention and debate 
concerning the linkage of education and neuroscience in Norway, this despite the fact that 
numerous (and often unscientific) traces of educational neuroscience are represented in 
Norwegian public and political fields.
viii 
 
Overall, my critical discourse analytical findings evince that educational neuroscience 
is a complex and a continuous changeable discourse. The discourse can be seen manifested at 
different levels (e.g. the academic, the public, and the political level), it encompasses an
intricate set of representations, values, approaches, structures, relations, practices, and actors, 
and it can additionally be seen to have emerged, and continue to develop, by means of 
discursive structures and strategic actions (viz. the power of discourse and the power over
discourse). I further argue that certain difficulties arise by reason of educational 
neuroscience’s novelty and complexity. Not only do issues arise due to philosophical, 
theoretical, methodological, practical, and ethical bridging problems at the academic level, but 
difficulties do also arise when educational neuroscientific research is recontextualised at the 
public and political level. Considering that educational neuroscience is still developing as a 
discourse, I deem that actors working at the interface of education, psychology, and 
QHXURVFLHQFHíand also at the interface of the academic, public, and political levHOíKDYHDQ
opportunity to negotiate, re-articulate, and shape the discourse of educational neuroscience. In 
this construction I claim that much is to be gained by perceiving educational neuroscience as 
an anti-reductionistic and transdisciplinary endeavour. 
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Norsk sammendrag 
Den pedagogisk nevrovitenskapelige diskursen er et kompleks felt, som favner om et
interaktivt nettverk av diskursive strukturer, relasjoner og praksiser både i og mellom ulike 
diskursive nivå. Denne kompleksiteten og mangfoldigheten gjør pedagogisk nevrovitenskap 
til et spennende forskningsobjekt og i mitt doktorgradsstudium tar jeg i bruk et kritisk 
diskursanalytisk og diskursteoretisk rammeverk for å studere utviklingen og nedslaget av 
pedagogisk nevrovitenskap som diskurs. Fokus ligger på det akademiske-, offentlige-,
politiske- og det norske nivået av pedagogisk nevrovitenskap, der jeg videre tar for meg de 
fire analytiske konseptene ‘emergence’, ‘hegemony’, ‘recontextualisation over structural 
boarders’, and ‘recontextualisation over scalar boarders’.
I den første analysedelen blir historiske tekster fra 1800-tallet og frem til i dag 
analyser og drøftet, dette for å belyse fremveksten og utviklingen av pedagogisk nevro-
vitenskap som et akademisk prosjekt. Her argumenterer jeg for å forstå pedagogisk 
nevrovitenskap som en GLVLSOLQVRPKDUYRNVHWIUHPIUDHWIHOWDYIRUKHQY UHQGHGLVNXUVHUí
en utviklingsprosess som har funnet sted ved problematisering, overskridelse og forhandling 
av tidligere diskursive grenser, der gamle diskursive element har blitt re-artikulert til nye 
diskursive konsept. Det akademiske nivået ved pedagogisk nevrovitenskap er også i sentrum i 
den andre analysedelen, der jeg studerer diskursive kamper, hegemoniske relasjoner, forhold 
av dominans, marginalisering, samt ulike maktdimensjoner.  Et sentralt argument her er at en 
underliggende kamp mellom den ‘robuste’ nevrovitenskapen (jf. naturvitenskapen) og det 
‘mykere’ pedagogiske feltet (jf. humaniora og samfunnsvitenskapen), har fått utslag i
hegemoniske aspekt knyttet til nevrovitenskapelig dominans og marginalisering av 
pedagogiske forklaringer og pedagogisk praksis i feltet. I den tredje delen er oppmerksom-
heten flyttet fra det akademiske feltet til en analyse av hvordan pedagogisk nevrovitenskap er 
rekontekstualisert i media, i den ‘hjernebaserte’ læringsindustrien, i politiske tekster og i 
tekster fra internasjonale organisasjoner. Fokus er på hvordan disse ulike aktørene 
representerer, tilegner seg, og har (eller mangler) dialog med pedagogisk nevrovitenskapelig 
forskning. Også den fjerde analysedelen omhandler rekontekstualiseringen av pedagogisk 
nevrovitenskap, men her er oppmerksomheten rettet over internasjonale og nasjonale grenser 
og til Norge. Mine funn viser her at det er liten akademisk oppmerksomhet og debatt rundt 
pedagogikk og nevrovitenskap i Norge, dette på tross at mange (og ofte uvitenskapelige) 
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fremstillinger av koblingen mellom pedagogikk og nevrovitenskap er representert i det 
offentlige og det politiske felt i Norge. 
Samlet sett viser mine analytiske funn at pedagogisk nevrovitenskap er en kompleks
diskurs i kontinuerlig forandring. Diskursen er manifestert i ulike nivå (slik som det 
akademiske, offentlige og politiske nivå) og den innehar et intrikat sett med relasjoner, 
verdier, perspektiver, retninger, strukturer, relasjoner, praksiser og aktører. Den har vokst
frem, og utviklet seg videre, ved hjelp av strategiske handlinger og diskursive strukturer (dvs. 
ved hjelp av makten til diskursen samt makten over diskursen). Jeg argumenterer for at den
relativt nyetablerte og komplekse diskursive strukturen til pedagogisk nevrovitenskap fører til 
visse utfordringer. Ikke bare oppstår utfordringer grunnet filosofiske, teoretiske, metodiske, 
praktiske og etiske brobyggingsproblematikk mellom feltene, men vanskeligheter oppstår 
også når pedagogisk nevrovitenskapelig forskning er rekontekstualisert til det offentlige og 
det politiske felt. Tatt i betraktning at den pedagogisk nevrovitenskapelige diskursen fortsatt 
er under utvikling, vil jeg hevde at aktører som jobber i møte mellom pedagogikk, psykologi 
RJ NRJQLWLYH QHYURYLWHQVNDS í VDPW L P¡WHPHOORP GH akademiske, offentlige og politiske 
GLVNXUVQLYnHQH í KDU PXOLJKHWer til å forhandle, re-artikulere, og forme den pedagogisk 
nevrovitenskapelige diskursen. I denne konstruksjonen vil jeg argumentere for viktigheten av 
å forstå pedagogisk nevrovitenskap som et anti-reduksjonistisk og transdisiplinært arbeid.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Over recent decades there has been considerable growth and expansion in the academic field 
which combines education and neuroscience. The concept of learning is a central nexus in 
research projects within this field, and much cross-disciplinary work has appeared at the 
interface of the disciplines of education, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. 
For instance, many international and collaborative research groups on education and 
neuroscience have been initiated, annual conferences are held, books and articles are 
continually being published on the topic, journals on mind, brain, and education have been 
launched, and numerous master and doctoral programmes at universities such as Harvard and 
Cambridge have been established. This substantial development has even led to the 
identification of education and neuroscience as a distinct and novel academic discipline. But 
the linkage of education and neuroscience has not only attracted interest within academia, and 
one can also find traces of education and neuroscience within policy documents, amongst 
intergovernmental interest actors such as the OECD and EU, within public media, in pop-
scientific books, in so-called ‘brain-based’ learning programmes, and in marketing of ‘smart’ 
drinks, foods, and pills which promise to enhance customer’s cognitive abilities. Notions 
related to learning, education, cognition, and neuroscience can therefore be found outside
academia as well, as related representations manifest themselves in public and political fields. 
The novelty of this academic discipline does, in itself, make the field an interesting 
topic for study since there is yet much to be explored with respect to connections between 
education and neuroscience. However, I will also argue that the field’s novelty contributes to 
encumbering the discipline, because it appears that certain disciplinary structures have not yet 
been firmly established and acknowledged. For instance, there is little coherence in the ways 
in which the academic project’s aim, research approach, values, and disciplinary relations 
relevant to education and neuroscience, are perceived and understood by actors both inside 
and outside the field. Ambiguous disciplinary principles and structures are even reflected in 
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the myriad different titles which are used, as names on research initiatives ranging from 
‘educational neuroscience’ (Campbell, 2011; Geake, 2008; Varma, McCanliss, & Schwartz, 
2008), ‘mind, brain, and education’ (Stein & Fischer, 2011), ‘neuroeducation’ (Ansari, De 
Smedt, & Grabner, 2012), ‘neuroeducational research’ (Howard-Jones, 2010), ‘neurolearning’ 
(Petitto & Dunbar, 2004), ‘pedagogical neuroscience’ (Fawcett & Nicolson, 2007), 
‘neuroscience and education’ (Goswami, 2006), ‘neuroscience in education’ (Della Sala & 
Anderson, 2012), and ‘brain-based education’ and ‘brain-based learning’ (Jensen, 2008).
Whereas some of these groups give the impression of being closely related to one another, 
others on closer examination attach different meanings to the ways in which one can perceive 
linkages that can and cannot be drawn between the disciplines of cognitive neuroscience, 
cognitive psychology, and education. The field combining education and neuroscience 
therefore appears to be growing, wherein one can find a complex web of disciplinary 
structures, relations, and actors holding different perceptions, principles, and values. 
 
Aim and research questions  
Many researchers have already studied practical aspects of education and neuroscience, such 
as how one can connect brain-scientific knowledge on reading and letter processing with 
educational interventions. However, little comprehensive research has been done to map out 
and critically analyse the field per se. I will argue that it is essential to focus also on 
disciplinary and macro-social dimensions, particularly if one considers the inconsistency in 
perceptions of the nature of the educational neuroscience discipline. My doctoral study will 
thus focus on the overarching field of education and neuroscience, with particular attention to 
how this field approaches concepts of learning. Consideration will furthermore be given to
societal, structural, relational, strategic, and disciplinary dimensions. In line with this, relevant 
research questions will ask how the professional discipline of educational neuroscience has
developed, what ‘general’ knowledge is accepted within the discipline, which issues and 
disagreements are negotiated within the profession, which stakeholders and agents are central 
to the discourse, and how educational neuroscience is recontextualised in other areas such as 
public and political fields. Accordingly, an appropriate approach for such a study is to 
consider the field of education and neuroscience as a discourse, since this complies with 
macro-social and critical perspectives on structural and disciplinary aspects of the education 
and neuroscience field. When using the term ‘discourse’, I base my definition on Fairclough’s 
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theoretical and methodological framework where a discourse is perceived as a set of complex 
relations and structures which both represent and constitute meaning, meaning-making, and 
other social entities (Fairclough, 1992, 2010). In line with this, the overall aim of my doctoral 
study is to analyse the development and impact of educational neuroscience by using a
critical discourse analysis. 
A critical discourse analysis of the educational neuroscience discourse is not a precise 
enough line of study, and further definition of the overall research aim needs to be made. In 
order to reach a wide-ranging and comprehensive analysis of the discourse, I have chosen to 
focus on the four discourse analytical concepts of emergence, hegemony, recontextualisation 
over structural boarders, and recontextualisation over scalar boarders. The first analytical 
part of my research aims to investigate how educational neuroscience has emerged and 
developed as an academic discipline. The second part builds on this, but focuses on discursive 
struggles and hegemonic relations found ZLWKLQ WKH GLVFRXUVH í attention is therefore on 
different narrations, positions, actors, strategies, and power relations that can be found within 
the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. Whereas the first two analytical 
parts analyse the academic level of discourse, the last two research sections aim to investigate 
the ways in which educational neuroscience is distributed and recontextualised to other 
societal fields. Accordingly, the third analytical part will focus on how educational
neuroscience is recontextualised over structural borders and into the field of media, brain-
based learning industries, policymakers, and other interest actors such as OECD, whereas the 
fourth and last section investigates educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation over scalar 
borders and into the Norwegian field. Analysis of educational neuroscience in terms of 
hegemony, emergence, and recontextualisation, can overall provide a copious analysis, as the 
four concepts together cover an extensive range of discursive facets at different discursive 
levels. The analytical approach also makes allowance for critical reflection and discussion by 
combining micro-textual analysis with macro-social perspectives and theories (Wodak & 
Fairclough, 2010).
Some clarifications ought to be made with respect to the aim of this research. Firstly, a 
focus on discursive aspects implies that my study will not offer any practical research on 
ways to link neuroscientific knowledge and education. Secondly, this means that I do not 
intend to include any specific academic research initiative linking education and neuroscience 
in the centre of my analysis, since it is the overarching discourse that I am interested in 
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analysing. Thirdly, for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the overarching academic research 
project as the discourse of educational neuroscience. By using the term ‘educational 
neuroscience’, I do not suggest that labelling discursive initiatives with the same name is 
advantageous, nor do I propose that this is the most suitable term for endeavours, studies and 
aims within this overarching research field. The term ‘educational neuroscience’ is, however,
frequently used by authors working at the interface of education, cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience, and it does seem to imply less relational directives than, for instance 
‘neuroscience in education’ or ‘brain-based learning’. The fourth aspect to be clarified is that I 
intend to take a critical approach when studying the discourse of educational neuroscience, 
but this will not be done in a censorial way but rather in the spirit of critical awareness and 
reflection. I am thus not commencing my doctoral research project with the aim of refuting or 
promoting educational neuroscientific work, but rather with the aim of analysing, describing, 
and reflecting upon discursive aspects pertaining to educational neuroscience. 
 
Scientific positioning and research approach  
Philosophical positioning 
:LWKUHJDUGWRP\SKLORVRSKLFDOWKHRUHWLFDODQGPHWKRGRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQLQJíDQGKHQFHWKH
HQVXLQJUHVHDUFKDSSURDFKWDNHQLQWKLVGRFWRUDOVWXG\íGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWVDUHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH
following chapters. Considering that scientific positioning influences everything from 
research questions asked, to research design and discussion of findings, it is essential also to 
clarify these aspects in the introduction. What ought to be mentioned first is that my 
philosophical positioning has been particularly thought-provoking, because my encounter 
with educational neuroscience as a research topic has challenged my formerly held 
philosophical stance. I am an educationalist, and during my years of educational and social 
studies I have been an adherent of social constructivism, where epistemological questions 
often take centre stage. When I started studying the discourse of educational neuroscience, 
however, the introduction of natural scientific aspects into educational matters provoked
certain basic philosophical questions, which I did not sufficiently manage to answer within 
the framework of social constructivism. In short, it can be noted that questions ensued from 
how I could link my idea of underl\LQJVRFLDODQGGLVFXUVLYHVWUXFWXUHVí LQFRQVWUXFWLYLVP
often perceived as essential social constructs íZLWK WKH LGHD WKDW WKHPDWHULDOZRUOG H[LVWs
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independently of our thoughts about it. If I, on the one hand, were to take a position of social 
constructivism, I would find that certain natural scientific premises such as biological aspects 
of the living brain are inadequately considered, since social constructivism has a preliminary 
focus on epistemological doctrines of socially construed understandings. If I on the other hand 
were to focus on ontological realism, I would find that social aspects such as meaning-making 
and underlying discursive structures are given less consideration than more existential 
aspects, such as neural biochemical processes in the brain. I therefore did not possess
sufficient philosophical grounding, since I found it difficult to use a philosophy of science
which does not make allowance for both natural and social aspects without giving 
predominance to either ontological premises (realism) or epistemological premises 
(relativism).
After searching for literature relevant to scientific philosophical grounding in 
educational neuroscientific matters, I realised that not much has been published about 
philosophies of science appropriate to educational neuroscientific research1. Lack of explicit 
philosophical grounding in educational neuroscience nearly made me change the focus of my 
doctoral study, in order to explore possible philosophies of science applicable to educational 
neuroscientific research. Although my motivation for doing a critical discourse analysis in the 
first place was my impression that the novel discipline of educational neuroscience has some 
essential disciplinary ambiguities, which ought to be invesWLJDWHG í ODFN RI DWWHQWLRQ WR D
coherent grounding in a philosophy of science is, in my view, just another example of this. 
Bearing in mind the limited time and space available for philosophical conundrums if 
progress were to be made in my critical discourse analysis of educational neuroscience, I have 
chosen to take a somewhat open and investigational philosophical positioning in my doctoral 
research. This implies that I am not set in my philosophical positioning, since there still is 
much to consider with respect to philosophies of science appropriate for educational 
neuroscientific research. I have, however, taken an approach influenced by critical realism
(Bhaskar, 1986, 1998, 2008), because this philosophy of science appears to meet some of the 
philosophical issues ensuing from the linkage of education and neuroscience. Not only does
critical realism assert that there is a real world which exists independently of our knowledge 
RI LW EXW LW DOVR DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW WKH UHDO ZRUOG LV VRFLDOO\ FRQVWUXFWHG í WKLV ZLWKRXW
                                                          
1 It must be noted that numerous texts are published with regards to other philosophical questions related to linkages of 
social, behavioural, and neuroscientific aspects such as consciousness, identity, and relations between body and mind, soul 
and matter (cf. dualism and monism). These questions do, however, tackle philosophical issues at a different level than 
ontological and epistemological questions adherent to philosophies of science. 
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reducing ontological questions to epistemic questions, or vice versa (Collier, 1994). A 
comprehensive account of critical realism and educational neuroscientific research is
presented in chapter 2, but for the moment, it can be noted that critical realism appears to 
function as a possible, but not exclusive, philosophical approach for this study, since it allows
for answering philosophical issues arising when linking education and neuroscience.
Theoretical and methodological positioning 
Despite a somewhat tentative philosophic positioning in critical realism, it is essential that my 
philosophical approach is compatible with the theoretical and methodological approach
chosen for the study. Considering that the research aim is to analyse structures, strategies, and 
relations in educational neuroscience as a discourse, Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) seems particularly appropriate as a theoretical and analytical framework 
(Fairclough, 1992, 2010). A general principle in Fairclough’s framework is to see textual 
analysis at a micro-level in relation to societal and sociocultural structures at a macro-level. 
As a further specification of this, Fairclough focuses on critical aspects by also giving 
emphasis to what he calls “opaque relationships of causality” between discursive texts, 
events, and practices on the one hand, and wider social and cultural structures, processes, and 
relations on the other (Fairclough, 2010, p. 93). Furthermore, and this is essential when 
adopting a consistent approach to my research, Fairclough has, during the course of his later 
work, taken a critical realist approach to discourse analysis, and focuses much of his later 
work on creating justifiable bonds between critical discourse analysis (CDA) and critical 
realism (CR) inspired by Roy Bhaskar (Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer, 2002).
 Besides presenting a theoretical framework of discourse founded in critical realism, 
Fairclough also offers methodological and analytical perspectives for critically analysing 
discourse. An essential point in critical discourse analysis is that it is not an analysis of 
discourse per se, but rather an analysis of dialectical relations between and within texts, 
discourse, and other elements of the social (Fairclough, 2010). Identification of such 
discursive relations is based on the idea that text (spoken or written language) must be seen as 
part of a social event shaped by social agents on the one hand, and by discursive and social 
structures and practices on the other. Systematic analysis of text is therefore essential because
it can reveal i) the network of practices wherein a text is located, ii) relationships between 
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semiosis and other elements within the practice, and iii) the discourse itself (Fairclough, 
2003). When it comes to a specific method design, however, critical discourse analysis cannot 
be seen to offer any ‘toolkit’ or special forms of micro-analysis of text. Instead it is argued 
that selection of method for each individual research project depends upon the object of 
research, the chosen focus of study, and its respective research questions (Fairclough, 2010).
Given that I pay attention to emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over structural 
and scalar borders when analysing educational neuroscience, the method and analytical design 
utilised must be able to sufficiently identify how these four discursive concepts are featured in 
different dimension of the discourse. Due to different focuses of attention, each concept is
treated DVDVLQJOHDQDO\WLFDOHQWLW\í with its individual research questions, separate selection 
criteria for literature searches, and thus also individual text material for analysis (corpora). 
Despite these variances, all four analytical parts follow some general analytical principles,
which I consider are applicable to my study. Firstly, texts are selected for the four corpora 
(each with approximately 30 texts), by following systematic literature search procedures and 
specific selection criteria, in order to ensure that each corpus represents a justifiable repertoire 
of texts relevant for the educational neuroscience discourse. Considering that discourse 
analysis and critical discussion of findings are inevitably dependent on the texts selected for 
these corpora, systematic and ample search criteria are important for the study’s reliability. 
Secondly, with regard to the specific mode of discourse analysis, all four parts contain a
structural analysis and textual analysis with both discursive and linguistic (semiotic) analysis. 
The extent of these modes of analysis may vary depending on what is expedient for each part, 
but a general principle is that micro-textual aspects are seen in relation to discursive and 
social structures, relations, and strategies at a macro-level. Thirdly, all four parts are presented 
in separate chapters wherein analytical findings are presented and critically discussed in light 
of a critical discourse theoretical framework. I will argue that this ensures analytical 
coherence in that the four parts follow the general principles of the same discourse analytical 
method, as well as ensuring analytical continuity since the method makes allowance for 
studying the concepts of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation in different 
dimensions of the educational neuroscience discourse. 
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Structure and coherence of the dissertation 
Considering my scientific positioning and the approach taken in my doctoral study, I will 
argue that there is consistency between research questions and my philosophical, theoretical,
and methodological approach. Not only can critical realism help as a possible philosophical 
approach for studying educational neuroscience, but justifiable links can also be drawn 
between critical realism and critical discourse theories and methodologies (cf. Fairclough,
2010; Fairclough et al., 2002). I will further argue that a focus on emergence, hegemony, and 
recontextualisation is a purposeful choice for framing a comprehensive analysis covering
different levels of educational neuroscience discourse. Additionally, these discourse analytical 
concepts provide a guiding framework for a coherent method design for analysing educational 
neuroscience. Based on this research approach, and in order to present my doctoral research in 
an organised manner, my dissertation is structured as follow: 
Ch. 1. Introduction
Ch. 2. Philosophic and scientific positioning í a critical realist approach to educational neuroscience
Ch. 3. 7KHRU\íFULWLFDOGLVFRXUVHWKHRULHV
Ch. 4. MHWKRGíFULWLFDOGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLV
Ch. 5. The emergence of educational neuroscience
Ch. 6. Hegemonic relations in educational neuroscience 
Ch. 7. Recontextualisation across structural borders
Ch. 8. Recontextualisation across scalar borders
Ch. 9. Final reflections
 
Research context and relevance 
A few notes are required in order to locate my doctoral project within a larger and already 
existing field of educational neuroscientific research, and the following research 
contextualisation is based on insights gained from my systematic literature reviews and 
discourse analysis of the educational neuroscience field. It is worth mentioning that 
considerable work has been done on the interface of education and neuroscience, and one can 
particularly detect an upsurge in such research from the 1980s and onwards, when improved 
neuroimaging techniques enabled better methods for studying structural and functional 
aspects of the brain. Many studies related to educational neuroscience promise to enhance our 
understanding of aspects pertaining to learning, often by combining insights from cognitive 
neuroscience, neurobiology, cognitive psychology, and/or education. Examples of such 
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studies are Jong and colleagues’ (2009) neuroscientific research which indicates the important 
role of mirror-neurons in our ability to learn from observing others, research on neural circuits 
and systems exploring human memory (Buzsáki & Moser, 2013), emotional influence on 
cognition (Patten, 2011), and aspects related to developmental difficulties such as dyslexia, 
dyscalculia, and ADHD (Fredrickson & Cline, 2009). The focus here is on practical aspects 
of educational neuroscience, as the research is based on structural or functional cognitive 
neuroscience seen in relation to concepts relevant for education, such as learning, memory, 
number and letter processing, learning difficulties, emotion, and social interaction. Practical 
studies like these are often conducted by researchers, or research groups, with profound 
knowledge of cognitive neuroscience, education, and psychology, who can, therefore, offer 
valuable insights concerning cross-disciplinary linkages between brain, mind, and education. 
Even if much research conducted at the interface of education and neuroscience has 
focused on practical aspects, my doctoral project takes a different approach to studying 
educational neuroscience. There are four reasons for this, which I also think add value and 
relevance to my doctoral project. Firstly, because I am a PhD candidate in the field of 
education – having only taken some minor courses in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, 
and educational neuroscience – I am not an expert in the fields of neuroscience or cognitive 
psychology. Rather, my academic background is concerned with macro-social perspectives on
education where attention is often on societal perspectives, political aspects, inter-
governmental structures, power relations, dominions of knowledge etc. (cf. Bourdieu, 1999;
Fairclough, 2010; Foucault, 1970, 1972; Karlsen, 2006). Accordingly, and as a way of 
ensuring some academic soundness and reliability, my research will reflect this macro-social 
perspective as I analyse discursive and relational aspects in educational neuroscience.
Secondly, even if I think it is important to link neuroscientific findings, learning and 
education per se, I also think it is essential to carry out research that critically analyses the 
enterprise, structure, and impact of the educational neuroscientific discipline. Educational 
neuroscience has, as already mentioned, experienced considerable growth both within 
academia and in other political and public fields, but the discipline does nevertheless give the 
impression of being shrouded in ambiguity. Despite inconsistency in disciplinary frameworks, 
so far there have been relatively few discursive analyses of educational neuroscience. Some 
articles, literature reviews, and studies with reference to the discipline of educational 
QHXURVFLHQFHGR LQGHHGH[LVWíVXFKDVBeauchamp and Beauchamp (2012; 2013), Koizumi 
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(2004), Samuels (2009)DQG7DPDUDíDOWKRXJK,ZLOODUJXHWKDWP\GRFWRUDOSURMHFW
offers a more comprehensive and systematic analysis of educational neuroscience. Because 
many of these studies focus on the academic discipline of educational neuroscience, I aim to 
take a step further with my discourse analysis by analysing both the academic discipline (i.e. 
educational neuroscience’s emergence and hegemony) and the broader public and political 
impact of educational neuroscience (i.e. recontextualisation of educational neuroscience 
across structural and scalar boarders). At present, such research perspectives are relatively 
sparse and it is even noted by authors such as Blakemore and Frith (2005a, p. 2) that “despite 
[a] growing body of knowledge and its relevance to education policy ... few links exist 
between brain research and education policy and practice”. By also focusing on 
recontextualisation processes in my doctoral research, I hope to contribute to new 
perspectives and knowledge concerning educational neuroscience’s distribution and uptake in 
public and political fields. Furthermore, my doctoral study can be set apart from other 
disciplinary analysis in that I take a critical approach when analysing the discourse of 
educational neuroscience. As numerous authors working at the interface of neuroscience and 
social scientific disciplines have called for more critical studies for this research field (Hruby, 
2012; N. Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013), I hope that my critical discourse theoretical framework 
will offer perspectives that to date have been relatively sparse. In this respect it should be 
noted that the depth of my critical discourse analysis and discussion is proportionate to the 
breadth and scope of my research. Since I aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
different levels of educational neuroscience discourse, in this doctoral research I will not be 
able to provide in-depth accounts explaining discursive changes and developments in light of 
extensive social, political, and historical contexts. This is because I consider it essential to 
first provide a comprehensive description and clarification of the manifestation of educational 
neuroscience discourse, on which further in-depth explanatory accounts can build. 
A third aspect which can contribute to the relevance of my doctoral study is that at the 
outset of my dissertation I problematize certain philosophical issues which can occur in 
educational neuroscientific research. In order to meet some of the critiques I mention 
concerning philosophical grounding in educational neuroscientific research, I have employed 
an open and investigational research approach based on critical realism. As I have not yet 
found any literature that explores a critical realistic approach for studying educational 
neuroscience, I believe that my investigational research approach may offer a new perspective 
on matters related to educational neuroscience’s philosophies of science. 
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The fourth and last reason for choosing a critical discourse analysis of educational 
neuroscience is because this research approach allows me to analyse the development, 
dispersion, dissemination and impact of educational neuroscience both at an international 
scale and national scale. As I am from Norway, I am particularly interested in analysing 
educational neuroscience in relation to the Norwegian context. Not only do I consider this 
important since to date, few, if any, critical studies on educational neuroscience’s impact in 
Norway, have been conducted, but I also believe that a Norwegian analysis is valuable as it 
can offer insight into the ways in which educational neuroscience is recontextualised into a 
country which only relatively recently has seen the introduction of this theme. In view of this, 
I will argue that my critical discourse analysis of educational neuroscience makes an original 
contribution to knowledge in the field, in that i) it offers a comprehensive and wide-ranging 
analysis of the discourse of educational neuroscience by focusing on emergence, hegemony, 
and recontextualisation, ii) it offers a critical analysis of the discourse, iii) my research 
approach explores critical realism as a possible philosophy of science for education 
neuroscientific research, and iv) my study also investigates educational neuroscience’s impact 
within a Norwegian context.
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Chapter 2 
Philosophic and scientific positioning  
Ϋ a critical realist approach to educational neuroscience 
What is real? How is one to know? 
These are among the most ancient questions not only of
philosophical inquiry proper, but of human thought as such.
Berger and Luckmann (1966).
Philosophy of science constitutes a crucial foundation for scientific research by addressing 
fundamental ontological and epistemological questions of ‘what exists’ and ‘how we can 
know what exists’ (Molander, 2003). Philosophies of science will furthermore often precede 
other essential research inquiries, such as scientific theories, methodological argumentations 
for study, and implications of science, since these notions inevitably include certain basic 
conceptions of the world. Consideration of philosophical positioning is therefore in my view, 
particularly essential in academic work and research, since both theoretical and method-
ological perspectives presuppose a set of ontological and epistemological conventions.
However, due to my critical discourse theoretical approach, I am of the opinion that 
philosophical conventions risk becoming unquestioned conceptions since they are often 
implicitly manifested within disciplinary research paradigms, theories, methodologies, and 
other scientific assumptions. In other words, different disciplinary traditions are often based 
on relatively resilient constitutions of a particular set of philosophies and allied theories, 
methodologies, and methods. Based on critical discourse theories, it can further be argued that 
a philosophy of science will be strengthened by associated theories and methods, since these 
build on and, in turn, manifest philosophical representations. This form of resonance in 
thought can further be reinforced by resonance in discursive and social practice – researchers 
conduct studies in line with specific philosophical, theoretical, and methodological 
assumptions, analogous scientific knowledge becomes manifested in articles and books, and 
related lectures are delivered to new students within the discipline. A set of philosophic 
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knowledge can therefore become institutionalised in an academic discipline if certain 
representations are manifested in ways of thinking, being, and acting (cf. Fairclough, 2010;
Hyland, 2009).
I will argue that manifestation and institutionalisation of thought in a field such as an 
academic discipline is not problematic per se; what is problematic is when particular ways of 
thinking and ‘being in the world’ become naturalised. Naturalised perspectives are 
unquestioned perspectives, since these representations are taken for indisputable truths about 
the world and our place in it (Fairclough, 2010). I will claim that this further implies that 
research conducted from a foundation of a ‘taken for granted’ philosophy of science, will be 
research which uncritically subscribes to certain presumptions. The line of argument in a 
research study may be completely flawless, but unless the premises a study is based on are 
reflected over, central aspects are left unaccounted for. Collier (1994) argues along similar 
lines by noting how certain scientists appear to have an “unconscious philosophy” which they 
apply in their practice. Also Gramsci (1971) points to similar assessments when he states that: 
Everyone is a philosopher, though in his own way and unconsciously, since even in the slightest 
manifestation of any intellectual activity whatever, in ‘language’, there is contained a specific 
conception of the world … [Thus the questions:] Is it better to take part in a conception of the world 
mechanically imposed by the external environment, i.e., by one of the many social groups in which 
everyone is automatically involved from the moment of his entry into the conscious world … Or, on the 
other hand, is it better to work out consciously and critically one’s own conception of the world and
thus, in connection with the labours of one’s own guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely from 
outside the moulding of one’s personality (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 323-324).
Thus, when it comes to philosophies of science, the crucial point is, in my view, not which
philosophic or scientific position one is located within. What is important is whether or not 
one is aware of one’s position and the set of assumptions that often shadow any given 
scientific stance. In view of these principles, it has been an elementary endeavour for me to 
critically contemplate fundamental philosophical conceptions and implicit disciplinary 
assumptions of which I, as a researcher, am inevitably a part of. Because educational neuro-
science is a topic of study that differs somewhat from general research conventions in my 
disciplinary community, I believe it is even more important to critically reflect on my 
scientific positioning and the research approach taken in my study. Moreover, in my work 
with educational neuroscience, I have encountered certain philosophical issues, which have 
challenged my previously held philosophical ideas. Issues have not only been linked to my 
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experience of philosophical conundrums recognised in educational neuroscience, such as 
linkages between mind and brain, or soul and matter, but philosophical challenges have also 
arisen due to personal conflicts concerning research approaches and appropriate philosophies 
of science for studying linkages between education and neuroscience. Time and scope of my 
project have not allowed me to investigate philosophical challenges as thoroughly as I would 
have liked, and I have instead found it necessary to proceed with an open and somewhat 
investigational philosophy of science inspired by critical realism. The following chapter will 
elaborate on these philosophical matters, commencing with an account of philosophical 
conundrums related to educational neuroscience, before presenting critical realism as a 
possible, but not the only, philosophy of science for studying educational neuroscience. 
 
Educational neuroscience and philosophical conundrums 
Disciplinary work related to educational neuroscience combines, in one way or another, 
aspects relevant to neuroscience with those relevant to education. Additionally, and despite 
often being absent from the discipline’s name, insights from cognitive psychology are also 
frequently included in educational neuroscientific work. Educational neuroscience can 
therefore be said to have a transdisciplinary endeavour at its heart2, since new disciplinary 
knowledge is created in the merging of different disciplines (Samuels, 2009). Trans-
disciplinary undertakings, howHYHUDUHRIWHQFRPSOH[DQGFKDOOHQJLQJíGLIIHUHQWDFDGHPLF
fields often operate with different vocabularies, methods, theories and, indeed, different 
philosophies of science, and the task of integrating perspectives across different disciplinary 
boundaries tends to bring certain difficulties to the surface (Stein, Connell, & Gardner, 2009).
Educational neuroscience is no exception when it comes to a complex transdisciplinary 
synthesis. A number of issues in educational neuroscience have philosophical roots, as 
endeavours linking education, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience experience 
both disciplinary and epistemological issues, in addition to old philosophical conundrums 
related to mind and matter. In the following section, philosophical issues related to 
educational neuroscience are elaborated on, since these can be considered to be preliminary to 
questions concerning philosophies of science for this research project.
                                                          
2 Samuels (2009) and Beauchamp and Beauchamp (2013) note how there are differences between ‘interdisciplinary’, 
‘multidisciplinary’, and ‘transdisciplinary’ endeavours. Personally, I argue that educational neuroscience ought to be 
perceived as a transdisciplinary endeavour (see chapter 9, page 341 for a comprehensive argumentation) and from now on, 
I will use the label of transdisciplinarity for educational neuroscience. 
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Different epistemologies and concepts of learning 
When it comes to cross-disciplinary endeavors, challenges of an epistemological character are 
noted as a central source of difficulties. Stein et al. (2009, p. 45) even note that 
“interdisciplinary syntheses are among the most epistemologically complex endeavours that 
humans can attempt”. The argument for such complexity is that cross-disciplinary projects 
require that the gap between academic fields is bridged – but, the breach between disciplines 
tends to run deep, due to differences in scientific perspectives, where differences in methods, 
theories, and philosophies contribute to generate different kinds of ‘knowledge’ (Stein et al., 
2009). Differences in disciplinary premises are thus a central factor for tension in cross-
disciplinary projects when the disciplines are influenced by fundamentally different 
philosophical concepts of the world. Such issues are noticeable in transdisciplinary synthesis 
of educational neuroscience as well, and philosophical difference can particularly be ascribed 
to the ‘gap’ between educational endeavours of the social sciences on the one hand, and 
neuroscientific endeavours of the natural sciences on the other. This gap is constituted due to 
the respective scientific fields’ long history of differences in philosophical perspectives, 
WKHRULHV FRQFHSWV DQG PHWKRGV í GLVVLPLODULWLHV ZKLFK DUH IXUWKHU PDQLIHVWHG LQ WKHLU
conceptualisations of knowledge and in their practice. 
If one considers epistemologies that are relevant to the discipline of cognitive 
neuroscience, some of the most common epistemologies can be said to be empiricism and 
realism (Samuels, 2009). Notable in these philosophical stands is that one often considers 
knowledge to come from what can be perceived. ‘Knowledge’ in the science of neuroscience 
is therefore connected to the idea that reality can be observed through empirical investigation, 
and modes of study are therefore often consistent with experimentation and observation 
(Samuels, 2009). Epistemological perspective can, moreover, be manifested in the ways that 
members of the neuroscience discipline understand certain concepts – for instance the concept 
of learning. Paul Howard-Jones (2008, p. 362) elaborates upon this perspective and notes that 
“in neuroscience, the term ‘learning’, when used as a noun, is often synonymous with 
‘memory’”. At the same time, learning is often associated with the declarative memory 
system and with how the hippocampus operates in the process of forming and recalling 
memories. In addition to declarative memory, other essential concepts related to learning in 
cognitive neuroscience are working memory, synaptic plasticity, structural changes in the 
brain, and accompanying functional correlations in, for instance, biological activity. 
17 
 
Neuroscientists therefore mainly consider ‘learning’ in terms of changes in an individual’s 
biological system (Howard-Jones, 2008, 2010), and methods used in order to acquire 
knowledge about learning are often related to empirical and technical experiments and 
analysis of brain structures and brain functions í such as measurements of electrical activity 
of the brain (e.g. EEG) and metabolic activity in the brain (e.g. PET-scan) (Gazzaniga, Ivry, 
& Mangun, 2009). In view of this, cognitive neuroscientists can be seen to take a natural 
VFLHQFH DSSURDFK í SDUWLFXODUO\ ZLWK ELRORJLFDO FRJQLWLYH DQG QHXURSV\FKRORJLFDO
SHUVSHFWLYHVíLQWKHLUFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIµOHDUQLQJ¶(Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Gazzaniga 
et al., 2009; Howard-Jones, 2010).
If one considers epistemologies related to the discipline of education, these 
philosophical conceptions can be seen to encompass rather different aspects than those of 
neuroscience. In education there is a tradition of rationalistic and relativistic epistemologies, 
where the current and prevalent epistemic stance is said to be that of constructivism (Samuels, 
2009, p. 48). Renowned landmarks in line with constructivist perspectives can furthermore be 
seen to be Berger and Luckmann’s book, The Social Construction of Reality (1966), in 
addition to work by Durkheim, Marx, Mead, Nietzsche, and Weber (cf. Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2010; Samuels, 2009). Common conceptualisations of ‘knowledge’ in the
educational discipline are accordingly related to the idea that “reality is socially constructed 
and that the sociology of knowledge must analyse the process in which this occurs” (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 13) íDQHSLVWHPRORJLFDOYLHZZKLFK LQGLFDWHV WKDW“knowledge comes 
from what can be thought about” (Samuels, 2009, p. 48). Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
assume that these epistemological perspectives are manifested in the ways in which 
educationalists understand research, in their practices, and in how they comprehend and 
define certain concepts. In this respect, educationalists’ understanding of ‘learning’ is of note.
Instead of looking at ‘learning’ as individual biological changes at a cellular and structural 
level of the brain (viz. cognitive neuroscience), educational researchers often focus on more 
social and political aspects of learning, such as social interaction and meaning making, the 
importance of context, learning with communities and groups, and socio-political influences 
on education. Educational concepts of learning are therefore more consistent with the view of 
the “holistic development of the person in the society” (Samuels, 2009, p. 48), where 
PXOWLIDFHWHG DSSURDFKHV DUH WDNHQ í IRU H[DPSOH VRFLR-political and intergovernmental 
approaches (Green, 2006; Rizvi & Lingard, 2006), developmental approaches (e.g. Piaget, 
1964), sociological approaches (e.g. Bernstein, 2000; Bourdieu, 1986), or sociocultural 
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approaches (e.g. Vygotsky, 1978). In addition, notions of learning in education also tend to 
include perspectives on value, justifications, ethical and moral issues, since one is often more 
inclined to ask ‘what learning and education ought to be’ rather than contemplating ‘what
learning and education actually is’. The discipline of education can, as such, be seen to 
comprise numerous different social perspectives and theories of learning, and evaluative 
judgments and reflections are incorporated as an essential part, since education is perceived to 
be interlinked with questions concerning what kind of citizen and what kind of society is 
aspired to. In comparison with cognitive neuroscience, it is therefore often said that 
neuroscience can only say what one can do, whereas education can say what one should do 
(Varma et al., 2008).
The discipline of education and that of neuroscience have rather different episte-
PRORJLFDO YLHZV íZKLFK LQ WXUQ DUHPDQLIHVWHG LQ GLIIHUHQW IUDPHZRUNV IRU UHVHDUFKZLWK
distinct methods, theories, and even different vocabularies and definitions of concepts like 
‘learning’. Such dissimilarities are noteworthy in the transdisciplinary endeavour of 
HGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQFHíQRWRQO\FDQGLIIHUHQWFRQFHSWVRI µOHDUQLQJ¶FUeate considerable 
misunderstandings and communication problems for members in the interface of education 
and neuroscience, but differences regarding ‘philosophies of learning’ also make it “easy to 
stray beyond the bounds of sense, at least as interpreted by one or both of these communities” 
(Howard-Jones, 2008, p. 362). When it comes to a ‘new philosophy of learning’ it must be 
said that numerous people working at the interface of educational neuroscience – whether 
educationalists, neuroscientist, psychologists, or philosophers – still argue about these 
philosophical issues of epistemological differences (Bakhurst, 2009; Changeux & Ricoeur, 
2002; Cigman & Davis, 2009; Howard-Jones, 2008; Samuels, 2009; Schrag, 2011). Like 
many of these authors, I, too, will concede that bridging of the ‘disciplinary gap’ cannot be 
done in one easy manoeuvre when either the discipline of education, or that of neuroscience, 
is reduced to the epistemological constraints of the other. Considering that educational 
neuroscience can be seen as a transdisciplinary endeavour, I will further argue that the 
discipline is likely to require a new understanding which ‘goes beyond’ the philosophical 
perspectives in each of the two respective disciplines. At present, the debate remains 
unsettled, and issues concerning the philosophical gap are still considered to be a 
philosophical conundrum. Nevertheless, there is common acknowledgement of the 
importance of these questions and it has been emphasized that philosophical issues cannot be 
left ignored by anyone studying aspects relevant to educational neuroscience. 
19 
 
Dilemma of mind and brain 
Transdisciplinary projects of educational neuroscience run into another obstacle, which can be 
clearly seen in terms of basic philosophy – namely the dilemma of mind and brain. This 
dilemma is interlinked with aQFLHQWSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQXQGUXPVUHODWHGWRµPLQGDQGPDWWHU¶í
a quandary expressed in various forms, for example, the dilemma of ‘body and soul’, 
‘dualism versus monism’, ‘mind-body dichotomy’, ‘brainism versus personalism’, ‘the 
illusion of consciousness’, and ‘philosophy of mind’ (Bakhurst, 2009; Changeux & Ricoeur, 
2002; Howard-Jones, 2008; Pribram, 1986; Sawyer, 2001). Despite the different names, the 
essential nexus of debate concerns questions regarding the relation between our mind and our 
body and brain. Intrinsically, the problem of the mind addresses essential questions regarding 
what makes us conscious beings able WR UHDVRQ DQG WKLQN í TXHVWLRQV ZKLFK KDYH SURYHQ
difficult to answer, partly because we cannot observe either our thoughts or our reasoning –
but they also leave traces at a more profound philosophic level: If a crucial part of being a 
conscious human is the ability to think and reason, then where exactly can these capabilities
be found? Is it our brain which thinks and reasons, or is it our mind which can be seen to be 
responsible for such processes? Is our mind a part of matter? Or is it a division between brain 
and mind, between body and soul? And who are we? – are we our mind’s drifting thoughts or 
are we our embodied brain? Over centuries, people have brooded over this connection
between mind and matter, and new literature is continually added to archives on the topic. To 
make matters even more confusing, different authors tend to allocate different names to 
philosophical groupings and their respective views. For instance, Bunge (2010) argues that
there are currently three main concepts of mind, namely ‘computerism’, ‘psychoneural 
dualism’, and ‘psychoneural identity thesis’; Bakhurst (2009) focuses his debate on the 
dispute between ‘brainism’ and ‘personalism’; Sawyer (2001) argues that debates have been 
polarised between ‘identity theorists’ on the one stand and ‘dualists’ on the other, albeit with a 
stand of ‘non-reductive materialists’ wedged in-between the two; whilst Howard-Jones (2008)
gives an account where ‘dualism’ is distinguished from ‘monism’. Different names 
notwithstanding, the various views fall under some comparable groups. Accordingly, and 
since this section will provide a general overview of the mind-brain dilemma and not a
profound in-depth argumentation on the topic, an account of the philosophical conundrum 
will be presented by using the two categories ‘dualism’ and ‘monism’, in addition to a third 
hypothesis suggested by cognitive neuroscientists. 
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Dualism  
Dualism has a long tradition in science, and numerous renowned names can be allocated to 
this philosophical notion of mind. One of the most prominent philosophers holding a dualistic 
mind-matter view is perhaps René Descartes – in fact, his ideas have been so influential that 
the related view is often known as the ‘Cartesian mind-body dualism’3. Even if there are 
different variations of dualistic philosophies of mind, a fundamental agreement is that the 
mind and the brain are distinct entities or substances (PLQGEUDLQ. Dualistic views on mind 
and matter, body and soul, additionally assert that the nature of conscious intelligence resides 
in something non-physical – which, in this respect, implies that our mind is beyond the scope 
of sciences such as physics, neurophysiology, and computer sciences (Churchland, 1988). For 
someone holding a dualistic view of mind, psychological attributes cannot be ascribed to the 
brain and it therefore makes no sense to state that a brain thinks or remembers, because such 
things are done by people and not by brains (Bakhurst, 2009, p. 57). However, even if the 
brain is understood as a concept separated from the mind, interaction between the two is not
dismissed – although it is firmly emphasized that neither can help explain the other. In other 
words, the mind has no effect upon the brain; nor has the brain any effect over the mind. 
Claims made about mind-behaviour relationship without considering the brain (or claims 
made about brain-behaviour relationship without considering the mind) will therefore be 
reasonable within a dualistic conception (Howard-Jones, 2008). In line with the same dualistic
argument, it is also reasonable to claim that both concepts can exist without the other. This 
latter idea can further be linked to dualistic relations between the material body on the one 
hand and the immaterial mind, soul and spirit on the othHUíDQLGHDZKLFKDOVRFRQQHFWVWR
theological notions, since separation of mind and matter is related to views of the survival of 
the soul after death (Churchland, 1988).
Despite ancient history in science and common acceptance; dualistic views on the 
mind-brain relation are met with considerable criticism. Howard-Jones (2008, p. 371), for 
instance, reminds us “of the practical benefits of avoiding dualist notions, which can be 
                                                          
3 The Cartesian mind-body dichotomy is, in accordance to Bakhurst (2009) and Bunge (2010), advocated by later 
philosophers such as Popper, Husserl, Hacker, and Ilyenkow, in addition to some neuroscientists such as Jackson, Bennett, 
Sherrington, Penfield, Sperry and Eccles. Dualism has, however, lost ground in current scientific and philosophic 
communities, but variation of these ideas are still evident in classical psychoneural dualism, in psychoanalysis and New Age-
ism, in forms of computerism involving hardware/software dualism, and implicit in scientists’ work on matter connected 
with the brain (Bunge, 2010; Howard-Jones, 2008). It is nevertheless said that a dualistic conception still is “the most 
common theory of mind in the public at large”, partly for the reason that it has been the dominant theory of mind for most 
of Western history and because dualism is entrenched in the most popular religions in the world as a way of “guaranteeing” 
the immortality of the soul (Bunge, 2010; Churchland, 1988, p. 7). 
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considered as fundamental hazards of a philosophical nature faced by workers at the interface 
between neuroscience and education”. One reason for this criticism of dualism can be linked 
to the idea of ‘causal power’ of mind over brain. Churchland (1988, pp. 8-9) elaborates on the 
problem, noting that “if ‘mind-stuff’ is so utterly different from ‘matter-stuff’ in its nature –
different to the point that it has no mass whatever, no shape whatever, and no position 
anywhere in space – then how is it possible for my mind to have any causal influence on my 
body at all?”. From a scientific perspective, it is problematic to argue for such mind-over-
matter causation, because this would violate naturalistic laws of momentum and energy 
conservation. Moreover, neuroscientific studies have provided new insights into the brain, 
which makes it difficult to defend dualistic notions of such causations. For instance, it has 
been shown that damage to certain brain processes (e.g. through trauma) can reduce mental
abilities. Firstly, this makes the claim of mind-over-matter causation problematic because, 
apparently, dysfunctions in the material brain can lead to reduction in mental abilities. 
Secondly, this indicates that biological processes in the brain are intimately connected to our 
cognitive abilities, and thus the concept of a clear mind-brain dichotomy may be difficult to 
defend (Howard-Jones, 2008, p. 370). It is, however, of note that even if dualism is a concept 
of mind that continues to lose ground in science, dualistic concepts are still evident in 
common theories of mind and in philosophical and scientific work connected to philosophy, 
psychology, education, and cognitive neuroscience. 
Monism  
Monism is perhaps the philosophy of mind which provides the most contrasting viewpoints to 
those of dualism. Instead of claiming that the mind and the brain are separate entities, monism 
argues that the mind and brain are one and the VDPH WKLQJí WKH WZRFRQFHSWVDUH, in other 
words, conflated into one, as mind equals brain and brain equals mind (mind = brain). This 
implies that the mind is nothing more than the biological brain, and herein it is often agreed 
that a one-to-one correspondence exists between mind and brain. In this viewpoint, mental 
processes are neural processes where “for every mental process M, there is a process N in a 
brain system, so that M = N” (Sawyer, 2001, p. 160). The mind can thus be described as states 
of the brain. If one further considers the extent of monism within scientific and philosophic 
communities, it should be noted that monistic conceptions, as with dualism, are common 
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interpretations of the mind-brain relation found amongst numerous contemporary research 
communities4.
Monistic accounts have not avoided criticism, though. Howard-Jones (2008, p. 368)
notes that a neurocognitive monism makes the mistake of using simplistic mind-brain models, 
and that such models inappropriately conflate the concepts of mind and brain into one: 
“Suggesting one-to-one correspondences between connections in the mind and synaptic 
connections in the brain is typical of the type of folk cognitive neuroscience used to market 
many commercial ‘brain-based’ educational programmes”5. Sawyer (2001) similarly notes 
that monistic positions of identity theorists are eliminative and reductionistic, since they claim 
that mind is nothing more than the biological brain. It is argued that the problem with monism 
is that complex cognitive processes cannot adequately be explained by mere biological 
references. Is it helpful to claim that the mind can solely be explained by microbiological 
concepts at the level of neurons and chemical processes in the brain? Will not social factors, 
such as upbringing and social environment, influence the way we think, learn and reason?
Also Bunge (2010, p. 148) criticise a monistic philosophy of mind, arguing that certain 
monists maintain the idea that “brain causes mind – which is like stating that legs cause 
walking, rather than walking being the specific function of legs”. Notions of causation are 
again problematic, due to the fact that monistic perceptions of mind-brain presume certain 
causal relationships of power between the two. It should be mentioned that several within the 
disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience are well aware of the philosophical 
problems related to a monistic view, and they are often careful not to conflate mind and brain 
(Howard-Jones, 2008). However, as with dualism, traces of monism, and/or confusion 
concerning the mind-brain relationship, appear to be manifested in knowledge and practice 
within numerous research communities. The question, though, is: how should one understand 
the mind and the brain when both dualism and monism are often considered to be insufficient 
accounts?
                                                          
4 Bakhurst (2009) notes that monistic ideas are found amongst some philosopher such as Daniel Dennett and John Searle, 
Sawyer (2001) claims monism is seen in certain traditions and schools such as the position of ‘identity theories’, whereas 
Bunge (2010) argue that ‘psychoneural monists’ of the materialistic kind conflate the mind and the brain.  
5 ‘Brain-based’ educational programmes are often linked to ‘unscientific’ programmes where neuroscience is uncritically 
used as argumentation for certain forms of educational practice. This topic is further elaborated upon in chapter 7.  
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Complex and bi-directional interrelations between mind and brain 
When it comes to philosophies of the mind, significant insights have been suggested in the 
wake of the cognitive revolution, as novel technologies and new disciplinary knowledge have 
initiated new ways to approach the mind-brain dilemma. As Karl H. Pribram notes: 
Interest in the relationship between mind and brain has become invigorated by the surge of activity in 
the neurosciences and in what has come to be called “cognitive science”. The time is therefore ripe to 
take a new look at this age-old problem, but now from the standpoint of the scientists as well as from 
that of the philosopher. Today, we are in a position not only to re-evaluate major philosophical stances 
but also to develop more limited and precise theories and models of mind/brain relationships that 
subsume a restricted database (Pribram, 1986, p. 507).
In particular, the discipline of cognitive neuroscience has suggested new theories relevant to 
the mind-brain relationship, but work within disciplines such as cognitive psychology, 
neurobiology, evolutionary biology, and social cognitive neuroscience, has also contributed to 
significant insights. For instance, new knowledge of the plastic brain and learning has
resulted in a major shift in our understanding of the mind-brain relationship. These concepts 
will be elaborated on in the following sections, but, to summarize, numerous studies have 
shown that the brain is able to change throughout the lifespan in response to external stimuli, 
experience, and learning (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). This insight has provided new knowledge 
about the mind, the brain, and the relationship between them, but how can cognitive 
neuroscientific accounts of the mind-brain relationship be positioned in comparison to 
dualism and monism? 
What can firstly be noted is that the majority of those working within the field of 
cognitive neuroscience appear to be careful not to position themselves within either a dualistic 
or a monistic position because of the issues and critiques already mentioned (Howard-Jones, 
2008). Instead, the view often emphasized is that mind and brain must be explained together, 
that the relationship between mind and brain is not straightforward, and that the mind and 
brain ought to be understood as concepts under construction (Blakemore & Frith, 2000,
2005a; Morton & Frith, 1995). Causal connections between brain and mind – and also 
between brain, mind, and behaviour – are therefore often seen as complex interrelations, 
which can occur bi-directionally (Howard-Jones, 2008). This argument is based on cognitive 
and neuroscientific research, which, for one thing, has shown that biological processes in the 
brain can alter cognition, which in turn can alter behaviour (brain Æ mind Æ behaviour). For 
instance, this is seen where damage to the brain (e.g. a stroke) can lead to an alteration in 
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cognitive abilities (e.g. memory impairment), which in turn can lead to changes in a person’s 
behaviour. A well-known example is the case of Phineas Gage, who in 1848 was hurt in an 
explosion where an iron pole pierced part of his brain and damaged vital areas of the 
RUELWRIURQWDOUHJLRQRIKLVIURQWDOOREHíDQDUHDZKLFKSOD\s a central role in social decision 
making, such as identifying which social rules are appropriate in a given situation. Gage 
miraculously survived the accident, but his behaviour and personality were reported as being 
drastically changed from a polite and well-liked man to a disrespectful, impatient, and bad-
mannered person (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). The brain injury caused by the explosion resulted 
in brain damage and cognitive change, which in turn altered Gage’s personality and behaviour 
íEHKDYLRXUDOFKDQJHVZKLFKZHUHOLNHO\WRKDYHLPSDFWHGRQKLVIDPLO\IULHQGVDQGRWKHUV
in his surroundings (environment Æ brain Æ mind Æ behaviour Æ environment). 
Cases such as these have therefore demonstrated causal connections between brain, 
mind, and behaviour. At the same time, causal connections have also been shown to work the 
other way (Howard-Jones, 2008). Social, cultural and environmental factors can influence our 
behaviour, for example, when we decide to join our friends for chess classes. Presentation of 
this new stimulus can, in turn, influence our mental processes in that we learn how to play 
chess. This learning can further be assumed to have some neural correlates at a biological and 
cellular level in the brain, such as the making or strengthening of new synaptic connections, 
shifts in patterns of activity within larger brain networks, and accompanying changes in 
biological functions, such as increased blood flow in certain areas of the brain (Gazzaniga et 
al., 2009). When it comes to the example of chess playing, one can even assert that continual 
chess practice can produce structural changes in the brain in terms of alterations in the shape 
and size of its component parts (environment Æ behaviour Æ mind Æ brain). These 
examples illustrate how there appear to be bi-directional relationships between brain, mind, 
and behaviour (brain ÅÆ mind ÅÆ behaviour), and also that environmental and social 
factors are significant factors of influence in this relationship (Blakemore, Winston, & Frith, 
2004; Howard-Jones, 2010).
This insight from cognitive neuroscience and educational neuroscience presents an 
understanding of the mind-brain relationship incompatible with dualism or monism, because 
neither the brain, nor the mind, is given explanatory supremacy. It is instead argued that mind 
and brain must be understood together, since there appears to be an intimate relationship – or 
set of relationships – between the brain, the mind, and behavioural and environmental aspects 
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(Bakhurst, 2009; Cigman & Davis, 2009; Goswami, 2009; Howard-Jones, 2008). This further 
conflicts with certain time-honoured hypotheses related to learning, like the hypothesis that 
our brain is fixed at birth and that experience can only fine-tune it, or that our brain is a blank 
slate at birth and thereafter is totally at the mercy of its environment. In contradiction to these 
two hypotheses, findings from neuroscientific and educational neuroscientific research 
provide a third hypothesis concerning the mind, the brain, and aspects of learning, by stating 
that parts of our brains are plastic and thus the brain changes as it learns, forgets, invents, 
plans, and makes decisions (Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Gazzaniga et al., 2009). The 
hypothesis offered by cognitive neuroscience can therefore neither be consistent with genetic 
nor with environmental determinism, because theories about the ‘plastic brain’ cannot solely 
be attached to either nature-explanations or nurture-explanations. Precisely how this 
relationship or set of relationships between mind, brain, and learning should be understood is 
still vague, but indications that our brain is influenced by biological factors in interaction with 
social, contextual, behavioural, cognitive, and environmental factors suggest that the 
relationship is entrenched in complex and dynamic processes of transformation and change. 
Philosophies of science for educational neuroscience 
So far, I have shown that there are certain underlying philosophical difficulties related to the 
enterprise of OLQNLQJHGXFDWLRQDQGQHXURVFLHQFHíERWKZLWKUHJDUGWRXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWKRZ
the mind-brain relationship ought to be understood, and with issues arising due to disciplinary 
differences in epistemologies, theories, methods, and definitions of concepts such as 
‘learning’. Inevitably, such disciplinary differences will lead to challenges, for instance in the 
attempt to move from biological descriptions at microbiological level in the individual brain 
to descriptions of classroom practice at macro-social level (or vice versa) (Howard-Jones, 
2008). Educational neuroscience therefore gains some of its complexity from its endeavours 
to integrate perspectives across different levels of analysis, where these levels of analysis not 
necessarily are related to one another (Stein et al., 2009). With regard to these discursive 
dissimilarities, Howard-Jones (2008, p. 362) also notes that “those who attempt to work at the 
interface of neuroscience and education will find themselves straddling at least two, very 
different, philosophies about learning, each expounding a very different set of concepts”. This 
is particularly made clear in the notion that cognitive neuroscience can be allocated to realistic 
philosophies of science, whereas education is more in line with notions of relativistic 
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philosophies such as constructionism (Samuels, 2009). Philosophical issues therefore lie at 
the very heart of educational neuroscientific work and, following critical discourse theories,
one can assume that the ways in which these disciplinary and conceptual relationships are 
understood, will influence knowledge, research approach, and practice in the discourse. 
Overall, I will thus argue for the importance of finding a philosophical approach which can be 
seen to be compatible with addressing the philosophical issues mentioned above, as well as 
being compatible with education and cognitive neuroscience, but without reducing one to the 
other. In order to address these issues, I present in the following section, three philosophies of 
VFLHQFH UHODWHG WRHGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQFH7ZRRI WKHSKLORVRSKLFDODSSURDFKHVíQDPHO\
UHDOLVPDQGUHODWLYLVPíDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKQHXURVFLHQFHDQGHGXFDWLRQ respectively, whereas 
the third account of critical realism is presented since I consider that it can offer a possible 
mutual philosophical basis for education and neuroscience. 
The problem linking realistic philosophies with educational neuroscience 
Different schools of thoughts exist within philosophies of science, and their borders often 
overlap, since many share similarities, despite being separated by essential nuances. Certain 
overarching categorisations of philosophical traditions can be drawn, though, and one of these 
is between realism on the one side and relativism on the other – or, expressed another way,
between ‘naturalism’ and ‘hermeneutics’ (Bhaskar, 1998), between ‘essentialism’ and 
‘postmodernism’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2010), between ‘materialism’ and ‘idealism’ 
(Campbell, 2011), between ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’ (Molander, 2003), between 
‘empiricism’ and ‘rationalism’ (Samuels, 2009), between ‘positivism’ and ‘constructivism’ 
(Kjørup, 2008). The list is long and “much of the history of the philosophy of the social 
sciences can thus be seen as a kind of historical see-saw, an oscillation to-and-fro between 
variants of these basic positions” (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 18)6. As well as having different names, 
what can be seen to separate these scientific positions are ontological and epistemological 
perceptions, as each tradition has a different understanding of ‘what is’ and ‘our knowledge
about it’. These essential questions have manifested themselves particularly with regard to the 
                                                          
6 A word of caution is necessary, because this is indeed a crude alignment of scientific positions and one may disagree to 
such a simple divide. Some will probably argue against grouping these positions at the same side of ‘the gap’; others may 
frown upon locating positions at different sides. Kjørup (2008), for instance, notes that one can find similarities between 
positivism and constructivism, and will probably reason against a clear-cut division between the two. I am usually cautious 
about drawing lines between either this or that, nevertheless, in order to address central problems related to philosophies 
of science for educational neuroscience, such rough categorisation of ‘the two camps’ ought to be made.  
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essence of natural science and social science, and whether or not the human domain can be 
studied in the same way as natural sciences. As Roy Bhaskar notes:
[T]o what extent can society be studied in the same way as nature? Without exaggerating, I think one 
could call this question the primal problem of the philosophy of the social sciences. For the history of 
that subject has been polarized around a dispute between two traditions, affording rival answers to this 
conundrum. A naturalist tradition has claimed that the sciences are (actually or ideally) unified in their 
concordance with positivist principles, based in the last instance on the Humean notion of law. In 
opposition to positivism, an anti-naturalist tradition has posited a cleavage in method between the 
natural and social sciences, grounded in a differentiation of their subject-matters (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 1).
In this note, Bhaskar pinpoints the same ‘gap’ as occurs to educational neuroscience. In order 
to address this gap, and to determine how educational neuroscience can be situated in relation 
to it, an account of the philosophical tradition of realism is appropriate. 
What first can be noted with regard to realism is how this tradition underlines the 
importance of ‘the real’. In a sense, every philosophy is some kind of realism7, but some 
philosophies will be more realistic than others depending on how the particular philosophy 
defines ‘the real’ in contrast to ‘the apparent’ or ‘the known’. Strong realism, for instance, 
will claim that “what is known would be real whether or not it were known: something may 
be real without appearing at all” (Collier, 1994, p. 6). In other words, such philosophies of 
realism will understand something as real, independently of whether or not it is observed. 
Viewed historically, this tradition of philosophies is represented by classical empiricism and 
Humean tradition, and is, essentially, based on Hume’s claim that “there is nothing outside an 
individual’s perceptions/experience ... the only reality we can legitimately refer to is that
which can be experienced” (Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p. 219). Bhaskar elaborates further on 
this philosophical tradition of realism by noting that:
According to [...] classical empiricism, represented by Hume and his heirs, the ultimate objects of 
knowledge are atomistic events. Such events constitute given facts and their conjunctions exhaust the 
objective content of our idea of natural necessity ... As to this conception, science is conceived as a kind 
of automatic or behavioural response to the stimulus of given facts and their conjunctions ... Thus 
science becomes a kind of epiphenomenon of nature (Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 24-25).
Realistic ideas and notions from this Humean tradition have influenced later scientific 
positions, and philosophical stands such as actualism, positivism, naturalism, objectivism, and 
                                                          
7 For positivists, for instance, sense-experience is real, whilst intersubjectivity or discourse is real for post-positivists. It is 
therefore said that every philosophical position is realistic; the question is rather what kind of realism one advocates 
(Collier, 1994; Patomäki & Wight, 2000). 
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materialism can, to a certain extent, be grouped with philosophies of realism (Bhaskar, 2008;
Clegg, 2005; Collier, 1994; Kjørup, 2008).
However, philosophies of realism have met with censure, and criticism is particularly 
voiced by social scientists. For instance, it is argued that philosophies of realism – with their 
loyalty to naturalism, objectivism, and empirical observable notion of reality – tend to neglect 
the importance of social factors. One of the most common arguments against a strong realistic 
philosophy, such as that of positivism, is therefore that the observed reality is not all there is. 
There may be social factors and underlying structures, which cannot be observed in the 
positivistic sense, but which may nevertheless influence observable facets of reality (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2010). Another critique, which builds on this, is that those holding positions 
based on realistic philosophy are inclined to claim that social factors can be studied in the 
same way as natural science. Andrew Sayer (2000, p. 4) notes this by criticising a positivistic 
account of philosophy and especially “its expectation that the social world could be shown to 
be a composite of a number of behavioural regularities which would eventually be described 
by social laws akin to those of natural science”. Numerous people within academia, and 
particularly within social sciences, therefore censure strong philosophies of realism by 
arguing that they do not adequately address social factors. 
Another critique of philosophies of realism – particularly those of classical 
empiricism, actualism, and positivism – is the critical realists’ claim that realism commits ‘the 
epistemic fallacy’. In order to exemplify such an epistemic fallacy, we can draw upon an 
account of actualism. Actualism is, according to Bhaskar, the most common form of realism 
in empiricist cultures, “for the view which, while asserting the reality of things and/or events 
and/or states of affairs, denies the existence of underlying structures which determine how 
things come to have their events, and instead locates the succession of cause and effect at the 
level of events: every time A happens, B happens” (Collier, 1994, p. 7). As with positivism 
and empiricism, one major problem with this position is its Humean view that “the only 
reality we can legitimately refer to is that which can be experienced” (Patomäki & Wight, 
2000, p. 219). The critical argument is that our experience and perception – no matter how 
modified and devoid it is of social variables – will be a social or personal experience. 
Because is not science, intrinsically, embedded in human knowledge, social structures, and 
historical understandings? “[Empiricism] does not recognize”, as Collier (1994, p. 72) notes,
“that what we experience is determined not just by what is there, but by what we have already 
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learnt. Hence it can take experience itself to be an authority above criticism, unaware of the 
way experience can confirm our prejudices, since we may see what we have been taught to 
see”. In light of this, critical realists argue that human experience, to which much of the 
realistic philosophies of science are reduced, is bound up in epistemological notions of ‘what 
we can know’ and not necessarily of ‘what there is’. Consequently, it is argued that followers 
of the Humean tradition and classical empiricism fall prey to the error of the epistemic fallacy 
since by deducing that ‘we know’ equates to ‘it is’, they are deriving ontological arguments 
from epistemological ones (Patomäki & Wight, 2000).
Realistic philosophies of science can be seen to be related to certain natural scientific 
disciplines such as neuroscience, although I will argue that issues arise if one links 
naturalistic, positivistic, and more realistic philosophies of science to the study of educational 
neuroscience. For instance, a positivistic approach to educational neuroscience can be 
problematic, considering that a common concern is that natural aspects are given more 
importance than the more social variables in positivism. By addressing educational 
neuroscience with a positivistic philosophy of science, one can accordingly risk devaluing
social variables in favour of natural, biological, and neuroscientific aspects. A note by the 
critical realist Sayer (2000) on biological reductionism can in this respect be brought forth:
Biological reductionism is an instance of what we have termed strong essentialism, in that it assumes a 
one-to-one correspondence between causal powers (including essences), and behaviour, and treats 
social phenomenon as reducible without residue to a biological substratum. It therefore shifts 
everything onto the nature side of the society/nature distinction … Strong social constructivism 
responds to biological reductionism by inverting this reduction, pulling everything onto the social side 
… There has thus been a shift from criticism of the naturalization of forms of social oppression to what 
seem to be attempts to write out nature as an extra-social or extra-discursive force altogether (Sayer, 
2000, pp. 97-98).
Within the educational neuroscience community, it has been argued that such reductionism is 
problematic, and it is stressed that “difficulties [arise] from privileging explanations either in 
terms of brain functioning or in terms of psychological and social factors” (Cigman & Davis, 
2009, p. 76). Acknowledging the importance of taking both neuroscientific and educational 
explanations into consideration in educational neuroscience, has therefore resulted in a 
common goal: to aspire to reciprocal collaboration between education and cognitive 
neuroscience (Ansari et al., 2012; Christodoulou & Gaab, 2009; Greenwood, 2009; Howard-
Jones, 2008; Mason, 2009; Stein & Fischer, 2011). I will therefore argue that philosophies of 
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realism which favour natural explanations over social explanations cannot be seen as 
compatible with educational neuroscientific research. 
The problem in linking relativistic philosophies with educational neuroscience 
Realistic ideas flourish in contemporary philosophies of science, but this broad philosophical 
tradition is often alleged to be a successor of Kant’s transcendental idealism (Bhaskar, 2008).
In contrast with the Humean tradition of realism, Kant counters Hume’s scepticism of an 
external reality by suggesting two worlds – the world of phenomena and the world of 
noumena (Patomäki & Wight, 2000). The world of noumena is the site of reason and 
morality, whereas the world of phenomena is the world we can experience. However, in 
contrast to Hume, Kant does not consider the phenomenal world to be the ‘real world’. This 
does not mean that Kant denies the existence of a real world; rather, he claims that we can 
know nothing of it. Kant’s idealistic argument is that we cannot know what we cannot 
experience, and everything we experience is coloured by reason and memory. Hence, if there 
is definite scientific knowledge of the phenomenal world, then it emanates from our 
categories of understanding and not from the nature of the world itself (Patomäki & Wight, 
2000). Kant’s idealistic and relativistic philosophical ideas have had a major influence on 
numerous philosophies of science, and such classical thought has encountered some alteration 
and modification over the decades. Nevertheless, some broad characteristics can be noted: 
Relativistic philosophies of science, as opposed to realistic philosophies, can be said to
uphold ‘an interpretational’ notion of science. Relativists are thus inclined to consider
everything to be relative, because the world as we understand it, differs in accordance with
different perceptions and interpretations, and social, historical, and cultural contextual factors 
may play a major role in our understanding of reality (Steinmetz, 1998). Epistemological 
notions of science are therefore at the heart of relativistic philosophies, since the main focus 
tends to be on aspects concerning ‘how we come to have knowledge of something’ – rather 
than an ontological focus, which seeks answers to ‘what this something is’. This does not 
necessarily mean that every relativistic philosophy rejects an ontological reality, rather, the 
attention is first and foremost on epistemological notions of science, whilst ontological 
enquiries are set in brackets (Neumann, 2010). When understood in this sense, then, 
numerous philosophical approaches connected to the social scientific domain can be allocated 
to the relativistic stance – some of the most renowned being postmodernism, hermeneutics, 
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idealism, subjectivism, structuralism, constructivism and social constructivism (cf. Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2010; Bhaskar, 2008; Campbell, 2011; Collier, 1994; Kjørup, 2008; Molander, 
2003).
Even with relativism’s strong foothold in contemporary philosophies of social 
sciences, this tradition has not avoided censure and criticism. Positions connected to 
relativism have, first and foremost, met with persistent critiques from more realistic and 
naturalistic positions, and much of this censure is due to relativism’s neglect of ontological 
aspects. Idealism, for instance, has been criticised for its assertion that reality, or reality as we 
know it, is fundamentally a mental construct – it is argued that ontological aspects of the 
world are thus either trivialised or neglected in idealistic accounts (Collier, 1994).
[W]hile many might readily accept that the physical world is independent of our knowledge of it, the 
idea that the phenomena studied by social science exist independently of our knowledge seems 
implausible, indeed as is particularly clear in subjects like the study of education and management, the
researchers are likely to encounter the influence of their own theories within their object of study. It is 
therefore tempting to reject the realist position and argue that since social phenomena are concept-
dependent, since they include social science itself, and since theories can influence social practice as 
well as respond to it, then the social world cannot be independent of our knowledge of it (Sayer, 2000, 
p. 33).
Similarly, relativistic positions relying on strong notions of discourse have been 
problematized. The heart of the difficulty is, again, the ontological aspect of such social 
structures, because “ontologically, if discourse do construct their own objects, then what 
constructed the discourse themselves?” (Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p. 217). Social-
constructionism does not escape censure, and also constructivists’ notions are considered to 
be inadequate due to their complete neglect of or, at best, their inattention to, ontological 
aspects. John Cromby (2004), for instance, criticises social-constructivism for not adequately 
addressing the embodiment of subjectivity. The material body tends to be omitted from 
constructionism, he argues, as the focus instead is on discursive forms and processes whereby 
a subject is displayed. Cromby (2004) argues that constructivism, by downplaying embodied 
materialism, conceals a Cartesian dualism since it implies that our world consists of nothing 
other than discourse. Yet again the critique seems to arise from a tendency to neglect ontology 
at the expense of epistemology. 
Bhaskar also suggests that a critique of relativism could be achieved by designating 
issues to ‘the epistemic fallacy’. Philosophies of relativism often claim that the only reality 
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we can know is the reality which we can experience, but experience will inevitably emanate 
from categories of understanding and not from the ‘real’ world itself. The problem with this, 
critical realists argue, is that deductions are drawn from ‘what we know’ to ‘it is’ (Bhaskar, 
2008; Collier, 1994). Epistemology and ontology are, in other words, tied together, because 
“what is known is what can be experienced and/or observed and what “is” is what can be 
known” (Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p. 217). In relativism, the real world ‘out there’ is, 
therefore, perceived to be intimately entangled with the world ‘in here’, which is considered 
to be problematic since ontology has been conflated with epistemology. 
Relativistic philosophies of science can thus be seen as related to social sciences, and 
in particular, constructivism, which has a strong foothold within the educational discipline 
(Samuels, 2009). I will, however, argue that one is likely to encounter certain difficulties 
when linking the philosophical tradition of relativism to the study of educational 
neuroscience. It is particularly challenging to position aspects related to neuroscience within a 
philosophical frame of social-constructionism. “At first glance, any synthesis of construc-
tionism and neuroscience appears to flounder upon a fundamental incompatibility” Cromby 
(2004, p. 801) notes, “which, in large part, derives from the common understanding of social 
constructionism’s emphasis on discourse, its denials that reality is accessible in direct and 
unmediated ways, and its consequent focus upon the social processes whereby knowledge is 
generated, legitimated and circulated”. In view of this, social-constructionism cannot be said 
to offer an advantageous philosophical framework for studying educational neuroscience, 
because it appears to favour epistemological aspects of reality at the expense of ontological 
ones, by denying that reality is accessible in direct ways. A tendency to give more weight to 
epistemological aspects is evident in social sciences, and numerous ideas, theories, and 
methodological procedures incorporate such constructionist ideas. For instance, the following 
statement explains how many constructionists understand embodied subjectivity and 
materiality. 
Many constructionists simply do not theorize or study subjectivity, focusing instead on the discursive 
forms and processes whereby it is displayed, managed and made to serve functional goals ... [E]ven 
where subjectivity is theorized, it is often somewhat disembodied, in that the particularities of the body 
are disregarded, downplayed, added in later, or made adjunctive to other supposed mental-linguistic 
entities or processes. Hence the body tends either to be omitted from constructionism, or only to appear 
as surface of inscription, metaphor or text – rather than as a fleshy organ bearing both enablements and 
constraints (Cromby, 2004, p. 798).
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With regard to the discipline of educational neuroscience, I will argue that downgrading the 
embodied materiality of human existence to mere language and discourse constitutes a 
significant problem. This is because educational neuroscience addresses issues at the 
borderline between mind and body, and between the social and the natural (biological). Both 
natural and social explanations should be considered relevant, and emphasis on the 
discursive-social at the expense of the embodied-material will indeed impede reciprocal 
collaboration between the two disciplines of education and neuroscience. Furthermore, as 
noted by Cromby (2004), social constructionism conceals, rather than addresses, Cartesian 
dualism, since it consistently conflates discourse and materiality. Drawing parallels with what 
has previously been noted concerning the error of conducting epistemic fallacies, in addition 
to the drawbacks of holding on to a Cartesian mind-body dualism, relativistic philosophical 
traditions, such as constructionism, can indeed be considered to be inadequate when studying 
aspects pertaining to educational neuroscience. 
Overall, I will argue that realistic and relativistic philosophies of science are 
insufficient frameworks to ground research in the interface of education and neuroscience. By 
taking a position of social constructivism, certain natural scientific premises such as 
biological aspects of the living brain, are inadequately considered, because social 
constructivism tends to have its preliminary focus on epistemological doctrines of socially
construed understanding. If, on the other hand, one uses a philosophical position of realism,
social aspects, such as meaning-making and underlying discursive structures, are liable to be 
given less consideration than more existential aspects such as neural biochemical processes in 
the brain. The general argument is, in simple terms, that neuroscience will call for naturalistic 
approaches, just as society must be described in terms of social categories. I will furthermore 
argue that a philosophy of science compatible with studying educational neuroscience must 
go beyond the two disciplines and their respective philosophies of science, because 
transdisciplinary educational neuroscientific research attempts to combine both naturalistic 
and social scientific aspects of study. Social, cognitive, and biological accounts are therefore 
important, and one must endeavour to achieve a common philosophy which neither reduces 
education, nor neuroscience. A similar note is stressed by Samuels;
Because both science and education have relied on different epistemologies, it might be expected that 
efforts to bridge the fields would necessitate understanding these epistemic differences. A simple bridge 
between two epistemologies is not likely to be sufficient, however. Increasingly, traditional 
conceptualizations of knowledge are being questioned ... The question of what knowledge is, what “the 
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mind” is, and what relation the brain has to these elements are questions beyond the realm of any one 
discipline and promise to be contentious and exciting for many years to come … Assuming that 
everyone shares the same epistemology is unrealistic and treating the differences as if they do not 
matter is either naïve or arrogant (Samuels, 2009, p. 49).
In view of this note, I am tempted to ask if perhaps critical realism holds perspectives which 
include, but go beyond, traditional conceptualisations of epistemology and ontology, and thus 
may suggest a philosophical foundation for educational neuroscience.
Critical realism and educational neuroscience 
In my doctoral study of educational neuroscience, I consider it essential to take a 
philosophical and scientific approach which makes allowances for, without giving 
predominance to, i) neuroscientific ideas, wherein existence of real objects is essential, and ii) 
central educational and social scientific premises, wherein, for instance, the idea of underlying 
social and discursive structures is essential. In view of this, it appears that critical realism 
presents a possible framework for a critical discourse analysis of educational neuroscience.
Furthermore, there is another motive behind this task of problematizing current philosophical 
accounts, and my attempts at investigating an appropriate philosophy of science connected to 
educational neuroscience research. Within the discipline of educational neuroscience, there is 
a general agreement that the ‘gap’ between education and neuroscience creates difficulties at a
practical, theoretical, and philosophical level (Varma et al., 2008). Advocates for educational 
neuroscience do, accordingly, endeavour “to bridge the gap” by reciprocal collaboration, 
voicing possible solutions to the difficulties encountered in this attempt. However, it appears 
that much work to date has addressed theoretical aQG SUDFWLFDO OHYHOV í ZKDW VHHP to be 
absent, though, are accounts of explicit philosophies of science that can provide possible
philosophical grounding for educational neuroscience research. It is as if practical and 
theoretical explanations are easier to sustain, in contrast to philosophical support for bridging 
the gap between natural and social sciences. However, and in my view, a philosophical 
account for a bridge between the two domains of natural and social sciences is crucial.
Because on what philosophical ground can the discipline of educational neuroscience base its 
theories and practices upon, if it is a philosophical cast-off in both social sciences and in 
natural sciences?
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Again, it must be stressed that this chapter is meant to be an open and investigative
approach to a philosophy of science appropriate for studying educational neuroscience. Thus, 
although I am inspired by critical realism in my critical discourse analysis on educational 
neuroscience, this does not imply that I would consider critical realism to be the ultimate 
philosophical ‘bridge’ that could be built between domains of education, cognitive 
psychology, and neuroscience. That said, critical realism seems to provide an alternative way 
of perceiving ontological and epistemological questions as opposed to that of many realistic 
and relativistic philosophies of science. The following chapter thus presents an account of the
critical realistic philosophy of science, before I go on to relate this to educational neuro-
science. 
Critical realism 
Critical realism, the philosophy of science suggested by Roy Bhaskar, has increased its 
prominence in academia, during recent decades, and its augmented recognition is particularly 
evident in the human and social sciences. “It is a recurring theme in Bhaskar’s work that the 
human sciences have been misled by a positivist misunderstanding of the natural sciences; 
and this has been the basis of several valuable interventions of transcendental realism in the 
work of the human sciences” (Collier, 1994, p. 102). Increased interest in critical realism has 
continued, as numerous academics take on board Bhaskar’s ideas and elaborate on them with 
regard to their own disciplines – in economics (Fleetwood, 1999; Lawson, 1997), in law 
(Norrie, 2010), in social studies regarding human reflexivity and social mobility (Archer, 
1995), in sociology (Sayer, 2000), in geography (Pratt, 1995), in historical sociology 
(Steinmetz, 1998), in organisation theory (Tsang & Kwan, 1999), in information systems 
(Mingers, 2004), and in critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010; Fairclough et al., 2002).
One reason for this acknowledgment can be that critical realism is seen as a philosophy of 
science that offers an alternative to social-constructionism (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2010).
Another reason is that it proposes a viable alternative to positivism and post-modernism 
(Bhaskar, 1998). Collier points to similar notions: 
Bhaskar’s account of social scientific work can be highlighted by contrast with the two main rivals, 
positivism and hermeneutics … Like hermeneutic theorists but unlike positivists, he holds that the study 
of any social practice must start with the agents’ conception of it. But unlike the hermeneuticist and like 
the positivist, he holds that social science can go on to refute these conceptions. He holds social 
36 
 
explanation to be both causal (as does the positivist) and interpretive (as does the hermeneuticist), 
denying their shared premiss that these two notions will not cohabit. And he rejects their shared 
acceptance of a Humean account of causality (Collier, 1994, p. 167).
In brief, the philosophical position of critical realism can be located in-between the relativistic 
stance (viz. hermeneutics, constructivism, and idealism) and the realistic stance (viz. 
positivism, empiricism, and naturalism). It neither completely refutes its neighbour’s ideas, 
nor fully agrees with them. In this respect, it should also be mentioned that Bhaskar’s critical 
realism is not necessarily unique in its criticism of realism and relativism, and it can thus be 
seen as one approach in a larger philosophic and scientific movement. When it comes to the 
questions of which alternative views critical realists are actually proposing, the following 
sections will present accounts of some of the critical realistic concepts.  
The epistemic fallacy 
It is appropriate to start with an account of what Bhaskar calls ‘the epistemic fallacy’, since 
this is a central nexus, from which critical realism’s overarching critique against strong 
realistic and relativistic philosophies follows. Under the headline ‘the status of ontology and 
its dissolution in classical philosophy’, Bhaskar (2008, p. 36) notes that “the ‘epistemic 
fallacy’ … consists in the view that statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in 
terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be transposed 
into epistemological terms”. In other words, it is argued that certain issues arise when one 
makes epistemic questions prior to ontological ones, because one will commit a logical 
misjudgement deducing from ‘what we know’ to ‘what there is’. Critical realists thus claim 
that epistemic questions are, in a sense, secondary to ontological ones. The argument for this 
claim is, as Collier (1994, p. 137) summarises, because “knowledge exists as an aspect of our 
being in the world, and before we can know what we know, we need to have some idea how 
we interact with that world in such a way as to acquire knowledge of it”. 
According to critical realists, the epistemic fallacy has been committed in the 
philosophy of science for decades and “since Descartes, it has been customary first to ask how 
we can know, and only afterwards what it is that we can know” (Collier, 1994, p. 137). As 
Collier further argues, the problem is that this Cartesian ordering of reality has had significant 
influence on western philosophies and thus contributed to the prevalence of the epistemic 
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fallacy. The tendency of letting questions concerning ‘how we can know’ determine our 
concept of ‘what there is’ have therefore become a recurring feature in philosophies. 
In fact the epistemic fallacy pervades not only classical empiricism, where it originates (though 
Descartes must take much of the blame for setting philosophy off in this direction), but also Kant, the 
absolute idealist, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, pragmatism, logical positivism, linguistic philosophy, 
poststructuralism, and, in a rather different form, phenomenology and existentialism (Collier, 1994, p. 
76).
By asserting that the majority of western philosophers have subscribed to the epistemic 
fallacy, Bhaskar justifiably stresses that these great philosophers have not deliberately 
committed what critical realists see as logical misjudgements. The problem is rather that this 
scientific error of concluding from ‘we know’ to ‘it is’ has to date dwelled unrecognised in 
academia. Collier stresses this, by noting that “[t]his shift is so common in the philosophy of 
the last three centuries that it often goes unnoticed, and it is an important achievement of 
Bhaskars’s philosophy to pick it out, name it, and (I think) refute it” (Collier, 1994, p. 76).
Bhaskar argues that the epistemic fallacy is a significant error committed by many of 
the western philosophies of science, and that one should therefore avoid deducing from ‘we 
know’ to ‘it is’. An alternative way to avoid subscribing to this common fallacy is, as Bhaskar 
(2008) further asserts, to be clear about the distinction between ‘experience’ and ‘existence’, 
and thus open up the possibility of a law-governed world independent of man. 
[T]ranscendental realism8... regards the objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that 
generate phenomena; and the knowledge as produced in the social activity of science. These objects are 
neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs imposed upon the phenomena (idealism), but 
real structures which endure and operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the 
conditions which allow us access to them. Against empiricism, the objects of knowledge are structures, 
not events; against idealism, they are intransitive (in the sense defined) ... According to this view, both 
knowledge and the world are structured, both are differentiated and changing ... On this view, science is 
not an epiphenomenon of nature, nor is nature a product of man ... Only transcendental realism, I will 
argue, can sustain the idea of a law-governed world independent of man (Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 25-26 [my 
footnote]).
In order to further explain his philosophical idea, Bhaskar promotes the concepts of transitive
and intransitive objects, the notion of mechanisms, the idea that both nature and science are 
stratified, and the notions of causal powers operating at different levels. 
                                                          
8 Transcendental realism is Bhaskar’s term for his general philosophy of science. This idea, in addition to his concept of 
‘critical naturalism’ – his philosophical concept of the human sciences – make up the overarching concept of ‘critical 
realism’.
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Transitive and intransitive objects 
Critical realists understand “objects of knowledge” as structures and mechanisms existing 
independently of man. As such, it is argued that an ontological aspect is maintained without 
reducing aspects of reality to i) our experiments or our perceptions (as with empiricism and 
positivism), nor reducing it to ii) epistemological notions of thoughts (as with ontological 
constructivism and idealism) (Bhaskar, 2008). Therefore, in agreement with critical realism, a 
tree is a tree which will continue to exist in this world regardless of there being humans who 
either i) observe/experience this tree, or ii) think about this green leafy thing. To define and 
clarify this philosophic notion, critical realists use the terms intransitive and transitive objects. 
Intransitive objects are objects which exist independently of science and of man. Intransitive 
objects can, as such, be seen as an ontological notion of existence. Transitive objects, on the 
other hand, are embedded in philosophical sociology and epistemological notions of 
existence, as these objects are related to human thinking and perceptions (Bhaskar, 2008).
‘[T]ransitive object’ refers to the state of scientific knowledge at any time, and the ‘intransitive object’ 
to the object which exists independently of science, which the science is about ... However much 
science deepens its knowledge of its intransitive object, its product remains a transitive object. This last 
point enables Bhaskar to allow quite a lot of scope for ‘the sociology of knowledge’, explanations of 
scientific results as produced by mechanisms quite extraneous to the project of our deepening our 
knowledge of nature. But it saves his theory from the ontological relativism that is often inferred from 
such social studies of science. Rival scientific theories necessarily have different transitive objects, or 
they would not be different, but they are not about different worlds (Collier, 1994, pp. 51-52).
Distinctions between transitive objects and intransitive objects are thus essential concepts in 
critical realism, as they allow for ontological accounts of reality independent of man, in 
addition to epistemological notions pertaining to social factors and human knowledge in 
science. 
Mechanism 
Another prominent aspect in critical realism, closely related to transitive and intransitive 
objects, is mechanism. According to Bhaskar (2008), reality can be understood in three 
domains – the domain of ‘empirical’, ‘actual’, and ‘real’. The ‘domain of empirical’
comprises only experiences, ‘the actual’ also includes events, whereas the ‘domain of real’
additionally encompasses mechanisms. By separating ‘the world’ into these three 
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categorisations, critical realists argue that they avoid condensing ontology into experience and 
thus prevent a foundation vulnerable to the epistemic fallacy (Bhaskar, 2008; Clegg, 2005).
                            Table 2.1: The three domains of the real, after Bhaskar (2008). 
The ‘domain of real’ can be seen to encompass experiences, events, and mechanism, and 
mechanism used in this sense refers to ‘mechanism generating an event’. It is not necessarily 
an indication of a mechanical mechanism, rather, it “is that to which a law refers” (Collier, 
1994, p. 43). Furthermore, what separates critical realism from numerous structuralist 
philosophies is that mechanisms are understood as real entities. This implies that mechanisms
– being an animal instinct, an economic tendency, or a syntactic structure – are not
understood as mere ‘theories’ or ‘logical constructs’; mechanisms are instead alleged to be 
real. By emphasising mechanisms and their causal criteria of reality, critical realists argue that 
they once again avoid the fallacy committed by numerous empiricists. 
Theories which relegate mechanisms to a lower ontological league, as ‘theoretical entities’, ‘logical 
constructs’, etc., are refusing to allow causal criteria for reality – i.e. they will only let something 
through the ontological customs office if it is a possible object of experience. Yet within the level of the 
Actual we are employing causal criteria all the time, and would never get out the Empirical if we did 
not: when we find the garden muddy in the morning, we assume a real rainstorm, though we slept 
through it; a murder-victim implies a murderer, even though one might never be identified. Rainstorms 
and murderers are possible objects of experience, but their existence is in these cases asserted on causal 
criteria only, since they are not ‘experiences’ in the sense of perceived. Why should we not likewise 
allow that mechanisms are real, though unperceived? (Collier, 1994, p. 44).
As indicated earlier, the point is that numerous philosophies of science tend to let human 
perception, experience, or language and thoughts determine what exists. By introducing the 
concepts of the three domains, the idea of mechanism as real entities, and the terms transitive 
and intransitive objects, Bhaskar makes an attempt to break with common epistemic and 
ontological assumptions held by dominant philosophies of science. 
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Nature as an open and stratified system 
Two critical realistic concepts which also ought to be elaborated on are Bhaskar’s idea that 
nature is an ‘open system’ and, furthermore, that it is ‘stratified’. Nature being an open system 
refers to the concept that one cannot perceive natural settings as ‘closed’, where only one 
mechanism alone operates (Bhaskar, 2008). In other words, a closed system is one where a 
genuine causal mechanism is isolated and where one therefore finds occurrences where ‘every 
time A occurs, B follows’, as in Humean causality. It is argued that open systems exist almost 
everywhere outside meticulous laboratory setups and experimental conditions, and here one 
cannot find Humean causalities because ordinary observable events are not invariably 
preceded by any other constantly connected event (Collier, 1994). Dark skies are not always 
followed by rain, and excessive amounts of reading homework for a child are not always 
followed by improved learning, because nature is a messy and complex system where 
numerous mechanisms occur simultaneously. This is important to consider in research. 
Notions of nature as an ‘open system’ in addition to the concept of ‘mechanism’ have 
led critical realists to the argument that nature consists of multiple strata. In this respect it is 
essential to remember that it is mechanisms, not things or events, that are stratified. 
[T]here is a multiplicity of mechanisms in nature. If there were a single mechanism only, there would be 
a naturally closed system, and passive observation would be enough to establish laws (or the law) of 
nature ... [T]hese mechanisms are, so to speak, layers of nature, and are ordered, not just jumbled up 
together ... It appears that the material universe existed before there were organic life, and that living 
organisms can only exist as composed of and surrounded by matter. In this sense, matter may be said to 
be more ‘basic’ than life; life in turn may be said to be more basic than rationality (in the sense that we 
are rational animals), and hence than human society and its history. This suggests that the sciences that 
explain a more basic layer may have some explanatory primacy over those explaining a less basic layer 
(Collier, 1994, pp. 45-46).
The philosophy of critical realism thus implies that different aspects of nature, and their 
related sciences, can be ordered in accordance with ‘levels of strata’. As a consequence,
critical realism has often been criticised for its realistic and naturalistic emphasises. It has
even been claimed that Bhaskar’s philosophy is in danger of committing the same error as 
positivists did – namely mistakes of reductionism. The accusation is understandable, because 
Bhaskar’s logic could readily be considered as an argument where, for instance, a biological 
stratum is perceived to be more ‘basic’ and thus has ‘some explanatory primacy’ over less 
basic strata, such as education. However, and this is noteworthy, critical realism should not be 
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considered as a reductive philosophy of science, because it has been repeatedly stressed that it 
is “impossible to reduce social to natural, or indeed social to psychological or psychological 
to social, or either to biological, or biological to physical, and so on” (Collier, 1994, p. 242).
Lower generative mechanisms can therefore explain without replacing the higher level such as 
the level of the societal. 
With regard to levels of strata, in addition to the view of different domains of the 
empirical, the actual, and the real, it is essential to elaborate more on the relationship between 
such strata. How do critical realists perceive the relationship between, for instance, human 
agency, causal power, and change? If the level of the natural can explain the societal, when
the social is not reduced to natural explanations, then what kind of power do social aspects 
and human actors possess? 
Society is an emergent stratum – societies are governed by social laws not natural ones, and may to a 
degree control by their organization the mechanisms presupposed and the forces generated by social 
existence ... [A]s individual agents we have powers which are not reducible to, but emerge from, 
biological and social ones (Collier, 1994, p. 120).
As a response to this, Patomäki and Wight (2000, p. 230) further note how “every social act, 
event, or phenomenon is only possible insofar as the conditions for action exist as well as the 
agents which act; conditions which, we argue, are real and not reducible to the discourse 
and/or experience of the agents”. Such an argument implies that discourse, for instance, ought 
not to be reduced to ‘nothing more than a discourse’ since, at least in part, the discourse is 
dealing with something real. Acknowledging that social structures are real social factors such 
as ideas, political paradigms, and ways of thinking, can also be seen to produce change 
(Sayer, 2000). This is noteworthy, as critical realism thus stresses the powers of structures and 
agencies.
 
Causation 
The last concept to be elaborated on is the critical realists’ concept of causation. As we have 
seen, critical realism assumes a stratified ontology where a distinction is drawn between the 
‘real’, the ‘actual’, and the ‘empirical’, and this in turn can be linked to causal powers. 
[T]he ‘real’ is the domain of structures and their associated ‘causal powers’; the ‘actual’ is the domain 
of events and processes; the ‘empirical’ is the part of the real and the actual that is experienced by social 
actors. The ‘actual’ does not in any simple or straightforward way reflect the ‘real’: the extent to which 
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and ways in which the particular causal powers are activated to affect actual events is contingent on the 
complex interaction of different structures and causal powers in the causing of events. Causal powers, 
moreover, are now exclusively the properties of structures: social agents also have causal powers which 
affect the actual (Fairclough, 2010, p. 355).
Critical realists thus interpret ‘causation’ as being a complex phenomenon which operates at 
different levels. This implies that when an event occurs, critical realists perceive it as being a 
result of a complex interplay between different causal factors. At the same time, complex 
relationships between causal factors make it difficult to understand the relationship between 
cause and effect. Since causes are interlinked, they will arguably be difficult to isolate without 
distorting and reducing the real world’s complex nature. It is therefore essential to be careful
when deducing effects from certain causal factors, since causality in the open and stratified 
reality is a complex phenomenon. Critical realists thus argue that one can substantiate that 
something will happen as a result of certain causal factors, but one cannot predict it with a
hundred per cent certainty (Kleven, Hjardemaal, & Tveit, 2011). By asserting this, critical 
realism differentiates itself from standard Humean cause-and-effect deduction. “One of the 
most distinctive feature of realism is its analysis of causation, which rejects the standard 
Humean ‘successionist’ view that it involves regularities among sequences of events” (Sayer, 
2000, p. 13). Humean regular conjunction of cause events and effect events is seen to be valid 
only in controlled and closed experimental setups, since a researcher under such circum-
stances is able to say that ‘every time A occurs, B follows’. The problem, however, is that 
such closed systems rarely occur in natural settings. Critical realism thus discards the Humean 
law of causality, on the grounds that it does not adequately address natural occurrences in the 
open and stratified reality. 
Causation is about what produces change (the activation of causal powers) not about (whether observers 
have registered) a regular conjunction of cause events and effect events. Hence, regularities are not 
necessary for explanation, whether of physical or social phenomena. Even where we do find regularities 
they still have to be explained in terms of what produces them. Thus critical realism rejects the Humean, 
constant conjunction view of causation (Fairclough, 2010, p. 205).
With regard to critical realists’ perception of causality, it should also be noted that critical 
realism views “objects as structured and as having particular causal powers or liabilities” 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 204). This implies that objects are able to act in certain ways or go 
through certain changes. Arguably, these powers often exist in dormant form, but they can be 
triggered in certain situations. Furthermore, it is stressed that if and when these powers are 
activated, the effects depend on the context (Fairclough, 2010). Again, critical realists refer to 
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the complex nature of reality as open and stratified, asserting that cause and effect cannot 
readily be predicted based on a simple ‘A thus B’ causation.  
The critical realistic account of a philosophy of science is both encompassing in its 
themes and complicated in its argumentation. To explain the entire philosophy in more depth 
as well as reviewing criticism of the position of critical realism, would be beyond the scope of 
this dissertation9. Nonetheless, some aspects will be further explained in the following 
section, where an attempt is made to link critical realism to the discipline of educational 
neuroscience. 
Critical realism as a possible philosophy of science for educational neuroscience  
As previously noted, the discipline of educational neuroscience encounters difficulties with 
regard to ‘the gap’ between education on the one side and neuroscience on the other 
(Campbell, 2011; Goswami, 2009; Howard-Jones, 2008; Samuels, 2009). Attention is 
therefore given to bridging the practical and theoretical aspects of this cross-disciplinary 
endeavour, but crafting an explicit philosophical bridge seems to have been slightly neglected. 
In order to address this issue, I will suggest the philosophy of critical realism as a possible 
philosophical foundation for educational neuroscience research. First of all, I propose this link 
between critical realism and educational neuroscience because I think critical realism 
DGGUHVVHVVRPHSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQXQGUXPVDWWKHYHU\KHDUWRIP\GRFWRUDOSURMHFWíDQGWKXV
perhaps other projects at the interface of education, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience 
as well. Secondly, I argue for this link because I think the discipline of educational 
neuroscience lacks a profound philosophical foundation for its transdisciplinary work. I am 
suggesting critical realism only as a possible framework, and do not consider it to be the only 
viable philosophical position which can make strong links between education and neuro-
science. 
What can first be noted in this respect is that a connection between social studies and 
critical realism is not a new idea and several disciplines within the social sciences have
                                                          
9 For more copious literature on critical realism see Bhaskar’s original work (1986, 1998, 2008), Collier’s (1994) introduction 
to Bhaskar’s work, Sayer (2000) on critical realism and social science, and Fairclough (2010) on critical realism and critical 
discourse analysis.  
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already been linked to a critical realistic philosophy of science10. Education is no exception 
and Brad Shipway (2011), in particular, notes the potential and uptake of critical realism in 
education:
[C]ritical realism ‘appears to have gained momentum in social theory, its fortunes seemingly inversely 
related to the demise of postmodernism’ (...) With the turn of the millennium, the ‘uptake’ of critical 
realist perspectives in education has grown rapidly, with some authors deliberately deploying Bhaskar’s 
concepts while others indicate a more latent, or tacit use of critical realism as they go about their work 
across education’s various domains (Shipway, 2011, p. 2).
Critical realism’s advance within the educational field notwithstanding, not much has been 
written about the possible connection between critical realism and the discipline of 
educational neuroscience11. I will therefore draw attention to what I consider to be possible 
connections between the two. 
One argument for suggesting a critical realistic foundation for educational 
neuroscience follows from critical realism’s repeated censure of ‘the epistemic fallacy’. By 
stressing the importance of not falling for WKH HSLVWHPLF IDOODF\ í LH GHGXFLQJ IURP µZH
know’ to ‘it LV¶ícritical realism has positioned itself as a philosophy of science that is careful 
not to conflate ontology into epistemology. With reference to the discipline of educational 
neuroscience, I will argue that this is essential in that it can aid educational neuroscientists 
arguing for the importance of considering cognitive neuroscientific aspects in educational 
matters. This is because by taking a critical realistic perspective, one will be careful not to 
overly emphasize social and educational variables (epistemology) at the expense of more 
embodied and material aspects such as neurobiological processes in the brain (ontology). This 
implies, for instance, that researchers studying the social and interacting child, who develops 
and learns within an educational and socio-cultural discourse, must also remember that our 
development and learning are influenced by neurobiological processes such as changes in 
synaptic strength in neural networks which, in turn, may be impaired by chronic high stress12.
Natural and biological aspects within the brain can therefore be seen to be interlinked with 
social aspects such as prolonged stressful environments (environment Æ brain), but 
                                                          
10 This can, as previously noted, be seen in the work by Archer (1995, 2000); Fairclough (2010); Fleetwood (1999); Mingers 
(2004); Norrie (2010); Pratt (1995); Steinmetz (1998); Tsang and Kwan (1999).  
11 Personally, I have not come across any literature or references concerning this explicit linkage between educational 
neuroscience and critical realism.  
12 Neuroscientific research has shown that both physical and psychological stress triggers the release of cortisol which, in 
ƚƵƌŶ͕ĐĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞŐůƵĐŽĐŽƌƚŝĐŽŝĚƌĞĐĞƉƚŽƌƐŝŶƚŚĞϭƌĞŐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƉƉŽĐĂŵƉƵƐоĂƌĞŐŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
consolidation of episodic memory. It has further been shown that cortisol in small quantities can increase attentiveness and 
aid learning. Chronic high stress, however, has disadvantageous effects on cognitive functions such as impairment of 
episodic memory (Gazzaniga et al., 2009).    
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impairment of cognitive functions such as memory can also be seen to influence an 
individual’s ability to learn and interact in educational settings (brain Æ mind Æ behaviour 
Æ environment). A focus on such complex and bi-directional relationships between 
environments, behaviour, mind, and brain is essential within the educational neuroscientific 
community, and I will suggest that critical realism can help to craft a philosophical argument 
for attentiveness to both ontology and epistemology in these matters. 
Distinguishing epistemological notions from ontological ones does not imply that 
critical realists consider biological factors to be more important than more social 
explanations. As previously noted, critical realism asserts that the world can be seen as 
‘stratified’, since different mechanisms are ordered in different ‘layers of nature’. Further-
more, even if critical realism suggests that more basic layers have some explanatory 
importance over less basic layers, it stresses that a layer can never be reduced to another layer. 
Lower generative mechanisms, such as biology, can therefore provide explanations without 
replacing higher levels, such as societal levels (Collier, 1994). In my view, critical realistic 
perspectives on different natural and scientific strata are essential with regard to the discipline 
of educational neuroscience as well as their emphasis on non-reductionism. A frequent 
criticism of educational neuroscientists is that they subsume educational aspects under the 
regime of neuroscience (cf. Varma et al., 2008). Such criticisms of reductionism can, 
however, be considered to be unwarranted. An emphasis on educational and social 
explanations is evident in the work of educational neuroscience, and even within the 
neuroscientific branch, as research pertaining to social cognitive neuroscience plays a
significant role in the attempt to understand the relationship between the social and the 
neurobiological (Blakemore et al., 2004). Condemnation of reductionism can therefore be 
seen as a misunderstanding because a central goal in the educational neuroscience community 
appears to be the crafting of reciprocal collaboration where neither education nor 
neuroscience is reduced under the influence of the other (Ansari et al., 2012; Christodoulou & 
Gaab, 2009; Greenwood, 2009; Howard-Jones, 2010; Mason, 2009; Stein & Fischer, 2011).
In this respect, once again I will argue that educational neuroscientists can find answers in 
critical realistic philosophies of science. Not only does critical realism provide arguments for 
why neuroscientific explanations are important in the educational domain, but it also argues 
for a non-reductive perspective on science in its focus on stratified nature and its mechanisms. 
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Moreover, critical realism asserts that different levels of ‘strata’ – such as those of 
education and of neuroscience – should be studied in different ways: 
Laws of human behaviour and of social processes will be distinct, and it will not be possible to reduce 
one to or predict one from the other. Each level is autonomous in the sense of having its own irreducible 
set of mechanisms, and distinct sciences using different concepts and discovering different laws will be 
required to study them (Collier, 1994, p. 117).
With the claim that the world is complex and stratified, and where each layer is irreducible 
albeit grounded in more basic layers, critical realists emphasise the uniqueness and 
complexity of each research object. Scepticism is therefore uttered about ‘cookbook’
prescriptions of method and one does instead argue that methods ought to be shaped around 
the object of study (Sayer, 2000). Different research objects will therefore require different 
modes of study, and transdisciplinary methods that follow different perspective of the natural 
and social world are thus claimed to be appropriate. A critical realistic perspective on 
educational neuroscience will therefore underline the importance of not using naturalistic 
methods to study the social – and not using social methods to study the natural. The critical 
realistic argument that different levels of strata require different methodological approaches, 
therefore seems to support educational neuroscientists’ emphasis on attentiveness to the 
different levels of analysis which exist between the disciplines of education and cognitive 
neuroscience (Ansari & Coch, 2006; Berninger & Corina, 1998; Varma et al., 2008). These 
non-reductive perspectives therefore seem to be suggested in both the educational neuro-
science discipline and in critical realism’s philosophy of science. 
In order to exemplify how critical realistic ideas about non-reductive levels of nature 
and science can help work within educational neuroscience, consider for instance the 
computer game The Number Race suggested by Wilson, Dehaene and colleagues (2006). This 
computer game is further elaborated upon in chapter 6, but to summarize, the game is based 
upon cognitive neuroscientific theories of number sense and symbolic representations, in 
order to help children with mathematical learning difficulties. In the design process, the 
research group made use of game design theories, data simulation, and learning algorithms in 
order to estimate how children would respond to the computer game. Not until the final stage 
weUH D VPDOO JURXS RI FKLOGUHQ LQWURGXFHG WR WKH JDPHíZLWK WKH UHVXOW WKDW WKHy found it
boring, too easy, and unengaging (Howard-Jones, 2010; Wilson et al., 2006). One essential 
flaw in this project was that usage, views, and opinions from the children – for whom the 
computer game was ultimately GHVLJQHG íZHUH QRW LQFOXGHG LQ WKH HVVHQWLDO VWDJHV RI WKH
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research, and the computer game was thus programmed solely on the basis of game design 
theories and cognitive neuroscientific concepts. Moreover, I will also argue that use of this 
computer game was not analysed in a social and educational setting, such as a complex 
classroom situation. Unfortunately, this example is not unique as one can find numerous 
examples where educational, social, cognitive psychological, or neuroscientific aspectV í
SUDFWLFDO RU WKHRUHWLFDO í have been neglected in research on education and neuroscience. 
Further elaboration of such instances will be presented later in the dissertation, but for now 
my argument is that a critical realistic approach to educational neuroscientific research would 
have helped prevent such neglect. This is because critical realism stresses that nature is 
stratified, and since each level has its own irreducible set of mechanism, distinct sciences with 
distinct concepts and laws will be required in order to study them (Collier, 1994). With 
UHVSHFW WR WKH H[DPSOH DERYH í DQG WR HGXFDWLRQDO QHXURVFLHQFH UHVHDUFK LQ JHQHUDO í WKLV
implies that neuroscience, with its relationship to biology, must be perceived as a more ‘basic’ 
layer than cognition, human behaviour, and social processes. Individual cognition (viz. 
psychology) must, by the same token, be distinguished from the social, as we also here are 
concerned with two distinct strata. This distinction is also noted by Collier (1994, p. 147)
when he claims that “people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents. Different 
strata, as we have seen, are characterized by different kinds of mechanism”. What this implies 
overall is that research on education and neuroscience such as The Number Race project, must 
recognise that it is OLNHO\WRHQFRPSDVVQXPHURXVYDULDEOHVDWGLIIHUHQWOHYHOVRIVWUDWDíDQG
that these variables should be studied using different research methods. Neuroscientific 
concepts on number processing, game design theories, and computerised learning algorithms
may contribute to valuable insight into how to design a software learning game for children 
with mathematical learning difficulties, but unless psychological, educational, and social 
modes of studies are also included one cannot acquire knowledge of how such computer 
games can be used, and how they might be perceived outside laboratory settings. 
When it comes to critical realism’s argument regarding the ordering of nature in 
different strata, certain notions should also be mentioned concerning a critical realistic 
approach to the mind-brain problem. Critical realists assume that matter is more ‘basic’ than 
life, and that life in turn is more basic than rationality, and so on up to the level of human 
society (Collier, 1994). In this respect, critical realists often use the term emergence when 
referring to relationships between higher-level and lower-level mechanisms, implying that 
higher-level mechanisms are rooted in, and emergent from, more basic levels. 
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Emergence theories [such as Bhaskar’s] are those that, while recognizing that the more complex aspects 
of reality (e.g. life, mind) presuppose the less complex (matter), also insist that they have features which 
are irreducible, i.e. cannot be thought in concepts DSSURSULDWHWRWKHOHVVFRPSOH[OHYHOVíDQGWhat not 
because of any subjective constraints on our thought, but because of the inherent nature of the emergent 
strata (Collier, 1994, p. 110).
A critical realistic approach to the mind-matter relationship, and hence also to the mind-brain 
problem, will therefore perceive matter and brain to be of a more ‘basic’ level than cognitive 
aspects such as rationality. The mind will, nevertheless, have features which are irreducible to 
the level of the brain. For the sake of comparison, one can therefore say that in contrast to 
dualism (viz. PLQGEUDLQFULWLFDOUHDOLVWVGRQRWXQGHUVWDQGWKHPLQGDVbeing completely 
independent of the brain, because more complex aspects of the mind will emerge from and 
thus presuppose more ‘basic’ aspects of the brain. In contrast to monism (viz. mind = brain), 
critical realists will emphasize that the mind cannot be thought of or fully explained by using 
concepts appropriate to the brain, because the complexity of the mind cannot be reduced to
more ‘basic’ levels such as the brain. In view of this, I will again argue that critical realism 
can offer a philosophy of science compatible with numerous ideas in the educational 
neuroscience community, and supports the view that the mind-brain relation is a complex and 
non-reductive interrelationship which cannot be explained either by monistic or dualistic 
philosophies (cf. Blakemore & Frith, 2000).
Overall, I will argue that critical realism can provide a valuable philosophical 
foundation for work conducted at the interface of educational neuroscience. Not only does 
critical realism provide an alternative to realistic and relativistic philosophies, it is also a 
philosophy of science that emphasizes both biological concepts (viz. ontology) and more 
societal and educational concepts (viz. epistemology), but without reducing one to the other. 
By the same token, critical realism also provides a philosophical perspective that emphasizes 
different levels of analysis, highlights the complexity in mind-brain relationships, and 
acknowledges transdisciplinary and reciprocal collaboration between disciplines such as 
HGXFDWLRQ FRJQLWLYH SV\FKRORJ\ DQG QHXURVFLHQFH í LVVXHV ZKLFK OLH DW WKH YHU\ KHDUW RI
many educational neuroscientific endeavours. 
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Chapter summary 
There is a ‘philosophical gap’ between the disciplines of education, cognitive psychology, and 
cognitive neuroscience. This ‘gap’ and the disciplinary dissimilarities which follow from it,
can lead to difficulties for anyone conducting work at the interface of education and 
neuroscience. My doctoral research has been a similar experience, as I, too, have encountered 
philosophical issues in my study of the educational neuroscience discourse. Philosophical 
issues, on the one hand, arise due to the ‘philosophical problems’ that can occur at the 
interface of education DQGQHXURVFLHQFHíVXFKDVHSLVWHPLFGLIIHUHQFHV, and issues related to 
the mind-brain relationship. More importantly, on the other hand, philosophical issues arise 
due to difficulties in finding an adequate philosophy of science for studying educational 
neuroscience. In short, it can be said that this is related to more fundamental philosophical 
enquiries, as I have encountered problems in linking research on educational neuroscience to
either realistic or relativistic philosophies of science. Despite the existence of much literature 
on educational neuroscience, I have, to date, found little work that explicitly addresses and 
suggests potential philosophies of science for educational neuroscience research. Indeed, 
philosophical issues such as epistemic differences and the mind-brain problem are commonly 
documented. However, more fundamental questions and suggestions for a common 
philosophical grounding for education, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience are seldom 
elaborated. Despite having limited time and scope to adequately address such fundamental 
questions of philosophy of science, I have attempted to propose a possible philosophical 
approach for studying educational neuroscience. 
Finding a research framework for my doctoral study where there is agreement amongst 
philosophical, theoretical, and methodological perspectives, in addition to complying with the 
object of study itself, has been a difficult task. Nevertheless, I consider that a critical realistic 
perspective may provide an appropriate foundation for such work. Firstly, I will argue that 
critical realism addresses certain essential philosophical problems for educational neuro-
scientific work in that it proposes a philosophy of science which acknowledges the 
importance of both ontological and epistemological notions. By making allowances for social 
aspects attached to education, cognitive psychological aspects attached to individual 
cognition, and natural aspects attached to neuroscience – this without conducting errors of 
reductionism – the perspective of critical realism appears to be a viable philosophical 
framework for research relevant to educational neuroscience. Secondly, I will argue that 
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critical realism is also in agreement with the views held by many working at the interface of 
education and cognitive neuroscience, regarding philosophical problems related to 
transdisciplinary collaboration (viz. epistemic, theoretical, and methodological differences) 
and the mind-brain dilemma. Again, this emphasises the notion that critical realism can be 
seen as a possible philosophy of science for educational neuroscience research. My third 
argument for using a philosophical approach inspired by critical realism is that it also helps to 
establish a coherent research approach in my own critical discourse analysis of educational 
neuroscience, since theories and methodologies adherent to Fairclough’s later perspectives are 
consistent with a critical realistic philosophy of science.  
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Chapter 3 
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This chapter aims to explain the theoretical framework used in my PhD research. Numerous 
theoretical approaches can be applied to a study on educational neuroscience – each may be 
related to different research questions and each can suggest a different angle of examination.
A researcher within cognitive neuroscience may, for instance, be interested in conducting a 
memory study and thus make use of neurobiological and cognitive theories of learning. An 
educationalist interested in pedagogical aspects, on the other hand, may be engrossed in more 
practical issues related to transformation of neuroscientific findings into classroom practices –
in this respect, teaching theories on a more pedagogical level can be appropriate. In contrast to 
cognitive neuroscience and practical pedagogy, however, my field of study examines macro-
social perspectives on education. This distinction indicates that my perspective is more 
closely related to structural perspectives on societies, political aspects, power relations, 
dominions of knowledge, historical concepts, relationships between text and context etc. The 
theoretical connections in my branch of study are therefore social and political work from 
Fairclough, Bourdieu, Habermas, Bernstein, and Foucault, rather than more pedagogical 
related theories such as Marcia and Bowlby, or neuroscientific theories such as those of 
Hodgkin and Huxley13.
As a consequence of my inclination toward macro-social perspectives, the theoretical 
framework I have chosen for this PhD study is drawn from the critical discourse analytical 
tradition – particularly the branch rooted in the work of Norman Fairclough. This is a 
tradition where examination of opaque ‘structures’ within discourse are central, as one seeks 
to expose discursive and social dimensions within, and between, different discourses. If one 
relates this critical discourse analytical framework to the study of educational neuroscience as 
a discourse, relevant research questions can be: ‘how did the academic discipline of 
                                                          
13 Both J. Marcia’s identity theory and J. Bowlby’s attachment theory are often referred to in pedagogical studies, whereas 
the Hodgkin-,ƵǆůĞǇŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞEĂЀĂŶĚ<ЀĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŶĐĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝƐĂŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞůƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŽĨ
action potential in the brain.  
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educational neuroscience emerge?’, ‘what are the common representations and narrations 
suggested by actors in the discourse?’, ‘can one find any hegemonic relationships within the 
academic level of educational neuroscience?’, ‘how is this academic discipline recontext-
ualised to other fields, such as the public and political field?’ and ‘how can educational 
neuroscience be seen to be distributed across scalar borders and into Norway?’ In order to 
address these questions comprehensively, a theoretical and methodological foundation must
be established. Chapter 3 will therefore present this research’s theoretical discursive 
framework, whereas chapter 4 gives an account of the method used in my study. As “theory 
and methodology are far from being mutually exclusive” in the critical discourse tradition
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 164), these two chapters should be seen in relationship to one another. 
Chapter 3 will commence with an account of, and an argument for, the specific theoretical 
framework I have chosen – namely a critical discourse analysis conducted from the work of 
Fairclough. I will then further define the scope by expounding on some central aspects 
pertaining to this critical discourse tradition, before elaborating on the analytical concepts of 
emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation across structural and scalar borders14. Overall, 
the theory chapter is set out in order to provide a theoretical grounding for the analysis of the 
educational neuroscience discourse. 
Fairclough’s critical discourse theoretical framework 
The tradition of critical discourse analysis is often associated with studies of language and 
text. Indeed, one of Fairclough’s latest books, a collection of twenty-three of his papers on 
critical discourse analysis, is even entitled ‘Critical discourse analysis; the critical study of 
language’ (2010). Language and text are undoubtedly essential but, and as numerous critical 
discourse analysts have pointed out, critical studies of discourse cannot be reduced to studies 
of language and text per se. There is a crucial distinction between the linguistic study of text
and a critical study of discourse. To understand this subtle, albeit highly crucial, distinction,
one needs to return to the beginning of critical discourse analysis15. Critical discourse analysis 
                                                          
14 Delimitations have to be made as regards which theoretical aspects are explained. There are significant numbers of 
different theories and definitions one can reflect upon – each with references to significant amounts of literature arguing 
whether or not one should write ‘discourse’ with miniscule or capital ‘D’, or what the differences is between ‘field’ and 
‘sphere’. I have chosen not to embark upon such a task, but will rather focus on critical discourse concepts of particular 
interest in this research on educational neuroscience.    
15 There are different schools within the discourse tradition, and even within the critical discourse tradition, which is often 
associated with the work of Foucault. The distinction between these perspectives can be confusing and Fairclough (2003, p. 
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(CDA) – that is, the school of analysis particularly associated with Norman Fairclough –
developed as a result of the disciplinary divide between linguistics and other areas of social 
science (Fairclough, 2010, p. 417). On the one hand there is the discipline of linguistics,
which has a long tradition of micro-analysing text, including patterns in talk and in writing. 
On the other hand there is social science, such as sociology, which has expertise in examining
macro-sociological issues such as social change and social practice. What tends to be 
problematic with the former, when challenged by the critical discourse tradition, is that 
linguists do not adequately address sociological issues of a discursive nature such as social 
change. The problem with the latter, though, is that claims about discourses made by 
sociologists tend to lack a firm grounding in the actual empirical analysis of language 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 418). In order to address these challenges, the tradition of critical 
discourse analysis explores macro-aspects of social relationships and processes as exposed in 
micro-aspects of text and language.  
In contrast with many branches of linguistics which define their research questions within their own 
discipline, CDA typically takes up social scientific questions and claims about social or institutional 
change, and explores how these changes may be taking place at the micro level of texts and interactive 
events. Or, to put the point in more general terms: CDA explores how discourse figures in relation to 
other social elements in processes of social or institutional change (Fairclough, 2010, p. 418).
The linking of micro-analysis of text with macro-sociological theories, further explains the 
close relationship between method and theory within critical discourse analysis. Interlinking
these two, however, is done by “conceptualise[ing] the more sociological concepts of 
discourse … in terms which can be explored empirically through repertoires of linguistic (in 
conjunction with non-linguistic) analysis” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 418).
When it comes to the connection between micro and macro analysis of text and the 
social, another distinctive facet of critical discourse analysis should be explained – that is, the 
notion of transdisciplinarity. The transdisciplinary nature of critical discourse analysis is 
closely linked to its objective – namely, to analyse relationships and structures within and 
between discourses. In Fairclough’s own words, the aim of the study is “not analysis of 
discourse ‘in itself’ as one might take it to be, but analysis of dialectical relations between 
discourses and other objects, elements or moments, as well as analysis of the ‘internal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
124) even notes how “Foucault’s work has been taken up in many different theories and disciplines, producing a rather 
bewildering range of overlapping and contrasting theorizations and analysis of ‘discourse’”. Fairclough’s approach to 
discourse studies, though, can be allocated to the larger critical discourse tradition and it has, confusingly enough, taken on 
the name critical discourse analysis. Even if Fairclough’s analytical approach is often known under the abbreviation CDA, I 
will continue to use its full name throughout the dissertation. 
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relations’ of discourse” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4). As critical discourse analysts aim to cut 
across discursive boundaries in their search for structural relations, they often characterise the
mode of study as transdisciplinary work. This transdisciplinary form of analysis also affects
the theoretical frame used in a study, since crossing of discursive boundaries often leads to
crossing of conventional boundaries between disciplines (Fairclough, 2010). For instance, if
one seeks to analyse a particular educational discourse, then investigation of structural 
relations between the educational discourse and the political discourse may be of value. 
Consequently, theoretical aspects from disciplines such as politics, economy, sociology, and 
linguistics, are appropriate for the analysis of discourse. The argument for applying such 
cross-disciplinary frameworks is that terms extracted from macro-sociological theories can be 
translated into discourse-analytical concepts. “What I mean by that is that … the logic of one 
theory can be put to work within (the logic of) another without the one being reduced to the 
other” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 398). This is shown throughout the critical discourse analytic 
tradition, as social and political thoughts relevant to the social theory of language – such as 
the work of Althusser, Foucault, Giddens, Gramsci, and Habermas – are often used to enrich 
and supplement the theoretical framework within the analysis of discourse (Fairclough, 2010).
Critical discourse analysis is thus an encompassing theoretical and methodological framework 
since it does not restrict itself to certain disciplinary confines, but instead attempts to create
constructive dialogue between social theories and research. 
Despite the notion that critical discourse analysts endeavour to combine micro aspects 
of text with macro-sociological theories in a transdisciplinary way, there is yet another aspect 
that should be addressed – an aspect which also makes it distinctive from other discourse 
traditions. In contrast with other discourse studies, critical discourse analysis seeks to go 
‘beyond’ what is said and done in a discourse; attempting, as such, to examine unclear 
structural relations between aspects such as language, discourse, knowledge, ideology, and 
power. Accordingly, its approach to the analytical subject of attention is, indeed, critical.
By ‘critical’ discourse analysis I mean discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often 
opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, 
and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, 
events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over 
power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a 
factor securing power and hegemony (Fairclough, 2010, p. 93).
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Because critical discourse analysis has the central goal of critically questioning discursive 
structures, its analytical work is normative and explanatory rather than a mere descriptive 
commentary on discourses. Fairclough (2010) elaborates on this distinction, noting that whilst 
descriptive work tends to be less interested in the more extensive effects of discourse, critical 
discourse analysis has an explicit explanatory endeavour. In other words, it seeks to address 
and evaluate ‘social wrongs’ in their opaque discursive disguise16. Taken together, critical 
discourse analysis can thus be said to be a transdisciplinary theoretical and methodological 
framework of study, which aims to critically explain and evaluate discursive structures and 
relations. 
Critical discourse theories and critical realism 
Fairclough’s methodological and theoretical framework can be distinguished in his early and 
later work, since his philosophical stand has been altered in the course of his academic carrier.
Fairclough himself stresses this development by documenting how, over recent years, he has 
started “working with a realist and specifically critical realist ontology” in numerous papers 
related to critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010, p. 164; Fairclough et al., 2002). As 
previously mentioned, the theoretical, methodological and, indeed, philosophical stance I use
in this doctoral research will resemble Fairclough’s later work, as this work draws attention to 
critical realistic arguments. Seeing that chapter 2 already has expounded on critical realism as 
a scientific philosophical anchoring for this dissertation, only a brief account concerning a 
critical realist approach to critical discourse analysis will be presented here. 
Understanding the shift in Fairclough’s critical discourse tradition brings us back to an
observation about philosophies of science. Numerous authors within the discourse analytical 
tradition – in addition to those involved with Fairclough’s original critical discourse analysis
– tend to conduct their work in line with a socio-constructivist, post-structuralist, or post-
modernist school of thought. This assemblage of philosophies of science is not surprising, 
considering the linguistic turn, the notion of structuralism, and the Foucaldian tradition’s 
emphasis on social construction of thought – all philosophies of science emphasize an 
epistemological focus of study (Fairclough, 2010). Iver Neumann (2010, p. 14 [my 
translation]) also stresses this philosophical position in the discourse tradition by stating that 
                                                          
16 See page 69 for further explanation on opaque discursive structure. 
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“it is for the discourse analysts … a basis of conception that the world appears to us as more 
or less changeable – in flux. It is meaningless to say that the world consists of either this or 
that without specifying how it became this way, how this world is maintained and how it is 
challenged by other possibilities”. On this note, Neumann continues by arguing that discourse 
analysts are not primarily interested in the real, but rather in the transpired, that is, how and 
why things become known as they do. “It is for this reason epistemological questions – how 
we can possess knowledge about the world – are the centre of attention in discourse analysis, 
whilst ontological questions are pushed to the background” (Neumann, 2010, p. 14).
Contrary to this, and what becomes apparent when reading Fairclough’s later work, is 
that Fairclough gives the impression of being sceptical about focusing on epistemology at the 
expense of ontology. He thus takes a critical stance against some prominent tendencies within 
the study of discourse, particularly those studies that adopt “postmodernist and extreme social 
constructivist positions” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 348). In order to address these issues, 
Fairclough bases his later work on a realist social ontology, in addition to a critical realism 
particularly inspired by the work of Roy Bhaskar. In a paper concerning critical discourse 
analysis of organisations Fairclough expresses this change to the point:
I shall argue instead for a critical realist position which is moderately socially constructive but rejects 
the tendency for the study of organisation to be reduced to the study of discourse, locating the analysis 
of discourse instead within an analytically dualist epistemology which gives primacy to researching 
relations between agency (process, and events…) and structure on the basis of a realist social ontology 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 348).
Fairclough’s philosophical shift is further argued by noting how critical realism accentuates 
ontological aspects without reducing epistemological aspects. In this way, the tradition of 
critical discourse analysis can recognise ontological aspects, while simultaneously avoiding a 
collapse of deep-rooted and prominent discourse theories, which are seen to constitute a
foundation of Fairclough’s critical discourse tradition. Fairclough is able to preserve his 
traditional theoretical approach with only a minor alteration, because “critical realism is a 
philosophy of (social) science, not a (social) theory, and a critical realist approach is 
consistent with diverse social scientific theories which CDA might productively enter 
dialogue with” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 361). By relating critical realism to the concept of 
discourse, a majority of social theories applied in the critical discourse tradition are 
maintained – albeit anchored by a slightly different philosophical argument, which also 
acknowledges the existence of a real world. Nevertheless, some notions of the critical realistic 
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approach to critical discourse analysis should be accentuated. To start with, it is essential to 
distinguish between the concept of discourse and that of reality. This distinction follows from 
the argument that the natural world (the real) and the social world (e.g. concepts of discourse) 
abide by a different set of rules where the former, but not the latter, exists independently of 
human action. 
[C]ritical realist ontology … asserts that there is a real world which exists independently of our (always 
limited) knowledge of it and of whether or how we represent it, rejects versions of discourse theory 
which collapse the distinction between reality and discourse, yet also assert that the real world is 
socially and discursively constructed (Fairclough, 2010, p. 164). 
A critical realistic approach to discourse analysis thus recognises that the natural and the 
social world are different, and that neither can be reduced to the other. It is furthermore 
stressed that concrete social events (such as text) and abstract social structures (such as 
semiotic systems, viz. language) are understood as part of social reality (Fairclough, 2010; 
Sayer, 2000). 
Another and related aspect relevant to discourse theories is critical realism and its 
understanding of causation, as critical realists show how a distinction can be drawn between 
the ‘real’, the ‘actual’, and the ‘empirical’, and causal powers found herein. ‘Causation’ is 
thus perceived as a complex phenomenon, which operates at different levels. This is 
important because critical realism is seen to explain how semiosis can have effects on and 
produce change in social practice, social institutions, and the social order more generally 
(Fairclough et al., 2002). In particular, three concepts connected to critical realism are
elaborated when arguing for its relevance to critical discourse studies and causation. It is 
stressed firstly that “critical realists distinguish the real from the actual and the empirical”, 
secondly that “critical realism views objects as structured and as having particular causal 
powers or liabilities”, and thirdly that “critical realists argue that reasons can operate as 
causes, that is, can be responsible for producing change” (Fairclough, 2010, pp. 204-205). In 
connection with causal powers related to semiosis, it is further noted how social events (e.g. 
texts) may be shaped by two forms of power: Social events (and texts) are, on the one hand,
shaped by social agents, and on the other hand, by social practices (e.g. order of discourse) 
and social structures (e.g. semiotic systems and language) (Fairclough, 2010). Emphasis is 
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additionally put on context, as it is asserted that language studied in isolation will lead to 
incomplete and reductionistic accounts of social causation17.
Realist discourse analysis in this view is based in a dialectic-relational social ontology which sees 
objects, entities, persons, discourses, organisations and so on as socially produced ‘permanences’ which 
arise out of processes and relations (...) and which constitute a pre-structured reality with which we are 
confronted, and sets of affordances and limitations on processes. The concern in research is with the 
relationship and tension between pre-constructed social structures, practice, identities, orders of 
discourse, organisations on the one hand, and processes, actions, events on the other (Fairclough, 2010, 
pp. 356-357). 
A critical realist perspective on discourse theories can generally be seen to repudiate much of 
the critique that discourse theories have encountered, concerning relativistic problems 
connected to post-modernism and social-constructionism. This is particularly due to the 
assertion that there is a real world which exists independently of our knowledge of it, to 
rejection of discourse theory which denies the distinction between reality and discourse, and 
the related assertion that the real world is socially and discursively constructed. Subsequently,
Fairclough notes that critical discourse analysis can now – with its new and critical realistic 
anchoring – be seen as a “‘moderate’ or ‘contingent’ form of social constructivism” 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 5)18. The forthcoming enquiry related to this chapter, however, is what 
these critical realistic discourse theories suggest: what do the discourse theories on structures, 
relations, language, power, ideologies and change actually encompass? Furthermore, what is 
the theoretical backdrop of critical discourse analysis used in this study?
Central discourse theoretical concepts in this research 
The following sections present central discourse-theoretical concepts for this critical discourse 
analytical study on educational neuroscience. This includes discursive notions of text, 
representation and discourse, intertextuality and interdiscursivity, and social events, practices 
and structures. Concepts of knowledge, ideology and power, discourse and social change, as 
well as opaque discursive structures and relations are also elaborated.
                                                          
17 For a more through argumentation for a critical realist approach to discourse analysis, see for instance Fairclough et al. 
(2002), Sayer (2000), in addition to chapter 8, 9 and 13 in Fairclough (2010). 
18 The critical discourse theoretical framework presented in this chapter is in concordance with Fairclough’s later work that 
is suggestive of a critical realistic approach to critical discourse analysis. If not explicitly stated, my theoretical framework 
will from now on forth simply be called critical discourse analysis, since this is in accordance with the term (the late) 
Fairclough himself used.
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Text, representations, and discourse  
As already noted, text is a central aspect of critical discourse analysis – but what precisely 
does this concept comprise? A basic element in the discourse tradition is that ‘text’ is 
understood as something more than just written text. As Fairclough (2010, p. 233) notes:
“Texts are to be understood in an inclusive sense, not only written texts but also conversations 
and interviews, as well as the ‘multi-modal’ texts (mixing language and visual images) of 
television and the internet”. The discourse tradition thus operates with an inclusive definition 
of ‘text’. Moreover, when it comes to this concept, it is emphasized that a text should not be 
understood in isolation. The argument is that a text cannot exist in a vacuum; someone must 
have created it and it will therefore be allocated time and/or space. A text – be it a written 
document, a spoken conversation, or news coverage on the internet – will therefore, inevitably 
and undoubtedly, be part of a larger historical, social, and cultural context. In line with this 
argument, critical discourse studies of text are rarely utilized as merely linguistic and 
grammatical analyses of documents. “Insofar as semiosis has been studied in isolation from 
its context,” Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer (2002, p. 2) notes, “this is bound to lead to an 
incomplete account of social causation and therefore risks committing one or more kinds of 
reductionism”. Since texts are seen as intertwined aspects of the contextual in the critical 
discourse analytical tradition, emphasis is put on complex relationships between the micro-
textual and the macro-sociological. 
This notion of text alone cannot fully illuminate the analytical value attributed to it by
critical discourse analysts. Yet another aspect should be assigned to the term, namely the 
concept of representation. ‘Representation’ is an abstract term, defined as the ‘concept of 
appearance’, which lies between the physical reality and our perception of this reality. The 
argument is that our perception of the world is not unmediated – in our effort to understand
the world around us, we make use of language, categories, and other social models of 
conception19. However, these social models are not – and never can be – neutral ‘reading 
glasses’, which reflect the reality without a socially biased perspective (Neumann, 2010). In 
other words: how we present the world will, to some extent, be attributable to the historical, 
social, and cultural context surrounding us. We can therefore never present the world as it is í
                                                          
19 Fairclough (2010) has in his later work used the term semiosis when referring to “meaning-making as an element of the 
social process” (p. 230). In some of his paper ‘semiosis’ is also referred to as ‘language’ and ‘discourse’, because semiosis is 
seen to encompass more than (verbal) language, in addition to offering a less confusing term than ‘discourse’ used as 
abstract nouns (p. 220). In my dissertation, however, I will make use of ‘language’ and ‘discourse’, because I consider these 
terms to be clearer and more comprehensible for readers without a background in critical discourse studies.  
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what we can do is re-present it. Understood in this manner, text – that is, our representation of 
the world – will be influenced by the discourse in which we, and the text, are immersed. 
In critical discourse analysis, the concept of text, as the previous paragraph indicates, 
must be seen in conjunction with the concept of representation – which in turn must be 
understood in conjunction with the concept of discourse. Before continuing, a more thorough 
definition of discourse is thus appropriate, although, defining the concept of discourse is not 
easy due to its imprecise nature. What has contributed to the vagueness of this concept are the 
many and different definitions of discourse formulated by various disciplinary and theoretical 
perspectives (Fairclough, 1992). In order to clarify this multi-defined concept, it is helpful to 
refer to Toews (2004), as he divides the term into two different meanings: discourse 
understood as text and discourse understood as structural dimensions. The first meaning is 
concerned with systems of categorization and codes in a communicative process – in other 
words, it is chiefly concerned with linguistic aspects. Language and other forms of text are 
relevant to the second meaning as well, albeit the focal point here is analysis of the underlying 
dimensions of discourses. As Toews (2004, p. 8917) notes, it is the “discourse as the 
historical a priori of thought, speech, and action” which researchers attempt to analyse. In this 
latter part, discourse is thus seen to encompass a dialogical conception of text and the social 
context. Considering what has previously been said regarding Fairclough’s tradition – and 
particularly concerning concepts of text and representation – it is not surprising that 
Fairclough has been signalling a social-theoretical concept of discourse in line with the latter 
discursive approach. 
In respect of the social-theoretical and structural approach a discourse can, generally 
speaking, be understood as “a specific way to talk about and perceive the world” (Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 1999, p. 9 [my translation]), although the simplicity of this account does not 
adequately identify the intricate nature of a discourse. Another definition, suggested by 
Fairclough himself, states that “[d]iscourse is an element of all social processes, events and 
practices, though they are not simply discourse” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 503). Even if this 
definition is more adequate than the first one, it is nevertheless not particular clarifying. 
Precisely this, though, is the difficult core of critical discourse analysis and its theoretical 
framework – the concept of discourse cannot easily be explained in one single sentence. 
Discourse is a complex concept, because it connects with a particular aspect of study and then 
branches out, attempting to reach everything from macro-social processes, events and 
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practices, to micro-linguistic aspects in text and language. To make things more complicated, 
the nexus of a discourse can be located either here or there depending on the research 
question and the aim of a particular study. The concept of discourse must therefore be seen as 
a variable analytical dimension rather than a fixed social concept. In other words, with the 
concept of discourse, one attempts to conduct an abstract delimitation of a vast and non-
restricted social concept or phenomenon.
The analytical notion of ‘discourse’ can be a somewhat ‘all-inclusive’ concept, given
that the intention is to cover both micro-textual and macro-social aspects of a particular topic. 
What is essential to emphasise, however, is the variety of different analytical aspects a 
discourse can therefore encompass. As already stated, ‘text’ is one aspect that is included in
discourse, but ‘subjects’ is also a part of discourses. The same goes for ‘knowledge’, ‘social 
practices’ and ‘events’, as well as more material aspects such as ‘organisations’ and 
‘institutions’. With regard to the two latter aspects, these can actually be seen as both material 
constructions and as programmes, which systematize thought and practices (Neumann, 2010).
An educational institution, for instance, can be perceived as a concrete school building, but 
also as an organisational system where certain knowledge and practices are institutionalized 
in ways of being and behaving within the educational domain. In view of this all-
encompassing notion of discourse, one can say that “discourse is a particular way of 
representing certain parts or aspects of the (physical, social, psychological) world” 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 358). One can, for instance, find discourses which represent social 
groups and social relationships in different ways. What is of further importance is that these 
discursive aspects are understood to be in a dialectical relation to one another – that is, they 
are seen to influence, and be influenced, by each other. Moreover, it is argued that a discourse 
cannot be reduced to its components and, simultaneously, that these aspects cannot be 
understood as simply discourse (Fairclough, 2010). In view of this, the concept of discourse is 
multi-layered and complex and, indeed, a concept which can be difficult to grasp. As 
Fairclough (2010, p. 3) notes; “Discourse is not simply an entity we can define independently: 
we can only arrive at an understanding of it by analysing sets of relations”. Thus, to fully 
understand the concept of ‘discourse’ as an analytical notion of study, it may be easier to 
draw on different theories related to the structures and relations one can allocate to discourses. 
These discursive structures can be conceived as a web, which is embedded within and 
between discourses – a network of potential relations of a social, political, historical, cultural, 
and textual nature. 
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Intertextuality and interdiscursivity 
One term which has been suggested in order to address textual discursive relationships is 
intertextuality; a term which indicates that one text will be affected by, and in turn affect, 
other texts. Intertextuality is thus a term referring to relationships between different texts, as 
each linguistic and semiotic aspect will carry ‘luggage’ with it from its meeting with other 
textual fragments (Neumann, 2010). Similarly, the concept of interdiscursivity indicates 
relationships between discourses, signifying how one discourse can both affect and be 
affected by other discourses (Fairclough, 1992). The concept of interdiscursivity thus 
contributes towards conveying the idea that “different discourses are intimately entangled 
with each other and together form the giant milling mass of overall societal discourse” (Jäger 
& Maier, 2009, p. 35). Interdiscursivity can be further related to the Foucauldian term ‘order 
of discourse’, albeit that this latter term has a somewhat different meaning. What this term 
suggests is that relationships between discourses are not necessarily neutral; rather, discourses 
are often arranged in a hierarchic ‘order’ where some hold more ‘dominant’ positions than 
others. “An order of discourse can more specifically be seen as a particular combination of 
different discourses, different genres and different styles, which are articulated together in a 
distinctive way” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 358). Taken together, intertextuality, interdiscursivity, 
and order of discourse refer to discursive structures and relationships, which can be found 
between texts and between discourses. These links are indeed central, since critical discourse 
studies aim to analyse and illuminate the entwined discursive web. 
Social events, practices, and structures 
The relationship between social structures, social practices, and social events is also of note 
within a critical realistic approach to critical discourse studies, where language and semiosis 
are seen as elements in all the social levels. Schematically this is illustrated by Fairclough 
(2003, p. 24) as follows: 
- Social structures: language
- Social practices: orders of discourse
- Social events: texts
Social structures are seen as very abstract entities, which are further understood to define a 
potential or a set of SRVVLELOLWLHVí VXFKDV DQ HFRQRPLF VWUXFWXUH D VRFLDO FODVVRUNLQVKLS
system. Additionally, language is understood as an abstract social structure, for instance in 
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how certain ways of combining linguistic elements are possible whereas others are not (e.g. 
‘the brain’ is possible in English, whereas ‘brain the’ is not). Yet even if social structures such 
as language define certain possibilities and exclude others, the relationship between what is 
structurally possible (i.e. structures) and what actually happens (i.e. events) is very complex 
(Fairclough, 2003). 
What this implies is that a concrete event, such as a text, is not in any direct or simple 
way the effect of potentials defined by abstract social structures such as language. Within the 
critical discourse tradition, relationships between social structures and social events are 
understood as mediated, and a level of intermediate organisational elements called ‘social 
practices’ is thus located between structures and events. Social practices are further seen as 
ways of controlling the selection and maintenance of certain structural possibilities in 
particular areas of social life. Additionally, social practices are understood as being networked 
together in particular and shifting ways. Examples of social practice are practices of teaching 
and practices of management in educational institutions, which, in turn, can also be seen to 
have undergone a shift during recent decades as they have become networked together with 
practices of management (cf. ‘marketization’ of education; Fairclough, 2003). If we also look 
at the semiotic and language dimensions of social practices, these are seen to be ‘order of 
discourse’. Elements of order of discourse are not elements of linguistic structures such as 
nouns or sentences, but rather particular social ordering of the relationship between different 
ways of acting, representing, and being in particular areas of social life (Fairclough, 2003). 
The important point to note is how this intermediate level of social practice articulates 
discourses (hence language) with other non-discursal social elements. This is also in line with 
the notion that as we move from abstract structures (e.g. language), through social practices 
(e.g. order of discourse), and towards more concrete events (e.g. text), it becomes increasingly 
difficult to separate language from other social elements (Fairclough, 2003). Overall, it can 
therefore be said that a social process can be seen as the interplay between the three levels of 
social structures, practices, and events.  
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Knowledge, ideology, and power  
When it comes to discursive structures embedded within a discourse, aspects such as 
knowledge, ideology, and power are essential20. With regard to notions of knowledge, the 
concept of representations ought to be brought forth. As previously stated, representations are 
the series of categories, metaphors, and other social models of conception, which we turn to 
when trying to make sense of the world. Our representations are seldom neutral, and texts 
should therefore be understood as being culturally encumbered (Neumann, 2010). The 
argument that follows from this perception of language and text is that how we express certain 
‘truths’ about our perceived reality, is also culturally laden and attributable to certain 
discourses. This implies that our knowledge of the world is influenced by discourses and what 
is understood as certainties will therefore vary depending on contextual factors such as time, 
place, and culture. However, this relationship between discourses and knowledge must not be 
seen as a one-directional influence where discourses solely affect our knowledge; the 
relationship is somewhat dialectical, because knowledge and language may shape social 
practices and material objects, which, in turn, may change discourses. This is a central aspect 
and it is emphasized that “discourses exert power because they transport knowledge on which 
collective and individual consciousness feeds. This knowledge is the basis for individual and 
collective, discursive and non-discursive action, which in turn shapes reality” (Jäger & Maier, 
2009, p. 39). In view of a critical realistic approach to discourse theories, knowledge about 
the world must therefore be understood as ‘truths’, which are related to certain discourses 
(Fairclough, 2010). In other words: our knowledge about the world is socially constructed and 
can be suggested, challenged, and even discarded since our concepts of certainties are 
changeable. 
Aspects of socially construed and changeable knowledge bring forth crucial questions 
for critical discourse analysts: which truths are acknowledged in certain discourses, why is this 
knowledge suggested, and who has the power to craft these truths? Relating knowledge to 
certain views of preference directs our attention to the concept of ideology. In Fairclough’s 
account of ideology – an account which partly builds on Althusser’s and Thompson’s 
theorization – ideologies are understood “to be ‘meaning in the service of power’” 
(Thompson 1984 in Fairclough, 2010, p. 8). This notion implies that ideology functions as a 
means of representing aspects of the world in particular ways – it being operationalized in 
                                                          
20 Seeing that discourses are related to one another (cf. interdiscursivity and order of discourse), structures which can be 
found within a discourse can also be seen as somewhat interlinked between discourses.   
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identities or in ways of acting – and these representations contribute towards establishing or 
sustaining relationships of supremacy. The concept of ideologies can, as such, be utilized to 
address relationships of discourse and power, but ideologies are also vulnerable to criticism
since they represent or explain aspects of the world inadequately (Fairclough, 2010).
Moreover, relationships between discourse and ideologies are of interest due to the entwined 
network of relationships between discursive aspects, such as knowledge, subjects, social 
practices, and institutions. As Fairclough notes:
Institutional frame includes formulations and symbolisations of a particular set of ideological 
representations: particular ways of talking are based upon particular ‘ways of seeing’ … in the process 
of acquiring the ways of talking which are normatively associated with a subject position, one 
necessarily acquires also its ways of seeing, or ideological norms. And just as one is typically unaware 
of one’s ways of talking unless for some reason they are subjected to conscious scrutiny, so also is one 
typically unaware of what ways of seeing, what ideological representations, underline one’s talk
(Fairclough, 2010, pp. 41-42).
Construction of knowledge and suggesting certain ‘ideological truths’ at the expense of others 
is further linked to notions of power. When considering the notion of power and discourse, it 
must be stressed that the term ‘power’ has a somewhat changeable meaning which should not 
be generalised – the notion of power will vary from discourse to discourse, and between 
different discursive dimensions. Jäger and Maier (2009, p. 37) elaborate on this and divide the 
connection between power and discourse into two dimensions: on the one hand one can have
power over discourse, whilst on the other hand there is the power of discourse. Firstly, the 
power over discourse indicates that the different individuals and groups in a discourse have 
different chances of influence. These agents or groups can be said to have more power over 
discourse than others, “for example because they have privileged access to the media or 
greater financial resources” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 39). Furthermore, these individuals have 
power in being able to suggest certain truths, representations, or views of the world. 
Construction and maintaining of doxa – that is, knowledge which at that time is considered to 
be the accepted truth – is power consuming because it demands continuous articulation of a 
certain representation, in addition to the continuous task of holding at bay conflicting 
representations. In other words, it takes excessive discursive work to ‘freeze meaning’ in a 
world where knowledge and truths are in constant fluctuation (Neumann, 2010). However, 
even if individuals and groups have power over discourse, none can be said to control 
discourses per se. “Discourses are supra-individual. Everybody is co-producing discourse, but 
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no single individual or group controls discourse or has precisely intended its final result” 
(Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 38).
This concept leads us to the second notion of power – the power of GLVFRXUVHíZKHUH
power bias is seen to lie within the discourse itself. The argument is that discourses exercise 
power since they regulate and institutionalise how subjects think, talk, and act, albeit this 
‘order of things’ appears as normal and consequently remains relatively unchallenged by 
individuals within the discourse (Neumann, 2010). This implies that people sometimes abide 
by an ‘imperceptible power’ – a power, that is, which is manifested and embedded in the 
discourse. There is neither one person nor a group of people who hold this supremacy; the 
power is instead in the discourse itself. Discourses can therefore be seen to exert power over 
their individuals as they make certain things appear to be true and beyond all doubt, even if 
this not necessarily is the case (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). Jäger and Maier elaborate on 
how discourses can exert power over their subjects simply due to their construction, by noting 
how one can distinguish between two different effects of discourse:
Firstly, discourses form individual and mass consciousness and thereby constitute individual and 
collective subjects. Secondly, since consciousness determines action, discourses determine action. This 
human action creates materializations. Discourses thus guide the individual and collective creation of 
reality (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 37).
The argument that discourses exercise power in a society by regulating and institutionalizing
ways of thinking, talking, and acting, can further be linked to the term discursive regularity.
The argument is that discourse exists due to a set of regularities between representations of 
reality, values, and institutions (Neumann, 2010). Expressed more precisely: when 
representations are reflected in social practices, one can say that the discourse is preserved in 
a state of status quo. In turn, social practices contribute to shaping materialized institutions 
and symbolized systems that regulate individuals, actions, and thoughts. As such, the power 
of discourse can be seen as a closed feedback-loop where discursive aspects reflect and affect 
each other. A discourse with a resilient discursive regularity between these aspects will be a 
system of self-maintenance. In other words, such powerful discourses can be said to hold a 
hegemonic and dominant position in that their representations appear to be stable and thus 
remain unchallenged (Neumann, 2010).
When analyzing states of hegemonic dominion and the power effects of discourse, it
is, furthermore, of importance to distinguish between discourse on the one hand and its 
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aspects on the other, because there is a difference between the effects of a singular discursive
aspect such as a text, and those of a discourse. “A single text has minimal effects, which are 
hardly noticeable and almost impossible to prove. In contrast, a discourse, with its recurring 
contents, symbols and strategies, leads to the emergence and solidification of ‘knowledge’ 
and therefore has sustained effects” as Jäger and Maier (2009, p. 38) note, before continuing; 
“What is important is not the single text … but the constant repetition of statements”. 
Discourse and social change 
One certainly receives the impression that discourses are somewhat profound and rigid 
structures with a firm set of relationships both within and between discursive orders. 
Furthermore, with regard to executions of power, it can appear that individuals are subject to
certain deterministic constraints of their discourse or other agents. Numerous authors have 
argued about this, debating whether or not subjects can be credited with an active role in the 
discursive matrix. Althusser, for instance, sees people as passive subjects deprived of the 
opportunity for ideological resistance and action (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). Fairclough 
(1992; 2010) and numerous authors (Jäger & Maier, 2009; Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999; 
Neumann, 2010) take another approach, claiming that one can oppose power. “The nature of 
conflicting elements holds the seed to resistance, since elements which challenge dominant 
representations provide people with resources to make resistance. Hegemony is therefore 
never stable, but changing and unfinished” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999, p. 88). Subsequently, 
this means that discursive dominance can cease to exist, hegemonic power can falter and 
change can occur. Critical discourse analysts therefore perceive individuals as active subjects,
and understand discourse as a system liable to change, because even if there are issues of 
power ‘over’ and ‘of’ discourse, there will always be the possibility of resistance and 
revolution. This implies that the feedback-loop between discursive regularities – such as those 
between representations, values, social practice, and institutions – can be broken (Neumann, 
2010). Moreover, change does not appear only within discourses, change can also occur 
between discourses. The next question is thus how change in discourses can occur? 
In his book ‘Discourse and social change’, Fairclough (1992) elaborates on the fragile
line separating hegemonic dominion from discursive change. One of the crucial factors that
can tip the scale in one direction or another – either towards continuance of hegemony or in 
favour of discursive alteration – is, indeed, voices of disagreement uttered from individuals 
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holding alternative representations. “The immediate origins and motivations of change in the 
discursive event lie in the problematization of conventions … Such problematizations have 
their bases in contradictions” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 96). When it comes to confrontation with 
discursive representations, values, social practices, or institutions, it is further argued that 
resistance is most likely to be expressed by individuals from other discourses, because their
external positioning provides them with resources to resist (Fairclough, 2010, p. 27). This 
suggests that subjects outside a discourse may not be as willing to accept certain 
representations and ‘ways of being and acting’, simply because they are not as institution-
alised within that particular discursive matrix as others. Consequently, people from outside 
are more likely to resist to discursive boundaries, which determine what can and cannot be 
said and done within a discourse. However, to state that people outside are more likely to
challenge a discourse does not mean that individuals within the discourse will not be critical –
on the contrary. With regard to how subjects react to hegemonic representations, one can 
draw on Hirschman’s theorisation of the different choices of action at individual level 
(Hirschman 1970, in Neumann, 2010). Firstly, it is noted that individuals accept the dominant 
representation and the ‘way of being’ presented by a discourse; one is, in other words, loyal to 
the discourse and willingly identifies oneself with the subject position presented by a
discourse. The second option is labelled voice, meaning that one protests about the discourse. 
Resistance by ‘voice’ can also be labelled contra-identification, as in this type of resistance
the subject opposes a discourse by choosing a position diametrically opposed, and exclusively 
contradictory, to the dominant subject position. “In this mode of resistance, the subject 
position one inhabits will still be a pre-made position, even if it is negative, because it is 
simply a variation of the dominant subject position” (Neumann, 2010, p. 171). Another, and 
more radical, mode of action is the third position, namely exit, where one chooses to leave the 
discourse altogether. Exit can also be seen as a type of dis-identification, because one locates
oneself in a subject position which is not entirely encumbered by the discourse. Dis-
identification can thus be seen to be “every strategy which presents new ways of being in the 
world” (Neumann, 2010).
Resistance can furthermore be seen as a struggle over representations and ways of 
being and acting. Such discursive tussles have also been characterised as hegemonic 
struggles. “Hegemony is a focus of constant struggle around points of greatest instability 
between classes and blocs, to construct or sustain or fracture alliances and relations of 
domination/ subordination, which take economic, political and ideological forms” as 
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Fairclough (1992, p. 92) notes, before continuing; “Hegemonic struggle takes place on a 
broad front, which includes the institutions of civil society (education, trade, unions, family), 
with possible unevenness between different levels of domains”. Hegemonic struggles can be 
seen to be played out both within discourses and between them, as boundaries between 
discursive elements can contain significant amounts of tension. Such battles over discursive 
confines are noteworthy, since these boundaries represent what can and cannot be said and 
done within a discourse. Resistance in the form of exit or dis-identification will therefore not 
only imply questioning of these borderlines, but also transgression of them.
Change involves forms of transgression, crossing boundaries, such as putting together existing 
conversion in new combinations, or drawing upon conventions in situations which usually preclude 
them … As producers and interpreters combine discursive conventions, codes and elements in new 
ways in innovatory discursive events, they are of course cumulatively producing structural changes in 
orders of discourse: they are disarticulating existing orders of discourse, and rearticulating new orders 
of discourse, new discursive hegemonies. Such structural changes may affect only the ‘local’ order of 
discourse of an institution, or they may transcend institutions and affect the societal order of discourse 
(Fairclough, 1992, pp. 96-97).
Discursive struggles and resistance can therefore be seen as struggles over discourses and 
over representations’ value of truth. Hegemonic struggles in a discourse can furthermore 
facilitate change, because boundaries are crossed and different discourses are being linked. 
Changes in one discourse can affect other discourses as well, and intertextual and
interdiscursive aspects are therefore prominent in processes of change. Critical discourse 
analysis even stresses this, by claiming that “high levels of interdiscursive connections 
coincide with change, while few interdiscursive connections indicate reproduction of status 
quo” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999, p. 94). When it comes to the shaping and changing of 
discourse, it must be stressed that new discourses and new representations will also be liable 
to change. The ‘milling mass’ of discourses, and the network of structures and relations 
entwined within them, must therefore be understood as concepts which are in constant
adaption. A discourse is not a set entity, and representation of knowledge, ideologies, power 
relations, dominance, hegemonic struggles, and resistance are therefore enduring processes.  
Opaque discursive structures and relations 
Critical discourse theories are generally about relationships, dimensions, and structures within 
RUEHWZHHQGLVFRXUVHVí these being notions of representations, social resonance, regularities, 
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power, dominance, hegemony, struggle, social practices, orders of discourse etc. What is of 
note concerning such discursive relationships, and what is particularly stressed within the 
critical discourse tradition, is that these dimensions are not necessarily explicit. On the 
contrary, discursive dimensions tend to be subtly embedded and are thus often ‘taken for 
granted’ or are even ‘unknown’ by people within the discourse (Neumann, 2010). These are 
the structures in our social reality which we obey, simply because they have become so 
compatible with our way of ‘being in the world’ that we do not question them. As these 
opaque discursive structures contributH WRZDUGV VKDSLQJKRZZH WKLQNDQGDFWí and hence
influence our knowledge, socLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVí it is argued that it is of analytical 
value to highlight them. Indeed, critical discourse analysis emphasizes this by noting how 
“[t]hese relations require analysis, because there are no societies whose logic and dynamic, 
including how semiosis figures within them, are fully transparent to all: the forms in which 
they appear to people are often partial and in part misleading” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 231).
This demonstrates a resemblance to the Foucaldian discourse tradition, as the importance of 
identifying what is acknowledged as truths, in addition to discovering who has the power to 
create these truths, implies a profound and critical insight into a discourse. The question that 
follows from this, however, is: how one can examine structural and abstract aspects 
embedded in a discourse? 
The analysis of thought is always allegorical in relation to the discourse that it employs. Its question is 
unfailingly: what was being said in what was said? The analysis of the discursive field is orientated in a 
quite different way; we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its 
conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be 
connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes. We do not seek below what is 
manifest the half silent murmur of another discourse; we must show why it could not be other than it 
was, in what respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst of others and in relation to 
them, a place that no other could occupy. The question proper to such an analysis might be formulated 
in this way: what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else? (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 30-31).
In other, perhaps more comprehensible, words; “Critical discourse analysis aims to question 
and criticize discourses … It reveals the contradictions within and between discourses, the 
limits of what can be said and done, and the means by which discourse makes particular 
statements seem rational and beyond all doubt, even though they are only valid at a certain 
time and place” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 36). Through this statement, the theoretical frame of 
the critical discourse tradition, which primarily accentuates different discursive structures, is 
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justified and complemented by its more methodological and analytical approach, where 
attention is paid to the actual study and exposure of these discursive structures. 
Emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation  
This last sub-section will present a brief account of a specific set of discursive concepts which 
constitutes a central analytical foundation for this research – namely emergence, hegemony, 
and recontextualisation across structural and scalar borders. This sequence of concepts is 
suggested by Fairclough (2010)21 as an analytical agenda in accordance with a critical realistic 
approach to discourse studies – an agenda, that is, which particularly emphasizes the analysis 
of dialectical relations between discourse and social elements, in addition to highlighting
other discursive aspects such as hegemonies, struggles, and relationships of power. Moreover, 
these concepts accentuate the role of active subjects, as they encompass a focus on potential 
strategies. As Fairclough notes: 
CDA oscillates between a focus on structures and a focus on the strategies of social agents, i.e., the 
ways in which they try to achieve outcomes or objectives within existing structures and practices, or to 
change them in particular ways. This includes a focus on shifts in the structuring of semiotic difference 
(i.e., shifts in orders of discourse) which constitute a part of social change, and how social agents pursue 
their strategies semiotically in text (Fairclough, 2010, p. 233). 
Overall, the analytical agenda comprising emergence, hegemony and recontextualisation can 
be an abundant methodological frame for critically analysing the discourse of educational 
neuroscience, and consequently it is used as the main analytical framework in this study. As
the next chapter covers the specific analytical research procedure, this section will present the 
theoretical account of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over structural and 
scalar borders.
 
Emergence 
The concept of emergence is, in brief, concerned with emergence of discourse. Underlying 
this concept is the notion that ‘nothing comes out of nothing’ – discourses are not crafted in a 
                                                          
21 The concept of operationalization can be added to this analytical agenda, where analytical focus is on processes where 
aspects of abstract discursive structures are ‘put into practice’ in more realistic and material settings (Fairclough, 2010). 
However, my critical discourse analytical study of educational neuroscience will not encompass this latter concept, since an 
additional operationalization analysis would have exceeded my research project’s time and scope margins. See also 
‘suggestions for further research’ in chapter 9.  
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vacuum, but instead “emerge through ‘reweaving’ relations between existing discourses” 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 367). What this implies is that discourses can be perceived to build upon 
already existing discourses, and developmental processes occur through a ‘reweaving’ of 
elements within and between the fields of available discourses. Furthermore, the emergence 
process can include problematisation, negotiation, and transgression of discursive boundaries, 
a de-articulation of ‘the old’ and, subsequently, a re-articulation of the new discursive 
elements. Emergence of discourse will therefore encompass notions of change í not only in 
discursive boundaries and in articulations, but also in discursive and social relationships, in 
structures, social practice, social agents, in organisations etc. (Fairclough, 2010). Emergence 
of discourse can, as such, be seen as an intrinsic notion within the discourse, as well as 
emergence between discourses, if, for instance, it becomes institutionalized within a changed 
order of discourse. However, even if emergence of discourse can be analysed at different 
levels, emergence must also be seen as a process associated with the use of ‘successful’
strategies. “[W]hile problems of emergence can be researched through analysing change in 
social processes, social interaction and text, including chains and series of interconnected 
texts over time and across organisational space, they also require reference to these structural, 
strategic and other factors” (Fairclough, 2010, pp. 367-368). Addressing the notion of 
appearance and development of discourse thus implies an identification of the range of 
emerging discourses, in addition to an account of the emerging strategies that have been used. 
Hegemony 
The concept of hegemony is valuable when illuminating aspects of change since it addresses
relationships of dialogue, conflict, struggles, and dominance between discourses. Fairclough 
(2010, p. 19) notes this by stressing that hegemony “[s]how how particular discourses gain 
prominence or become marginalised over time, and how particular discourses emerge as 
dominant or hegemonic”. One basic principle underpinning the hegemony concept is the idea 
that discursive ‘truths’ and regularities will constitute a natural centre for struggle and change 
(Fairclough, 2010). This implies that discourse is not a fixed entity set once and for all and 
that a discourse’s narrations, practices, values, institutions, and other discursive aspects can 
therefore be seen as negotiable. This is where notions of power and hegemony come into play,
because negotiations of discursive aspects will often bring into play different actors’
intentions and strategies for shaping a discourse in a certain way. 
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Hegemony is a focus of constant struggle around points of greatest instability between classes and 
blocs, to construct or sustain or fracture alliances and relations of domination/subordination, which 
takes economic, political and ideological forms ... [Hegemonic struggle] contributes in varying degrees 
to the reproduction or transformation not only of the existing order of discourse ... but also through that 
of existing social and power relations (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 92-93).
In this respect it must be mentioned that preservation of a certain discursive way of thinking, 
being, and acting in the world can become a less power-consuming task if there is strong 
resonance between discursive regularities. As previously mentioned, this implies that the 
discourse settles into a feedback-loop between discursive representations, values, and 
institutions (Neumann, 2010). The stronger the resonance is between discursive regularities, 
the more closed the feedback-loop will become; and the more closed and self-sustaining a 
discourse is, the more difficult it will be to break its (seemingly) naturalised hegemonic 
dominion. Such aspects of discursive regularities are important to note, because they bring 
into focus an essential point: discursive change must be seen as interplay between individual 
actors/groups and discursive structures. While individual actors and groups undoubtedly enter
into negotiations and struggle over different discursive ‘truths’, no one can be seen to control 
discourse or to precisely have intended its final ‘result’ (Jäger & Maier, 2009). Constitutions 
of hegemonic relationships must therefore be seen to be brought into play by actors and by 
discursive structures, since both subjects’ power over discourse and the power of discourse 
contribute to changes in discourse. By critically analysing hegemony as a discursive aspect,
one can therefore provide insights into the struggles between different strategies for 
transforming society in different directions, identifying and explaining the success of certain 
strategies and the failures of others, in addition to illuminating tensions, conflicts and 
struggles within and between discourses. 
 
Recontextualisation 
The concept of recontextualisation is adopted from the sociological term suggested by 
Bernstein in his sociology of pedagogy, and is further operationalized as a category in 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analytical tradition. Recontextualisation as a concept addresses 
the ways in which a discourse can be distributed to other fields or discursive levels, as noted 
by Fairclough in the following:  
The sociological concept of ‘recontextualisation’ (Bernstein, 1990) has therefore been operationalized 
in CDA in order to explore the potentially distinctive recontextualising principles associated with 
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different fields or networks of practices (governmental, academic, public sphere etc.) which affect, at 
the concrete level, how one type of text or event is transformed into others in flows along chains and 
through networks. These flows are not simply unidirectional – there are flows into ‘practical’ events 
from governmental and theoretical fields, as well as flows in the other direction (Fairclough, 2010, p. 
422).
In other words, whereas the concept of hegemony shows how particular discourses become 
dominant and hegemonic, the concept of recontextualisation addresses how a discourse is
disseminated, re-articulated, and internalised to other fields. Fairclough (2010) further 
distinguishes between recontextualisation across structural borders and scalar borders. The 
former pay attention to how a discourse becomes distributed over the structural boundaries 
found between different social fields, such as the academic, public, and political field, 
whereas recontextualisation over scalar boundaries focuses on how a discourse is 
disseminated at international, national, and/or local level. 
Recontextualisation bears further resemblance to concepts of intertextuality,
interdiscursivity, and to the notion that there is always a continuous flow of influences within 
and between discourses, since a discourse will inevitably affect – and be affected by – other 
discourses. Here, some of the same principles used in emergence analysis are applied,
although ‘the table is turned’ as one is now examining how a discourse can be seen to cross 
discursive borders into other contexts. Accordingly, the analytical focus, for instance, will be 
on how elements of the educational neuroscience discourse are re-articulated and put into
relation with the discursive elements that already exist within these new contexts (cf. 
Fairclough, 2010). Another central concern is how particular fields can have their own 
distinctive ways of internalising an external discourse. In this respect Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough (1999) note that recontextualisation includes a colonisation-appropriation 
dialectic where the recontextualisation process can be seen as i) the ‘colonisation’ of one field 
or institution by another, but also as ii) the ‘appropriation’ of external discourses in the way in 
which the field actively incorporates a discourse into strategies pursued by particular groups
or social agents within the recontextualising field. For example, the discourse of educational 
neuroscience appears to have become recontextualised into the public field (e.g. by media and
by business persons in ‘brain-based’ learning programmes) and into the political field (e.g. by 
policymakers), but educational neuroscience may have become incorporated differently into 
the strategies of mass media, business managers, or government officials. The concept of 
recontextualisation thus acknowledges the active and diverse strategies of central actors 
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pertaining to educational neuroscience, as well as recognising how the discourse itself can be 
seen to have had an impact on different fields and at different discursive levels. When it 
comes to the study of educational neuroscience, the concept of recontextualisation can be of 
great value, since it directs attention away from the academic level of discourse and instead 
investigates how educational neuroscience has become re-contextualised within other societal 
fields í both internationally and nationally.
Chapter summary 
This chapter has attempted to provide a theoretical backdrop for this doctoral study on 
educational neuroscience. As I intend to use critical discourse analysis as a methodological 
framework – a mode of study where theory and method are highly interlinked and, indeed, 
where the resulting discussion of the topic is chiefly based on critical discourse theories –
substantial space has been allocated to the clarification of central theoretical concepts. 
Discursive aspects such as text, representation, knowledge, ideology, power, hegemony, 
subject positions, social practice, and events have been explained, and the web of 
relationships one can find within and between discourses has been emphasized. One of the 
chief arguments throughout the chapter is therefore that discourses constitute a set of 
relationships and structures which contribute towards shaping our knowledge, practices, and 
institutions, and that these aspects in turn shape discourse. In other words, there is a
dialectical relation within and between different discourses and their aspects. Another central 
argument is that such discursive relationships tend to be opaque and unknown to people 
within the discourse, as these discursive dimensions are often accepted as a natural part of 
discourses. Connected to this, critical discourse analysis, due to it being critical, aims to 
uncover and evaluate elusive discursive dimensions. Accordingly, and in regard to this 
doctoral study, the following method chapter will explain in more detail how these discursive
structures and the theoretical concepts of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation can 
be linked to an analysis of the educational neuroscience discourse. 
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Chapter 4 
Ϋ  
 
Critical discourse analysis is a multidisciplinary and multimodal theoretical and methodical 
framework, where macro-sociological theories are interlinked with micro-analysis of text. 
This implies that critical discourse analysis does not consist of one particular theory, nor can 
it be said to offer one specific method design. When Fairclough refers to critical discourse 
analysis, he therefore often defines his account of it as a ‘methodology’ rather than a 
‘method’. The distinction is essential, as method implies particular analytical procedures, 
whereas methodology has a theoretical character because it justifies the use of particular 
research methods (Fairclough, 2010, p. 164). In a critical discourse study, the method used 
has a complex and research-unique design, which inevitably depends on the object of research 
and its relevant theoretical framework. Conducting critical discourse analysis is therefore not 
simply a matter of ‘applying methods’ in the conventional way (Fairclough, 2010; Jäger & 
Maier, 2009).
CDA is not a toolkit for analysing text and talk … which can be evaluated against competing toolkits. 
CDA does not offer special forms of ‘micro’ analysis; it is a way of framing any choice of modes of 
‘micro’ analysis. It is a resource for tracing relations between the processes and relations and patterns 
one can discern in text and talk, and wider social (economic, political, legal etc.) relations and processes 
and practices and structures (Fairclough, 2010, p. 419).
Lack of a coherent method design has led to the criticism that critical discourse analysis is a 
rather ‘imprecise’ and ‘vague’ mode of study. However, even if critical discourse analysis 
lacks a detailed and universal method procedure, it has an abundance of methodological 
accounts of critical discourse studies. Furthermore, flexible methods that allow researchers to 
tailor analytical designs to their own object of research will require careful theoretical and 
methodological consideration of one’s own research project – this can therefore be seen as a 
strength rather than a weakness of critical discourse analysis.
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Researchers using critical discourse analysis must evaluate potential method designs 
with the aim of formulating method procedures that will benefit the research. In order to 
provide transparency in my research process, I will in the following chapter present 
considerations and clarifications regarding method design for this doctoral project. I will first 
elaborate on the general methodology of critical discourse analysis, before presenting the
method procedures for my critical discourse analysis of educational neuroscience. This latter 
account includes a presentation of research questions, a definition of discursive boundaries, an 
account of literature searches, and the presentation of general text analytical designs. 
Subsequently, I will elaborate on the specific clarifications of the four analytical parts of 
emergence, hegemony, recontextualisation over structural borders, and recontextualisation
over scalar borders, before considering certain limitations regarding the method design. 
 
General methodology of critical discourse analysis 
Numerous perspectives are offered concerning critical discourse methodology and analytical 
designs for how one can strongly link macro-social theories with micro-textual analysis of 
language. To start with, some basic principles are suggested by Fairclough, in order to 
distinguish critical discourse analysis from other forms of research. Essentially, Fairclough 
(2010, pp. 10-11) suggests “that research and analysis counts as CDA in so far as it has all of
the following characteristics:
1. It is not just analysis of discourse (or more concretely, texts), it is part of some form of systematic 
transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process. 
2. It is not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of text. 
3. It is not just descriptive, it is also normative. It addresses social wrongs in their discursive aspects 
and possible ways of righting or mitigating them”.
Critical study of discourse offers a transdisciplinary mode of research where the goal is to 
analyse dialectical relations between discourses and other social aspects, in addition to 
analysing internal relations within discourse. This goal reflects the general objective of critical 
discourse analysis, as it aims “to systematically explore often opaque relationships of 
causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider 
social and cultural structures, relations and processes” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 93). In view of 
this, an analysis of discourse will also suggest transgression of disciplinary boundaries, as 
social, political, and linguistic theories may be put to use (Fairclough, 2010). It is important in 
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this respect that linguistic analyses are not reduced to social theories – nor the other way 
around. This is noteworthy, as Fairclough aims to transcend the division between social and 
linguistic studies of discourse by focusing on dialogical relationships between text and
context.
So, text analysis is an essential part of discourse analysis, but discourse analysis is not merely the 
linguistic analysis of text. I see discourse analysis as ‘oscillating’ between a focus on specific analysis 
of text and a focus on what I call the ‘order of discourse’, the relatively durable social structuring of 
language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social 
practices. Critical discourse analysis is concerned with continuity and change at this more abstract, 
more structural, level, as well as with what happens in particular texts (Fairclough, 2003, p. 3).
This transdisciplinary concept of text and context – the linking of micro-textual analysis with 
macro-social theories – reflects what Fairclough calls “a relational view of texts, and a
relational approach to text analysis” (2003, p. 35). Analytically speaking, this draws attention 
to certain concerns about ‘levels’ of analysis and, notably, attention to the relationship 
between such ‘levels’. In order to distinguish these levels of text analysis, this can be arranged 
schematically as follows (cf. Fairclough, 2003):
- The level of the social: ‘external’ relations of texts, i.e. the text’s social context.
- The level of discourse: interdiscursive relations, i.e. a mediating level.
- The level of text: ‘internal’ relations of texts, i.e. the text per se.
The ‘level of text’ encompasses language text, spoken or written, and is concerned with the 
text per se. Level of text can accordingly be associated with an analysis of ‘internal’ 
relationships of texts, as it includes descriptive and linguistic text analysis (Fairclough, 2003).
Methodologically speaking, the argument for such a mode of study is that detailed and 
systematic analyses of text will reveal how discourse is manifested textually. Essentially this 
assumes that language is an interconnected and irreducible part of the social, and that there 
will always be a textual moment in work in the production of social practice and in social life.
Fairclough (2003, p. 203) emphasizes this by noting that “[w]ithout detailed analysis, one 
cannot really show that language is doing the work one may theoretically ascribe to it”. 
Numerous analytical tools can assist in the task of revealing ways in which texts represent and 
construct certain perspectives of the world, social identities, practices, and relationships.
However, critical discourse analysis does not initially provide all the analytical modes of 
study necessary for conducting detailed text analysis, and many analytical strategies come 
from Michael Halliday’s tradition of ‘Systemic Functional Linguistics’ (Fairclough, 2003;
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Halliday, 2002). Other methods of text and language analysis í IRU LQVWDQFH SHUVSHFWLYHV
from conversation analysis, linguistic pragmatics, or corpus linguistics í can also be applied 
to discourse studies (Fairclough, 2003; Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2009). Linguistic modes 
of analysis therefore cover a variety of textual aspects, ranging from interactional control to 
metaphors, as well as semantic, grammatical, vocabulary, and phonological relationships.
Moving on to the middle dimension – the ‘level of discourse’ – this section involves 
discursive aspects such as discursive practice and processes of production, distribution, and 
consumption of text. The focus of attention is thus on how texts are articulated and 
represented, and how they can resemble other texts and other discourses. Accordingly, 
intertextual and interdiscursive relationships are central to how the relations between genres, 
discourse, and styles are examined and analysed. These latter aspects can also be found in 
both ‘level of text’ and ‘level of the societal’: In ‘level of texts’, genres, discourse, and styles 
can be organised into interdiscursive relationships, as these elements may be articulated, 
mixed and textured together; whereas, at the ‘level of the societal’ they can be articulated 
together through variations in the order of discourse. Since the elements appear in texts and 
the social, the level of discourse constitutes “a mediating level between the text per se and its 
social context” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 37). In view of the importance of text–context 
relationship in critical discourse studies, the intermediate level of discourse is a key-element.
At the level of the social, the focus is on analysis of ‘external’ relationships of texts, as 
here one is analysing their relationship to other elements of social events and, more abstractly, 
social practices (such as order of discourse) and social structures (such as language) 
(Fairclough, 2003). What the three-dimensional model further emphasises is that the level of 
text and the level of discourse must be interrelated with the social elements of which they are 
part. Analytically, this may imply an uncovering of relationships between discursive
practices, the social, and the order of discourse on which these practices draw. In addition to 
focusing on the order of discourse, researchers can also examine the social matrix of 
discourse, scrutinize how practices are regulated and distributed, focus on the ideological and 
political effects of discourse, study traces of discursive and social change, or examine 
hegemonic relations (Fairclough, 1992). Considering these broader social traits, this level 
connects the level of text, discourse, and the societal by means of social analysis. 
Consequently, researchers will often draw their final conclusions, results, and evaluations 
when analysing this last level, since this stage addresses issues of, for instance, power, 
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ideological consequences, or social change. Engagement in such issues makes the study 
political and critical (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999).
Regarding the actual analysis in critical discourse studies, researchers may wish to 
code a complete body of text in general terms or analyse a smaller number of samples in more 
detail. Researchers can also choose various analytical perspectives when analysing texts, as 
one can code textual data in broad terms, code it in terms of topics, summarize the discourse, 
scan text material for particular features or formulations, or examine texts with respect to 
certain types of questions (Fairclough, 1992, p. 230). Furthermore, text analyses may also 
comprise various modes of linguistic analysis, modes of categorization of texts, and other 
qualitative text analytical procedures (Wetherell et al., 2009). Bearing in mind that critical 
discourse analysis emphasizes dialogical and relational aspects of discourse, the levels of text, 
discourse, and the social will not be analysed separately, but will rather be considered as 
interlinked. Investigations therefore do not only focus on linguistic analysis, but also include 
interdiscursive analyses and analysis of social contexts. Taken together, this model of critical 
discourse analysis can help describe, interpret, and explain the discursive concepts. Another 
consideration worth mentioning is that the three-dimensional outline illustrates relational 
dimensions of discourse and how these discursive dimensions should be considered when 
combining micro-textual analysis with macro-social aspects. It is therefore a methodological
diagram rather than a specific method design for analysing discourse. Different research 
projects will have different foci and thus require different method designs. Furthermore, not 
every research project will find it necessary to cover each level of analysis in the same depth, 
and again it is the object of research that will determine which delimitations should be made.
 
Method procedure for this research on educational neuroscience 
The method used for the critical discourse analysis in this doctoral project is anchored in 
Fairclough’s critical discourse tradition. In order to present an account of the general method 
procedure for my analysis of the educational neuroscience discourse, I will in the following 
sections present more detailed accounts of the research questions, the definition of discursive 
boundaries, selection criteria for texts, and general text analytical design.
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Research theme and research questions 
The overarching theme for my doctoral study is the discipline of educational neuroscience –
that is, as briefly mentioned in the introduction, the rather novel discipline which combines 
insights from disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience, neurobiology, psychology, and 
education. Within this cross-disciplinary field one can find different research perspectives, as 
some researchers or research groups are interested in the concepts of emotions whereas others 
give their attention to learning difficulties such as dyslexia or dyscalculia. The focus of my 
study, however, is the overarching field linking education and cognitive neuroscience, where I 
focus more specifically on how one approaches the concept of learning. This is because the 
concept of ‘learning’ is essential in the fields of education, cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience (albeit that different meanings are often denoted to the phenomenon, as shown 
in chapter 2), and the concept of learning can also be shown to be related to other relevant 
concepts in educational neuroscience, such as emotions and learning difficulties. Furthermore, 
as my academic background is particularly oriented towards macro-social perspectives on 
education, I have chosen to align my research approach accordingly. The focus in my doctoral 
study will therefore be on societal, structural, and relational dimensions of educational 
neuroscience as a discourse, and the overall aim is:
to analyse the development and impact of educational neuroscience by using a critical discourse 
analysis.
In view of this, relevant research questions are: how the professional discipline of educational 
neuroscience developed, what ‘general’ knowledge is accepted within the discipline, which 
issues and disagreements are negotiated within the discipline, which stakeholders and agents 
are central to the discourse, and how educational neuroscience is recontextualised into other 
areas such as public and political fields. In this respect, four discursive concepts for 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQFDQEHRISDUWLFXODUYDOXHíQDPHO\emergence, hegemony, recontextualisation
across structural borders, and recontextualisation across scalar borders. These research 
aspects are also appropriate since they are consistent with a critical realist approach to critical 
discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010; Fairclough et al., 2002). As these concepts further 
define my critical discourse analysis, four corresponding research questions are defined:  
- How and where did the discourse of educational neuroscience emerge and develop?
- What are the processes of discursive struggles related to the discourse of educational neuroscience 
and which associated narratives and relations of hegemony can be identified? 
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- How, where and how extensive has the discourse of educational neuroscience been 
recontextualised across structural borders and into public and political fields?
- How, where and how extensive has the discourse of educational neuroscience been 
recontextualised across scalar borders and into the Norwegian level?
Investigating educational neuroscience in terms of hegemony, emergence, and recontext-
ualisation can help in a thorough analysis of the discourse, since together they comprise an 
analytical approach which combines micro-textual analysis with macro-social perspectives. 
This approach will also be in line with principles associated with Fairclough’s three 
dimensional concepts of discourse and discourse analysis, because an analysis that combines 
aspects of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation makes allowance for dialogical 
relationships between text, discourse, and social factors (Wodak & Fairclough, 2010). It 
should further be noted that certain concept-specific aspects will set these topics and their 
respective research questions apart, and that the four discursive concepts will therefore be 
addressed as distinct parts. Specific concept-dependent aspects notwithstanding, the methods 
for analysing emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over structural and scalar 
borders will share numerous similarities, such as the principles for defining discursive 
boundaries, the procedure for finding texts to the corpora, in addition to general analytical 
designs.  
Definition of discursive boundaries 
Any discourse analysis should encompass a clarification of the discursive lines that are drawn 
by the researcher in order to delimit the discourse in question. The reason for this is that 
discourse is neither a concrete nor a constant concept; a discourse can instead be seen as an 
abstract delineation used to analyse and clarify particular parts of the world. More specifically 
it is noted by Fairclough that: 
‘Discourse’ is widely used in social theory and analysis ... to refer to different ways of structuring areas 
of knowledge and social practice ... Discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and 
relations, they construct or ‘constitute’ them; different discourses constitute key entities (be they 
‘mental illness’, ‘citizenship’ or ‘literacy’) in different ways, and position people in different ways as 
social subjects (e.g. as doctors or patients) (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 3-4).
Based on this, one can talk about the ‘discourse of education’, for instance, or the ‘discourse 
of neuroscience’, but one can also talk about a ‘social scientific discourse’, a ‘natural 
scientific discourse’, or an overarching ‘academic discourse’. Moreover, an ‘academic 
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GLVFRXUVH¶ FDQ EH VHHQ WR EH LQ FRQWUDVW WR D µSROLWLFDO GLVFRXUVH¶ RU D µSXEOLF GLVFRXUVH¶ í
although aspects of politics and the public cannot be entirely separated from an academic 
discourse since they are highly interwoven in society. This suggests that discursive
boundaries are neither prearranged nor constant, and a discourse cannot be entirely separated 
from other discourses (Hyland, 2009; Neumann, 2010). The ‘borderlines’ which separate one 
discourse from another are, therefore, vague and should be perceived more as analytical 
delineations of a concept, rather than concepts signifying actual discursive boundaries22.
Accordingly, it is essential that the discourse analyst clarifies where discursive lines are 
drawn in a research study, since these boundaries will define and restrict the research in hand.  
As this doctoral project’s overarching research aim is to analyse educational 
neuroscience in terms of the discursive aspects of emergence, hegemony, and recontext-
ualisation over structural and scalar borders, one can assume that the discourse under study 
ZLOO EH VLPLODUí QDPHO\ the discourse of educational neuroscience. However, I will argue 
that the lines defining educational neuroscience as a discourse are far from clear. For instance, 
is the educational neuroscience discourse the same as the academic discipline of educational 
neuroscience? If so, can this discipline be seen to embrace only academics who hold shared 
perspectives, aims and aspirations? And what about the analysis of the emergence of 
educational neurosciHQFHíWKLVPXVWVXUHO\LPSO\DQDQDO\WLFDOVFRSHWKDWDOVRHQFRPSDVVHV
prior discourses and disciplines, since the aim here is to scrutinise the historical context of 
educational neuroscience before it was established as a distinct discipline. Moreover, by
drawing educational neuroscience’s discursive boundaries entirely with academic confines in 
mind, then what about political and public aspects which also appear to influence, and in turn 
be influenced by, aspects pertaining to educational neuroscience? For instance, should 
popular scientific narrations presented in media be excluded from the analysis, since such 
texts cannot fully be considered under the academic domain? With these issues in mind, I 
have been careful when defining the educational neuroscience discourse. Not only must the 
discursive boundaries defined make allowance for complex relationships within and between 
different levels of the educational neuroscience discourse and other related discourses, but 
definitions of discursive boundaries must also make it possible to analyse particular levels of 
the discourse without becoming overwhelmed by its complexity. 
                                                          
22 The concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity are used in critical discourse studies as a means to incorporate 
aspects of discursive ‘entanglement’, by indicating that any discursive or textual aspect will carry certain ‘luggage’ from 
other texts and other discourses.   
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In order to define certain discursive borders in a field with complex and continually 
changing borderlines, I have chosen to mark out the analytical field, based on the concepts of 
emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over structural and scalar borders. They are all 
related to what can be seen as an overarching discourse of educational neuroscience, albeit 
that they can also be seen to represent what Fairclough (2010) calls ‘different levels of 
discourse’ in that they focus on somewhat different structural, social, and relational aspects of 
educational neuroscience. Different levels of the educational neuroscience discourse relevant
to this study are illustrated in model 4.1. However, it must be noted that the overarching 
educational neuroscience discourse can be seen to encompass other discursive levels than the 
ones I have illustrated here. One should also bear in mind that there is a complex set of 
relationships within and between these different levels of discourse, because each level can 
influence, and in turn be influenced by, other levels both within and outwith the overarching 
educational neuroscience discourse. I have attempted to illustrate the complex set of relations 
with the dotted lines, which also indicate that these outlines are abstract and unfixed borders. 
 
 
Model 4.1: Different levels of the educational neuroscience discourse relevant in this study.
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In my research I have chosen to differentiate between four levels of the educational 
neuroVFLHQFHGLVFRXUVHíQDPHO\WKHDFDGHPLFSXEOLFSROLWLFDODQG1RUZHJLDQOHYHO,KDYH
further placed the academic level in a central position, since educational neuroscience first 
and foremost can be seen to have emerged and developed as an academic project. The outline 
of the academic level of the discourse is further augmented by reference to educational neuro-
scientific aspects which are related to academic structures, practices, and events. As such, the 
academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse will be relatively similar to the 
academic discipline of educational neuroscience. I further understand the academic level of 
educational neuroscience to be somewhat different from the public and political levels, in that 
it can be seen as an entity revolving around specific areas of knowledge and social practice 
which, in turn, are closely interlinked with, and influenced by, structures, practices, and 
events from a larger academic discourse. For instance, this can be seen in how knowledge is 
constructed and structured around the relationship between the brain, mind, and education, 
and in how practices such as research, publishing of articles, and use of academic language 
also evolve around this. Furthermore, it appears that certain discursive positions and social 
roles are more prominent at this discursive level than others, such as relationships between 
researchers, teachers, and students in education, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. In 
view of this, it is the analytical concepts of emergence and hegemony that are essential at the 
academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. Specific clarification of these two 
concepts is presented later in this chapter, but for the moment, it can be noted that the 
emergence analysis will focus on how educational neuroscience has emerged and developed 
as an academic project, whereas the hegemony analysis will investigate hegemonic 
relationships within and between academic structures, narratives, and practices related to 
educational neuroscience.
Even if educational neuroscience can be seen to have its origins in academia, it can 
also be seen to influence, and in turn be influenced by, public and political aspects. In order to 
encompass these aspects in my critical discourse analysis, I have also outlined the educational 
neuroscience discourse in terms of a public level and a political level. The public and political 
levels can be seen to encompass a range of different structures, practices, and events, and can 
partly be set apart from the academic level in that they do not follow the same discursive 
structures as the academic level. The public level can be seen as the part of educational 
neuroscience discourse most accessible to the public community, since, for instance, it 
encompasses popular scientific texts and media articles on educational neuroscience, in 
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addition to events linked to the so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industry. The political level, 
on the other hand, is more related to policymakers and international interest actors and the 
ways in which they use educational neuroscience and incorporate it into political discourse. It 
is the analytical concept of recontextualisation across structural borders that is apposite in 
this respect, since it addresses how educational neuroscience has become distributed to the 
public and political fields. Outlines for the recontextualisation analysis are therefore not
drawn with the main focus on academic discipline, as with the emergence and hegemony 
analyses; instead they focus on fields with internalised aspects of educational neuroscience.
Particularly of interest is the consideration of how educational neuroscience is presented in 
media (in news articles and popular scientific literature), how a single ‘branch’ of so-called 
‘brain-based’ learning industry as arisen, and also how educational neuroscience appears to 
have been picked up by policymakers and other significant actors within international 
organisations and institutions.
The last level of interest in the educational neuroscience discourse is the level of 
Norway. Just as educational neuroscience can be seen to be recontextualised across structural
borders, so can it be seen to be recontextualised across scalar borders which lie between the 
international and the national. I have chosen Norway as a level of particular interest, 
principally due to my Norwegian nationality. However, I will also argue that Norway is an 
interesting level of analysis as the country appears to be in its initial stages of introducing 
educational neuroscience, and it can thus act as a valuable case of analytical study. In this 
respect one can ask how educational neuroscience has been received by academics in 
Norway, how media presents this topic, if there are any examples of brain-based learning 
industries, and how educational neuroscience is represented in political documents. In order to 
investigate these aspects of the Norwegian level of educational neuroscience, discursive 
outlines will be drawn with the main focus on capturing the reach of educational neuroscience 
in Norway, with an additional focus on the Norwegian academic, public, and political fields23.
 
Finding texts  
After describing a set of research questions for the analysis and outlining the boundaries for 
the discourse, the next step in critical discourse analysis is consideration of the text material, 
or corpus, for analysis. This is essential, since my understanding of the discourse of 
                                                          
23 Further clarifications on different discursive levels and relevant analytical concepts will be presented in page 99-118. 
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educational neuroscience will emerge through an analysis of the manifestation of the 
discourse in texts. However, available text material relevant to a discourse is usually too 
massive to examine in full. Consequently, the task of constructing a manageable body of texts 
appropriate for analysis is essential (cf. Krippendorff, 2004). In this respect, one has to decide 
on the size of the corpus, procedures for a literature search, which search tools to use, and 
criteria for which texts to include and exclude from the corpora. The following sections 
describe these procedures by elaborating on guiding principles for the research corpora,
literature searches used in this study, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and presentation of the 
final texts selected for corpora. As text data selected in a critical discourse study is the basis 
for analysis, the following account is also presented in order to provide research transparency.
Guiding principles for the research corpus  
As my research topic is the discipline of educational neuroscience, seen in relationship to the 
concepts of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over structural and scalar borders, 
my corpus must inevitably reflect this line of study. Furthermore, it has been emphasized that 
samples for the corpus will depend upon researchers’ knowledge of the relevant ‘archive’ 
(Neumann, 2010). With regard to background knowledge, it must be stressed that as a 
preliminary to this doctoral research, I conducted a master project where I surveyed the field 
of educational neuroscience. I can therefore modestly say that the discourse of educational 
neuroscience – and the archive related to this discourse – is rather familiar to me. Such 
familiarity was helpful when selecting corpora, although, it must be stressed that further 
insight into the field and relevant archives also arose throughout the research. 
Another factor, which defines a research corpus, is whether or not the intention is to 
examine small sets of texts or larger quantities of data. In this respect, one ought to 
acknowledge that there are strengths and weaknesses associated with both methods. Using a 
large-scale corpus, for instance, has been criticised, because with this method it is not feasible 
to include more detailed and qualitative samples of texts, whereas research using smaller sets 
of data has met with criticism, since “attempting to answer research questions from a limited 
set of data introduces the spectre of sampling bias” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 111). In order to 
avoid some of this criticism, my discourse study on educational neuroscience will draw on a 
rather large set of data, using both large-scale and detailed approaches to text analysis. I also 
believe that using a large-scale research corpus will be beneficial, since I intend to select texts 
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from the academic, public, political, and Norwegian level of the educational neuroscience 
discourse. In order to choose a profitable research corpus which encompasses relevant texts 
for each discursive level and their respective analytical concepts, I will refer to four distinct 
corpora for the analytical parts of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over 
structural and scalar borders. This implies that each of the four analytical parts is based on a 
body of text that corresponds to the specific research questions and discursive level in 
question. As I intend to use structural and interactional analysis of larger discursive structures 
and changes in relationships within and between discourses, rather than a detailed linguistic 
text analysis of just two or three texts, I have further decided that each of the four corpora will 
refer to approximately 25-30 texts.
Even if this critical discourse study consists of four corpora, certain general criteria 
will be followed. The research corpora will mainly consist of written texts – these being 
articles, book chapters, media reports, and collections of political documents written in 
(QJOLVK RU1RUZHJLDQ í VLQFH WKLVZLOO KHOS WR QDUURZ GRZQ WKH TXDQWLW\ RI UHOHYDQW GDWD
Literature searches for the research corpora will also be conducted in order to detect so-called 
‘monument texts’ or ‘cruces’ in the educational neuroscience discourse. A monument text can 
be seen as a key text for the discourse, and cruces are further defined as ‘moments of crisis’ in 
the discourse as they draw attention to conflicting opinions, changes, problematisation of 
practices, and other points of difficulty (Fairclough, 1992, p. 230; Neumann, 2010).
Monument text and cruces in a discourse can be of analytical value and it is therefore 
beneficial for critical discourse analysts to find such texts in literature searches. Regarding 
selection of a body of texts, Fairclough (1992, p. 228) also stresses that “the corpus should be 
seen not as constituted once and for all before one starts the analysis, but as open to ongoing 
enhancement in response to questions which arise in analysis”. The collection process for the 
corpus will therefore be open to alteration, and incorporation of supplementary text materials 
at later search stages is thus a possibility. 
Literature searches and search tools 
As I aim to analyse educational neuroscience at different discursive levels, and to focus on 
different discursive concepts, the scope for potential text material relevant to my research 
could be massive. In order to achieve validity and soundness of procedures for collecting 
texts, I will try to ensure that my literature searches are precise in their targeting, and 
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systematic in their screening of texts. I will therefore follow a set of designated search 
procedures, since this can support ordered literature searches and consistent evaluation
procedures for texts. As the approach of ‘systematic literature review’ is a generally accepted 
method for literature searches with a defined systematic search approach, I have chosen to 
adapt certain parts of this method to my literature search. The following process is based on 
the procedure for a systematic literature review by Jesson, Matheson, and Lacey (2011, p. 12),
but I have adjusted it to make it compatible with my critical discourse analysis of the 
educational neuroscience discourse: 
1. Define research questions for analysing a particular concept (i.e. emergence, hegemony, or 
recontextualisation over structural/scalar borders) of educational neuroscience.
2. Identify a range of information sources to discover where key information is available.
3. Develop online searches by identifying key words and creating complex searches.
4. Define inclusion and exclusion criteria for the corpora.
5. Search online databases, follow up citations, and keep a record of results.
6. Screen titles and abstract.
7. Reduce the data, generate categories, and produce final interpretation criteria.
The first step has been covered in the previous section and thus the other key points will be 
elaborated on in the following VHFWLRQ í VWDUWLQJ ZLWK WKH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI UHOHYDQW
information sources. As the discipline of educational neuroscience is relatively ‘new’, I can 
H[SHFW WR ILQG WKHPDMRULW\RI UHOHYDQW WH[WVRQ WKH LQWHUQHWíRUDW OHDVW ILQG WKHP OLVWHG LQ
internet databases and/or library catalogues. Internet searches are therefore a sound gateway 
to finding relevant text materials for the four research corpora, but this method also generates 
certain difficulties when it comes to the vast amount of data resulting from searches. In order 
to ensure a comprehensive search procedure, I intend, when possible, to use web-based search 
engines which provide systematic literature searches. In this respect, certain criteria must be 
fulfilled. For example, the search engine must present results in chronological order, in 
addition to being able to detect older references, which are often ‘hidden’ from general web 
searches, since they may be listed in web based library catalogues. Moreover, it is important 
that the search databases used are accurate, up to date, suitable for comprehensive literature 
searches and refer to texts with quality information. The search engines used must 
additionally present correct quantities of information, so that a particular article reference only 
appears once instead of turning up numerous times in a result set. It is also essential that 
search engines used for systematic literature examinations provide ample tools such as key 
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word search, reference search, author search, search within a specific timespan, and other 
valuable search options24. Based on these criteria, I have chosen to use search engines such as 
web-based library catalogues from the library of Bristol University and the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology, in addition to the online database ‘Web of Science’.
Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science (formerly known as ISI Web of Knowledge) is an 
international database and online index for peer-reviewed academic journal articles25 dating 
from the present back to the 19th century. Web of Science is a comprehensive search engine 
providing numerous search tools for systematic and targeted literature searches. The database 
is also appropriate for my research since it is not restricted to topic searches in specific areas 
such as ‘education’ or ‘neuroscience’, instead providing combined searches over numerous
databases such as those which cover ‘the sciences’, ‘social sciences’, and ‘arts and 
humanities’. It should further be noted that Web of Science has a database of more than 54 
million records in over 12,000 different journals which, indeed, is a substantial number of 
texts accessible through automatic searches26 (Web of Science, 2014). This is of note because 
extensive and combined searches are essential to my search procedure, where the cross-
disciplinary topic of educational neuroscience necessitates access to an interdisciplinary 
literature.
It must be noted, however, that Web of Science may not be able to detect all texts 
relevant to the different levels of educational neuroscience. The search engine’s failure to find 
some texts can be due to their format, where it is published (e.g. a conference synopsis not 
listed as a peer reviewed journal article), or the fact that it is not recorded in any of the 
databases used in Web of Science. Moreover, Web of Science does not refer to policy 
documents, book articles, or public texts, unless they are part of a reference list in an article. 
To compensate for this limitation, every reference list of relevant texts listed by Web of 
Science has been examined with the aim of finding PRQXPHQWWH[WVIUHTXHQWO\UHIHUUHGWRí
these being other journal articles, policy reports, conference or meeting synopses, public texts, 
or articles in books. In this way, texts which are significant for the discourse, but fail to 
                                                          
24 Needless to say, neither Google nor Google Scholar provides systematic literature searches, as these engines are limited 
in their capacity to order search results chronologically, to detect texts in library catalogues, to show only journal articles, 
and to utilise un-biased search without being affected by previous searches (i.e. use of ‘cookies’ in internet searches).  
25 The concept of peer reviews is based on confidence in the reliability of the peer review process. However, there are some 
limitations in this process, since “being judged by experts who have established perspectives and paradigms can act as a 
barrier to publishing new and unconventional ideas ... “The result is that there is less likely to be what is known as a 
paradigm shift, or a fresh movement away from accepted thinking towards a new direction” (Jesson et al., 2011, pp. 20-21). 
This underlines the importance of also using grey literature throughout my critical discourse analysis in this research.  
26 These journal records are from numerous disciplines, both within social sciences and natural sciences and, of course, 
many of these fields are not relevant for linking education and neuroscience.   
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appear in Web of Science, may be detected, examined and, if relevant, included in the corpus 
for further analysis. What this implies is that Web of Science must be seen only as a search 
tool for guiding my literature search, and not as the only gateway to finding relevant texts.
After identifying search engines and literature databases, one should develop online 
searches by identifying key words and combining these to enable complex searches. What can
first be noted with regard to general key word searches is that certain ‘natural language’ key 
words can be identified LQ WKH VHDUFK WRSLF LWVHOI í LQ WKLV FDVH LW ZLOO EH education and 
neuroscience. Additionally, it is important to identify a ‘controlled vocabulary’ for key word
searches, which includes similar and related words such as synonyms, variants of words27,
and broader or narrower terms of the topic’s natural language (Jesson et al., 2011). In the case 
of this critical discourse study, controlled vocabulary can be learning, cognition, and brain.
These key words can further be used to initiate complex searches in the databases, where 
different combinations, different database-topics, and different time-spans can be selected. To
assist key word combinations, Boolean operators, such as and/or/not, can be utilized in order 
to improve target-specific searches (Jesson et al., 2011). Accordingly, the general search used 
in my four target-specific literature searches will include the following:
- Searches with different key words and different combination of key words (such as education* 
neuroscience* learning* brain*). 
- Searches with different criteria (timespan, most cited, specific journals, different Boolean operators, etc.)
- Searching additional and relevant texts by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Searching additional ‘grey literature’ by cues given in citations and reference lists.
The two last points have been added in order to widen my search beyond the narrow confines 
of online literature databases, so that ‘grey literature’28 and non-electronic literature such as 
conference summaries, meeting reports, and books can also be detected. Manual literature 
searches in library catalogues, examination of printed journals, and other literature searches
outside online search-engines are therefore also essential to ensure that I access important 
articles and monument texts that would not appear in my web-based key word search29.
                                                          
27 The Web of Science database uses the asterisk symbol * when searching for variants for words, such as different endings. 
Searching for education* will therefore denote a search for education, educate, educational, educative, educationalists, etc.  
28 Grey literature is literature that is not academic and/or peer-reviewed texts. 
29 Finding literature besides that of peer-reviewed journal articles is also important as a means to include ‘un-biased’ 
published articles in the literature search. Jesson and colleagues (2011, p. 114) note this by stating that “publication bias 
occurs where journals have a tendency to promote a given approach and reject papers which make a negative stance or 
produce inconclusive findings.” This is also an important point in critical discourse analysis, since it also aims to include and 
analyse ‘less dominant’ voices in the discourse (cf. Fairclough, 2010).  
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In accordance with what is noted in both critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010)
and literature reviews (Jesson et al., 2011), I will consider my literature search to be near 
completion as soon as the same key texts keep appearing when accessing different 
information sources and trying several complex key word searches30. Before finishing my 
search, I intend to cross-reference my research record with the following checklist from 
Jesson et al. (2011, p. 30) to ensure that I have undertaken a thorough search:
- Have I searched all the appropriate resources?
- Are there any gaps in the information sources searched?
- Have I used complex search statements as required by individual databases?
- Could any improvements be made to the searches?
- Have I identified all the relevant references?
- Have I used both full-text and bibliographic databases?
Even if this checklist is extracted from a classic literature review, and even if I have adapted 
numerous procedures from a systematic literature review in order to ensure an ordered and 
systematic literature search and data examination, I must stress that my research is a critical 
discourse analysis. This distinction is important to note because, besides from parts of the 
literature search itself, there are significant differences between a systematic literature review 
and a critical discourse analysis. Firstly, where a systematic review follows a structured
approach and has a rigorous method for searching the literature, a critical discourse analysis is 
more inclined to also find literature outwith a set of search criteria defined in advance. The 
reason for searching outwith a specified set of search criteria is because critical discourse 
analysis also aims to find ‘hidden voices’ in a discourse, and a rigid schedule for search 
criteria may not always allow this. Secondly, a systematic literature review usually ends up 
with a synthesis or meta-analysis, which follows a prescribed form, whereas a critical 
discourse analysis does not follow a fixed model for its presentation of findings. Thirdly, 
whereas a systematic literature review aims to show research which has been completed and 
potential knowledge gaps in a field, critical discourse studies take the analysis to a more 
critical level as texts are reflected on in a broader societal context. My research must therefore 
be viewed as a critical discourse analysis, which utilizes a systematic literature approach 
when searching for relevant texts for the corpora, and not as a systematic literature review per 
se.
                                                          
30 It must be noted that a critical discourse analyst often works with flexible and interactive research stages. New texts and 
new understanding of the discourse might emerge during the work, and one must therefore be able to incorporate new 
aspects throughout the research. This implies that new texts can be included in the final corpora even after the general 
work with the systematic literature search has ended.
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Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the corpora 
During work pertaining to literature searches, one will often scan a substantial number of 
texts and one should therefore screen texts successively in accordance with inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. In order to narrow the four bodies of text down to a manageable size of 
around 25-30 texts each, and additionally to ensure that all texts are systematically evaluated 
and selected on the same criteria, I have designed a four-step selection procedure. The pre-set 
inclusion and exclusion criteria used in the evaluation steps are based on my research 
questions, critical discourse concepts pertaining to emergence, hegemony, or recontext-
ualisation over structural or scalar borders (Fairclough, 2010), and general criteria often used 
in classic and systematic literature studies (Hart, 2001; Jesson et al., 2011). The general 
structure for selection procedures is identical for each of the four analytical parts, albeit that 
each literature search will also have specifically designed inclusion and exclusion criteria 
corresponding to its respective discursive topics (specific clarification for each analytical part
is presented later in this chapter). 
The first stage in the screening process for selecting texts for the corpora, encompasses 
quite broad inclusion and exclusion criteria, since the aim here is to collect as many relevant 
documents as possible. The title and abstract of texts from internet and e-library searches and 
from references followed up manually, will therefore be selected in accordance with the 
following general inclusion and exclusion criteria: 
- Texts relevant to educational neuroscience
- Texts relevant to the academic, public, political, or Norwegian level of the discourse
- Texts relevant to emergence, hegemony, or recontextualisation over structural- or Norwegian borders
- Written texts mainly
- Texts in English or Norwegian (the latter for the Norwegian analysis) 
- Focus on monument text and cruces in the discourse
After screening texts by using these broad criteria, I am still likely to have relatively large 
bodies of text relevant to the four research corpora. To narrow the text material down further, 
three succeeding stages have been designed in order to assess texts with progressively more 
subject-specific inclusion and exclusion criteria. Each stage also involves a more thorough 
reading of the texts. The second stage, for instance, aims to select texts in accordance with 
their potential in scope, and general aspects of each text will therefore be noted. The same 
procedure is applied in the third and fourth steps, as this involves a more focused reading of
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the abstract and/or full text, with evaluation criteria closer to the overarching research 
questions on emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over structural and scalar 
borders. Inclusion and exclusion criteria at these latter stages include, for example, identifying 
how a text relates to the connection between education and neuroscience, how the relationship 
between education and neuroscience is presented, if the text shows any particular traces of 
emergence/hegemony/recontextualisation, if there are any notable intertextual references, or if 
the text is suggestive of any boundary conflicts or transgressions. 
By systematically evaluating texts through a four-step examination plan, my intention 
is to avoid exclusion of relevant texts due to general and superficial search criteria. In 
DGGLWLRQ , KDYH DOVR GHVLJQHG WKHVH IRXU FRPSUHKHQVLYH UHYLHZ VWDJHV í HDFK ZLWK PRUH
IRFXVHGUHDGLQJVDQGPRUHWDUJHWHGLQFOXVLRQDQGH[FOXVLRQFULWHULDíDVDPHDQVWRREWDLQDQ
overview of the available data. In turn, this can aid in the selection of four useful corpora for 
my critical discourse analysis of educational neuroscience. It should also be mentioned that a 
record is kept for each text evaluated, where key points from the criteria above are recorded 
and evaluative remarks regarding either inclusion or exclusion criteria are given. The final 
texts in the four different corpora will therefore contain an extensive record of key elements 
which can be used in the final critical discourse analysis. 
Table 4.2: Search report table for the four analytical parts.
Emergence Hegemony
Recontext. over 
structural 
borders
Recontext. over 
scalar borders
Approx. number of hits resulting 
from the literature searches31
121 115 texts 2 082 texts 364 740 739
texts
452 849 texts
1st stage: scanned in e-library 
databases and grey literature
6 495 texts 1 146 texts 1 979 texts 3 716 texts
2nd stage: interesting and potential 
in scope 
131 texts 107 texts 127 texts 203 texts
3rd stage: relevant in topic after 
reading
79 texts 65 texts 77 texts 108 texts
4th stage: data in final corpus 24 texts 29 texts 27 texts 31 texts
 
                                                          
31 These amounts may not be accurate, since some texts can be presented in numerous complex key word searches. 
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The search report table and number of relevant articles after each round of literature 
screening is reported in table 4.2, and complete evaluation lists for inclusion or exclusion of a 
text in each of the four stages of the four corpora can be found in appendix B. The first corpus 
consists of 24 texts and is selected with the intention of analysing the emergence of 
educational neuroscience, whereas the second corpus encompasses 29 texts and is selected 
with the purpose of analysing educational neuroscience’s hegemonic relation. The corpus for 
analysing educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation over structural borders and into the 
public and political level, comprises 27 texts, and the last corpus for analysing educational 
neuroscience’s recontextualisation over scalar borders and into the Norwegian level, 
encompasses 31 texts. Full reference lists for the corpora are presented in appendix C.
 
General text analytical design 
As previously noted, an understanding of the discourse of educational neuroscience will 
emerge through an analysis of texts, because discursive relationships, structures and other 
discursive aspects will inevitably be manifested in a discourse’s text. In Fairclough’s critical 
discourse analytical tradition, a chief endeavour is to combine textually oriented discourse 
analysis with non-textual discourse analysis (for example, approaches associated with
Michael Foucault). Fairclough’s approach can therefore be seen to move between linguistic 
analysis of specific texts and interdiscursive analysis of order of discourse (Fairclough, 2003).
Regarding linguistic analysis of text, researchers within the critical discourse tradition tend to 
refer to ‘systemic functional linguistics’ (SFL). 
My main point of reference within existing literature on text analysis is Systemic Functional Linguistics 
(SFL), a linguistic theory and associated analytical methods particularly associated with Michael 
Halliday. In contrast with the more influential Chomskyan tradition within Linguistics, SFL is 
profoundly concerned with the relationship between language and other elements and aspects of social 
life, and its approaches to the linguistic analysis of text is always oriented to the social character of text 
... This makes it a valuable resource for critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003, p. 5).
The combination of critical discourse analysis and systemic functional linguistics is 
highlighted by numerous researchers within the two respective fields, since the two 
approaches share several major commonalities (Fairclough, 2003; Halliday, 2002). Young 
and Harrison (2004) expand on these commonalities, noting in particular three shared aspects:
their emphasis on the role of language in society, their view of a dialectical relationship 
between language and discourse, and their shared emphasis on cultural and historical aspects 
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of meaning. However, there are some differences between the two traditions worth 
mentioning: firstly, whilst systemic functional linguistics uses highly specialised linguistic 
terms, discourse analysts try to use simpler terms when analysing text; secondly, critical 
discourse analysis is more trans-disciplinary than systemic functional linguistics as it attempts 
to combine linguistic analysis with various social theories (Fairclough, 2003). Considering its 
lack of references to social theories and analysis, systemic functional linguistics should be 
seen as a supplementary text analytical tool within the critical discourse analytical tradition. 
In line with these arguments, in my critical discourse analysis I will make use of 
systemic functional linguistics as an additional framework for detailed text analysis.
Examination will be based on textual analysis and interpretation of a series of texts pertaining 
to educational neuroscience. Each text will be studied using interactional text analysis and 
structural analysis, whereby an attempt is made to categorise the underlying meaning of a text 
and interpret it in accordance with a pre-set list of terms. The pre-set lists in each of the four 
analytical parts are designed in accordance with the analytical discourse concept and the 
related set of research questions (see appendix D). Additionally, to enable a more qualitative 
path of analysis, smaller samples within the corpora will be selected for more detailed 
analysis, as these can illustrate certain qualities of the educational neuroscience discourse (cf. 
Jørgensen & Philips, 1999). For every text analysed, a data extraction sheet will be 
completed, on which, for instance, traces of discursive boundary problematisation, detection 
of representations, de-articulation, re-articulation, changes in relationships and narrations are 
noted (cf. Fairclough, 2003, 2010; Hitching & Veum, 2011). Identification and interpretation 
of these aspects is essential in critical discourse analysis since we after “discussion of terms, 
models, narrations and categorisations will get a clearer picture of the discursive field we are 
attempting to map” (Hitching & Veum, 2011, p. 129). Moreover, because each text in a
corpus is analysed with the same key concepts, an overarching critical discourse analysis and 
interpretation of discursive concepts and an assessment of the level of discourse at hand will 
be available. The four analyses can, in turn, be seen in relationship to one another, as they 
illuminate different levels of discourse. This is important to note, since it is not each 
individual text per se that is interesting in this critical discourse study, but rather the 
comprehensive picture of the educational neuroscience discourse that they make together.
In order to keep to basic analytical vocabulary, and to follow Fairclough’s example, 
specialised linguistic terms will not be used. Definitions, terms, and analytical categories will, 
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instead, follow systemic functional linguistics as adapted by Fairclough in his critical 
discourse analysis, since these modes of analytical categories are more applicable to a social 
analysis of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, 2003, 2010). Moreover, to direct the focus towards 
the issues of textual analysis discussed in previous sections, in this study detailed text analysis 
will be concerned with textual notions such as intertextuality, difference, strategies, 
assumptions, discourses, representations of social events, modality and evaluation. As such, 
these modes of analysis will, include both structural analysis (e.g. analysis of relationships
between orders of discourse) and textual and interactional analysis (e.g. linguistic analysis) 
(cf. Fairclough, 2003). Overall, structural, interactional and textual analysis will be relevant to
each of the four research issues of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation across
structural and scalar borders. However, lines of analysis and relevant data for examination 
will vary for every issue, as each discursive concept has its own sets of research questions,
which inevitably direct the respective text analysis.
It should be emphasized that my critical discourse analytical study is broad, since I 
intend to clarify the manifestation of the educational neuroscience discourse in terms of the 
four concepts of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation at different discursive levels 
(i.e. the academic, public, political, and the Norwegian level). This indicates that what is 
gained in breadth is lost in depth, because time and scope constraints for my doctoral project 
do not allow for a comprehensive as well as an in-depth analysis of the educational 
neuroscience discourse. I will, therefore, not meticulously explain discursive changes in light 
of extensive social, historical, ideological and political theories in order to clarify why these 
GLVFXUVLYH VWUXFWXUHV H[LVW DQG RSHUDWH LQ WKH ZD\ WKH\ GR í VLPSO\ EHFDXVH VXFK D VWXG\
would diminish the scope of my research considerably. Rather, my intention is to present a 
comprehensive account of the manifestation of the educational neuroscience discourse, where 
key concepts relevant to the emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation of the educational 
neuroscience discourse are critically analysed and discussed. 
With regard to the presentation and discussion of results from my critical discourse 
analysis, a chapter will be dedicated to each of the four critical discourse analyses of 
emergence (chapter 5), hegemony (chapter 6), and recontextualisation over structural and 
scalar borders (respectively chapters 7 and 8). It should also be noted that a central aim for 
critical discourse analysts is to illuminate certain discourses so “that people become more 
aware of the discursive practices they are a part of when using language and consuming texts, 
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in addition to craft awareness of those social structures and power relations which discursive
practices are formed by and, in turn, contribute to form and change” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
1999, p. 100). In other words, the aim is not to prove which discourse, text, or reading is 
‘correct’, but rather to show such different views and consider them all as “evidence of the 
text’s inherent ideological ambiguities, distortions and absences” (Codd in McCulloch, 2004, 
p. 47).
Specific clarifications to the four analytical parts 
I have argued that four particular discursive concepts can be beneficial for a comprehensive 
analysis of the educational neuroscience discouUVH í namely the concepts of emergence, 
hegemony, and recontextualisation over structural and scalar borders. Procedures for 
analysing these four discursive concepts will, on the whole, follow the same general method 
design as presented above. However, certain concept-specific aspects and designs will be 
appropriate, and the subsequent sections will therefore clarify the notions exclusively related 
to each of the four analytical discourse concepts applicable to my critical discourse study on 
educational neuroscience.  
Emergence  
The analytical concept of ‘emergence’ is defined as an analysis of “the processes of 
emergence of new discourses, their constitution as new articulations of elements of existing 
discourses” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 367). As mentioned in the theory chapter, the basic principle 
is that nothing can emerge out of ‘nothingness’. Regarding the development of discourse, it is 
argued that a discourse will arise from building on already existing discourses. Emergence 
can thus be seen as a ‘reweaving’ of existing discourses where discursive boundaries are 
questioned and crossed, elements of the old are articulated in new ways, and a new discourse 
is constructed. Considering that discourse is a complex notion, its development will inevitably 
also encompass notions RI FKDQJH í QRW RQO\ FKDQJHV LQ WH[WV EXW DOVR those in social 
practice, social agents, institutions, organisations, ideas etc. Changes in a discourse are 
therefore sought by: identification of intertextual articulations in historical series of texts, 
notions of discursive boundary crossing, detection of developing strategies, and other aspects 
which reveal a discourse’s emergence process (Fairclough, 2010).
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Outline of discursive boundaries and specific research questions 
In my doctoral research, I intend to investigate how educational neuroscience has emerged 
and developed as an academic project and discipline. Accordingly, the analytical focus lies at 
the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. Considering that the emergence 
concept focuses on traces of early appearances and development of the discipline, prior and 
external discourses in a historical context related to educational neuroscience are also of 
interest. This implies that the analytical focus will be based at the academic level of 
educational neuroscience (i.e. the discipline we are familiar with in the present day), but the 
emergence analysis is also likely to encompass relevant discursive fields prior to the 
discipline’s establishment. Considering that educational neuroscience has a central connection 
with relationships between the mind, the brain, and education, it will be relevant to investigate 
GLVFRXUVHV SHUWDLQLQJ WR WKLV OLQN í such as the discourse of education, that of cognitive 
psychology, and of cognitive neuroscience. Historical notions are also considered in respect to 
these discourses, so that changes within discourses prior to how we know them today can be
acknowledged32. Discursive delimitations in the critical discourse analysis of emergence will 
therefore encompass: 
- the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse
- prior discourses from which the academic project and discipline of educational neuroscience can be 
seen to have emerged (e.g. education, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience)
- educational neuroscience’s earlier and more contemporary phases (i.e. 1800-2013)
The analysis of educational neuroscience’s emergence will focus on a historical series of texts
pertaining to the connection between the brain, the mind, and education, with the aim of
explaining how, where and when the academic level of the discourse emerged and how it has 
continued to develop. The emergence analysis can therefore be done by focusing on research 
questions such as:
- Where can one locate the discourse of educational neuroscience within the field of prior discourses? 
- How did the discourse of educational neuroscience emerge from this prior field?
- Which structural and strategic emergence processes can be found?
- Why has a discourse of educational neuroscience emerged in the past few decades, when the connection 
between mind, brain, and education has arguably existed for centuries? 
                                                          
32 Neuroscience, for instance, appears to have been established as an academic discipline around the 1970s. Numerous sub-
fields within the brain sciences such as neuroanatomy and neurobiology have, however, existed since the 1800s and these 
fields are important when considering educational neuroscience’s history. 
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- What are the ‘main themes’ in the discourse of educational neuroscience, and how does the discourse 
represent, narrate and ‘justify’ these particular themes?
- Which particular perspectives, points of view, and positions are available within the discourse of 
educational neuroscience?
- Which recurring themes can be found throughout the history of educational neuroscience?
- Which changes in themes can be found throughout the history of educational neuroscience?
Analysis of relationships found between the discourse of educational neuroscience and the 
field of prior discourses will be identified, in addition to any identification of changed 
relationships within the discourse. This may explain emergence processes relating to 
problematisation of discursive borders, discursive transgression, changes in narrations, 
constitution of discursive positions, potential emergence strategies, and changes in narrative 
justifications33. Furthermore, clarification of these aspects concerning the emergence of 
educational neuroscience can explain the discourse itself, since “discourse is not simply an 
entity we can define independently: we can only arrive at an understanding of it by analyzing
sets of relations” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 3).
Finding texts for the emergence corpus 
The procedure for finding texts for the emergence corpus will, in general, follow the 
principles for literature searches that already have been elaborated on. However, certain 
clarifications should be made with respect to search procedures that are particularly 
influenced by the level of discourse at hand and concept-specific research questions of 
emergence. What can firstly be noted is that text material chosen must be relevant for 
analysing the emergence and development of educational neuroscience. It is also essential that 
these texts come from both the academic level of educational neuroscience discourse (viz. the 
educational neuroscience discipline) and from the field of external discourses such as those 
pertaining to the discourse of education, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. 
Historical notions are also central in this respect, and texts chosen must cover a significant 
timespan wherein the discourse of educational neuroscience can be seen to have emerged and 
                                                          
33 It must be noted that other authors before me have presented historical accounts and literature reviews of educational 
neuroscience (Beauchamp & Beauchamp, 2013; Théodoridou & Triarhou, 2009). However, my intention is not to give a 
descriptive historical account of the topic; rather, it is to present a critical discourse analysis where the emergence and 
development of educational neuroscience is discussed in light of critical discourse theories pertaining to structural and 
strategic emergence processes and changes in discursive elements. Furthermore, such critical discourse analysis of the 
emergence also provides a basis for the pending analysis of hegemonic relationships and recontextualisation of the 
educational neuroscience discourse, since these concepts seem to have been left in a void without a comprehensive 
historical foundation.     
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developed. As texts relevant to the emergence of educational neuroscience are likely to have 
been published as far back as the 19th and 20th centuries, it is important that literature searches 
focus on online engines such as the Web of Science34, in addition to manual search methods 
in, for instance, library catalogues. 
By using general and emergence-specific criteria, the search procedure for the final 
emergence corpus covered a timespan from 1815 to 2013. By using the four-step reading and 
evaluation procedure with specific inclusion and exclusion criteria relevant to the emergence 
concept, a total of 24 texts from the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse 
were selected for the emergence corpus. As previously mentioned, the four-step evaluation
criteria can be found in appendix B, and a complete list of the selected texts for the emergence
corpus is presented in appendix C
Critical discourse analytical procedure  
With regard to the actual analysis of the emergence of educational neuroscience, procedures 
will largely follow the general text analytical design for thiVVWXG\íQDPHO\LQWHUDFWLRQDOWH[W
analyses and structural analysis. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that researching
relationships between the discourse of educational neuroscience and prior discourses can be 
done by analysing the discipline’s emergence and the relevant constitution of external 
discourses. Such analysis will require a genealogical approach, which locates the discourse 
within a historical context (cf. Fairclough, 2010). Emergence, development, and location of 
educational neuroscience in a historical context will further involve analysis of discursive 
articulations. In this respect, text analytical perspectives such as intertextuality and traces of 
interdiscursivity are essential, since such concepts can help to identify how the discourse of 
educational neuroscience bears resemblance to – and combines – features of other external 
discourses and texts. Analysing the emergence of educational neuroscience will also enable
identification of any development in relationships found within the discourse. In addition to 
recognition of different discursive positions within the discourse, detection of the main 
themes and narratives presented in the discourse will therefore also be essential in the 
analysis. Such examination will comprise text analysis, where, particular, texts within the 
discipline itself will be analysed since the intention is to identify and locate certain statements 
                                                          
34 It should be noted that some of the first key word searches in Web of Science ‘only’ date back to 1918. This indicates that 
I need to rely on other and more manual search strategies for relevant literature conducted before the 20th century.  
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in terms of thematic categories. Considering that each text in the historical series will be 
analysed with the same set of analytical categories and topics (cf. appendix D), it will also be 
possible to conduct an overarching critical discourse analysis of the whole sequence of texts. 
This overarching analysis can help to identify any changes and continuities throughout the 
historical line of discursive elements pertaining to relationships within the discourse of 
educational neuroscience and between the fields of related discourses. 
After analysing, categorising, comparing, and evaluating the historical series of texts, 
the results are presented and discussed. Chapter 5, ‘The emergence of educational 
neuroscience’, will present a general and chronological account of educational neuroscience 
development from the 19th century to present date. Direct quotes from texts in the corpus are 
used to underline the historical narrative presented. Chapter 5 will also encompass an
interpretive and critical account of the emergence and development of educational 
neuroscience. In this part, findings from the textual analysis are critically analysed and 
discussed by approaching the topic from a critical discourse theoretical perspective. This 
implies that the general historical account is attempted illuminated by use of critical discourse 
theories concerning discursive boundaries, discursive structures, emergence structures, 
discursive change and other relevant theories. Quotations from texts in the corpora will also 
be used in this latter part, this time to underline interpretation and arguments.
Hegemony  
The second research issue, ‘hegemony’, further examines discourse as it indicates analysis of 
“the processes of particular emergent discourses (and not others) and associated narratives 
becoming hegemonic” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 367). As already mentioned in the theory 
chapter, the concept of hegemony in critical discourse theories is concerned with notions of 
power relationships both within and between discourses. One basic principle underpinning the 
hegemony concept is that discursive ‘truths’ and regularities will constitute a natural focus for 
struggle and change (Fairclough, 2010). Essential in this respect are notions of discursive 
struggle, since dialogue, negotiation and conflicts between different discourses may lead to 
hegemony of particular discourses. One aim is therefore to show how some discourses gain 
prominence whilst others become marginalized over time. Relationships between texts and 
more permanent and institutionalised levels of ‘reality’ and social structures are therefore also 
essential.
104 
 
CDA can provide particular insights into the struggle between different strategies for transforming 
society in different directions through rhetorically oriented analysis of how strategic differences are 
fought out in dialogue, debate, polemic etc. But again such analysis must be informed by and integrated 
within transdisciplinary critique which seeks to explain the success of certain strategies and the failure 
of others, and also ‘positive’ critique which seeks to identify strategies which are, as we might put it, 
both desirable (in that they may advance human well-being) and feasible (Fairclough, 2010, p. 20).
In my research, the analytical issue of ‘hegemony’ will encompass an analysis of relationships 
of dialogue between discourses, in addition to debates, conflicts, and dominance between
educational neuroscience and other related discourses. 
 
Outline of discursive boundaries and specific research questions 
Analysis of hegemony can help to illuminate points of negotiations, struggle, power, and 
hegemonic relationships pertaining to the discourse of educational neuroscience. With regard 
to the level of discourse of interest, I consider it essential to focus on the academic level of 
educational neuroscience when analysing hegemonic relationships. The reason for this is 
because I have decided to base my research at the academic level of educational neuroscience, 
and, from there, investigate its emergence, hegemony, and its further recontextualisation to
other levels of discourse. This suggests that attention to hegemonic relationships at the 
academic level of educational neuroscience can help to further examine discursive changes 
identified in the analysis of emergence (e.g. changes in narrations, justifications, and 
discursive positions). Consideration of hegemony can also help to identify which topics that 
are significant points of struggle in the academic discipline, which voices in the academic 
debate are marginalised, and which practices have become more or less taken for granted, in 
addition to providing insight into how certain narrations have gained prominence over time at 
the academic level of educational neuroscience. In turn, this can be seen in relationship with 
the two analytical parts concerning ‘recontextualisation’, since these analyses will inevitably 
encompass certain hegemonic relationships with reference to educational neuroscience’s 
public, political, and Norwegian level. 
Regarding an outline of discursive boundaries relevant to the hegemony analysis, it 
should be noted that this analytical part does not necessarily benefit from studying exactly the 
same outline as the previous emergence analysis. This is because a more thorough analysis of 
hegemony may be obtained by paying attention to the later and more contemporary phases of 
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the educational neuroscience discourse, rather than considering prior and historic discursive 
events in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Texts from the earliest phases of educational 
neuroscience history can reveal more of the appearance and development of the discourse 
than texts from 1980s and onwards, which are more likely to reveal hegemonic relationships 
found in debates during the time when educational neuroscience became established and 
developed as a distinct academic discipline (cf. findings from the emergence analysis). 
However, analytical focus is not strictly limited to the level of educational neuroscience, since 
in disciplinary borderlines, one can find negotiations, conflicts, and hegemonic relationships
which may be valuable to consider in a hegemony analysis. Overall, this suggests that the 
outline of discourse in the hegemony analysis should encompass: 
- the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse
- closely related fields which may help to illuminate hegemonic struggles pertaining to educational 
neuroscience, and 
- educational neuroscience’s later and more contemporary phases (i.e. 1980-2014)
Outlining and defining the discourse under investigation are connected with the set of 
research questions for the discourse study. If we start by looking at the overarching aim in the 
analysis of hegemony, this is to investigate hegemonic relationships pertaining to educational 
neuroscience’s academic level. Analysis of hegemonic relationships can accordingly be 
conducted by directing focus to research questions such as:  
- Which narratives (including implied definition of terms such as assumptions and presuppositions) of 
educational neuroscience are represented? How concretely or abstractly, specifically or generally, are 
they represented?
- Are there any negotiations, struggles and conflicts pertaining to the educational neuroscience discourse? 
- Do any sets of discursive conventions implicitly embody or naturalize certain (ideological) rationalities?
- Can any discursive elements (narrations, justifications, positions, practices etc.) be seen to hold a 
dominant and hegemonic position, and are any elements neglected?
- If there are hegemonic or neglected elements, then how can these discursive aspects appear to have 
gained hegemonic prominence, or have become marginalised, over time?
- Are there struggles and power relationships between different strategies for transforming society in 
different directions, and why do some of these strategies appear to succeed whilst others fail?
Considered together, questions concerning ‘hegemony’ entail locating points of struggle 
related to the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. Researching 
hegemonic issues can thus direct us toward confrontations between the new discipline of 
educational neuroscience and, for instance, more established and long-standing disciplines of 
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education, psychology, and neuroscience. Furthermore, enquiries about ‘hegemony’ will 
direct attention towards conflicts pertaining to certain representations or themes, such as 
philosophical issues regarding mind, brain and education, issues of vocabulary and of a 
theoretical or methodological nature, struggles between discursive positions, or other 
contestations and struggles concerning educational neuroscience (cf. Fairclough, 2010; 
Wodak & Fairclough, 2010). Not only can such analysis be interesting because it considers 
tensions and struggles pertaining to the educational neuroscience discourse, analysis of 
hegemony can also be valuable since it seeks to critically analyse discursive aspects that have, 
to some extent, become ‘naturalised’ in the discourse. The aim is thus to explore both the 
heard and the unheard voices in the discourse, in addition to questioning how certain 
representations have become more salient than others.  
Finding texts for the hegemony corpus 
Regarding literature chosen for the final corpora, the most essential criterion is, indeed, that 
these texts are relevant for examining hegemonic relations pertaining to the academic level of 
educational neuroscience discourse. In this respect, texts including debates, negotiations, or 
conflicts are particularly interesting, since such ‘points of struggle’ are more likely to reveal 
hegemonic power relationships as they reveal tensions within and between discourses 
(Fairclough, 1992; Neumann, 2010). As such, relevant texts for analysis are monument texts, 
which can be seen as ‘cruces’ or ‘moments of crisis’. Such ‘cruces’ make visible any 
conflicting opinions, problematisation of practices, changes and other points of difficulty 
pertaining to the discourse, and will consequently be ideal for analysing issues of hegemony 
and discursive struggles. Moreover, and contrasting with the analysis of emergence, the 
timespan for literature searches for the hegemony corpora will not date too far back in history. 
Instead, the focus is on later and more contemporary phases of the educational neuroscience
discourse. Giving attention to the last couple of decades can also be justified due to findings 
from the former emergence analysis, as this discourse analysis has indicated an increase in 
debates pertaining to educational neuroscience in the 1980s, the late 1990s and onwards. 
Based on these findings, the timespan for the literature search for the hegemony corpora 
ranges from 1980 to 2014. It should further be noted that one comprehensive search tool 
which covers literature within these criteria is Web of Science. There are however limitations 
to this search-engine, since it chiefly covers peer-reviewed journal articles and thus excludes 
107 
 
‘grey literature’ and texts not published in the scientific journals covered by Web of Science. 
:LWK UHVSHFW WR WKH DQDO\VLV RI KHJHPRQLF UHODWLRQVKLSV í ZKHUH ERWK GRPLQDQW and
PDUJLQDOLVHG YRLFHV VKRXOG EH DQDO\VHG í LW LV DOVR LPSRUWDQW WR UHO\ RQ GLIIHUHQW types of 
literature gateway when searching for texts relevant to the corpora. Accordingly, I have 
chosen to deploy search engines such as web-based library catalogues from the libraries of 
Bristol University and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, in addition to 
manual searches where relevant key words and references in texts can be followed up. In this 
way I can detect texts that are relevant to the discourse but fail to appear in Web of Science. 
By systematically evaluating texts by a four-step examination plan with hegemony-
specific inclusion and exclusion criteria (appendix B), I have obtained a final corpus 
consisting of 29 texts from the academic level of educational neuroscience discourse. A
reference list for the final hegemony corpus is presented in appendix C, and a data extraction 
sheet for the critical discourse analysis of hegemony is presented in appendix D.
Critical discourse analytical procedure  
Analytically, hegemonic relationships of the educational neuroscience discourse have been 
studied using the general text analytical design for this study. Each text has therefore been 
examined by using interactional qualitative text analyses and structural analysis, although, in 
the analytical part I have attempted to categorise and interpret the text’s underlying meaning 
in accordance with pre-set lists of hegemony-related inquires (see appendix D). The analytical
issues I have attempted to identify are, for instance: traces of negotiations or hegemonic 
struggles; argumentation standpoints and ideological manifestations; attempts to naturalise or 
de-naturalise discursive aspects; tendencies of domination or marginalization, whether or not 
certain narrations (significantly) have been excluded, whether or not the complexities of 
reality have been reduced and condensed, and whether or not there are any conflicts which 
can particularly be seen as negotiations with more ongoing or permanent and institutionalized 
levels of social reality and social structures (cf. critical discursive analysis pertaining to 
hegemony, as noted by Fairclough, 2003, 2010; Hitching & Veum, 2011; Wodak & 
Fairclough, 2010). Moreover, since every text in the corpora has been analysed with the same 
key concepts and target questions, together they have made available a more overarching and 
comprehensive picture of hegemonic relationships pertaining to the academic level of the 
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educational neuroscience discourse. Analytical findings and discussions of results are 
presented in chapter 6. 
Recontextualisation over structural borders  
The concept of recontextualisation was originally suggested in Bernstein’s sociology of 
pedagogy, although it has been operationalized as a category in critical discourse analysis in 
order “to explore the potentially distinctive recontextualising principles associated with 
different fields or networks of practices (governmental, academic, public sphere etc.)” 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 422). The central goal of the analytical concept as such, is to investigate 
ways in which a certain discourse is distributed across its discursive boundaries and into other 
fields. In this respect, it is further distinguished from investigation of discursive dissemination 
across structural and scalar boundaries, where structural boundaries are seen to lie between 
organisations and institutions, or between different social fields such as education and 
politics. 
Outline of discursive boundaries and specific research questions 
The third analytical part of this research will focus on educational neuroscience’s recontext-
ualisation over structural boundaries. In this respect I consider it essential to focus on how the 
academic project of educational neuroscience has been distributed across the public and 
political fields, since it appears that aspects of education and neuroscience can particularly be 
found in these two fields. Accordingly, the analytical focus is on how the academic level of 
the educational neuroscience discourse has been recontextualised at the public level and at the 
political level of the discourse (see model 4.1). The outline for the recontextualisation
analysis over structural borders is therefore not drawn with the intention of focusing mainly 
on the academic level of the discourse, as with the emergence and hegemony analysis. 
Instead, it focuses on the public and political levels which contain internalised aspects of 
educational neuroscience. Based on knowledge of previous literature searches and findings 
from the emergence and hegemony analysis, it will furthermore appear that four areas in 
particular are prominent in the educational neuURVFLHQFHGLVFRXUVHíQDPHO\ WKHPHGLD DQG
the so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industry (viz. the public level), in addition to policy-
makers and other significant interest actors within intergovernmental organisations (viz. the 
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political level)35. Overall, this indicates that the outline of discourse in the recontextualisation
analysis over structural borders encompasses:
i) the public level of the educational neuroscience discourse
a. media
b. the so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industry
ii) the political level of the educational neuroscience discourse
a. policymakers showing interest in educational neuroscience
b. international organisations and other actors interested in educational neuroscience (e.g. OECD, 
Royal Society, EU)
iii) educational neuroscience’s earlier and more contemporary phases (i.e. 1800-2014)
The outline of the level of discourse under study connects to the set of research questions, 
where the overarching endeavour is to investigate: how, where and how extensively has the 
academic level of educational neuroscience become recontextualised across structural 
boundaries to the public field and the political field? In order to further direct the analysis, the 
following research questions can be useful (cf. Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 
2010):
- Identification of traces where educational neuroscience is disseminated across structural boundaries to 
the public field and to the political field.
- How and where are educational neuroscientific representations articulated within the public field and 
the political field? I.e. how is educational neuroscience rearticulated in (and set in relationship to) the 
old field?
- How is educational neuroscience internalized within particular public and political fields (e.g. in 
businesses, in the media, in political domains, and in intergovernmental organisations)? 
- Can traces of ‘colonisation’ and/or ‘appropriation’ of educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation be 
found at the public and political fields?
- Which interest groups/agents give the impression of being significant where educational neuroscience is 
recontextualised across structural boundaries? How do these interest actors present educational 
neuroscience?
- What is the relationship between agents from educational neuroscience’s academic level and agents in 
the respective public and political fields?
As these questions suggest, the concept of ‘recontextualisation’ will point the research 
towards structural dissemination of the discourse and narratives of educational neuroscience. 
                                                          
35 Academic texts regarding, for instance, brain-based learning programmes and neuromyths, will be used as background 
information and not as text in the corpora per se. This is because academic texts (and texts pertaining to the academic level 
of educational neuroscience) are already analysed in both the emergence analysis and the hegemony analysis, whilst the 
chief focus in this part is on recontextualisation of the academic level of discourse. 
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It is thus of analytical value to see educational neuroscience being taken on board by political 
agencies, international organisations, and by the public. It is particularly interesting to 
consider how educational neuroscience is presented by the media (in news articles and 
popular scientific literature), how a so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industry has emerged, and 
also how educational neuroscience appears to have been adopted by policymakers and other 
significant actors within international organisations and institutions. It is also relevant to 
consider how educational neuroscientific narratives at public and political levels can be seen 
in relationship to narratives presented at academic level. 
Finding texts to the recontextualisation corpus 
The basic search strategy for finding a comprehensive corpus is, indeed, to cover appropriate 
texts wherein recontextualisation of educational neuroscience at public and political levels can 
be found. In contrast to the analysis of emergence and hegemony, analysis of 
recontextualisation of educational neuroscience will focus only on literature searches for grey 
literature. Grey literature is not academic and peer-reviewed texts, and thus media articles, 
‘brain-based’ learning websites, and political reports and statements will fall into this 
category. Focusing on grey-literature will therefore alter some of the search procedures, since 
the search-engine for Web of Science is not adequate for the targeted literature. Instead, more 
internet searches and library searches of news articles, brain-based literature, and policy 
reports are used in order to find an adequate body of relevant texts for studying educational 
neuroscience’s recontextualisation across structural borders and into the public and political 
domains. This further indicates that the possibility of conducting a systematic literature search 
is somewhat reduced, since general literature searches on the internet, using search tools 
provided by, for instance, Google or Firefox, do not have the same rigorous standards as the 
search-engine for Web of Science36. Nevertheless, to ensure as far as possible an ordered 
search and evaluation of the literature, I still follow the four-step search procedure which I 
KDYH GHVLJQHG IRU WKLV UHVHDUFK í DOEHLW ZLWK FRQWHQW-specific searches and criteria 
corresponding to recontextualisation over structural borders. With regard to the timespan 
                                                          
36 The possibility of conducting a stringent and systematic literature search does, indeed, seem to be reduced, due to the 
exceedingly large number of texts on the internet. To illustrate this, it can be noted that whereas my general literature 
search for the emergence corpora gave 121 115 hits and that of hegemony gave 2 082 hits (both chiefly conducted on the 
search-engine, Web of Science), my general literature search for the recontextualisation corpora on the Internet gave 
almost 365 million hits. To conduct a systematic literature search with such a large number of texts would therefore exceed 
the scope and possibility of this critical discourse analysis. 
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relevant for literature searches for the recontextualisation corpus, here I have also chosen to 
focus on educational neuroscience’s later and more contemporary phases (i.e. 1980-2014). 
This is because previous findings, particularly from the emergence analysis, indicate that this 
is the period when educational neuroscience has undergone significant growth and spread to 
other fields.  
Based on these criteria, a general literature search of grey literature was conducted in 
e-library resources, online archives, and library catalogues, and a total of 364 740 739 hits 
resulted. What became apparent after the first general literature search, was the enormous 
amount of text, how many different actors appeared to have an interest in educational 
neuroscience, and the range of differHQWWRSLFVIRXQGíIURPQHXURVFLHQWLILFDVSHFWVRQVOHHS
and learning, to thinking caps and cognitive abilities, presented in everything from pop-
scientific media articles, blogs, ‘brain training’ games, to political manifestos. The amount of 
relevant texts and the number of different actors with an interest in educational neuroscience
was too vast to be covered in this third analytical part of my critical discourse research. 
Search criteria needed to be narrowed down even further and I therefore decided to focus 
particularly on the USA and UK, because these are the two largest western English-speaking 
countries. Additionally, based on my general literature search and what this examination 
identified as recurring topics and prominent actors in the public and political fields, I decided 
to focus on: 
- Prominent international media agents: particularly the BBC, The Times, The New York Times, The 
Guardian, Science Daily37
- Brain-based educational products38
- Prominent policymakers in the UK and US (cf. English speaking countries)
- Prominent international interest agencies: OECD, EU, The Royal Society, EEF and the Wellcome Trust
- Specific searches on different internet portals, archives and in library catalogues 
- Additional searches for relevant texts by cues given in citations and reference lists
- Searches for the ‘most cited’ texts (because I am interested in texts that have/have had significant
impact at the public and political levels).
                                                          
37 Selected because they are some of the largest news providers in the UK and in the USA. 
38 Brain-based education material can be seen as a broad umbrella term which covers ‘brain-based education theories’, 
‘brain based principles and corresponding instructional techniques’, ‘brain based neurofeedback training’ and ‘brain based 
educational products’ (Sylvan & Christodoulou, 2010). Differences between these four sub-categories are elaborated on 
later, but for the moment, it can be noted that the latter, i.e. brain-based educational products, are commercialized 
programmes. Considering that this category is closely related to a profit-oriented learning industry that does not necessarily 
have an academic or professional foundation, this subcategory was selected as a point of focus in the analysis.   
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By focusing the search on these particular areas within the public and political fields, certain 
aspects were inevitably excluded from the literature search. However, what was lost in 
diversity was gained in more target-specific searches for what appear to be prominent actors 
and features in the public and political levels of educational neuroscience. In this respect, it 
must also be mentioned that due to the significant existence of educational neuroscience in the 
public and political fields – ERWKLQWKHDUUD\RIWRSLFVDQGWKHQXPHURXVLQWHUHVWDFWRUVíWKLV
analysis does not seek to research in-depth any specific focus found in this area39. The aim is 
rather to ‘skim the surface’ in order to identify the scope of impact of the educational 
neuroscience discourse into the larger societal discourse. After evaluating texts from the 
general literature search on these focus areas, using the inclusion and exclusion criteria
relevant for the recontextualisation-concept (see appendix B), I acquired a total of 27 texts for 
the recontextualisation corpus (see appendix C). Of these, ten texts are media articles40, six 
are brain-based learning programmes, six are related to policymakers in the UK and US, and 
five are from other interest actors/organisations. 
Critical discourse analytical procedure  
Directing the focus on text analytical applications, ‘recontextualisation’ can be textually 
recognised as the mixing of ‘new’ recontextualised elements with ‘old’ elements. An 
analytical point is thus to identify how educational neuroscience is “articulated with 
discourses that already exist within these new contexts” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 509). In this 
respect, focus upon intertextuality and interdiscursivity can be of value. When it comes to the 
former, intertextual relations implies a focus on how features of educational neuroscience 
(e.g. words, phrases or larger elements) are incorporated in other texts external to the 
discipline of educational neuroscience. Analysis of interdiscursive relations, though, will 
imply endeavours to identify and examine traces of educational neuroscience in other 
discursive levels and fields external to the academic level of educational neuroscience. When 
it comes to analysing sections of texts and how they narrate and recontextualise certain 
aspects of educational neuroscience, it can further be of value to compare them in terms of 
                                                          
39 Besides, there are already some in-depth analyses of some of these aspects, such as Gonon, Bezard, and Boraud’s (2011) 
study on misinterpretation of neuroscience data on ADHD in the media, Sharp, Bowker, and Byrne’s (2008) research on VAK 
learning programmes in primary schools in England and Wales, and O’Connor, Rees, and Joffe’s (2012) study on media 
coverage of neuroscience in the UK daily newspapers. These studies do not look into the topic of educational neuroscience 
per se, but do touch upon central aspects related to the recontextualisation of the discourse in the societal field. 
40 More media articles were chosen since media articles often are approximately 400-800 words, whilst, in comparison, 
brain-based webpages can be 2 000 - 4 000 words and policy reports 2 000 - 40 000 words. 
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which elements are included or excluded in other fields, with what degree of generalisation
aspects of educational neuroscience are represented, and how aspects of educational 
neuroscience are arranged, explained, legitimised and evaluated across structural boundaries
(see appendix D). The text analytical procedures to be utilised are therefore detailed text 
analysis and structural analysis. The analytical issues that may be identified are, for instance,
how features of educational neuroscience are internalised in public and political texts, how 
educational neuroscience narrations and practices are re-articulated and set in relation with 
‘old’ elements in the particular field, traces of ‘colonisation appropriation’ dialectics, 
identification of significant interest actors and how they present educational neuroscience (cf. 
Fairclough, 2003, 2010; Hitching & Veum, 2011). Identification and interpretation of these 
discourse concepts are essential, since they can help make visible how and to what extent the 
academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse is recontextualised over structural 
boundaries and into the public and political fields. Critical discourse analytical findings and 
the related discussion will be presented in chapter 7. 
Recontextualisation over scalar borders and to Norway 
The concept of recontextualisation can, as noted in the previous section, be analysed with 
regard to how a discourse is distributed across structural borders and across scalar borders. 
The discursive concept of recontextualisation in the two approaches is the same, and thus they 
also share many discourse theoretical perspectives and analytical procedures for critically 
analysing a discourse’s recontextualisation to other levels of discourse. Their difference can, 
KRZHYHUEHIRXQGLQWKHDQDO\WLFDOIRFXVRQGLVFXUVLYHERUGHUVíZKHUHWKHIRUPHUIRFXVHVRQ
structural borders found between organisations and institutions or between different social 
fields, whereas the latter focuses on discursive recontextualisation across borders found 
between the local, the national, and the international (Fairclough, 2010). In this respect, my 
forth and last analytical part will focus on how educational neuroscience is recontextualised 
across scalar borders and to the Norwegian level of the discourse. 
 
Outline of discursive boundaries and specific research questions 
This analytical part aims to investigate the ways in which the international level of the 
educational neuroscience discourse is recontextualised over scalar borders and into Norway, 
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and the discursive outline is therefore drawn with respect to the Norwegian level (see model 
4.1). Considering that my analysis so far has focused on the academic level (viz. the 
emergence and hegemony analysis) and the public and political levels (viz. analysis of 
recontextualisation over scalar borders), I have chosen to also focus on the academic, public, 
and political fields which can be found within the Norwegian level of the educational 
neuroscience discourse41. The reason I have chosen to pay attention to all these three fields is 
because I have a hypothesis that a comparison over scalar borders can show some interesting 
aspects with regard to the ways in which educational neuroscience is distributed to the 
academic-, public- and political level in Norway. An outline of the recontextualisation 
analysis over scalar borders therefore encompasses: 
i) The academic field related to the Norwegian level of the educational neuroscience discourse.
ii) The public field related to the Norwegian level of the educational neuroscience discourse.
iii) The political field related to the Norwegian level of the educational neuroscience discourse.
iv) Educational neuroscience’s earlier and more contemporary phases (i.e. 1800-2014).
Outlining the discursive level to be studied is connected with the relevant set of research 
questions, where the overarching objective is to investigate how, where and how extensively
the international level of the educational neuroscience discourse has become recontextualised
across scalar borders to Norway. In order to direct the analysis further, the following research 
questions are helpful (cf. Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2010):
- Identification of traces where educational neuroscience is disseminated across scalar boundaries to the 
academic, public, and political fields in Norway.
- How and where are educational neuroscientific representations articulated within the Norwegian
academic, public, and political fields? I.e. how is educational neuroscience re-articulated in (and set in
relation to) the old field?
- How is the educational neuroscience internalised within particular academic, public and political fields 
(e.g. in Norwegian academia, debates, media, and amongst national policymakers)? 
- Can traces of ‘colonisation’ and/or ‘appropriation’ of educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation be 
found at the Norwegian academic, public and political levels?
- What is the relationship between agents of the international level of the educational neuroscience 
discourse and agents in the respective fields of Norwegian academic, public and political?
                                                          
41 When it comes to an outline of the academic-, public-, and political fields in Norway, these fields will, by and large, follow 
the same principles as the outline of the international academic-, public-, and political levels. Borderlines between such 
categorisation can overlap and sometimes it can, as became evident throughout the sparse Norwegian search, be difficult 
to find texts relevant to such categorisations. 
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Concept of ‘recontextualisation’ will, as these questions suggest, point the research toward 
scalar dissemination of the discourse, where analytical focus is on educational neuroscience’s 
uptake in the academic, political, and public domains in Norway.
 
Finding texts for the Norwegian recontextualisation corpus 
As with previous literature searches, procedures for finding texts for the Norwegian corpus 
follow the general search design set out for this research. Certain concept-specific criteria 
ZHUH JHUPDQH í IRU LQVWDQFH WKDW OLWHUDWXUH VHDUFKHV PXVW LGHQWLI\ UHOHYDQW WH[WV ZKHUHLQ
educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to the academic, public, and political fields in 
Norway can be found. In this analytical part, I have also decided to pay attention to 
educational neuroscience’s later and more contemporary phases, and literature searches thus 
focus on the timespan ranging from 1980 to 2014. Relevant search engines in this respect are, 
therefore, databases for Norwegian academic and peer-reviewed articles (such as Idunn, Web 
of Science, and ERIC), general internet searches, and target-specific searches in databases 
such as ‘Kunnskapsdepartementet’ and ‘Regjeringen’42, and ATEKST43. Relevant key word 
searches focus on Norwegian target words such as ‘utdanning, nevrovitenskap’ (‘education, 
neuroscience’) and ‘hjernebasert læring’ (‘brain-based learning’), but also on English words 
since Norwegian academics may publish their texts in English. This implies that the 
possibility of conducting a precise and systematic literature search is somewhat reduced, since 
general literature searches on the internet, using search tools provided from, for instance, 
Google or Firefox, do not have the same rigorous standards as the search-engine Web of 
Science. Nevertheless, to ensure as ordered a search and evaluation of literature as possible, I 
will follow the same general literature search design as in the previous analysis. Overall, 
literature searches for the Norwegian corpus focus on:
- Texts from the academic field relevant to the Norwegian level of educational neuroscience discourse
- Texts from the public field relevant to the Norwegian level of educational neuroscience discourse: 
particularly with focus on Norwegian media articles and brain-based educational products
- Texts from the political field relevant to the Norwegian level of educational neuroscience discourse
                                                          
42 ‘Kunnskapsdepartementet’ (Ministry of Education and Research) and ‘Regjeringen’ (The Norwegian Government) provide 
database searches in governmental achieves. These database searches automatically search through the Norwegian 
government’s electronic documents that are open to the public оǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ĚƌĂĨƚ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů EŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ reports 
(NOU’s), white papers (Meld. St.), or other official documents.   
43 ‘ATEKST Retriver’ is a web-database where one can conduct complex searches for Norwegian electronic and printed 
media texts. ATEKST is said to offer ‘complete’ media coverage and articles from NRK, Aftenposten, VG, Dagbladet, 
Morgenbladet, Klassekampen and other Norwegian media agencies are included. In my search, texts (whether printed 
and/or web-based) from media agencies with a national reach were selected.  
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- Internet searches with different Norwegian (but also English) key words44
- Specific searches on different internet portals, archives, and in library catalogues (such as in ATEKST,
Kunnskapsdepartementet, Idunn etc.)
- Additional searches for relevant texts by cues given in citations and reference lists
Certain clarification should be made with regard to this list. Most importantly, the analytical 
part concerning educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to Norway is similar to the 
other analytical parts in terms of the size of corpus, the amount of analytical work estimated, 
and scope for presenting my critical discourse analytical findings. This implies that the 
coverage of the Norwegian academic-, public-, and political fields will be considerably lower 
than the international academic-, public-, and political level of educational neuroscience (as 
three analytical parts are dedicated to addressing these levels of the educational neuroscience 
discourse). One should bear this in mind, since this further suggests that my discourse 
analytical findings from, for instance, the academic field in Norway are based on a smaller 
amount of textual data than discourse analytical findings related to the international academic 
level of the educational neuroscience discourse. 
It should also be noted that the amount of texts pertaining to the linkage of education 
and neuroscience is significantly smaller in Norway than in an international context. The 
overall body of literature relevant for including in the Norwegian corpus is therefore less than 
that which is relevant for the corpora of emergence, hegemony, and recontextualisation over 
structural borders. Since the overall body of Norwegian text relevant to educational 
neuroscience is so small (at least in comparison with international literature searches), I also 
had to select texts that cannot be precisely allocated to either the academic, public, or political 
fields. Considering that segregations between these fields are overlapping, selections of texts 
at these borderlines can lead to difficulties when analysing, comparing, and discussing 
discourse analytical findings. There are, for instance, pop-scientific texts published in the 
PHGLDWKDWEHDUDFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHDFDGHPLFILHOGíVD\LIDFDGHPLFVFR-author or are 
interviewed in an article presented in a public newspaper. One can, moreover, find differences 
between newspapers, as some media agencies have a more scientific profile (such as 
                                                          
44 It must be emphasised that I intend to analyse Norwegian texts published within the Norwegian context of either the 
academic, public, or political field. As such, texts (co-)authored by international actors but published within the Norwegian 
context can be interesƚŝŶŐƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞ͕ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƐĞƚĞǆƚĂƌĞŵĂĚĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚƚŚĞEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶůĞǀĞůоĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞĂůƐŽĂƌĞůŝĂďůĞ
to influence events, practices and discursive structures at the Norwegian level. Texts published by Norwegian authors at the 
international level are, on the other hand, not necessarily essential in this analytical part, since this text will link more to the 
international discursive level, and not to the Norwegian level. Indeed, a Norwegian actor publishing educational 
neuroscientific texts at an international level would be of note, albeit, in this respect it would be more relevant if such an 
actor also published texts within his/hers own national context.     
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Morgenbladet) whereas other agencies focus on tabloid media stories (such as VG). The same 
goes for articles published with relation to the academic field in Norway, since some of these 
articles are peer-reviewed, whereas other texts are published in minor academic magazines 
(such as Lektorbladet). Other academic texts can further be closely interlinked with the 
political field if they, for instance, are commissioned research reports45. In order to elaborate 
on the type of texts that are selected in the academic, public, and political fields in Norway, in 
addition to showing a detailed list over the different literature searches in Norway, I have 
documented the four-step evaluation list for inclusion/exclusion criteria for the Norwegian 
corpus in appendix B.
Using general literature searches, a total of 452 849 hits resulted from the different key 
word searches and following of references. By systematically evaluating text documents 
through the four-step examination plan, I further managed to narrow the text material down to 
a final 31 texts in the corpora. Of these, 8 texts are from the academic field, 16 texts are from 
the public field (2 of these are brain-based learning programmes), whilst 7 texts are related to 
policymakers in Norway. A complete reference list of texts selected for the Norwegian corpus 
can be found in appendix C.
Critical discourse analytical procedure  
The analytical procedure of recontextualisation in Norway is, by and large, similar to that of 
the recontextualisation analysis over structural borders DW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHYHO í WKH RQO\
differences are related to the concept-specific research questions asked. Central to the 
investigation is identification of differences between educational neuroscience at an 
international scale in comparison with how educational neuroscience is distributed on a
national scale in Norway. The essence is to identify how the international level of educational 
neuroscience is internalised within Norway (see appendix D). Accordingly, the analytical 
focus is, for instance, on how elements of the educational neuroscience discourse are re-
articulated and put in context with discursive elements that already exist within these new
contexts (Fairclough, 2010, p. 509). Examination is based on textual analysis and 
                                                          
45 ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĂƌĞĂƚǇƉĞŽĨŐƌĞǇůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞǁŚĞƌĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐоŽĨƚĞŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐо
are appointed and paid for by policymakers or organisations to undertake a certain type of research. In this respect it is 
noted by Jesson et al. (2011, p. 56) that “the final research report will have undergone several reviews by the commissioner 
until an agreement is made ... The final report may be the version with which the commissioners are happy because it 
meets their organisational needs”. 
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interpretations of the texts in the recontextualisation corpora. Each text is studied using both 
interactional qualitative text analyses and structural analysis, where the text’s underlying 
meaning is categorised and interpreted in accordance to pre-set lists of inquiries. Analytical 
issues which may be identified are, for instance, how features of educational neuroscience 
(e.g. words, phrases or larger elements) are internalised in the Norwegian academic, public 
and political texts, how educational neuroscience narrations and practices are re-articulated 
and set in relation to ‘old’ elements in the particular field, and traces of ‘colonisation-
appropriation’ dialectics (cf. Fairclough, 2003, 2010; Hitching & Veum, 2011). The analytical 
part concerning educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation over scalar borders and into 
the Norwegian level will be presented in chapter 8.
Considerations and limitations
This last section will consider some limitations with regard to my research on the discourse of 
educational neuroscience. In this regard it must be noted that the tradition of critical discourse 
analysis has been the subject of some general critiques, which may be germane for my 
research as well. The critical discourse tradition, as previously mentioned, has been 
particularly criticised for offering rather vague and unspecified methods. Lack of a general 
method procedure is, as argued by critical discourse analysts, due to the notion that every 
research project is unique, and method designs may thus vary depending on the object of 
study, research questions, sampling of corpus, and theoretical framework. Attempts to force 
incompatible projects into restrained method schemes would obstruct the research, and it is 
therefore argued that critical discourse analysts should strive to define a method design 
applicable to one’s particular research (Fairclough, 2003). Construction of specific method 
procedures for each critical discourse study will, however, call for a certain degree of 
consideration and reflexivity from the researcher. Moreover, as researchers make numerous 
choices in order to design a research-specific method for their critical discourse study, notions 
concerning the study’s replicability become an issue. In addressing questions of replication, it 
is emphasised that critical discourse analysts should strive for a high degree of research 
transparency – every choice and each step in the research should therefore be presented as 
explicitly as possible (Bratberg, 2014). In view of notions of replicability, and in 
consideration of issues of vague method procedures in the critical discourse tradition, in this 
chapter I have tried to present every step and every decision concerning my method design. 
119 
 
As I cannot elaborate on all the decisions made concerning literature searches and analytical
designs, I have supplemented my method account with more detailed clarification in the 
appendices (see appendix B-D). Hopefully, this transparency will help illuminate the choices 
which have been made, and disclose the foundations from which interpretations have been 
drawn throughout the course of this research. 
It must also be stressed that research transparency is particularly essential when it 
comes to selecting literature for the corpora. As selected text material constitutes the basis of 
a critical discourse analysis, much will depend on the selection criteria used. Moreover, the 
design of search procedures, definition of selection criteria, and the final assessment of which 
texts should be incorporated and which should be excluded from the corpora, will inevitably 
lay open to my subjective evaluation of what constitutes good and representative corpora for 
analysing the educational neuroscience discourse. The key question here is whether a similar 
analysis, but with different educational neuroscientific texts, would result in other discourse 
analytical findings and, subsequently, other interpretations of the educational neuroscience 
discourse. Indeed, questions regarding selection and representativeness of data are critical in 
all research, and in order to ensure adequate data material, I have chosen to follow certain 
principles. Firstly, I have ensured that design selection procedures for my literature searches 
are in line with the principles set by renowned authors in critical discourse studies and 
systematic literature reviews (cf. Fairclough, 2003, 2010; Hart, 2001; Jesson et al., 2011).
Secondly, I have given much consideration to where I can locate relevant texts for each of the 
four analytical concepts and their related discursive levels, and how I can ensure that I detect 
as many relevant texts as possible. In this respect, systematic and comprehensive search 
engines such as Web of Science and university library catalogues have been utilised, in 
addition to general internet searches and specific archive searches in relevant databases. It has 
also been essential to follow up references and cues given in texts, in order to detect other 
relevant monument texts in the discourse. Thirdly, I have used comprehensive literature 
searches and relatively large corpora in this study as a means of addressing questions 
regarding representativeness of data. By choosing texts based on aspects frequently occurring 
in the general literature searches, in addition to choosing 25-30 texts in each corpus, I hope to 
have covered textual, discursive, and social aspects which are relatively representative for the 
educational neuroscience discourse. Moreover, by analysing four discursive concepts ranging 
over four different discursive levels, I also hope to present a relatively representative 
overview of the overall educational neuroscience discourse. Finally, what should be noted 
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with regard to representativeness of data, is that some of my critical discourse analytical 
findings seem to correspond with findings from other studies concerning educational 
neuroscience (cf. Beauchamp & Beauchamp, 2013; Samuels, 2009; Théodoridou & Triarhou, 
2009)46. Even if none of these studies have used critical discourse analysis, they nevertheless 
point to comparable or similar findings with regard to aspects pertaining to the discourse of
educational neuroscience. 
Another question, which should be addressed here is: ‘can discourse explain’? There is 
much debate concerning whether or not discourse analysis should (or can) come to any 
conclusions about cause (Bratberg, 2014). In this respect it should be clarified that discourse 
analysts often focus their research on interpretation rather than explanation. Discourse 
analysis is therefore not about cause and effect; rather it is about understanding social and 
discursive events, actions and structures (Bratberg, 2014; Fairclough, 2010). Moreover, it is 
argued that discourse analysts have the potential to study relationships of causality in broader 
terms than quantifying cause effects. 
We can, first of all, attempt to say something about where a discourse comes from, and what there is 
that gives a certain discourse a prominent or hegemonic position. We can, secondly, be concerned with 
consequences or implications; what does the discourse lead to? Here the causal relation is about 
drawing connections from language to behaviour, in that it is assumed that social and political action is 
influenced by the dominant discourse (Bratberg, 2014, p. 51 [my translation]).
These notions should also be kept in mind with reference to this doctoral study, since my 
discourse analysis will focus on interpretation and discussion of relationships of causality
with respect to educational neuroscience’s emergence, hegemony and recontextualisation, 
rather than offering explanation of cause and effect related to the discourse.  
Regarding critical discourse studies, there are other considerations which ought to be 
highlighted – particularly concerning the role of the researcher and his or hers relationship to 
the discourse. Reflexivity over notions of objectivity is essential in almost every research
project and one cannot ignore the claim that pure objectivity is an impossible concept– every 
study will, from the moment the object of study is chosen and the research question is set out,
be influenced by some form of subjective inclinations, choices, and preferences (Bratberg, 
2014). The researcher, therefore, will inevitably, have some subjective predispositions which 
affect the development of the research. However, when conducting a critical discourse
                                                          
46 Some of which have been published during the course of my doctoral research.  
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analysis, such predispositions ought to be noted, since the researcher’s analytical endeavour 
often is to look ‘beyond’ structures and manifested truths within a discourse. Paradoxically,
however, a researcher tends to be part of the discourse under examination. Considering my 
interest in educational neuroscience, and the amount of work I have put into the task of 
examining the discourse, I cannot consider myself to be a neutral bystander completely 
detached from the discourse of educational neuroscience47. I am part of this discourse and as 
such will be subject to representations, discursive relationships, and structures central to the 
discourse. Despite my best efforts, I will become entangled in the discursive web which I 
myself am trying to disentangle. I therefore suggest that a completely objective analysis is 
impossible to achieve. However, entangled as I will be, I am not unaware of being in the 
discourse. After all, my aim is to critically analyse the discourse and I will thus be obliged to 
attend to the constant task of reflexivity within potential discursive structures and 
relationships pertinent to educational neuroscience. 
Another aspect worth mentioning is related to the analysis of texts in this research:
even if I make use of detailed text analysis, I will not be conducting micro-linguistic text 
analysis at micro-detailed grammatical, lexical and vocabulary level. This is because the 
majority of text material used in this study is written in English. Even if my English is 
acceptable, I am not a native speaker and have not studied English linguistics. Nevertheless, I
will use detailed text analysis, focusing on this analysis at a more basic level and not being
concerned with micro-linguistic textual analysis. Moreover, and in line with what is noted in 
the section above, it should be stressed that text analysis is a process encumbered by 
selection. “In any analysis, we choose to ask certain questions about social events and texts, 
and not other possible questions” as Fairclough (2003, p. 14) notes, before continuing: “There 
is no such thing as an ‘objective’ analysis of text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply 
describes what is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by the ‘subjectivity’ of the 
analyst”. This notion is also in line with a realist ontology of science, which emphasizes that 
‘what is there’ cannot be reduced to our knowledge of reality (Bhaskar, 2008). Arguments 
based on critical realist ontology will therefore also apply to texts, and “we should not assume 
that the reality of texts is exhausted by our knowledge about texts” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 14).
                                                          
47 I am not only subjective concerning the discourse of educational neuroscience, I am also part of an academic discourse 
with its own rules and its own relationships of hegemony, ideology, and power. My reasons for choosing the topic of 
educational neuroscience, as well as the particular philosophic, theoretical and methodological framework, are not 
coincidental.  
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This is a recurrent philosophical principle in my research on educational neuroscience, of 
which readers should be aware. 
Moreover, I cannot escape from personal engagement with this research í I do have 
opinions which, unavoidably, will be reflected in the evaluation and discussion of issues 
relevant to educational neuroscience. The importance of being honest about such engagement 
is often emphasised within the tradition of critical discourse analysis, and Jørgensen and 
Phillips (1999, p. 76) even note that “critical discourse analysis does not perceive itself as 
politically neutral (as objectivistic social science often do); but as a critical approach 
politically engaged in social change … Besides, one often has the intent that results derived 
from critical discourse analysis can be used in the strive for radical social change”. It is 
important to note, however, that reflections, evaluations and considerations should not be
camouflaged as neutral accounts of reality, and that the respective presentations of analysis 
and evaluation will therefore clearly be separated. In my dissertation, therefore, I have 
separated my most subjective and evaluative notions from the critical analysis and discussions 
and, instead, documented them in the distinct chapter for ‘final reflections’. Furthermore, as a 
researcher I should be aware of the responsibility I hold when presenting certain aspects of 
the world – in this case, aspects key to the discourse of educational neuroscience. 
[T]he critical analyst, in producing different interpretations and explanations of the area of social life, is 
also producing discourse. On what grounds can we say that this critical discourse is superior to the 
discourse which its critique is partly a critique of? The only basis for claiming superiority is providing 
explanations which have greater explanatory power. The explanatory power of a discourse (...) is its 
ability to provide justified explanations of as many features of the area of social life in focus as possible 
(Fairclough, 2010, p. 8).
In view of this, a chief endeavour is to provide a solid analysis (both in the number and range 
of features that are chosen, and in the quality of analysis), so that explanations provided can 
bear a certain degree of explanatory power and profundity.
Summary of the method chapter  
This chapter has presented a methodological justification of critical discourse analysis, in 
addition to a more specific account of the method procedure and analytical design, which are 
used in my critical discourse analysis of educational neuroscience. When selecting and 
arguing for a particular method procedure, particular suggestions have been made about the 
123 
 
importance of linking detailed text analysis with more macro-social theories of discourse. I 
have further presented a method design for analysing four concepts of the educational 
QHXURVFLHQFH GLVFRXUVH í QDPHO\ HPHUJHQFH KHJHPRQ\ UHFRQWH[WXDOLVDWLRQ RYHU VWUXFWXUDO
borders, and recontextualisation over scalar borders. The value of analysing these discourse 
concepts are supported by my argument that this combination of discursive concepts can 
provide a multi-faceted and comprehensive identification of different levels of the educational 
neuroscience discourse. Not only can such an approach present an account of the development 
and emergence of the discipline of educational neuroscience, it can also indicate different 
discursive position and representations, points of struggles, and relationships of hegemony 
both within and between the discourse and other central discourses to educational 
neuroscience. In this respect, issues of recontextualisation are apposite, and the significance 
of steering the analysis towards how processes of educational neuroscience impact at different 
‘scales’ and over different ‘structural borders’ is highlighted. Overall, I suggest that the 
method design selected for this study is advantageous for addressing the aim and research 
questions defined at the outset of my research. I further suggest that the method design is 
consistent with a realist approach to critical discourse analysis, which further helps to build 
coherence in my philosophical, theoretical and methodological framework for analysing the
discourse of educational neuroscience. 
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Chapter 5 
The emergence of educational neuroscience 
 
What we group under the name of the sciences is, as the application of the word in the plural 
shows, no single entity, but consists of many separate fields of knowledge, which often lie far 
apart. Through the increase of such knowledge, these fields increase, and their boundaries, 
originally far apart, approach each other more and more. The investigation of these border 
zones then becomes one of the most interesting problems in science and a new branch of 
science itself, whereby the experience and methods of one speciality are applied to the other 
and entirely new points of view are reached that lead to fruitful work in both fields.
Constantin von Economo (1876-1931) 
in Théodoridou and Triarhou (2009)
In the following chapter, my critical discourse analysis of the emergence of educational 
neuroscience’s academic level is presented. The central elements in this respect are analysis 
of the ways in which educational neuroscience emerged as an academic project and discipline, 
which recurring themes, strategies, and positions can be found in the course of its history, and 
which changes can be discovered throughout educational neuroscience’s development. The 
first part of the chapter will present a descriptive account of educational neuroscience’s 
history from the 19th century to the early 20th century, and the second part provides a critical 
analysis and discussion of certain key elements of the emergence of the academic level of 
educational neuroscience.
Historical account of the development of educational neuroscience 
The following descriptive account of the academic project of educational neuroscience is 
based on textual and historical references ensuing from my literature search and my discourse 
analysis. In order to present a cohesive timeline, findings related to the emergence analysis 
are organised FKURQRORJLFDOO\íVWDUWLQJZLWKWKHODWHth century and ending with the present 
21st century. In addition, findings are linked to a broader historical context in order to provide 
a more comprehensive account of the development of educational neuroscience as an 
academic project and discipline. It must be further stressed that some aspects of educational 
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neuroscience’s emergence are related to forthcoming analysis and discussions, such as 
hegemonic aspects and educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to other levels of 
discourse. When this is the case, I will give as full an account as possible, whilst signposting 
forthcoming chapters where these aspects are elaborated on more thoroughly. Overall, the 
first part aims to establish a general historical account of educational neuroscience’s 
development upon which the subsequent discussion in part two is based. 
Late 19th century and early 20th century 
Findings from my emergence analysis indicate that some of the first traces associated with a 
linkage between brain, mind, and education can be found as far back as the late 19th century 
and the early 20th century48. Before elaborating on these emergence references for educational 
neuroscience, I will provide a brief contextual and historical account. What can be mentioned 
first is that the 19th to the mid-20th century is often associated with ‘the behaviouristic era’ 
(Duit & Treagust, 1998; Tomic, 1993). The doctrine of behaviourism is concerned with the 
study of behaviour of individual organisms, and a central tenet within the behaviourist school 
of thought is that “behaviour can be described and explained without making ultimate 
references to mental events or to internal psychological processes. The sources of behaviour 
are external (in the environment), not internal (in the mind, in the head)” (Graham, 2015 para. 
1). In other words, behaviour is perceived as a response to external stimuli, and renowned 
examples of these theories can be seen, for example, in Pavlov’s classic conditioning theory 
and Skinner’s operant conditioning theory (Woolfolk, 2006). With its focus on behaviour, the 
doctrine also comprises elements relevant for learning í and thus behaviourism is interlinked 
with the discourse of education. J. B. Watson (1878-1958) and his behaviouristic learning 
theory can also be mentioned in this regard, where he claims that learning is what an 
organism does in response to stimuli. For Watson and other (radical) behaviourists, learning is 
therefore explained by focusing on the external events which cause these changes in observed 
behaviour (Woolfolk, 2006; Graham, 2015). 
During the 19th century’s behaviouristic era, one can also detect the early burgeoning of 
DQRWKHUILHOGíQDPHO\WKDWRIEUDLQUHVHDUFK+HUHDWWHQWLRQZDVGUDZQWRµWKHP\VWHU\¶RIWKH
                                                          
48 Much insight into the history pertaining to the educational neuroscience discourse was found during my systematic 
literature search and the evaluation work for the emergence corpus. By identifying the first occurrences when 
neuroscience/brain science was linked with education, one can acquire an indication of the timespan within which the 
educational neuroscience discourse emerged and developed.  
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brain and the nervous system, and post-mortem examinations and animal studies were 
conducted in an attempt to elucidate anatomical and functional aspects of the brain. Gradual 
advances were made and new insights, such as the effect of muscle stimulation on the spinal 
cord and the cerebral cortex, were postulated (Windle, 1975 [in corpora])49. Other renowned 
neurological studies include those by Paul Broca in 1861 and by Carl Wernicke in 1876. 
Those studies of stroke victims suffering from language and speech deficits resulted in 
increased attention to how focal brain damage in particular areas can cause specific 
behavioural deficits (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). Some of the biggest breakthroughs within the 
field of neurological research, however, came in the 1890s when ‘the neuron doctrine’
emerged from the postulation of the renowned ‘neuron theory’. Who first proposed the 
existence of specific interneuronal connections is in dispute, but Santiago Ramón y Cajal is
often accredited for his revolutionary neural hypothesis in the 1890s, where he claimed that 
neurons are discrete entities which transmit electrical information in one direction from the 
dendrites to the axon (Rosenzweig, 1976 [in corpora]; Rutledge, 1976, p. 329 [in corpora])50.
Historical references further indicate how the neural theory was expanded on and re-defined 
by numerous scientists, such as the neuroanatomist Waldeyer who introduced the term neuron 
and thus ‘popularised’ the neuron doctrine in 1891 (Théodoridou & Triarhou, 2009), the work 
of the Italian neurologist Tanzi, who, in 1893, suggested that plastic changes within the brain 
were likely to be found at the junctions between neurons, and Foster and Sherrington in 1897, 
who elaborated on Tanzi’s work and also bestowed the name ‘synapse’ on these neural 
connections (Rutledge, 1976; Rosenzweig, 1976). Together, these significant studies created 
the neuron doctrine. 
As progress was made in studies pertaining to the brain and nervous system during the 
last decades of the 19th century, links were also drawn between the brain and the mind.
According to Windle (1975), one of the first pioneers in this respect is Clarence L. Herrick. 
He [Herrick] was the pioneer American neuroscientists, not the first to study brains, but the first to try 
to explore interrelations between neural structure and function, comparative and integrative, in a search 
for understanding the mind of man. Others before him had described results of research in the nervous 
                                                          
49 In Windle’s (1975) introduction to the journal issue ‘Neuroscience Now: Education, Manpower, and Opportunities’, two 
pioneering works in brain science are noted: The first is Brown-Séquard (1849) who studied pigeons’ spinal cords and the 
effect of movements, sensation, and the occurring histological changes in the spinal cord. The second is Fritch and Hitzig 
(1870) where they stimulated the exposed cerebral cortex of dogs as they induced muscle constrictions of the legs.  
 
50 Both Camillo Golgi and Santiago Ramón y Cajal were neck to neck in suggesting the ground-breaking neuron theory. Even 
if Cajal often is accredited the pioneering work, it must be noted that Golgi’s method for making neurons visible played a 
significant part in Cajal’s discoveries. The story also goes that Golgi and Cajal were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine in 1906 for their work on the structure of the nervous system (Gazzaniga et al., 2009).  
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system. He was the one, however, who saw the necessity of bringing them together, and the need to 
compare species. And he was among the first to try to lift psychology out of the esoterism of the 
metaphysician, and to bridge the dichotomy of body and mind (Windle, 1975, pp.1-2). 
As well as the mention of Herrick’s pioneering efforts in linking the brain and mind, other 
historical references also indicate early and significant studies in the emerging cognitive field 
in the 1880s and 1890s. In his account of memory research, Rozin (1976 [in corpora]) notes 
the importance of Ribot’s classical research on ‘Diseases of Memory’ in 1882, where the 
pathology of memory is outlined and fundamental registration and recollection aspects of the 
memory process are described. In 1889 Korsakoff expanded on Ribot’s work and published 
some redefined research on memory deficit, and in 1890 James published his work on 
memory in Principles of Psychology í a text which was later recognised as a significant 
monument in the history of psychology. Together, these and similar advancements led to the 
labelling of the 1880s as ‘the Golden Decade of memory research’ (Rozin, 1976), and the 
1890s as ‘the Silver Decade’ (Rosenzweig, 1976). 
Evidently, during the last decades of the 19th century, interest was increasingly focused 
on the mind and the brain, as numerous scientists emphasised the importance of these 
concepts. As a consequence, contemporary behaviourist theories were questioned because, 
apparently, there was more to human behaviour than simply stimulus-response causalities. 
Cognitive factors could no longer be neglected, it was argued, and since behaviourism 
persistently sidestepped aspects of the mind, behaviourist explanations were deemed 
inadequate by many within the field of brain science and cognitive research. This 
problematisation of behaviourism at the start of the 20th century marks the early emergence of 
what later would be known as the ‘cognitive revolution’. It should be noted, however, that 
even if the transition from the 19th to the 20th century is often associated with a shift from the
‘era of behaviourism’ to the early beginning of ‘the cognitive revolution’ (Tomic, 1993), this 
does not imply that behaviouristic perspectives ceased to exist. Rather, historical references 
indicate an ideological split at this time: On the one hand there were those, often within brain 
science and cognitive research, who questioned behaviourism for its lack of cognitive 
explanations. On the other hand, however, one can find researchers in fields such as education 
and psychology who were dissatisfied with the results suggested by the novel cognitive field. 
Research into human mental processes was considered to have little solid substance and little 
to contribute, and thus many within the educational and psychological field continued to study 
observable behaviour instead (cf. Duit & Treagust, 1998). In the late 19th century and up until 
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the mid-20th century, one can therefore still find a predominantly behaviourist tone in, for 
instance, educational theories. Cognitive-based research can, indeed, also be found in this 
period, but it did not become mainstream within the educational and psychological disciplines 
until the 1950s (Woolfolk, 2006). 
It is in the shift between the 19th century’s behaviourism and the 20th century’s cognitive 
revolution that I found some of the first historical references where linkages are made
between brain, mind, and education. Early references from my search are, for instance,
Thomas I.M. Foster’s (1815) ‘Essay on the application of the organology of the brain to 
education’, Edward H. Clarke’s (1874) work on women’s education in ‘Building of a Brain’
where it is argued that women’s biological constraints in education are due to “an error in 
female building”, and J. Crichton-Browne’s (1884) work ‘Education and the nervous 
system’51. Another early work linking brain research with education, and which is included in 
the corpus, is the work by neurologist Henry H. Donaldson. As early as 1895, Donaldson 
published his book entitled ‘The growth of the brain: A study of the nervous system in relation 
to education’, where he describes the growth of the nervous system and the brain, diffusion of 
nerve impulses, the native character of mental powers, and “the comparative insignificance of 
formal education” (Donaldson, 1895, pp. 5-6). Donaldson even dedicates an entire chapter to 
‘the education of the nervous system’, where he links neurological and cognitive aspects with 
aspects pertaining to education:  
Education consists in modifications of the central nervous system. For this experience the cell elements 
are peculiarly fitted. They are plastic in the sense that their connections are not rigidly fixed, and they 
remember, or, to use a physiological expression, tend to repeat previous reactions. By virtue of these 
powers the cells can adjust themselves to new surroundings, and further learn to respond with great 
precision and celerity to such impulses as are familiar because important (Donaldson, 1895, p. 336).
Donaldson elaborates further on the linkage between education and modifications of the 
central nervous system by relating it to more practical aspects pertaining to formal education.
Connections between the exercises of formal education and brain change have not been demonstrated. It 
is not known how a year's schooling affects the central system, and it is not probable that we shall soon 
arrive at facts of this sort. Available, however, are the facts of anatomical growth during this period, and 
to these, plausible explanations have been given. The aim at the moment, therefore, is to determine what 
limitations anatomy places to the educational process, and thus to obtain a rational basis from which to 
attack many of the pedagogical problems. It appears probable that the education of the schools is but 
                                                          
51 Brown (1884) and Clarke (1874) are not included in the emergence corpus since they do not meet relevant criteria 
concerning the educational neuroscientific topic, and Foster (1815) was unfortunately difficult to obtain.  
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one, and that, too, rather an insignificant one, of many surrounding conditions influencing growth 
(Donaldson, 1895, pp. 342-343).
What becomes evident when reading Donaldson’s account is that factors related to education 
and schooling are given less prominence in influencing brain growth and neurocognitive 
processes than inner biological properties such as gender, brain plasticity, and critical periods. 
Formal education and nurture is thus considered “insignificant” and of “much less importance 
than nature” since the most significant capacities “are certainly inborn rather than made” 
(Donaldson, 1895, p. 344). Donaldson’s emphasis on aspects pertaining to nature rather than 
nurture may not be surprising, considering his neurological background. Besides, and as 
Donaldson himself stressed, at the time there was scarcely any research on the linkage 
between educational practice and the braLQíWRDWWHPSWWRGHPRQVWUDWHHGXFDWLRQLPSOLFDWLRQV
to brain growth was therefore deemed too premature. 
Further findings from my analysis show that Donaldson was not alone in relating 
neuroanatomical and neurocognitive aspects to education in the late 19th century. In 1896, a 
year after Donaldson’s book was published, another work was published which has similar 
FRQQHFWLRQV í QDPHO\ 5HXEHQ 3 +DOOHFN¶V ERRN µThe education of the central nervous 
system. A study of foundations, especially sensor and motor training’. Whereas Donaldson 
ZDVDQHXURORJLVW+DOOHFN¶VEDFNJURXQGZDVHGXFDWLRQíDGLIIHUHQFHGHWHFWDEOHWKURXJKRXW
the text. Similarly to Donaldson, Halleck (1896) stresses the importance of normal brain 
growth for optimal cognitive functioning and “intellectual powers”, although Halleck 
attributes to education a much greater role in influencing “modifications in brain cells”. This 
is already evident in the preface of Halleck’s book where he calls attention to “the importance 
of early purposeful training of the central nervous system while its brief morning of plasticity 
lasts” (Halleck, 1896, p. vii). Dissimilarities are also apparent in how education and 
neuroscience are represented in the two works. This can be seen when Halleck gives the 
impression of informing and even ‘prescribing’ educationally relevant neurological 
knowledge to teachers, parents and others with little or no previous background in neurology
íDVH[HPSOLILHGLQWKHIROORZLQJ
It has been known for some time that the higher processes of thought are dependent on modifications in 
brain cells, and that the highest intellectual superstructure can be no firmer than the sensory foundation, 
but this knowledge has not been properly applied in training these cells. Practical application of truths 
lags far behind a theoretical knowledge of them. The principal object of this book is to prescribe for our 
complex central nervous systems at the proper time, the special kinds of exercise, sensory, motor, and 
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ideational, demanded for full development ... The writer has endeavoured to present herewith some 
facts which every parent and teacher must know and apply in order to secure the fuller development of 
children at a critical time (Halleck, 1896, p. viii).
More detailed and critical reflections on these texts will be provided later in the discussion, 
but for this descriptive account, it can be noted that regardless of different academic 
backgrounds and despite their differing degrees of emphasis on the role of training and 
education, both Donaldson (1895) and Halleck (1896) appear to have authored some of the 
first and most extensive works where brain, mind, and education are linked. It is significant in 
respect of the discourse of educational neuroscience that these works were already published 
in the late 19th century. At a time when the discipline of neuroscience was in its infancy, when 
scientific studies on the connections between the brain and the mind were novel, and decades
before educational neuroscience became established as an academic discipline, the novelty of 
connecting brain, mind, and neuroscience is indeed noteworthy. 
 
The 20th century 
As noted above, at the start of the 20th century the cognitive revolution had commenced in 
certain areas of academia, and advancements were continually being made in fields pertaining 
to the brain and mind. Despite this progress, brain science and cognitive research were still in 
their earliest stages. ‘Neuroscience’, as a separate academic discipline, had not yet been 
established and the field still bore a resemblance to collaborative work between different areas 
such as neuroanatomy, neurobiology, neurochemistry, neuropsychology, clinical medicine, 
and other work pertaining to the neural systems (cf. Rosenzweig & Bennett, 1976b). In 
addition, behaviourist explanations were still predominant in certain disciplines such as 
psychology and education, and cognitive research was thus often doubted within these fields
up until the 1950s (Tomic, 1993). 
Even considering the early stages of brain research and cognitive studies, a linkage 
between the brain, mind, and education was still a rather unusual endeavour in the 1900s. 
Historical references from my analysis nevertheless indicate some noteworthy texts with 
regard to educational neuroscience’s emergence at this time. In 1903, only six years after 
Halleck’s publication, the educational psychologist Edward L. Thorndike published 
Educational Psychology íDZRUNUHSXEOLVKHGLQas a book including three volumes, the 
first of which is entitled ‘The Original Nature of Man’ [included in the corpora]. Thorndike’s 
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objective is to outline elementary psychology, and in the first volume he aims to describe 
“man’s original mental equipment, the inherited foundation of intellect, morals and skill” 
(Thorndike, 1923, p. vii). Regarding the emergence of educational neuroscience, it is 
interesting that Thorndike puts significant emphasis on neural structures and their relation to 
learning, memory and intelligence in his educational psychological theories52. This is, for 
instance, seen in Thorndike’s grounding principles where he states that: “Intellect, character 
and skill have their psychological basis in the structures and activities of the neurones and 
accessory organs which compose the nervous system. The original nature of man in these 
respects depends on the original structure and activities of neurones” (Thorndike, 1923, p.
209). On these and analogous premises, Thorndike builds his working hypothesis by drawing 
connections between neural processes and cognitive aspects of learning and memory. In his 
account of ‘the hypothesis of the physiological mechanism of learning’ it is concluded: 
Thus, certain synaptic intimacies are strengthened and others weakened, the result being the 
modifiability of the animal as a whole which we call learning. The simple avoiding-reaction of the 
protozoa, inherited by the neurones of the brain, is the basis of the intelligence of man. The learning of 
an animal is an instinct of its neurones (Thorndike, 1923, p. 228). 
My discourse analytical findings show that even if Thorndike’s psychological account of ‘the 
original nature of man’ puts great emphasis on connections between neural processes and 
cognitive functions such as memory and learning, general education is barely mentioned. A 
few general remarks are nevertheless made as he makes recommendations for education: 
The basis of intellect and character is this fund of unlearned tendencies, this original arrangement of the 
neurones in the brain. The original connections may develop at various dates and may exist for only 
limited times; their waxing and waning may be sudden or gradual. They are the starting point for all 
education or other human control. The aim of education is to perpetuate some of them, to eliminate 
some, and to modify or redirect others (Thorndike, 1923, p. 3).
However, detailed educational advice is not explicitly given in this volume, except for some 
general advice about providing adequate stimuli (perpetuation), withholding stimulation or 
‘associating discomfort with their action’ (elimination), and ‘substituting another response 
instead of the undesirable original one’ (redirection) (Thorndike, 1923, p. 4). These vague 
educational recommendations are perhaps not surprising, because Thorndike gives the 
impression of taking a rather cautious approach throughout his text, frequently stating that 
                                                          
52 Although my analysis shows that the words ‘neurone’ and ‘neural’ appear frequently throughout Thorndike’s text (1923), 
the word ‘neuroscience’ is not mentioned once. Again this underlines the notion that the discipline of neuroscience had not 
yet been established under this name in academia, and that the neuroscientific field was still in its infancy in the 1920s.  
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‘knowledge is lacking’ and that it is ‘too premature’ to make certain connections (Thorndike, 
1923). Vague links to education notwithstanding, the significance of Thorndike’s work should 
not be underestimated. Not only did Thorndike present an exhaustive account of the 
connection between cognitive functions such as learning and neural processes at a time when 
such linkages were relatively novel in educational psychology, but the significance of this 
work must also be seen in relation to the status and prominence he acquired over his career in 
the field of educational psychology. Overall, Thorndike’s work is indeed an emerging trace of 
a connection between education and neuroscience, and his approach appears to be significant, 
as one of the first in a line where attention chiefly lay on the relationship between 
neurological processes and learning (and not necessarily education and schooling).
Findings from my literature search from the next few decades of the 20th century do 
indeed indicate that numerous studies were published on topics pertaining to neural processes 
and learning53 í DPDMRULW\ RIZKLFK KDG D EDVLV LQ DQLPDO UHVHDUFK RQ UDWVmonkeys, and 
dogs54. These findings further indicate a significant growth and development within the 
neuroscientific field throughout the 20th century. For instance, it can be noted that in 1903 the 
first international neuroscience organisation, ‘The Brain Commission’, was founded in 
London (cf. Théodoridou & Triarhou, 2009). In 1949, Donald Hebb published his findings 
concerning pre- and post-synaptic elements (Morris, Kandel, & Squire, 1988), and from 1938 
to 1952 Alan Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley published a series of ground-breaking articles 
describing action potential in neurons (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). Progress in brain research 
continued throughout the 1960s and 80s, further driven by technological advances such as the 
PET-scan and EEG-technology, and thus, by the late 20th century, it appears that neuroscience
had become firmly established as a separate discipline within academia55. During this period, 
the field of cognitive neuroscience also starts to emerge56.  
                                                          
53 Findings from my literature search show that a frequent subject from 1900 to the 1980s was nursing and education of 
people with brain injuries or brain dysfunctions (e.g. Henrikson, 1949). During the 1980s my search includes articles where 
neuroscientific topics (e.g. language, brain development aŶĚ ƌŝŐŚƚͬůĞĨƚ ŚĞŵŝƐƉŚĞƌĞƐͿ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ о but 
again, mostly with connections to brain dysfunctions. Another frequent topic from the 1970s and 80s is how one should 
purposefully teach neuroscience to students о or ‘neuroscience education’ as it is often referred to (e.g. Wolf, 1967). Even if 
these texts match my key word search they are evaluated as being irrelevant for the corpus, because their focus is on 
nursing and medicine or on how to educate students in neuroscience (rather than on general education).  
54 Examples are Lashley (1929) ‘Brain mechanisms and intelligence’, Gengerelli (1934) ‘Brain fields and the learning process’, 
Rosenzweig, Krech, and Bennett (1960) ‘A search for relations between brain chemistry and behaviour’, and Krech, 
Rosenzweig, and Bennett (1960) ‘Effects of environmental complexity and training on brain chemistry’.  
55 The term neuroscience is said to date back to 1962, when Francis O. Schmitt used it to designate his Neurosciences 
Research Programme (N. Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). 
56 It is said that the field received its name in the late 1970’s from Gazzaniga and Miller when they were on their way to a 
meeting where cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists “were joining forces to study how the brain enables the mind”. 
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Moving from the domain of natural sciences to the social scientific domain, it is noted 
by other authors that in the 1950s and 60s one starts to see traces of a ‘positivistic’ movement 
within social scientific fields íLQFOXGLQJWKHHGXFDWLRQDOGLVFLSOLQH. Positivism has objective 
and natural scientific modes of studies as ‘a gold standard’, and more interpretative methods 
are therefore problematised since they are not seen to result in verified data in the form of 
empirical evidence (e.g. from observation and experimentation). Positivism further holds that 
society, and not only the natural and physical world, is also law-governed and should thus be 
studied by use of ‘objective’ methods (Choudhury, Nagel, & Slaby, 2009). Besides certain 
positivistic perspectives and their problematisation of prior social scientific modes of studies, 
between1960 and 1990, one can again detect significant traces of brain, mind, and education
FRQQHFWLRQVíWKLVWLPHKRZHYHUWKHHQGHDYRXUDSSHDUVWRKDYHKDGDVOLJKWO\ELJJHULPSDFW
than in the late 19th century and early 20th century57. One of these endeavours is Herman 
Epstein’s publication from 1974, ‘Phrenoblysis: Special brain and mind growth periods.
Human mental development’58 [included in the corpora]. Epstein refers to previous studies 
where brain and skull development are indicated, but takes the endeavour further by 
addressing the question of “whether brain growth spurts are correlated with mental growth 
periods” (p. 218). Epstein takes a psychobiological approach in his work and the article is 
mainly on the relationship between human brain and mind development, although, in his 
concluding discussion, explicit parallels to teaching and schooling are drawn:
Increase in GA [grade age] specifies the capacity to handle certain tests and to learn certain common 
information or concepts. By themselves, these increases do not tell us whether the periods of slow 
growth, such as that at age 13 yr, are times for trying to teach children more or for teaching them less. A 
number of indications lead to the inference that children cannot benefit from attempts to help them learn 
any of the more abstract information at this age. For one thing, the near-zero value of the Cattell fluid 
intelligence factor at age 13 indicates that children have little available creative intelligence at that 
period ... [This] would indicate that in the normal course of events such children assimilate little new 
thinking capacity, and hence it might be worth postponing many learning activities until age 15 ... It 
would hardly be likely that attempts to do intensive teaching at this age [of slow learning at 13] could be 
particularly effective (Epstein, 1974, pp. 222-223 [my brackets]).
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Since the topic lacked a name, the term ‘cognitive neuroscience’ was coined to describe “the question of understanding 
how the functions of the physical brain can yield the thought and ideas of an intangible mind” (Gazzaniga et al., 2009, p.3).  
57 My literature search shows that whereas one can find few articles linking the brain, mind, and education in the shift from 
the 19th to 20th century, there is a significant increase in the topic from 1960s and onward. This increase corresponds with 
the development of the educational neuroscience discourse, but again, an upsurge in search results must also be seen in 
relation to the database used (e.g. Web of Science) since their archives are generally more voluminous in later years.  
58 The term phrenoblysis is used by Epstein to describe brain and mind spurts during growth periods (Epstein, 1974, p. 217).  
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This paragraph will be left at this descriptive stage for the time being, leaving further critical 
reflections for the impending discussion part. To keep to the historical description, it is 
evident that the linkage between the brain, the mind, and education is yet again raised by 
researchers during the 1970s. 
Epstein’s work is just one example of a growing interest from scientists in connecting 
neuroscientific and cognitive theories with education, and during the 1970s numerous events 
followed. Findings from my literature search indicate, for instance, that in June 1974 a five-
day conference was held at Asilomar in California, where the main theme was “current 
research approaches being used to find out how learning and memory occur in terms of neural 
processes” í a conference whose papers were later published in the book ‘Neural mechanisms 
of learning and memory’ edited by Rosenzweig and Bennett (1976a, p. ix)59. In general, these 
39 conference papers approach the field from a neurological or cognitive psychological 
perspective, and the main focus appears to be on the linkage between neurological aspects and 
cognitive processes, such as the biochemistry of human memory, and information processing 
and memory. Nevertheless, some implicit and explicit linkages to education can be found 
WKURXJKRXWWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SDSHUVíDGYLFHDQGµKRSHIXODSSOLFDWLRQs’, which are emphasised 
in the introductory and summary chapters of the book.
The chapters of this volume offer a rich and varied panorama of research largely directed toward 
understanding the biological processes involved in learning and memory. Such basic research is 
undertaken with the hope, often implicit but amply justified by history, that it will eventually lead to 
applications that become socially beneficial. As such basic research is pursued, it may supply concepts 
and techniques that can be applied to problems such as improving classroom teaching, alleviating the 
difficulties of the retarded, the aphasic, and the senile, and fostering the fullest development of human 
intellectual potential (Rosenzweig & Bennett, 1976b, p. xi).
Anticipation that research in this field will be able to aid educational practice and teaching is 
evident, and related questions and recommendations are frequently posed. For example, to the 
question of “how a person’s time [can] be allocated most efficiently for learning”, aspects 
such as repetition, depth of analysis, sufficient time and effort spent on the material to hand, 
and motivational factors are recommended (Rosenzweig & Bennett, 1976b, p. xii). Other 
neuroscientific and cognitive aspects are also put forward, such as efficient information 
                                                          
59 This book is relevant for the emergence corpus, but because it is a collection of conference papers, it encompasses too 
much text for a thorough discourse analysis for this study. Consequently, only the preface, introduction, and conference 
summary (Rosenzweig & Bennett (eds.) 1976) and the chapters by Rozin (1976) and Rutledge (1976) are analysed, since 
these are the most relevant chapters with respect to the linkage of neuroscience and education. See full reference details in 
appendix C.  
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‘packages’ for retrieval and learning, mental strategies, and the benefits of early experiences. 
Based on these and similar premises, it is concluded: “Therefore, it should be possible to 
apply this knowledge to the scheduling of learning tasks in relation to age and also to the 
planning of training for the early childhood years” (Rosenzweig & Bennett, 1976b, p. xiii).
Overall then, the 1974 conference and the editors’ note on the resulting book, ‘Neural 
mechanisms of learning and memory’, give the impression of a collective and rather 
optimistic outlook for the application of neuroscientific and cognitive findings for classroom 
practice, teaching, and childhood learning. In relation to the emergence of the educational 
neuroscience discourse, this optimism is indeed interesting. Even more noteworthy is that this 
five-day conference in California was not the only event to be held on neuroscience and its 
possible applications to related fields. A few months later, in October 1974, the Society for
Neuroscience held its fourth annual meeting. As with the conference in California, this 
V\PSRVLXPDOVR UHVXOWHG LQDSXEOLFDWLRQíQDPHO\ WKH MRXUQDO LVVXHHQWLWOHG ‘Neuroscience 
now: education, manpower, and opportunities’ published in Experimental Neurology in 
197560. The symposium aimed to “survey the current number and characteristics of teachers 
and investigators in the basic neurologic and communicative sciences and the anticipated 
needs in 1985” (Shooter, 1975, p. 13), and the conference’s focus was accordingly on 
neuroscientific education and manpower, rather than the linkage of neuroscience and general
education. Nevertheless, and as exemplified by the extract below, the conference papers 
express a general optimism for the future of neuroscience, and possible applications to other 
sectors such as education, are encouraged. 
In case of the biobehavioral sciences, major additional developments may be expected in clinical 
psychology, social welfare, special education, and a variety of paramedical fields relating to patient care 
and rehabilitation and to community health ... Coincidentally, in the near future, a Year Book of the 
National Society for the Study of Education will be devoted to “Implications for Education of Research 
upon the Brain,” advancing relations between the neurosciences and general education ... By 1985, the 
employment market for neuroscientists may be extended substantially into these fields, as well as that of 
special education (Shooter & Magoun, 1975, pp. 40-41).
The two symposia held in 1974 indeed bear witness to a shared optimism with regard to the 
growth and advancement made within the neuroscientific field in the mid-20th century. These 
neuroscientific conferences, and their subsequent publications, also point to great expectations 
                                                          
60 This journal issue edited by Marshall and Magoun was published in Part 2 of Experimental Neurology Vol. 49, No. 1. Only 
the most relevant articles in the journal issue are analyseĚ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂ о ŶĂŵĞůǇ Shooter’s 
preface (1975), and the articles by Windle (1975) and Shooter and Magoun (1975). See appendix C for references.   
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amongst neuroscientists that knowledge within their field would have great academic and 
even greater social benefits in areas such as general education and schooling61. These texts,
however, are first and foremost neuroscientific discussions, where neuroscientists’ views and 
YLVLRQVDUHH[SUHVVHGíEXWZKDWDERXWRSLQLRQVYRLFHGIURPWKHHGXFDWLRQDOGRPDLQ"+RZ
did educationalists view the linkage between neuroscience and education?
A publication resulting from my literature search, which features opinions from the 
educational field, is the text from the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE). 
The purpose of this American society is to investigate important educational issues, and in 
consideration of the growing interest in linking neuroscience and education, the NSSE Board 
deemed it, in 1973, appropriate for a “serious analysis” and “an overview of current 
scholarship in the neurosciences that has implications for educational theory, research, and 
practice” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978a, p. xiii). In order to present neuroscience to educational 
UHVHDUFKHUV DGPLQLVWUDWRUV DQG WHDFKHUV HPLQHQWQHXURVFLHQWLILF VFKRODUVíVXFKDV7H\OHU
:LWWURFN*URVVPDQDQG(SVWHLQíZHUHDVNHG WRFRQWULEXWHSDSHUV WRDYROXPHRI166(¶V
seventy-seventh yearbook dedicated to ‘Education and the Brain’ (Chall & Mirsky, eds., 
1978)62. Findings from my discourse analysis show that the papers in the yearbook are written 
from a neuroscientific approach, with suggestions for possible educational implications. It is 
only in the volume’s preface and, particularly, in the summary chapter that the educationalists 
Chall and Mirsky comment on four general themes which they have identified throughout the 
book. The first theme is “the central role of environmental stimulation and experience in 
growth and development of the brain”, which is deemed to signify that “neuroscientists 
writing in this volume are saying to educators that education is central for optimal brain 
development” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b, p. 371). Secondly, Epstein’s contribution on brain and 
mind growth is noted, and the importance of early and ‘proper timing’ is emphasised. The 
third theme throughout the papers is that “certain kinds of training are more effective than 
others” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b, p. 373). As an example of such methods, Chall and Mirsky 
cite Wittrock’s work, where it is indicated that “it may be possible in the foreseeable future to 
match some instructional methods most useful to the left-brained and others to the right-
brained and still others to differentially organized brain typologies” (p. 373). The last and 
most ‘popular’ topic highlighted is “the importance of cerebral lateralization for the 
                                                          
61 As demonstrated in the texts Shooter (1975), Shooter and Magoun (1975), and Rosenzweig and Bennett (1976b). 
62 Also this book encompasses too much text for a thorough analysis and thus only the most relevant chapters for 
ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĂƌĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ĐŽƌƉƵƐ о ŝ͘Ğ͘ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŽƌǇ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǇĞĂƌďŽŽŬ͛Ɛ
summary chapter written by the editors Chall and Mirsky (1978a; 1978b). See appendix C for full reference details.  
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development of human cognition and for understanding differences in learning style” (p. 373). 
Even if cerebral lateralisation is considered to offer an “exciting hypothesis for education”, 
Chall and Mirsky (1978b) are ‘cautious’, as they say, in drawing exact applications to 
educational practice. In their supposed ‘careful’ approach, they refer to general literature on 
lateralisation and learning by indicating educational recommendations “that students who are 
weak in academic skills (based heavily on the left hemisphere) be taught music, construction, 
and other activities involving right-brain processing in order to provide these right-brained 
children with some activities in which they can excel” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b, p. 374)63.
Optimism for linking neuroscience and education is evident in NSSE’s yearbook, and overall 
it appears that the editors believe that neuroscience can help inform education. 
In essence, the neuroscientists writing in this volume are saying to educators that education is central for 
optimal brain development. Indeed, the more recent the findings, the stronger the evidence for the 
importance of education appears to be ... The neuroscientists have presented evidence here that 
environmental stimulation helps the “healthy” brain develop to its optimal condition (Chall & Mirsky, 
1978b, p. 371). 
At the same time, the editors also stress a cautious approach and the importance of a mutual 
collaboration. “Since the application of the neurosciences to education is still relatively new, 
it must therefore be approached with caution as well as with the excitement that comes from 
viewing old problems in a new light” Chall and Mirsky (1978b, pp. 374-377) note, before 
continuing, “It would appear from the neuroscientists writing this volume that the next decade 
should bring a fruitful collaboration between neuroscientists and educators ... To be fully 
beneficial to both groups, the collaboration must be a mutual one”. With hindsight, and in 
view of what the two editors have concluded concerning a cautious approach and mutual 
collaboration, Chall and Mirsky’s final notes are rather remarkable in that they attempt to 
predict “an exciting utopian aid to education in the twenty-first century”:
It is tempting to speculate on a possible future collaborative effort between educators and 
neuroscientists as we enter the twenty-first century ... Each child in the school system needing special 
assistance would, according to this [new educational neuropsychological] scheme, be tested by this new 
professional ... Computer-assisted analysis of these data [brain size, maturity, degree of myelinisation, 
and neurohumoral balance] would enable the educational neuroscientist to perform an accurate 
assessment of the child’s developmental stage, his particular strengths and weaknesses, the instructional 
materials he would best be able to handle, and the problem areas that would most likely be encountered 
during his educational career. This information would be made available to the child’s teacher or 
                                                          
63 Characterisations of ‘right-brained’ and ‘left-brained’ children have, in later years, been considered as simplifications and 
misinterpretations of neuroscientific research. A more critical discussion of this is provided in later chapters.  
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teachers, and would be continuously updated and upgraded at regular intervals (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b,
pp. 377-378 [my brackets]).
The 77th yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education is a significant indicator 
of the emergence and development of the educational neuroscience discourse, since it conveys 
the view from some educationalists on the implications and prospects of a linkage between 
neuroscience and education. It is interesting to note that educationalists in the 1970s are said
to have been ‘interested in the neurosciences for some time’ (Chall & Mirsky, 1978a, p. xi), 
and the view conveyed by the editors is a shared optimism for the implications and futuristic 
prospects amongst educationalists which also has been noted by neuroscientists in the mid-
1970s. Similar optimism and enthusiasm is also noted by other authors, and in Frank 
Vellutino’s book review of NSSE’s ‘Education and the brain’ it is “concluded that this text is 
well worth reading, and the authors and editors are to be commended for a job well done” 
(Vellutino, 1979, p. 866 [in corpora]).
My analytical findings indicate that confidence in the prospect that neuroscience can 
bring new perspectives and have valuable implications for the educational field continued into 
the 1980s, and an increased number of articles were dedicated to the topic. My literature 
search and discourse analysis also shows how both neuroscientists and educationalists held a
general view that new neuroscientific knowledge about the human brain may be beneficial to 
formal education. For instance, Rita Peterson (1984, pp. 74 & 79 [in the corpora]) predicts
“Great expectations: collaboration between the brain sciences and education ... It seems 
especially appropriate for us to contribute to building a bridge between the brain sciences and 
education”, and Leslie Hart states that:
New understandings of the triune brain, of the two-sided brain, of an organ that grows and develops, 
influenced in good party by experiences and input, of brains that are “normal” even though they use 
VWULNLQJO\GLIIHUHQWVW\OHVDQGVWUDWHJLHVíDOOWKHVHFDQFDUU\VFKRROorganization and practices to a far 
more sophisticated level and bring educators more enjoyable and satisfying conditions of work. The 
doors stand open. Those who go through them may well find what must be found if public schools are 
to survive (Hart in Sylwester, Chall, Wittrock, & Hart, 1981, p. 17 [in corpora]).
Similar claims are made by Robert Sylwester when he says that, “What we now know about 
the human brain and what we’ll discover in the years ahead may well transform formal 
education (Sylwester in Sylwester et al., 1981, p.7), by M. C. Wittrock (in Sylwester et al., 
1981, p.12) claiming that “there are important educational implications of the recent research 
on the human brain”, and by Thompson (1986 [in corpora]) in the following statement:
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More generally, education, a multibillion dollar industry in the United States alone, strives to achieve 
the most effective and meaningful learning. The science most basic to all these conditions and 
HQGHDYRXUV LV WKH QHXURELRORJ\RI OHDUQLQJ DQGPHPRU\íKRZ WKHEUDLQ FRGHV VWRUHV DQG UHWULHYHV
memories (Thompson, 1986, p. 941).
However, historical references from this period also indicate a growing awareness and 
warnings of misinterpretations of neuroscientific findings, particularly concerning so-called 
right-hemispheric and left-hemispheric learning. Accordingly, greater emphasises are put on 
‘cautious approaches’ and ‘mutual collaborations’64. But despite these notes, the 1970s and 
80s indicate a common optimism for the emerging link between education and neuroscience. 
Even if one can find increased interest in the linkage of education and neuroscience 
from the mid-20th century and onwards, it should be noted that this period within the 
educational field is perhaps better known for its linkage between education and cognitive 
SV\FKRORJ\ í DQG QRW QHFHVVDULO\ QHXURVFLHQFH 7KLV FDQ IRU LQVWDQFH EH VHHQ ZLWK -HDQ
Piaget’s (1954, 1964) and Lev Vygotsky’s (1962, 1978) renowned cognitive perspectives on 
internal mental events, learning and development. The cognitive approach represented by 
Piaget and Vygotsky further indicates a move away from behaviouristic learning theories 
within the educational field in the mid-20th century, as learning is understood as changes in 
internal mental structures and not entirely as changes in behaviour. It has also been noted that 
Vygotsky’s development and learning theories in particular, which encompass social and 
interactional aspects to a greater extent than Piaget’s theories, have retained a strong foothold 
within the educational domain up until the present day (Woolfolk, 2006).   
At the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, findings from my discourse 
analysis indicate that neuroscience as a discipline had caught the attention of politicians and 
WKHSXEOLFDWODUJHíLQGHHGWKHVZHUHHYHQODEHOOHGµThe Decade of the Brain’ by the 
U.S. government (Bush, 1990). Simultaneously, publications and debate concerning the 
linkage of education and neuroscience continued to escalate throughout the 1990s. What is 
interesting to note from my discourse analytical findings is that the ‘common optimism’ seen 
in the 1970s and 1980s was confronted by a more sceptical position, which gradually 
manifested itself over the years. Misinterpretations of neuroscientific findings, such as 
erroneous left-and-right hemispheric learning strategies, were now turned against optimistic 
and collaborative endeavours to ‘build a bridge’ between the brain sciences and education. It 
is, for instance, noted that ‘more research is needed’, that the endeavour to transfer neuro-
                                                          
64 As seen in Peterson (1984), McGuinness (1987), and Chall and Mirsky (1978a; 1978b). 
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scientific findings to educational practice is “too immature”, that some authors “grasp at 
straws that are exceedingly dangerous”, and basically that the education and neuroscience 
venture fails because “its advocates are trying to build a bridge too far”65. Additionally, and in 
response to the 70s and 80s optimism shared by many in the educational field, it is noted, for 
instance, by Peterson (1984) and McCall (1990) that many educators in previous decades 
seemed to have been misled by ‘runaway movements’ which promoted educational practices 
such as right-and-left hemispheric teaching with no apparent neuroscientific grounding: 
Regardless of who initiated or promoted them, many teachers and administrators attended lectures, 
workshops, and in-service training sessions in which they were urged to consider plateaus in brain growth 
as a possible explanation for poor school performance and a basis for changing curricula. The information 
many received at such sessions was not always tempered with uncertainty, tentativeness, and caution, and 
some educators and school systems reportedly were all too eager to hear and act upon the good news. 
After all, here apparently was a biological explanation for past educational failings and a scientific, 
neurological basis for educational reform that might satisfy their many critics (McCall, 1990, p. 888).  
Sceptical voices such as these, particularly remembered by John Bruer’s (1997) renowned 
article ‘Education and the brain: a bridge too far’, did not go unchallenged and numerous 
authors took an optimistic and cautious position in the education and neuroscience debate66.
Despite the nature of the arguments being voiced, though, the 1990s indicate an increased 
international attention and academic debate on the linkage of education and neuroscience67.
The double issues of Educational Psychology Review in 1998 are illustrative of such debates,
as these two journal issues were dedicated to Byrnes and Fox’s text ‘The educational 
relevance of research in cognitive neuroscience’ (1998a) and eight responding 
commentaries68. In the emergence of the educational neuroscience discourse, the 1990s are
particularly noteworthy, since this decade witnessed the establishment and significant 
expansion of educational neuroscience as a topic of debate in academia. 
                                                          
65 As seen in McGuinness (1987), McCall (1990), and Bruner (1997) [in the corpora]. 
66 As seen in Byrnes and Fox (1998a), and Berninger and Corina (1998) [in the corpora]. 
67 My literature search indicates that the word ‘neuroscience’ first appeared in the most ‘renowned’ international 
educational journals in the 1990s. This is evident when searching for the key word ‘neuroscience’ only in educational 
journals (such as Educational Psychology Review, Educational Philosophy and Theory, and Educational Research), where the 
first texts resulting are Berninger and Abbott (1992) in Educational Psychologist, and the two issues of Educational 
Psychology Review (Volume 10, Issue 3 & 4) in 1998 which were dedicated to education psychology and neuroscience. 
68 I will not include the entire double issue in the emergence corpus, since there is too much text material for a thorough 
analysis at this point. Three articles instead are selected, since they can be seen to represent the general theme of this issue 
о ŶĂŵĞůǇ ǇƌŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ &Žǆ ;ϭϵϵϴĂͿ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ͚dŚĞ ĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝŶ ŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ EĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕͛
Berninger and Corina’s commentary article (1998), in addition to Byrnes and Fox (1998b) responding article. 
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The 21st century 
Whereas the 1990s were labelled ‘the Decade of the Brain’, the 21st century has been labelled 
the ‘neuroscientific revolution’, as progress continues to be made within brain sciences and 
cognitive research (Brown & Bjorklund, 1998). With regard to the social scientific field and 
the educational domain, one can also find developments and changes here also, and one can 
particularly detect a slight ideological and political ‘evidence movement’ in the 21st century. 
Further elaboration on this ideological and political shift will be presented in later discussions, 
but for the moment it can be noted how, in the run-up to the new millennium, one can detect a 
renewed interest, and in particular, political requests, for ‘evidence’, ‘what works’ and 
‘scientifically based practices’ in education (Davies, 1999).
Findings from the literature review and the discourse analysis indicate further 
development of the discourse of educational neuroscience at the turn of the 21st century. For 
instance, this can be seen in an augmented debate concerning the linkage of education and 
neuroscience, but also in debates concerning the application of brain research to education 
(Posner & Rothbart, 2006 [in corpora]) and the “gulf between current [cognitive 
neuro]science and direct classroom applications” (Goswami, 2006, p. 2 [in corpora]). What is 
also interesting to note from the findings is that numerous authors are starting to argue for 
‘sustainable bridges’ between education and neuroscience, ‘reciprocal collaboration’, and the 
‘need to be cautious’ í as seen in the texts by Blakemore and Frith (2005b; 2004), Ansari and 
Coch (2006), Fischer et al. (2007), and Varma and colleagues (2008) in the emergence 
corpora. In addition to this, findings from my literature search indicate that the linkage of 
education and neuroscience is starting to be referred to as a “developing field” (Ansari & 
Coch, 2006), “a new and emerging discipline of educational neuroscience” (Royal Society, 
2011b; Szücs & Goswami, 2007), “a new science” (Fischer et al., 2007), and that “there is 
now a global emergence of educational neuroscience” (OECD, 2007a, p. 21).
But the 21st century does not only witness mere talk of ‘a new science’ and ‘a 
developing field and discipline’; the beginning of the 21st century is also suggestive of more 
concrete initiatives related to developments in educational neuroscience discourse. What can 
firstly be noted in this respect is that in 1999, the OECD’s Centre for Educational Research 
and Innovation (CERI) launched an eight-year long project called ‘Learning Sciences and 
Brain Research’. This project was an international and political endeavour stretching from 
1999-2007, whose purpose “was to encourage collaboration between learning sciences and 
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brain research on the one hand, and researchers and policymakers on the other hand” (OECD, 
2007a, p. 3). Another noteworthy instigation can be found within the academic domain 
around the same time, as the Harvard Graduate School of Education initiated a programme in 
‘Mind, Brain, and Education’. Following this Mind, Brain, and Education programme, Fisher 
and Gardner began in 2002 to teach a year-long course called ‘Cognitive development, 
(GXFDWLRQ DQG WKH %UDLQ¶ í D FRXUVH EHOLHYHG WR EH ³WKH ILUVW FRXUVH RQ WKLV WRSLF WR EH
regularly offered at a school of education” (Blake & Gardner, 2007, p. 61). Further initiatives 
at Harvard Graduate School of Education followed and soon the first master degree and 
doctoral programme in Mind, Brain and Education was offered. 
It did not take long before other collaborative programmes and postgraduate courses 
followed the example of Harvard University, and during the first two decades of the 21st
century numerous centres, collaborative works, and university programmes were established 
around the globe. Some of these are ‘International Mind, Brain, and Education Society’ 
(IMBES) in the USA, ‘Centre for Educational Neuroscience’ (CEN) in London, ‘Centre for 
Neuroscience in Education’ (CNE) at the University of Cambridge, ‘Brain, Neuroscience and 
Education’ (BNE; SIG), ‘Research School Network’ (RSN) in Texas, and the centre for ‘Mind 
and Brain in Educational and Social Contexts’ (MBESC) at Bristol University. Other 
significant developments in the academic field pertaining to educational neuroscience worth 
mentioning are the launching of the scientific journal ‘Mind, Brain, and Education’ in 2007, 
followed by the journal ‘Trends in Neuroscience and Education’ which published its first 
issue in 2012. 
Besides academic publications and collaborative work, there is also evidence of 
growing interest amongst politicians with regard to the linkage of education and neuroscience. 
Not only can the OECD’s project ‘Learning Sciences and Brain Research’ indicate such 
interest, but a similar educational and political project, for instance, can be found in the
American early learning and childcare project ‘Head Start’ and ‘Early Head Start’ (US
Department of Health & Human Services, 2014), and the UK initiative of TLRP (2007). As 
well as the political interest, analytical findings also show an increased interest within the 
public and commercial field in the 21st century. This is evident from the numerous popular-
scientific books published on ‘the learning brain’, media articles and TV programmes based 
on topics pertaining to ‘how to improve your brain’, in addition to several commercial ‘brain 
based’ learning programmes offered to teachers and schools. Overall, then, the 21st century 
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has seen significant growth and development of the educational neuroscience discourse, as the 
discipline appears to have attracted interest outside academia and in other domains such as the 
political and public spheres. Considering that the analysis in chapters five to eight will focus 
on the contemporary phase and development of the discourse, further description of 
educational neuroscience in the 21st century is not included at this point, since this will be 
thoroughly elaborated on in the following sections. 
With the establishment of numerous academic centres and collaborative works 
pertaining to educational neuroscience, the founding of postgraduate courses and degrees in 
numerous universities around the globe, annual conferences, the launching of two academic 
journals, and an extensive archive of academic articles and books, the 21st century has 
witnessed the establishment of educational neuroscience as a distinct academic discipline. 
Even if the most significant and rapid developments in the discourse of educational 
neuroscience have occurred over the last four decades, historical references show early 
tendencies to link education with brain science and cognitive research as far back as the late 
19th century. Obviously much has changed since the early references made by Donaldson and 
Halleck in the 1890s, and even after the neuroscience and education debate re-emerged in the 
1970s and later in the late 1990s. But there is more to the history and development of the 
academic project and discipline of educational neuroscience, and a critical analysis and 
discussion also reveal continuities, recurring narratives and justifications throughout the 
decades. Whilst the first part of this chapter has been dedicated to descriptive accounts of the 
emergence and development of educational neuroscience, the next sections will take a more 
critical and reflective approach to the development of the discourse.   
Educational neuroscience’s emergence and development 
Analytical findings from the emergence corpora reveal certain ‘problematisations’ concerning
discursive borders within and between discourses pertaining to educational neuroscience, in 
addition to changes in certain narratives, justifications, and practices. In order to critically 
analyse and discuss these findings, the following sections are structured around the main 
research questions related to educational neuroscience’s emergence process. In the 
discussion’s first section, boundaries between related discourses are examined, and strategies 
used to develop the field are scrutinised. The second section asks what the main themes in the 
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discourse of educational neuroscience are, and reflections concerning continuity and changes 
in these themes are presented. Overall, this critical analytical approach helps to elucidate how 
and why educational neuroscience has emerged, which recurring themes, strategies, and 
positions can be found during the course of its history, and what has changed throughout its 
development. 
Educational neuroscience and the field of prior discourses 
A central tenet in critical discourse theories is that discourses do not suddenly, and 
miraculously, emerge of their own accord out of nothingness, fully equipped with discursive
structures, relations, and narrations of the world (Fairclough, 2010). Discourses are instead
perceived to develop through a reweaving of already existing discourses, as discursive
boundaries are questioned, negotiated, and crossed. With regard to the discourse of 
educational neuroscience, the same principles apply, and thus this discourse cannot have 
emerged and developed in a vacuum. It is therefore expedient to see educational neuroscience 
as emerging from a field of already existing discourses. In view of such an emergence 
perspective, it is germane to enquire into, and explore, the field of prior discourses from 
which educational neuroscience has emerged, in addition to discussing how the discourse 
emerged from this field. Certain critical discourse concepts are useful when elaborating on 
educational neuroscience’s emergence, and in the following sections, theories pertaining to i) 
problematisation of discursive boundaries, ii) changes at different levels, iii) discursive 
transgression, and iv) construction of new articulations are drawn upon.
Problematisation of discursive boundaries 
Fairclough (1992) stresses that discursive boundaries indicate what can and cannot be 
thought, said, and done in a discourse, because these restrictions confine what are liable 
discursive representations. In other words, a discourse is outlined by its boundaries at any 
given time, since these constraints help to define the set of premises, representations and 
practices found in a discourse. Discursive boundaries, from the perspective of a singular 
discourse, are not problematic per se, since such borderlines merely define a discourse. But a
discourse does not exist in emptiness and it will inevitably have some form of relationship
with other discourses (Jäger & Maier, 2009). Alignment of discourses makes the boundaries 
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between them potential points for tension, since one discourse’s representations do not 
necessarily correspond with another discourse’s representations. Contradictory represent-
tations and tension between discourses can further lead to problematisation of discursive 
boundaries and hegemonic struggles as conflicting discourses strive to protect their discursive 
regularity69 (Fairclough, 1992). 
If we start by looking back to historical references from the 19th century, one can see 
how behaviourism held a strong position within numerous academic disciplines at this time. 
Findings from my emergence corpus also show how the 19th century saw growing 
advancement in the field of brain sciences, as numerous studies pertaining to neuro-
anatomical insights and structural functions of the brain were carried out70. With reference to 
discursive boundary theories, it can further be noted how these discursive boundaries can be 
seen as points of potential struggle due to different discursive narrations. On the one hand,
there was the long-standing behaviourist discourse, which gave stimulus and response 
explanations as the central cause for human behaviour and learning. On the other hand, 
however, there was the relatively novel discourse of brain science and cognitive research,
where it was claimed that modification of neurons in the central nervous system were crucial 
factors for behavioural changes related to memory, learning, and intelligence71. Differences in 
discursive narrations are evident, and historical references, particularly during the transition
from the 19th to the 20th century, suggest boundary conflicts between the two discourses. This 
discursive conflict can be demonstrated by the censure and problematisation of behaviourism, 
as it was argued that behaviouristic stimulus-response representations were inadequate in their 
explanation of human behaviour since they did not encompass cognitive aspects. This censure 
can further be seen as relating to the development of the novel field of brain science and 
cognitive research, since this field put the concept of mind on the agenda by frequently 
publishing studies emphasising the importance of brain and mind in human factors such as 
learning, memory and intelligence72. In view of this, discursive boundaries between the 
behaviouristic discourse and that of brain science and cognitive research, give the impression 
that they were points of significant tension. Struggles over discursive narrations also appear in 
                                                          
69 Discursive regularity is, as mentioned in the theory chapter, a set of regularities existing between a discourse’s 
representations of reality, values, and institutions. When there is a resilient and closed feedback-loop between discursive 
regularities, the discourse can be seen to be a stable and unchallenged system of self-maintenance (Neumann, 2010).   
70 As noted in the texts by Shooter and Magoun (1975) and Rosenzweig and Bennett (1976b).  
71 As seen in the texts by Donaldson (1895), Halleck (1896), and Thorndike (1923).  
72 As for instance seen noted in the texts by Donaldson (1895), Halleck (1896), Epstein (1974), Shooter and Magoun (1975), 
and Rosenzweig and Bennett (1976b). 
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the gradual change from the dominant behaviouristic discourse of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
to the commencement of what was later called the ‘cognitive revolution’ in the 20th century. 
Changes at different levels  
Problematisation of discursive boundaries can further be linked to aspects of discursive 
change at different levels, in addition to theories concerning interdiscursive and intertextual 
relations. What this implies is that aspects of one discourse may affect aspects of other, 
closely linked discourses (Fairclough, 1992). Thus, when discursive boundaries are 
challenged at one level, other closely interlinked discourses may be affected by these 
alterations. It can be further noted that changes in a discourse can have varying degrees of 
LPSDFWGHSHQGLQJRQWKHLUUDQJHíRQDORFDOOHYHOWhese may be restricted to changes within a 
specific discourse, but they can also affect closely related discourses, or can result in larger 
structural changes in an order of discourse (Fairclough, 1992). Intertextual aspects found in 
related discourses can thus be an important factor in processes of change, since this can 
indicate how one discourse affects other discourses. 
Arguably, this suggests that problematisation of the behaviouristic discourse in the late 
19th century was likely to affect connected discourses at other levels. In other words, when 
behaviouristic representations, narrations, and justifications were being doubted within 
academia at large, these doubts were likely to affect disciplines which relied on behaviouristic 
explanations. Of note in this respect is that both the discipline of psychology and that of 
education had strong behaviouristic traditions throughout the 19th century and up until the 
mid-1900s (cf. Duit & Treagust, 1998). When the behaviouristic discourse was problematised
within academia, one can therefore assume that similar doubts affected education and 
psychology. Historical references, in fact, indicate that numerous educationalists and 
psychologists abandoned behaviouristic stimulus-response explanations in favour of more 
cognitive theories and perspectives such as those of Piaget and Vygotsky. Not only is this 
evident in the gradual change of focus to neural correlates between learning and memory73,
this is also evident with the emergence of separate disciplines such as educational psychology, 
cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology.
                                                          
73 As seen demonstrated in Donaldson (1895), Halleck (1896), and Thorndike (1923). 
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Discursive transgression and new articulations 
Changes at different levels bring us to concepts concerning discursive transgression and 
construction of new articulations. Here it is noted that problematisation of discourses can lead 
to requests for new representations and explanations that are more adequate than prior 
narrations. In the process of crafting new representations, one often finds transgression, 
negotiation, and crossing of discursive boundaries. On this note, Fairclough (2010, p. 19) 
argues that the appearance of new discourses occurs by dialogue, as “they are formed through 
articulating together (features of) existing discourses”. Discourses can, as such, emerge as a 
result of boundary transgression, as different discursive boundaries are crossed and combined 
in new ways. New discursive articulations do not only imply changes in textual notions; 
construction of new articulations can also indicate changes in social practice, new discursive 
positions, novel institutions, new ways to act, new structural changes and other alterations 
within and between discourses. Again, concepts of interdiscursivity and intertextuality are 
apposite since they indicate relations between discourses and texts, and how one discourse can 
both affect and be affected by other discourses (Fairclough, 1992). 
My analysis of historical series of texts pertaining to educational neuroscience does, in 
fact, suggest that numerous works in the late 19th and early 20th centuries combine concepts of 
prior discourses (e.g. education), with concepts from new discourses (e.g. the emerging field 
of brain science and cognitive research). Almost every text in the corpora bears witness to 
such transgressions, and authors’ cross-disciplinary endeavours are frequently manifested in 
how the linkage is described, such as “formal education and the central nervous system” 
(Donaldson, 1985; Halleck, 1986), “neurones of the brain and education” (Thorndike, 1923), 
“brain and mind development and teaching and schooling” (Epstein, 1974), “education and 
neural mechanisms of learning and memory” (Rosenzweig & Bennett, 1976a), “education and 
the brain” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978a), “education and brain research” (Sylwester et al., 1981), 
and “brain sciences and education” (Peterson, 1984). Other explicit manifestations of 
discursive transgression found throughout the historical series of texts are labels identifying 
educational neuroscientific work as ‘interdisciplinary’, ‘multidisciplinary’, or ‘trans-
disciplinary’ work74. Yet another clear identification of a cross-disciplinary endeavour is the 
commonly used metaphor of ‘a gap’ and the ‘bridging’ of this division between the 
                                                          
74 Respectively in Blakemore and Frith (2005b); in Rosenzweig and Bennet (1976b), Berninger and Corina (1998), Ansari and Coch 
(2006) and Varma et al. (2008); and in Samuels (2009) and Beauchamp and Beauchamp (2013) from literature searches.  
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disciplines75. Furthermore, and perhaps most obviously, the cross-disciplinary endeavour is 
even manifested in the discipline’s name. Titles alluding to the discourse, for example, 
include “Mind, Brain, and Education” (Fischer et al., 2007; Samuels, 2009), “educational 
neuroscience” (Samuels, 2009; Beauchamp & Beauchamp, 2013), “neuroeducation”
(Théodoridou & Triarhou, 2009), “neuroeducational research” (Howard-Jones, 2010),
“pedagogical neuroscience” (Fawcett & Nicolson, 2007), and “neurolearning” (Petitto & 
Dunbar, 2004). Even if the name has varied throughout the decades, and actually still varies 
from author to author, the title of the discourse clearly indicates a cross-disciplinary venture 
between neuroscience, psychology, and education. 
Table 5.1: Examples of how prior discursive elements are combined in new reconstructions.
                                                          
75 As seen in Peterson (1984), Bruer (1997), Blakemore and Frith (2005b), Ansari and Coch (2006) and Varma et al. (2008). 
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Further reflections on the development of educational neuroscience 
Intertextual references in historical series of texts reveal aspects related to boundary crossing, 
tension, and a struggle between the field of education, brain science, and cognitive research, 
in addition to reweaving of prior discursive elements to new articulations (see table 5.1). 
What these findings further suggest is that educational neuroscience has emerged and 
developed from a field of prior discourses pertaining to what we today identify as cognitive 
neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education76. However, the aim of this section is not 
to point out the (rather obvious) notion that educational neuroscience is a cross-disciplinary 
endeavour, rather, it is to shed light on how educational neuroscience came to emerge from 
this field of discourses. In view of my historical findings, in addition to critical discourse 
theories, I will argue that the emergence of educational neuroscience is interlinked with i) 
development and advancement made in fields related to brain science and cognitive research, 
ii) problematisation of discursive elements, such as ‘insufficient’ behaviourist accounts in 
other and related discourses, and iii) transgression of discursive boundaries and reconstruction 
of discursive elements from prior discourses. In the same way, I will suggest that these three 
notions are not only relevant to the early emergence of educational neuroscience, but that in 
varying degrees the aspects appear to have affected the further development of educational
neuroscience throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries. Furthermore, the emergence and 
development of educational neuroscience’s academic level should be seen as a shifting 
process, more likely to have developed in stages rather than a smooth linear progression. 
My argument about a somewhat uneven developmental phase is based on my analysis
of the historical series of texts, where publications and augmented debate pertaining to the 
linkage of brain research and education appear at certain periodic intervals. One can, for 
instance, detect a first and emerging phase in the late 19th century and early 20th century with 
the work of Donaldson (1895), Halleck (1896), and Thorndike (1923), where brain science 
and cognitive aspects were provisionally linked to education. It is worthy of note that this 
                                                          
76 I will argue that the emergence of educational neuroscience must not be seen as fixed interrelations between the 
discourse of education, cognitive research, and brain science; considerations must also be paid to notions that these 
different discourses have their individual history and discursive developments. Up until the early 20th century 
‘neuroscience’ was not yet established as a singular academic discipline, but was a field under development, comprising 
research in neuroanatomy, neurology, neurochemistry, neurobiology, electrophysiology, and clinical brain research. The 
discourse of psychology has also undergone cross-disciplinary alterations throughout the history (viz. cognitive psychology, 
developmental psychology, and neuro-psychology are identified); so has the educational field (viz. educational psychology, 
educational sociology and educational philosophy). The field of prior discourses related to educational neuroscience 
therefore encompasses a complex set of discursive relations, as different discourses are crossed and combined in new 
disciplines over the course of history.  
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period of time corresponds with the period of early problematisation between the 
behaviouristic discourse and the novel field of brain science and cognitive research. From the 
1930s until the 1950s and 60s, however, findings from my literature search indicate that there 
is a small interval during which the main focus is on linkages between brain science and 
cognitive aspects such as learning and memory, with scarcely any explicit links to formal 
education and schooling. 
In the 1970s and 1980s another peak of increased effort to link brain science and 
cognitive research within education is found. This can be exemplified by the three separate 
conferences pertaining to neuroscience and possible application to education from the 
emergence corpora77, in addition to separate work from authors such as Epstein (1974), 
Sylwester et al. (1981), and Peterson (1984). Again, this developmental peak corresponds 
with development and increased optimism about the neuroscientific discourse, advanced by 
brain research technologies such as PET-scan and EEG. Increased attention to a linkage 
between education, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience at this time can, additionally, be 
interlinked with a renewed ‘cognitive revolution’ in the disciplines of education and 
psychology. Up until the mid-20th century, a behaviourist approach was predominant in these 
fields, but around the 1950s it was widely acknowledged that behaviourism could only offer 
limited explanations for human behaviour. In line with this, cognitivism gained significant 
ground in education and psychology (cf. Duit & Treagust, 1998). This can, for instance, be 
seen in the emergence of cognitive psychology as a distinctive field of science, in addition to 
the discipline of educational psychology. In the same way, developmental and cognitive 
learning theories from Piaget and Vygotsky started to capture the interest of educational 
acaGHPLFVíDSSURDFKHVZKLFKIRFXV on how individual cognitive processes generate learning 
(Woolfolk, 2006). It can also be noted how a positivistic perspective, with its ‘gold standard’ 
of natural scientific methods and philosophies, started to gain an increased foothold in social 
scientific research and in the educational sector, during the 1950s and 60s (Choudhury et al., 
2009; Telhaug & Mediås, 2003).
From the 1980s onwards, several publications have been found concerning the brain-
mind-education linkage, but it was not until the late 1990s and early 2000s that the 
educational neuroscience debate again received increased attention, with arguments from 
                                                          
77 As demonstrated by the 4th annual meeting of the Society of Neuroscience in 1974 (Marhsall & Magoun, 1975), ‘The 
conference on Neural Mechanism of Learning and Memory’ in 1974 (Rosenzweig & Bennett (eds.), 1976), and National 
Society for the Study of Education’s project on ‘Education and the Brain’ from 1973-1978 (Chall & Mirsky (eds.), 1978).  
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authors such as Byrnes and Fox (1998a, 1998b), Bruer (1997) and Blakemore and Frith 
(2005b). In comparison to the last developmental peak in the 1970s when numerous 
conferences were held, the peak in the late 1990s and early 2000s also featured the initiation 
of political projects and reports, the foundation of collaborative centres, the establishment of 
postgraduate university courses, and the launching of specific mind, brain, and educational 
journals. If one again links this developmental peak with advancement in the neuroscientific 
discourse, it can be noted that the 1990s is labelled ‘the Decade of the Brain’ and that the 21st
century ‘neuroscientific revolution’ has caught the attention of society at large (Brown & 
Bjorklund, 1998). Moreover, and as will be further discussed in the recontextualisation
chapters, the 21st century has shown renewed interest, and a particular political request for 
more ‘scientifically based practice’ in education.  
Overall, I will therefore argue that the history of educational neuroscience reveals
WKUHHGHYHORSPHQWDOSHDNVí WKHILUVW LQ WKHVKLIW IURPWKHth and 20th century, the second 
around the 1970s, and the third around the late 1990s and early 2000s. I will further argue that 
the three developmental peaks in the emergence of educational neuroscience appear to be 
connected with advancements made in fields related to brain science and cognitive research, 
in addition to the problematisation of related discourse in pursuit of more ‘scientific’ 
DSSURDFKHV íwhether the uproar against behaviourism at the end of the 19th century, the 
positivistic debate in the educational sector in the 1950s, or later in the early 21st century 
when more ‘evidence-based’ research and practices were demanded. Moreover, and with 
reference to discourse theories, I will argue that these aspects are linked to the ensuing 
transgression of discursive boundaries pertaining to education, cognitive science, and 
neuroscience, as discursive aspects of these prior discourses are reconstructed into new 
discursive elements, consistent with educational neuroscience discourse. 
 
Educational neuroscience and emergence strategies  
A basic premise for this chapter is the notion that discourses do not emerge of their own
accord out of nothingness (cf. Fairclough, 2010). The previous section, therefore, elaborated 
on how educational neuroscience appeared and developed from a field of external discourses. 
However, emergence and development of discourse must also be seen in the light of 
emergence processes found within a discourse. Accordingly, this section will approach the 
question by focusing mainly on discursive strategies and actions. 
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Structural and strategic processes 
Notions of structural and strategic emergence processes bring us to aspects pertaining to the 
power to act and the power to change discourse. In the theory chapter, I explained how 
discourses have their own power, and can thus be seen as powerful structures, due to internal 
mechanisms which can enhance and resonate discursive regularities in a self-sustaining 
process. This power of discourse lies in discursive structures, as discourses exercise power by 
regulating and institutionalising how subjects think, talk, and act (Neumann, 2010; 
Fairclough, 2010). It is further noted how discourses are supra-individual in the sense that 
“everybody is co-producing discourse, but no single individual or group controls discourse or 
has precisely intended its final result” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 38). Theoretical notions about
the power of discourse can easily give the impression that discursive developments resemble a 
GRPLQRJDPHí DV VRRQDV WKH ILUVW SLHFH LQa discursive chain has been set in motion, the 
succeeding pieces will automatically and effortlessly fall into place. However, discourses do 
not develop automatically, and they are not driven by the mere power of discourse found 
within and between prior fields of discourses. Rather, development of discourses must be seen 
as a process, which also includes power over discourses. This idea ascribes human subjects 
with an active role in the discursive matrix, as they are considered liable to develop and 
change discourses by means of strategic actions78. Emergence and development of discourses
must therefore be related to discursive and structural mechanisms found within and between 
discourses, and to human actors (individuals or groups) and their ‘successful’ use of 
strategies, practices and actions pertaining to a discourse’s progress (Fairclough, 2010; Jäger 
& Maier, 2009)79. In view of this, it should be noted that different discursive aspects and 
different human actors hold different possibilities of discursive impact and change. Some 
individuals and groups will, for instance, have a greater chance of influence, because they 
have more power over discourse thDQ RWKHUV í IRU H[DPSOH LI WKH\ KDYH JUHDWHU ILQDQFLDO
resources or privileged access to the media (Jäger & Maier, 2009). One can also detect 
differences in the effects derived from discursive aspects. “A single text has minimal effects, 
which are hardly noticeable and almost impossible to prove. In contrast, a discourse, with its 
recurring contents, symbols and strategies, leads to the emergence and solidification of 
                                                          
78 Whether use of strategies are conscious actions or not, is another matter, since it can be argued that human actions and 
practices can be regulated and institutionalised by the power of discourse as ‘natural ways’ of being and acting in the world.  
79 The term ‘successful strategies’ is used when differentiating between the success and failure of competing strategies in 
discursive processes (Fairclough, 2010). Words of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ are therefore not normative validations of a strategy 
(or the outcome of a strategy), but rather a term describing whether or not a strategy can be seen as being connected to 
change. 
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‘knowledge’ and therefore has sustained effects” Jäger and Maier (2009, p. 38) note, before 
continuing, “What is important is not the single text … but the constant repetition of 
statements”. 
Consideration of both discursive structural processes and strategic actions by 
individuals and groups is therefore important with regard to the emergence of a discourse. 
Different emergence processes and strategies can also be said to have different degrees of 
success, depending on their impact and effect in changing and developing the discourse. It is
also important to note that discursive emergence processes and actors’ strategies can be 
perceived as being intertwined with one another, because discursive structures may prompt 
certain strategic actions, and strategic actions may in turn instigate certain structural 
processes.
Emergence processes and strategies in the discourse of educational neuroscience 
With regard to educational neuroscience’s developments, numerous emergence processes and 
strategies are found in my analysis. As mentioned in the previous section, problematisation,
negotiation, crossing of boundaries, and re-articulation of discursive elements can signify 
emergence processes and strategies. To ascribe these emergence processes merely to one 
discursive aspect or to some individual’s, would, however, be unproductive. Arguably, and in 
line with critical discourse theories, the emergence of educational neuroscience occurred 
through a combination of discursive emergence processes and actors’ strategies. In other 
words, discursive problematisation and ‘reweaving’ of discursive elements in the field of 
external discourses must be seen as having been brought into play as a result of both 
discursive structural dispositions and human actions. 
Discursive structural dispositions are, for instance, found in the very arrangement of 
relations within and between discourses pertaining to educational neuroscience. What I mean 
by this is that the field of prior discourses also contains the seeds of possible conflicts, since 
boundaries between discourses are potential points of tension and conflict. Moreover, the 
nature of conflicting elements also creates possibilities of resistance, because those elements 
that challenge dominant representations also provide people with resources to make resistance 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). In the words of Fairclough (1992, p. 96): “The immediate 
origins and motivations of change in the discursive event lie in the problematization of 
155 
 
conventions … Such problematizations have their bases in contradictions”. In the same way, I 
will argue that discursive structures within and between discourses related to educational 
neuroscience present structures with the potential for discursive conflicts, contradiction, and 
thus discursive change. For instance, in the field of prior discourses in the late 19th century, 
such conflicting elements are seen between the discourse of behaviourism and the novel 
discourse pertaining to brain science and cognitive research. As already argued, similar 
boundary conflicts are also found throughout the history of the same field of discourse 
pertaining to education, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience, in addition to conflicts 
pertaining to positivism in the social sciences in the 1950s and claims for more of an evidence 
base in the 1990s.  
Considering that emergence processes should also be seen to be interrelated with 
human actions and strategies, it should be stressed that whereas discursive structures hold the 
seed to possible problematisation, it is individuals or groups holding alternative 
representations who, in the end, will convey disagreement (Fairclough, 1992). Moreover, 
problematisation of discourse necessitates new representations, and the field of prior 
discourses, on the basis of their inherent power, offers the resources to craft new discursive
elements. This, however, requires human action and the use of strategies to negotiate, re-
articulate and combine prior discursive elements into new constructions. In problematising the 
behaviourist discourse, authors and researchers claimed that behaviourist stimulus-response 
representations were too limited, since they did not encompass cognitive factors. Accordingly, 
discursive boundaries were being crossed and prior discursive elements were re-articulated in 
new narrations that justified relations between the brain, the mind, and behaviour. These 
processes of problematising behaviourist narrations and the postulation of new articulations 
can therefore be seen as central actions and strategies in the early emergence process of the 
educational neuroscience discourse. 
Other strategies related to the development of educational neuroscience are found in 
the ways in which educational neuroscience is talked about í either explicitly or implicitly,
for example, in how an author chooses to refer to educational neuroscience. In 1895, it was
noted by Donaldson that “education consists in modifications of the central nervous system” 
(p. 336), and later in 1923, Thorndike hypothesised that “the capacity to learn and remember 
could find its physiological basis in the movement-process of the neurones” (p. 225). During 
the 20th century, there is more explicit mentioning, and often warm appraisal, of “fruitful 
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collaboration between neuroscientists and educators” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b, p. 376), “great 
H[SHFWDWLRQVí FROODERUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH EUDLQ VFLHQFHV DQG HGXFDWLRQ´ (Peterson, 1984, p. 
74), and need for “interdisciplinary dialogue” (Blakemore & Frith, 2005b). Strategies are also 
used in arguments for ‘building bridges’, and recommendations such as “it seems especially 
appropriate for us to contribute to building a bridge between the brain sciences and education” 
(Peterson, 1984, p.79) are seen in numerous texts80. In the 1980s and 90s, numerous strategies 
to constrain the development of educational neuroscience are also found, in warnings about
the ‘exceedingly dangerous’ pitfalls of neuromyths and ‘a bridge too far’81 (see further 
representations in table 5.2). 
Emergence strategies are not solely detected in how different authors refer to 
educational neuroscience; strategic actions related to the development of educational 
neuroscience are also seen in instigations of social events and practices, and in materialised 
aspects of discourse. Some of the first traces of this are found in the 1970s, with the launching 
of many conferences DQG SURMHFWV í DOO RI ZKLFK Vent an optimistic message about
neuroscience and its possible applications in the field of education82. Later, in the 1990s and 
the two first decades of the 21st century, the instigation of numerous conferences and projects 
on educational neuroscience83, the establishment of collaborative centres, postgraduate 
degrees in several universities such as Harvard University, Cambridge University, the 
University of London, and the University of Bristol, and the launching of two academic
journals on the linkage of mind, brain and education, are also clear evidence of actions and 
strategies pertaining to the development of the educational neuroscience discourse (see table 
5.2). The discourse of educational neuroscience, therefore, reveals numerous individual and 
group strategies, which together have crafted discursive change and development. 
                                                          
80 Also seen in Byrnes and Fox (1998a) and Ansari and Coch (2006). 
81 As seen in McGuinness (1987) and Bruer (1997). 
82 As seen by the 4th annual meeting of the Society of Neuroscience in 1974 (Marshall & Magoun (eds), 1975), the 
conference on Neural Mechanism of learning and memory in 1974 (Rosenzweig & Bennett (eds), 1976), and the National 
Society for the Study of Education’s project on Education and the Brain from 1973-1978 (Chall & Mirsky (eds), 1978). 
83 As seen by the projects by OECD (2007), TLRP (2007), and The Royal Society (2011a; 2011b). 
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Table 5.2: Examples of strategies found in the development of the discipline.
 
Strategies in form of value-laden articulations 
 
Strategies and actions 
pertaining to practices,  
 
Positive  
 
Negative  
instigations of events etc. 
 
 
“Fruitful collaboration between 
neuroscientists and educators” 
(Chall & Mirsky, 1978b, p. 376). 
 
“The educators who sheds past 
confusions to see that the brain is 
the organ for learning enters an 
enchanting new world ... The 
doors stand open. Those who go 
through them may well find what 
must be found if public schools are 
to survive” (Hart in Sylwester et 
al., 1981, p. 17). 
  
 “Great expectations - 
collaboration between the brain 
sciences and education ... It seems 
especially appropriate for us to 
contribute to building a bridge 
between the brain sciences and 
education” (Peterson, 1984, p. 74 
& p. 79). 
 
“[T]he importance of anchoring 
education in an evidence base 
derived from neuroscience” 
(Blakemore & Frith, 2005b, p. 459). 
 
“It is time for education, biology 
and cognitive science to join 
together to create a new science 
and practice of learning and 
development. The remarkable new 
tools of biology and cognitive 
science open vast possibilities for 
this emerging field” (Fischer et al., 
2007, p. 1). 
 
 
“Some ambitious authors [are] 
grasping at straws in trying to 
draw parallels with what 
might be relevant to the 
classroom about their unique 
areas of expertise. Often these 
grasps at straws are 
exceedingly dangerous ...” 
(McGuinness, 1987, p. 117).  
 
“[It] points rather more to 
dead ends (what does not 
work) and promising leads 
than to definitive solutions” 
(McGuinness, 1978, p. 119).  
 
“Advocates [for neuroscience 
and education] are trying to 
build a bridge too far. 
Currently, we do not know 
enough about the brain 
development and neural 
function to link that 
understanding directly, in any 
meaningful, defensible way to 
instruction and educational 
practice” (Bruer, 1997, p. 4). 
 
“Neuroscience has discovered 
a great deal about neurons 
and synapses, but not nearly 
enough to guide educational 
practice” (Bruer, 1997, p. 15). 
 
Instigation of conferences such 
as the 4th annual meeting of the 
Society of Neuroscience (1974) 
and Neural Mechanism of 
learning and Memory (1974). 
 
Instigation of National Society 
for the Study of Education’s 
project on Education and the 
Brain (1973-1978). 
 
OECD’s project Learning 
Sciences and Brain Research 
(1999-2007).  
 
TLRP’s project Neuroscience and 
Education: Issues and 
Opportunities (2007).  
 
The Royal Society’s project 
Brain Waves: Neuroscience: 
implications for education and 
lifelong learning (2011). 
 
Establishment of postgraduate 
degrees, such as the master and 
doctoral degree of Mind, Brain, 
and Education at Harvard 
University (2002).  
 
Establishment of collaborative 
university centres, such as 
IMBES, CEN, BNE: SIG, and 
MBESC (21st century).  
 
Launching of journals, such as 
the Mind, Brain, and Education 
(2007). 
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Why did the discourse of educational neuroscience emerge when it did? 
In order to tie up some loose ends, in this section I will consider why the academic level of 
educational neuroscience only became established during the past few decades, when the 
linking of mind, brain and education has arguably existed for centuries. In this respect, I will 
particularly emphasise three factors. I will argue, firstly, that the establishment of educational 
neuroscience is interlinked with neuroscientific advancement, secondly, that it can be related 
to dynamics in education, and thirdly, that emergence can be connected with successful 
strategies. Starting with neuroscientific advancement, I have already argued that 
developments within the neuroscientific discourse have influenced developments in the 
educational neuroscience discourse. I will further argue that advancement within the neuro-
scientific field also can be ascribed a central role as to why educational neuroscience was 
established at the time it was, and not earlier. If we look at historical references from my 
corpora, one can clearly detect a sense of ‘novelty’ in the endeavour to link education with 
aspects of the mind and brain. This is easily seen in much of the critique of educational 
neuroscientific endeavours, as much censure is grounded in claims that “more research is
needed before application” (McCall, 1990, p. 885), and that “advocates are trying to build a 
bridge too far. Currently, we do not know enough about the brain development and neural 
function to link that understanding directly, in any meaningful, defensible way to instruction 
and educational practice” (Bruer, 1997 p. 4). Interestingly enough, it is not only sceptics who 
QRWH D ODFN RI LQVLJKW FRQFHUQLQJ WKH PLQG DQG WKH EUDLQ í DOPRVW HYHU\ DXWKRU LQ WKH
emergence corpora who expresses optimism for a linkage between the brain, the mind, and 
education also says that there is a ‘lack of current knowledge’ and that there will be ‘better 
possibilities in the future’. Donaldson (1895, p. 342), for instance, notes that “it is not known 
how a year’s schooling affects the central nervous system, and it is not probable that we shall 
soon arrive at facts of this sort”. Additionally, Thorndike (1923) makes similar reminders that 
“knowledge is lacking” and it is even stressed in one of his footnotes that: 
The attempt made here to givHDSK\VLRORJ\RI WKHDGDSWLYHHOHPHQW LQ OHDUQLQJíRIPRGLILDELOLty in 
favour of the satisfying – is too premature and speculative to be of much value; and the discussion of it, 
without reliance upon technical acquaintance with the physiology of the neurones and the behaviour of 
the micro-organisms, is necessarily inadequate (Thorndike, 1923, p. 224). 
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Other references can be found in Epstein’s text (1974)84, in Sylwester et al. (1981)85, and in 
the text by Blakemore, Winston and Frith (2004). Thus, even if numerous actors express 
optimism with regards to the future of educational neuroscience, they also show caution by 
emphasising that there is ‘lack of current knowledge’.
Findings from my discourse analysis indicate that something has changed over the last
few decades, as from the 1990s onwards, one can detect more confidence in the 
neuroscientific field. This can be associated with the introduction of ground-breaking 
technologies such as MRI and fMRI which opened new doors for neuroscientific research. 
Such neuroscientific advancements further led to proclamations such as ‘the Decade of the 
Brain’ in the 1990s and ‘the neuroscientific revolution’ in the shift to the 21st century, in 
addition to a growing interest in the brain amongst both politicians and the public at large. 
Increased attention and confidence in the neuroscientific discourse can also be found amongst 
many working at the interface of education, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience86. In
view of this, it can be assumed that technological advancement and new research possibilities 
in the neuroscientific field, in addition to a growing body of knowledge concerning the brain 
and the mind, were significant factors in the establishment of an academic discipline of 
educational neuroscience.
Another factor which can be linked to the establishment of educational neuroscience 
as a distinctive discipline around the 21st century is, as I will argue, the dynamics within the
educational discourse itself. What I will specifically point out is a shift in educational 
perspectives from the 1990s and onwards, where increased attention was given to 
‘scientifically grounded practices’, ‘evidence-based knowledge’, ‘what works’ and a request 
for ‘evidence-based education’. This shift can further be seen as being connected to a larger 
ideological and neo-liberal shift in educational policies, ensuing from the 21st century’s 
increased globalisation, attention to human capital, calls for greater accountability from 
educational institutions and, hence, also requests for better and more efficient educational 
systems which meet politicians’ and society’s high standards. It can further be noted that the 
direction of change in educational thinking and practice is increasingly top-down, as central 
governments, think tanks, intergovernmental organisations (such as the OECD), and the 
                                                          
84 “Without further evidence no inferences should be drawn about single individuals” (Epstein, 1974, p. 223). 
85 “It’s still too early for schools to effect immediate organisational, curricular, and instructional change ... But can we afford 
to wait until all problems are solved before we begin to study educational issues implicit in this research?” (Sylwester et al., 
1981, p. 8).    
86 Seen in Byrnes and Fox (1998a, 1998b), Berninger and Corina (1998), Blakemore et al. (2004), Blakemore and Firth (2005b), 
Posner and Rothbart (2006), Ansari and Coch (2006), Goswami (2006), Fischer et al. (2007), and Varma et al. (2008). 
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media influence the educational discourse (Davies, 1999). Seeing that one during the 21st
century, one can find top-down calls for ‘evidence-based education’ and request for 
‘scientifically grounded practices’, the linkage of education with the ‘hard science’ of 
neuroscience can seemingly appear to meet the 21st century’s ‘evidence-movement’. In later 
chapters, I will discuss why the discipline of educational neuroscience does not necessarily fit 
neoliberal ideas about evidence in education, but for now it should be noted how the shift 
towards ‘evidence-based practice’ in education may have contributed to the progression of 
educational neuroscience in the 21st century.  
A third factor, also significant in the development of educational neuroscience, is the 
use of particularly successful strategies (successful in that they have crafted discursive 
changes). Numerous strategies appear to have been rather successful in the last decades, such 
as initiation of projects like OECD’s ‘Learning Sciences and Brain Research’ in 1999, 
TLRP’s project ‘Neuroscience and Education: Issues and Opportunities’ in 2007, and The 
Royal Society’s project ‘Brain Waves: Neuroscience: implications for education and lifelong 
learning’ (2011a, 2011b). What is interesting about these emergence strategies is that they 
have caught the attention of policyPDNHUVDQGWKHPHGLDíGLVFXUVLYHDFWRUVZKRLQWXUQFDQ
be said to have potential influence both within the political domain and the public domain87.
Other successful strategies in the establishment of educational neuroscience are instigations of 
conferences and seminars, crafting of collaborative networks and centres, and launching of 
DFDGHPLF MRXUQDOV í DOO DFWLRQV SDUWLFXODUO\ RFFXUUing within the academic sphere. Perhaps 
some of the most substantial strategies can be seen to be establishment of the many courses, 
university programmes and degrees (both postgraduate master degrees and doctoral degrees) 
pertaining to educational neurosciences. One significant facet of these university programmes 
is the continual recruitment to the field which they provide, in addition to the competence 
they provide to new academics by offering participants a background in the three areas of 
cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education. Overall, it therefore appears
that these successful strategies, in addition to advancement in neurosciences, changes in 
dynamics in education such as increased focus on ‘scientifically grounded practice’, a 
growing body of knowledge regarding the brain and the mind, and increased confidence in the 
neuroscientific discourse are significant factors in the establishment of educational 
neuroscience as a distinctive academic discipline in the 21st century. 
                                                          
87 Educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to political and public fields is analysed and discussed further in chapter 7 
and 8.  
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Discussion of the main themes in educational neuroscience  
Whereas attention in previous sections for the most part is on relations found between the 
discourse of educational neuroscience and other adjacent discourses, this section will focus on 
relations found within the discourse. This is because the discourse of educational 
neuroscience also has undergone internal changes during its development. As a means to 
detect educational neuroscience’s internal changes, a critical discourse analysis and discussion 
of discursive narrations and discursive positions found throughout the history is presented. 
Research questions investigated are accordingly ‘how has the discourse of educational 
neuroscience represented, narrated and justified particular aspects of the world throughout its 
history’ and ‘which particular perspectives, points of view, and positions are available within 
the discourse?’ Investigation of discursive representations will follow the idea that crossing of 
discursive borderlines has resulted in ‘new articulations’ in the educational neuroscience 
discourse. Investigation of representations is also purposeful since it can reveal how the world 
is narrated and justified by subjects within the educational neuroscience discourse – an aspect 
which, furthermore, is liable to resonate with other discursive elements, such as discursive 
subject positions, social practices, values, organisations and institutions. A useful way to 
present these findings is to discuss them in relation to aspects of continuity and change in the
development of educational neuroscience88.
Which recurring themes can be found in the discourse’s development? 
Even if elements pertaining to the academic level of educational neuroscience have developed 
since the late 19th century, my analysis of historical series of texts reveals certain recurring 
themes. Intertextual findings suggest that the most obvious and continuing theme in the 
discourse concerns the cross-disciplinary endeavour to link aspects of the brain, the mind, and 
education. I have already elaborated on this notion in previous discussions on the field of 
prior discourses, however this section aims to analyse changes and recurrences of relations 
found within the discourse of educational neuroscience. A critical discourse analysis of such 
internal discourse elements can reveal more of the inner development of the educational 
                                                          
88 Alignment in accordance with continuity and change can easily lead to the idea that a distinct line can be drawn between 
‘new’ and ‘old’ discursive elements. However, and as concepts of interdiscursivity and intertextuality point out, every 
discursive ĞůĞŵĞŶƚоwhether it be textual narrations, social practices, or discursive ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐоǁŝůůďĞĂƌƐŽŵĞƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ
or ‘luggage’ from previously discursive elements. Thus, when categorising something into either continuity or change, this 
will inevitably imply an alignment with restrictions, since there will always be some aspects of continuity in ‘new’ 
articulations, just as some alterations in seemingly consistent and recurring themes are likely to be found. 
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neuroscience discourse by identifying recurring themes, perspectives, and which ‘parts of the 
world’ are represented and which are neglected (cf. Fairclough, 2002, p. 129). Overall, this 
can help to elucidate the main themes that have remained central throughout the history of 
educational neuroscience, and how the discourse keeps representing, narrating and justifying 
particular parts of the world and not others.
Cautious optimism 
My critical discourse analysis indicates that a recurring theme in academic texts from the 
educational neuroscience discourse is an emphasis on ‘the novelty of brain science’ and that 
‘there is still much we don’t know about the brain’. Intertextual findings from my analysis 
also show that an acknowledgment of ‘lack of neuroscientific knowledge’ is often followed 
by a note of cautious optimism. In later years, ‘cautious optimism’ appears to have become a 
catch phrase amongst numerous academics in the educational neuroscientific discourse, as it 
is often used deliberately to signify an author’s position towards educational neuroscience89.
In short, this position can be seen to indicate an optimistic standpoint towards the linkage of 
brain, mind, and education, albeit that it is also stressed that one should be cautious in 
drawing educational recommendations from neuroscientific findings (Flobakk, 2011). The 
article by Varma et al. (2008) argues strongly “for a cautious optimism”, but other references 
of cautious optimism can also be found in texts by Byrnes and Fox (1998a), Blakemore et al. 
(2004), and Blakemore and Frith (2005b). 
The phrase ‘cautious optimism’, or variations of it, is often detected in texts from the 
last three decades. What is interesting to note, however, is that similar phrases of cautious 
optimism are found throughout the history of educational neuroscience. As far back as 1923,
Thorndike suggests a cautious optimistic approach, as he optimistically notes the linkage 
between the brain and cognitive aspects such as learning and memory, albeit that he also 
firmly stresses that ‘knowledge is lacking’ and that some of his hypothesis is ‘too premature’ 
and ‘inadequate’ (Thorndike, 1923, p. 224). Similar sentiments are also seen in the text by 
Epstein (1974). Another and perhaps more explicit note is found in the summary of the five-
day conference on ‘Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory’ in 1974, where it is noted: 
“To conclude, it seems to me that a feeling of progress and optimism has pervaded our 
                                                          
89 A discussion of different discursive positions in the educational neuroscience discourse is presented later in this chapter.  
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discussions, even as we acknowledge the problems that we still have to face” (Rosenzweig, 
1976, p. 599). Additionally, in NSSE’s yearbook dedicated to ‘Education and the Brain’ it is 
stressed that “[s]ince the application of the neurosciences to education is still relatively new, it 
must therefore be approached with caution as well as with the excitement that comes from 
viewing old problems in a new light” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b, p. 375)90. Other references are 
found in Vellutino’s (1979, p. 864) text where a general optimism is noted, albeit “[one] 
should be cautioned against premature acceptance of seminal research findings as a basis for 
instructional programming”, in the text by Sylwester et al. (1981), and in Peterson’s (1984) 
concluding remarks in her optimistic article: ‘Great expectations: collaboration between the 
brain sciences and education’: 
What then are the implications of research in the neurosciences? Those who are expecting to find 
classroom applications will be disappointed for there simply are none that are obvious at this time 
[1984]. If neuroscientists themselves are wary (and they are wary) of drawing from their work 
conclusions about how to teach children differently, how much more cautious educators should be 
(Peterson, 1984, p.79 [my inserted brackets]). 
Intertextual findings from my emergence analysis therefore show how statements of cautious 
optimism are a recurring notion amongst scientists working at the interface of education, 
psychology, and neuroscience from Thorndike’s work in 1923, to numerous later works in the 
21st century. A recurring statement of cautious optimism can therefore be seen as an element 
of continuity throughout the development of educational neuroscience, although, and as 
previously stressed, the meaning of the term appears to have changed slightly since the early 
1900s, since it now also appears to have connotations with a distinctive position within the 
discourse.  
Different levels of analysis 
The endeavour to link aspects of neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education has been 
at the very heart of the educational neuroscience discourse since the late 19th century. In line 
with this clearly stated cross-disciplinary endeavour, one also finds numerous themes 
regarding the relation which ought to pertain between these disciplines related to educational 
neuroscience. For instance, there are statements of inter- multi- and transdisciplinarity, calls 
                                                          
90 Even if Chall and Mirsky (1978b) note of a cautious optimism, in hindsight, one can deem that they were not cautious 
enough in some of their claims, for instance by linking brain lateralisation with implications for education. 
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for collaboration and dialogue between disciplines, in addition to debates concerning 
‘bridging of the gap’ between the discourses91. This evident awareness of a cross-disciplinary 
project is also seen in relation to another major theme in the educational neuroscience 
GLVFRXUVH í QDPely acknowledgment of different levels of analysis found between the 
disciplines.  
Findings from my analysis suggest that statements regarding awareness of different 
levels of analysis recur throughout the history of educational neuroscience. Some of the more 
explicit references, for instance, are seen in Rosenzweig and Bennett’s conference synopsis 
IURP WKH V ZKHUH LW LV VWUHVVHG XQGHU WKH KHDGLQJV µ0XOWLGLVFLSOLQDU\ UHVHDUFK í
problems and potentialities’ and ‘Levels of analysis’ that:
Some of these problems between disciplines can be alleviated by the understanding that many of us are 
really working at different levels of analysis ... Solving problems at one level does not necessarily solve 
them at another, although it should provide help and encouragement ... The long-run goal is to discover 
the rules or transformations that permit translation from one level of analysis to another (Rosenzweig, 
1976, pp. 597-598).
Similarly, Wittrock notes how “we should go slowly and carefully with the development of
these educational implications, remembering the great difference in level of research between 
neuroscience and education” (Sylwester et al., 1981, p. 15). Other references from the corpora 
regarding differences in analysis and methodology between the disciplines pertaining to 
educational neuroscientific work are: McGuinness (1987), Bruer (1997), Byrnes and Fox 
(1998a, 1998b), Berninger and Corina (1998), Ansari and Coch (2006), and Varma et al. 
(2008, p. 141), where the scientific distance between education and neuroscience is 
investigated by asking if “their different methods, different data, and different theories 
constitute a fundamentally unbridgeable divide?”.
Analysis of historical series of texts indicates cross-disciplinary and intertextual 
aspects of ‘different levels of analysis’, which seem to run through the history of educational 
QHXURVFLHQFHíeven if it is more explicitly stated from the mid-20th to the 21st century. One 
can therefore argue that attention to analytical and methodological differences between 
disciplines pertaining to educational neuroscience’s cross-disciplinary endeavour have been a 
continuous theme throughout most of the development of educational neuroscience. 
 
                                                          
91 As seen in Chall and Mirsky (1978a, 1978b), Peterson (1984), Byrnes and Fox (1998a, 1998b), Bruer (1997), Blakemore 
and Frith (2005b), Varma et al. (2008). 
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Misinterpretations of neuroscientific findings  
Another recurring theme found when analysing historical series of academic text concerns 
how neuroscientific findings can easily be misinterpreted when related to educational 
practice. Mentioning of misinterpretations of neuroscientific findings and warning against 
neuromyths have been particularly central features in the educational neuroscience debate in 
academia in the 90s and up to the present day. Furthermore, it can, appear that such 
‘warnings’ are either used as a strategy for arguing against the educational neuroscientific 
endeavour92, or as a reminder for caution and awareness in linking education and 
neuroscience, from more optimistic advocates of educational neuroscience93. However, 
warnings against misinterpretation of neuroscientific findings and censure of vague links 
drawn directly from neuroscience to recommendations for educational practice are not a 
UHFHQW SKHQRPHQRQí ILQGLQJV IURPP\ DQDO\VLV DQG IURPRWKHU KLVWRULFDO UHIHUHQFHV VKRZ
similar representations as far back as the 1890s. The contributions from Donaldson (1895) 
and Halleck (1896) are noteworthy in this respect, as they provide an early and significant 
linkage between the brain and education. However, whereas Donaldson, the neuroscientist, 
gives the impression of being cautious in drawing links from neural changes in the brain to 
educational practice, Halleck tends to simplify complex neuropsychological knowledge 
throughout his text in order to provide “facts which every parent and teacher must know and 
apply in order to secure the fuller development of children at a critical time” (Halleck, 1896, 
p. viii). It is interesting to note, when reading later historical references related to Halleck’s 
text, that Halleck met with considerable criticism in the aftermath of his publication, largely 
because his work was considered ‘incomplete’ due to:
inadequate treatment of brain structure and function and the disproportional discussion of sensation and 
memory, while leaving out ideas such as the neuron theory (...) He was further criticised for lack of 
correct scientific thinking, and for making deductions based on inadequate data (Editorial, 1896, and 
Herrich, 1897, in Théodoridou & Triarhou, 2009, p. 126).
It is noteworthy that Halleck, the educationalist, was criticised for misinterpretation when 
working to link neuroscience and education as early as in 1896. It is also noteworthy that 
historical references continue to provide similar ‘warnings’ of misinterpretations throughout 
the centuries and up until the present day. For instance, it is stated in the summary of the 
neuroscience conference ‘Neural mechanism of learning and memory’ from 1976, that “It is 
                                                          
92 As seen in McGuiness (1987) and Bruner (1997). 
93 As seen in Byrnes and Fox (1998a), Ansari and Coch (2006), Goswami (2006), and Varma et al. (2008). 
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certainly our ongoing responsibility to communicate our research, and to try to do this in such 
a way as to prevent misuse of our findings, to prevent misunderstanding, and to prevent 
attempts to use biological shortcuts to solve long-term social problems” (Rosenzweig, 1976, 
p. 598). My analytical findings include numerous other references to misunderstandings and 
misapplications, and during the late 20th century many of the complaints were about brain 
lateralisation, as it was argued that research concerning brain hemispheres went astray and 
was broadcast via misinformed educational practices concerning right brain and left brain 
learning (cf. Williams, 1983). In this respect it is noted that “it is important to conclude with a 
cautionary note ... It is unfortunate that the simplistic notion of teaching to one or the other 
hemispheric process of the brain has become widespread and popular” (Sylwester et al., 1981,
p. 15), and in Peterson (1984) it is similarly noted that:
Unfortunately, caution has been thrown to the wind by many in the name of advancement. Presently [in 
1984] a runaway movement characterized by Right Brain-Left Brain workshops is sweeping through the 
schools, leading one to believe that every school district in America has its own resident neuroscientist. 
But few of those who actually conduct local workshops appear to understand the basic research 
underlying the implications they extract from brain laterality or hemisphericity (Peterson, 1984, p.79 
[my inserted bracket]). 
One can therefore argue that warnings against both misinterpretation of research findings 
related to cognitive neuroscience and misapplication in educational practice are elements of 
continuity throughout the development of the educational neuroscience discourse. Again it 
must be noted that even if warnings against misinterpretations are recurring in the discourse, 
some changes are also found here. The most notable of these is perhaps that 
misinterpretations, misinformation, and/or over-interpretations of neuroscientific findiQJVíRU
‘neuromyths’ as they have been called LQ UHFHQW \HDUV í DSSHDU WR KDYH WDNHQ D PRUH
distinctive commercial turn from the 1980s up until today. This is noted by numerous 
authors94, as they warn about the growing commercial ‘brain-based learning industry’ which 
approaches teachers with learning programmes arguably based on ‘neuroscientific evidence’. 
However, this commercial turn notwithstanding, warning against misinterpretations and 
neuromyths appears to run through the history of educational neuroscience from the late 19th
century to the 20th century, and continues as a central theme in the 21st century’s educational 
neuroscience discourse. 
                                                          
94 As seen in Peterson (1984), McCall (1990), and Goswami (2006). 
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Table 5.3: extracts illustrating some reoccurring themes in the history of educational neuroscience.
 
Cautious  
Optimism 
 
Different level  
of analysis 
 
Misinterpretations, 
misinformation, and/or over-
interpretations of neuroscientific 
findings
 
 
“To conclude, it seems to me 
that a feeling of progress and 
optimism has pervaded our 
discussions, even as we 
acknowledge the problems that 
we still have to face” 
(Rosenzweig, 1976, p. 599).  
 
“Since the application of the 
neurosciences to education is 
still relatively new, it must 
therefore be approached with 
caution as well as with the 
excitement that comes from 
viewing old problems in a new 
light” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b, 
p.375). 
 
“If neuroscientists themselves 
are wary (and they are wary) of 
drawing from their work 
conclusions about how to teach 
children differently, how much 
more cautious educators should 
be” (Peterson, 1984, p. 79).  
 
“...educational researchers 
should view these 
[neuroscientific] results with 
appropriate caution” (Byrnes & 
Fox, 1998a, p.305). 
 
“[W]e need to be cautious when 
interpreting the results of 
neuroimaging studies...” 
(Blakemore et al., 2004, p. 216). 
 
“[W]e argue for a cautious 
optimism. Neuroscience cannot 
replace education, nor is that 
the goal of educational 
neuroscience” (Varma et al., 
2008, p. 141). 
 
 
“Some of these problems 
between disciplines can be 
alleviated by the understanding 
that many of us are really 
working at different levels of 
analysis ... The long-run goal is 
to discover the rules or trans-
formations that permit 
translation from one level of 
analysis to another” 
(Rosenzweig, 1976, pp. 597-
598). 
 
“We should go slowly and 
carefully with the development 
of these educational 
implications, remembering the 
great difference in level of 
research between 
neuroscience and education” 
(Wittrock in Sylwester et al., 
1981, p. 15).  
 
“[T]he problem of trying to 
relate “brain”, “cognition”, and 
“education” as if they were 
one-dimensional constructs. 
Not only do brain science, 
cognitive science, and 
educational research address 
completely different levels of a 
hierarchy, but there are many 
more levels within each 
discipline” (McGuinness, 1987, 
p.117). 
 
“[T]he scientific distance 
between education and 
neuroscience. Do their 
different methods, different 
data, and different theories 
constitute a fundamentally 
unbridgeable divide?” (Varma 
et al., 2008, p. 141). 
 
 
“It is certainly our ongoing 
responsibility to communicate our 
research, and to try to do this in such a 
way as to prevent misuse of our 
findings, to prevent misunderstanding, 
and to prevent attempts to use 
biological shortcuts to solve long-term 
social problems” (Rosenzweig, 1976, p. 
598).  
 
“It is important to conclude with a 
cautionary note ... It is unfortunate 
that the simplistic notion of teaching to 
one or the other hemispheric process 
of the brain has become widespread 
and popular (Wittrock in Sylwester et 
al., 1981, p. 15).  
 
“[M]any teachers and administrators 
attended lectures, workshops, and in-
service training sessions in which they 
were urged to consider plateaus in 
brain growth as a possible explanation 
for poor school performance and a 
basis for change in curricula. The 
information many received at such 
sessions was not always tempered with 
uncertainty, tentativeness, and 
caution, and some educators and 
school systems reportedly were all too 
eager to hear and act upon the good 
news” (McCall, 1990, p.888) 
 
“[A]t present, teachers are at the 
receiving end of numerous ‘brain 
based learning’ packages. Some of 
these contain alarming amounts of 
misinformation ... These neuromyths 
need to be eliminated. The dominance 
of these myths obscures the important 
strides being made by cognitive 
neuroscience in many areas relevant to 
education” (Goswami, 2006, pp. 2-3).  
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Discursive positions 
Another theme which seems to continue throughout the history of educational neuroscience is
that of the discursive positions available within the discourse of educational neuroscience. A
discursive position is a certain standpoint taken WRZDUGDFHQWUDOíRUthe FHQWUDOídiscursive
theme. In consequence, one can easily be led to believe that there will be just as many 
discursive positions as there are subjects within a discourse, since each individual may have a 
distinct interpretation and stance towards a discursive theme. However, the term ‘discursive
position’ covers a much broader ensemble of perspectives than just a few individual opinions. 
A discursive position can therefore be seen as a collective consortium of subject positions 
holding relatively the same representation, perspective and ideology. In other words, 
discursive positions imply an institutionalised way of ‘being in the world’ that is offered 
within the discourse (Neumann, 2010; Fairclough, 2010). What can also be noted is that
stable and rigid discourses with little change, often have one discursive SRVLWLRQíRUDWOHDVW
one dominant position. Discourses with greater notions of discursive tensions and instability, 
however, may have more possible discursive positions available. This is because discourses 
whose boundaries are crossed and where continuous alterations are being made, may also 
experience constant negotiations over rHSUHVHQWDWLRQV í QHJRWLDWLRQV which will often be 
congregated around different subjective positions. 
As to whether it is a stable discourse or one associated with change, educational 
neuroscience indeed appears to fall under the latter category. Not only is educational 
neuroscience suggestive of discursive tension, and crossing and negotiation of boundaries, but 
one can also find constructions of new articulations, numerous intertextual and interdiscursive 
relations, and an evident debate concerning ‘bridges over troubled waters’ (cf. Ansari & 
Coch, 2006). In accordance with these aspects of ‘instability’ and ‘negotiations’, I will 
therefore argue that there may be a number of different discursive positions available in 
relation to the educational neuroscience discourse. With reference to my critical discourse 
analysis of the emergence corpora, in addition to my previous critical discourse research on 
the academic debate regarding educational neuroscience (Flobakk, 2011)95, I will argue that 
RQHFDQILQGIRXUPDLQSRVLWLRQVZLWKLQWKHHGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQFHGLVFRXUVHíSRVLWLRQV,
have chosen to label as cautious optimism, apprehension, over-enthusiasm, and 
neutrality/indifference. In order to illustrate the different discursive positions, I have produced a 
                                                          
95 It must be noted that I have made some minor alterations to the model I proposed back in 2011. 
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basic illustration. Although the model is simplistic, it provides an overview of the different 
discursive positions one can take with regard to educational neuroscience’s chief endeavour96.
Figure 5.4: Different discursive positions in the educational neuroscience discourse.
Diametrically opposed to each other are the discursive positions of apprehension and over-
enthusiasm, whereas the positions of cautious optimism and neutrality/indifference are 
somewhere in-between these two camps97. The latter of these lie somewhat outside the 
discourse, because those taking a neutral/indifferent position cannot truly be seen engaged in 
educational neuroscience discourse. Conversely, the other three positions are more involved 
in the academic level of the discourse since they all appear to take a stand on major issues and 
debates regarding educational neuroscience. 
Regarding the discursive position of ‘over-enthusiasm’, this can be allocated to groups 
of people who are overly enthusiastic about what neuroscience can ‘offer’ education. Within 
this overly enthusiastic position, often one also finds a top-down translation, where attempts 
are made to translate neuroscientific findings directly into classroom practices. What appears 
to be problematic with this approach is that these overly enthusiastic actors, in their eagerness 
to apply neuroscientific findings to educational settings, may draw overly hasty conclusions 
by leaping from neurobiological findings at a lower micro-level of analysis to the higher level 
of analysis found in a classroom’s complex social setting. Moreover, and what is even more
alarming, is that individuals within this overly enthusiastic position, seldom appear to have a 
                                                          
96 These discourse positions are also in concurrence with similar accounts from authors such as Geake (2005) and Varma et 
al. (2008).  
97 These four positions also correspond with critical discourse theories, where it is argued that available positions in a 
discourse often take the form of either loyalty/identification, voice of opposition/contra-identification, or dis-
identification/exit (Neumann, 2010).  
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background in cognitive neuroscience or cognitive psychology, perhaps not even in 
education. Neuroscientific findings can therefore easily be misinterpreted and over-simplified, 
which again enhances the inadequacy of the educational recommendations suggested. As a 
result, misguided enthusiasts are at risk of crafting and advocating neuromyths to teachers and 
schools, rather than offering recommendations founded in educational neuroscience. 
Unfortunately, a commercial aspect has also come into play, and numerous seminars, 
workshops, and so-called ‘brain-based learning programmes’ are sold to teachers and
schools98. So-called ‘brain-based learning’ advocated by misguided enthusiasts includes, for 
instance, learning programmes on how left and right brained children should be taught, on 
how children should be labelled as ‘visual’, ‘auditory’ or ‘kinaesthetic’ learners (the VAK 
programme), and on how ‘Brain Gym’ and pressing certain ‘Brain Buttons’ can improve 
children’s learning (cf. Goswami, 2006; Howard-Jones, 2010; Flobakk, 2011). It can therefore 
be argued that the discursive position of over-enthusiasm holds a rather misguided and un-
informed perspective towards educational neuroscientific research. For that reason, actors 
who are overly enthusiastic about the linkage of education and neuroscience are meeting with
strong censure. Not only do numerous neuroscientists criticise them for simplifying and 
misinterpreting neuroscientific research, but also some who work within the educational 
neuroscience discourse itself censure the over-enthusiasts for obstructing the more cautious 
and scientifically grounded endeavours of educational neuroscientists99.
In contrast to the over-enthusiasts, people adopting a perspective of ‘apprehension’ are
more inclined to consider the endeavour to link education and neuroscience as a rather 
fruitless exercise. It is therefore no surprise that the most profound criticism of educational 
neuroscience comes from this discursive position. By reviewing historical texts from the 
literature search and from the corpora, disapproval and criticism are seen to be anchored by at
least two aspects. Apprehension can, first of all, be based on strong condemnation of the 
misguided learning industry and its neuromyths ísometimes one can also detect confusion 
here, as the discipline of educational neuroscience is confused with so-called ‘brain-based 
learning’100. Censure is further emphasised by referring to studies where ‘brain-based’ 
learning programmes have failed in their attempt to improve children’s learning (cf. Varma et 
al., 2008). In the same way, the entire discipline of educational neuroscience seems to be
                                                          
98 Further discussion of this commercial ‘brain-based’ learning industry will be presented in chapter 7 and 8 regarding the 
recontextualisation of educational neuroscience to other discursive levels.  
99 As seen in Goswami (2006) and Varma et al. (2008). 
100 As seen in Davis (2004). 
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discredited, since the difference between overly enthusiastic programmes based on neuro-
myths and the more scientifically grounded discipline of educational neuroscience are deemed 
to be separated only by a fine line. Another criticism is aimed at the assumed reductionistic 
approach which educational neuroscientific endeavours is believed to take, as one is afraid 
that the role of the brain is given predominance over social explanations, in addition to claims 
that neuroscientists invade, cannibalise, and de-professionalize the educational field101 (cf. 
Flobakk, 2011). Yet another, and often related, critique voiced by the apprehensive position 
concerns judgments about ‘the gap’ between education and cognitive neuroscience. 
Arguments arise from the numerous differences found between the discourse of education and 
that of neuroscience, such as differences in philosophy, theories, methodology, methods, 
definitions and vocabulary. In other words, this ‘gap’ between the different levels of analysis 
is considered to be so vast and profound that a bridging project would be a ‘dead-end street’ 
and should not even be attempWHGíRUDWEHVWWKDWLWLVVWLOOWRRVRRQWRVWDUWVXFKEULGJLQJ
projects102. For these reasons, the camp of apprehensive actors, gives the impression of 
wishing to dismiss the link between the two fields, and the project of educational 
neuroscience is thus also dismissed. What is interesting to note, and this will be discussed in 
later sections, is how much of this critique misses its target because many of these worries do 
not conflict with current educational neuroscientific representations. 
I have already elaborated on ‘cautious optimism’ earlier in this section, when I argued 
that a recurring theme within the educational neuroscience discourse appears to be a note of 
cautious optimism. The discursive representation of cautious optimism, however, is so
common that it can be seen manifested as a distinct discursive position within educational 
neuroscience. To restate, this discursive position adopts an optimistic perspective towards the 
educational neuroscience venture, in addition to emphasising the importance of a cautious 
approach. Attempts to link neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education are therefore 
deemed to be profitable and important, as long as one is careful when translating findings 
from one level of analysis to the other levels. In view of this, requests for reciprocal 
collaboration between neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, and educationalists are 
                                                          
101 As seen in Schumacher (2007) and Davis (2004).  
102 As seen in Bruer (1997) in the corpora, and in Mayer (1998), Bruer (2006), Davis (2004), and Schumacher (2007). 
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stressed103. ‘Reciprocal’ is a key word here, as it is believed that ‘sustainable bridges’ should 
be bi-directional: 
Education is not neuroscience, and neuroscience is not education. Each discipline addresses a broad 
range of research questions using a variety of methods ... Educational neuroscience will need to mind 
WKHVHDQGRWKHUJDSVíEXWLWQHHGQRWEHGHILQHGE\WKHP9DUPDHWDOS
By taking a cautious approach when making links between the brain, the mind, and education, 
in addition to the importance of reciprocal collaborations, the discursive position of cautious 
optimism appears to distance itself from the perspective of over-enthusiasm and rebuke some 
criticism voiced by the apprehensive. Detachment from the discursive position of over-
enthusiasm is evident in the cautious optimists’ disapproval of the brain-based learning 
industries’ diffusion of neuromyths amongst schools and teachers. As previously shown, such 
warnings of neuromyths and so-called ‘brain-based’ programmes are found by numerous 
authors within the discourse and throughout the history of educational neuroscience104.
Additionally, cautious optimism addresses some of the apprehensives’ criticisms by firmly 
stressing that reciprocal collaboration has to be founded on mutual dialogue amongst 
neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and educationalists. This implies that a cross-disciplinary 
endeavour can bridge aspects pertaining to the brain, the mind, and education. Attempts to 
link concepts of the brain directly to educational practice are rendered inadequate (cf. the 
censure of over-enthusiasm), and insights from cognitive psychology are considered to be 
highly relevant. The ‘bridge’ is therefore not solely made between neuroscience and 
education, despite what the discipline’s name might suggest105, and cognitive psychology is 
also assigned great importance. 
Overall, it can be noted that a critical discourse analysis of historical texts gives the 
impression that four main discursive positions are offered within the discourse of educational 
QHXURVFLHQFH í QDPHO\ µcautious optimism’, ‘apprehension’, ‘over-enthusiasm’, and 
‘neutrality/indifference’. Even if debates regarding educational neuroscience have been more 
pronounced in later years, meaning that the different discourse positions are more prominent
now, I will argue that these subject positions have been available throughout the history of 
                                                          
103 As seen in text from the emergence corpus, such as Ansari and Coch (2006), Goswami (2006), Fischer et al. (2007) and 
Varma et al. (2008), in addition to other texts from the literature search such as Geake and Cooper (2003), Petitto and 
Dunbar (2004), Howard-Jones (2010), and Ansari et al. (2011). 
104 As demonstrated in Chall and Mirsky (1978b), Vellutino (1979), Sylwester et al. (1981), Peterson (1984), McCall (1990), 
Goswami (2006), and Varma et al. (2008). 
105 Some advocated within the educational neuroscience discourse have therefore taken names such as ‘brain, mind, and 
education’ (Fischer et al., 2007), and ‘Mind and Brain in the educational and social context (MBESC)’ (Howard-Jones, 2010).  
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educational neuroscience. The reason behind such a suggestion is because these four 
discursive positions offer the main viable positions that can be taken towards a discursive 
theme106. However, even if it can be argued that the different discursive positions available 
have been largely unchanged throughout the development of educational neuroscience, the 
meaning and the narratives in the debate can be seen to have changed during the centuries. 
Alterations in narrations and meaning attributed to, for instance, the linkage between brain-
mind-behaviour takes us to the next section, where changes in discursive aspects pertaining to 
educational neuroscience are analysed and discussed. 
Which changes can be found in the discourse’s development? 
There are certain recurring themes and enduring subject positions at the academic level of 
educational neuroscience, but my analysis also shows a discourse that has undergone 
significant changes throughout its hundred or more years of history. Discussion of some 
aspects of developmental change was presented earlier in this chapter, and its focus was on 
relations between discourses in the field pertaining to educational neuroscience. In the current 
section, however, changes occurring within educational neuroscience are analysed and 
discussed. Attention is primarily given to changes concerning the main discursive themes, 
since this can reveal how particular parts of the world are represented, narrated and ‘justified’ 
at the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse (cf. Fairclough, 2010). 
Relations between the brain, the mind, behaviour, and the environment  
The brain-mind-education relation recurs throughout the history of educational neuroscience 
from the late 19th century to the 21st century, and it can therefore be argued that it is a constant 
aspect within the discourse’s academic level. However, even if this cross-disciplinary 
endeavour is a constant aspect in educational neuroscience, my critical discourse analysis 
shows that the perception of the brain-mind-education concept has changed significantly
throughout the centuries. It is essential to elucidate how this perception has altered, given the 
centrality of the brain-mind-education link to the discourse. Moreover, and in line with 
critical discourse theories, how this concept is understood is also likely to affect perspectives, 
theories, narrations, justifications, and practices within educational neuroscience. 
                                                          
106 See page 68 in the theory chapter with regard to critical discourse theories on ‘loyalty’, ‘voice’ and ‘exit’.   
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What should first be noted with regard to perceptions of the brain-mind-education link 
is that it is closely connected to perceptions concerning links between the brain, the mind, 
behaviour, and the environment107. Arrows of causation or correlation drawn between brain,
mind, behaviour, and environment are well-known and recurring themes in science, because 
variations of these links will, inevitably, be the basis of explanations pertaining to human 
action. Narrations found in the educational neuroscience discourse are no exception, and my 
analytical findings show how changes in key concepts appear to be influenced by changed 
ideas concerning which arrows can be drawn between brain, mind, behaviour, and 
environmental aspects. In order to demonstrate changes in perception of this relation in the 
educational neuroscience discourse, we can start by looking at the main representation found 
in the 19th century. At this time behaviourism was a dominant perspective within academia 
and key representations appear to resemble a stimulus-response model. This implies that 
certain stimuli, such as hearing a bell, cause a behavioural response such as drooling (cf. 
Pavlov and his dogs). Models of stimulus-response relation are also evident in brain research 
in the 19th century, for example in studies showing how stimuli to nerve endings in a dog’s 
exposed brain cause muscle contractions in its legs (cf. Fritch and Hitzig’s study in 1870, in 
Windle, 1975). In the 19th century one can thus often find explanations in line with stimulus-
response relations and, concurrently, with brain-behaviour models (see my illustration in 
figure 5.5). 
                                                          
107 One must be careful not to confuse a relation sequence of ‘brain-mind-behaviour’ with a ‘brain-mind-education’ 
sequence, since the term ‘education’ can imply both environmental educational aspects such as teaching and classroom 
settings, as well as individual behaviour aspects of education such as reading or solving math problems.  
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When approaching the first epoch of educational neuroscience as it develops from the 19th to 
the 21st century, one detects a shift from behaviourism to the burgeoning of a cognitive 
revolution within academia. Behaviourist explanations were problematised and the 
importance of cognition was emphasised. This shift also implies a shift in explanations of the 
IDFWRUV WKDW FDXVH EHKDYLRXUDO RXWFRPHV í IRU LQVWDQFH RXWFRPHV SHUWDLQLQJ WR HGXFDWLRQDO
achievements. It can therefore be argued that the stimulus-response relation found in the 19th
century’s brain-behaviour model was altered to a model that also encompassed a cognitive
level. Concurrently, the relationship between the brain, the mind, and behaviour became 
established, as it was argued that changes in the level of the brain would lead to changes in 
cognition, which in turn would result in certain behavioural outcomes (see my illustration in 
figure 5.6). Historical references from text pertaining to the educational neuroscience 
discourse, show this idea of a top-down brain-mind-behaviour relation. For instance, 
Donaldson (1895) notes how anatomical growth of the brain and arrangement of cell elements 
influences mental powers, which in turn affects behavioural aspects pertaining to education. 
This idea of a top-down relation between the brain, mind, and education can be illustrated in 
the following extract from Donaldson: 
On neurological grounds, therefore, nurture is to be considered of much less importance than nature, 
and in that sense the capacities that we most admire in persons worthy of remark are certainly inborn 
rather than made ... No amount of education will cause enlargement or organisation where the rough 
materials, the cells, are wanting; and on the other hand, where these materials are present, they will, in
some degree, become evident, whether purposely education or not (Donaldson, 1895, p. 344 & p. 355).
Similar ideas about a top-down model of brain-mind-behaviour relation are found in 
Thorndike’s work from 1923. In his work on ‘the original nature of man’, he notes how 
cognitive aspects like “the capacity to learn and remember could find its physiological basis 
in the movement-process of the neurones” (p. 225), as neural activities in the brain are seen as 
the basis for learning and memory. Apparently, therefore, arrows can be drawn from the brain 
to cognitive aspects, and onward to the behavioural level by references such as “the response 
to be made to a situation may be determined by man’s inborn organization” (p. 3) and “[t]he 
fact is that it is the neurones, not the body as a whole, whose life processes are primarily 
concerned in the ‘successful’ operation of a behaviour-series” (p. 126). Gazzaniga and 
colleagues (2009) also elaborate on Thorndike’s early work, arguing that he holds to a form of 
behaviourist-associationist psychology, since he claimed that operation of a behaviour series 
could be seen as an associative process emerging from sensory information (stimulus) on
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which pre-existing mental structures act (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). Thorndike’s work from the 
first epoch of educational neuroscience’s development therefore appears to be based on a 
perception of top-down relations between the brain, the mind, and behaviour. 
Representations in line with a top-down model of brain-mind-behaviour are central 
within educational neuroscience discourse up until the mid-20th century, when one can find 
increased argumentation for also including environmental aspects108. The brain-mind-
behaviour model, in the mid-20th century, thus appears to have been extended in order to 
encompass layer(s) of environmental influences (see figure 5.7). This change in perception is 
evident in numerous historical references from my literature search, as many authors from the 
mid-20th century refer to animal studies where deprivation of environmental stimulus leads to 
changes in brain development and cognitive performance. An example is seen in NSSE’s 
yearbook project on ‘Education and the brain’ where it is noted how “rats reared in an 
enriched environment (with litter mates in a cage full of ‘interesting’ objects) show marked 
changes in brain development, compared to rats reared in impoverished environments” (Chall 
& Mirsky, 1978a, p. xiii). Based on neuroscientific studies such as these, the importance of 
education is further stressed by noting that:
One of the strongest themes relates to the central role of environmental stimulation and experience in 
the growth and development of the braiQ í DQLPDO DQG KXPDQ í DQG LQ RYHUFRPLQJ WKH HIIHFWV RI
inherited deficiencies or acquired injuries. In essence, the neuroscientists writing in this volume are 
saying to educators that education is central for optimal brain development. Indeed, the more recent the 
findings, the stronger the evidence for the importance of education appears to be (Chall & Mirsky, 
1978b, p. 371). 
Similar ideas, which also suggest perceptions based on a model encompassing environmental 
influences on brain-mind-behaviour relations, are found in Vellutino (1979), in Sylwester et 
al. (1981), and Peterson (1984). These and other historical references underline a change in 
perception of the mind-brain-behaviour relationship during the 20th century, as environmental 
factors were incorporated in the model (cf. Morton & Frith, 1995). Furthermore, changes in
the perception of environmental influences on the brain-mind-behaviour model appear to have 
influenced the educational neuroscience discourse, as factors pertaining to formal education 
were now perceived to have a more significant role than previously believed. However, what 
is distinctive about the brain-mind-behaviour model from the early 20th century (figure 5.6) 
                                                          
108 It should be noted that by 1896, Halleck had already argued for the importance of environmental aspects such as formal 
education, by noting that “[w]e certainly have sound reason for believing that we can by the proper training make our 
nervous system more helpful machines” (Halleck, 1896, p. 42).  
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and the mid-20th century model, which also encompasses possible influences from environ-
mental aspects (figure 5.7), is that representations of the brain, the mind, and behaviour 
indicate a top-down relationship. In other words, the arrows in the models are uni-directional
because they indicate a relationship moving from the brain, to the mind, and finally to 
behaviour.
My critical discourse analysis of the emergence corpora suggests yet another shift in 
perceptions pertaining to the arrows which can be drawn between aspects of the brain, mind, 
EHKDYLRXU DQG HQYLURQPHQW LQ WKH HGXFDWLRQDO QHXURVFLHQFH GLVFRXUVH í D VKLIW ZKLFK LV
particularly noticeable in representations from the 21st century. Arguably, the model from the 
mid-20th century remains the same, although during recent decades arrows have also been 
drawn the other way round (Howard-Jones, 2010; Flobakk, 2011). What this implies is that
the model appears to have changed from a top-down relationship (cf. my illustration in figure 
5.7), to encompass possible bi-directional links, which can be drawn from behaviour to 
cognitive aspects and on to aspects of the brain (cf. my illustration in figure 5.8). 
Changes in perception in the 21st century again appear to follow new insights into cognitive 
neuroscience, as numerous recent studies concerning the plasticity of the nervous system have 
shown how environmental factors and experience can lead to changes in synaptic connections 
in the brain’s circuitry and changes in the brain’s structure (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). For 
instance, Elbert and colleagues’ (1995) study on musicians who began their training early in 
life suggests that they had increased cortical representation, owing to their altered sensory 
experience. This finding indicates that alterations in behaviour and experience can also lead to 
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alterations at brain level, as Elbert and colleagues themselves conclude: “These results 
suggest that the representation of different parts of the body in the primary somatosensory 
cortex of humans, depends on use and changes to conform to the current needs and 
experiences of the individual” (Elbert et al., 1995, p. 305). Other studies show similar 
evidence of how alterations in experience and environment can lead to changes at the neural 
level of the brain, such as Maguire and colleagues’ (2000) famous study on London taxi 
drivers which concludes “[i]t seems that there is a capacity for local plastic changes in the 
structure of the healthy adult human brain in response to environmental demands” (p. 4398).
Blakemore, Winston, and Frith (2004) also emphasise the importance of environmental and 
social aspects in matters related to the brain: 
Humans crave the company of others and suffer profoundly if temporarily isolated from society. Much 
of the brain must have evolved to deal with social communication and we are increasingly learning 
more about the neurophysiological basis of social cognition ... It may once have seemed foolhardy to 
work out connections between fundamental neurophysiological mechanisms and highly complex social 
behaviour, let alone to decide whether the mechanisms are specific to social processes. However, as we 
shall see, neuroimaging studies have provided some encouraging examples (Blakemore et al., 2004, p. 
216). 
The role of environmental influences on the brain-mind-behaviour relation appears to have 
become stronger in the 21st century, as the possibility of a complex net of relations in the 
model is emphasised. This has concurrently altered certain perceptions within educational 
neuroscience discourse, as now one increasingly finds representations of bidirectional OLQNVí
a change which is also highlighted by Howard-Jones: 
[B]ehaviour is most often explained in terms of the contents of the mind, and cognitive neuroscientists 
usually attempt to understand the mind by drawing upon our understanding of the brain. Hence, there 
are arrows leading from brain to mind, and from mind to behaviour. However, these arrows might also 
be drawn as bi-directional. For example, environmental influences (such as being able to access new 
stimuli) can influence our behaviour that also, in turn, influences our mental processes. If these 
processes produce learning, this learning can be assumed to have some neural correlate at a biological 
level, such as the making of new synaptic connections in the brain (Howard-Jones, 2010, pp. 90-91). 
Models of the relationship between the brain, the mind, behaviour, and environmental factors 
therefore appear to have become more complex throughout history, in the move from a brain-
behaviour model to a model encompassing bi-directional arrows between brain, mind, 
behaviour, and environmental aspects in the 21st century. Changes in models are essential for
understanding changes within the educational neuroscience discourse, since these basic 
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perceptions of relations between the brain, the mind, behaviour, and environment are
fundamental for understanding the relationships between brain, mind, and education. The 
following sections will continue this discussion by drawing further links to discursive
practices, hierarchies and justifications of central educational neuroscientific theories.
 
The relations between neuroscience and education  
With reference to the previous section, I will thus argue that changes in the key concept of 
how linkages between the brain, mind, behaviour, and the environment have been understood, 
may lead to changes in how theories and ideas of educational neuroscience are narrated.
Furthermore, it can be argued that there have been alterations in the way in which practical 
relations between the discipline of neuroscience and that of education, and hence also social 
relations between neuroscientists and educationalists, are understood. For instance, this can, 
be explored by looking at the relationship between educationalists, cognitive psychologists, 
and neuroscientists, and how this relationship has encountered a range of responses 
throughout its history – from great expectations and optimism, to reductionism, ignorance, de-
professionalisation, cannibalisation, and misinterpretation. In the following analysis I attempt 
to clarify and discuss this aspect of change in more detail. 
My discourse analysis shows that one view of the relationship between education and 
neuroscience seen in the emergence corpora is a top-down perspective where the field of brain 
research and cognitive science are located at the top, whereas the educational field is located 
at the bottom109. This view implies that neuroscientists, with research from the cognitive 
neuroscientific field, are in a position of valuable knowledge that can inform educationalists
in how they should improve educational practices. I will further argue that evaluation of a
‘superior’ and ‘informing’ neuroscientist can be suggestive of a situation where neuro-
scientific findings hold a dominant position, as neuroscientific explanations are used as 
‘justifications’ of educational recommendations. This does not necessarily mean that 
educational aspects are completely neglected; they are just somewhat overrun by more 
dominant neuroscientific representations. It must also be noted that a top-down view, in 
which neuroscientists prevail over educationalists, does not necessarily imply that this view is 
                                                          
109 As seen in Donaldson (1895), Thorndike (1923), Chall and Mirsky (1978a, 1978b), McCall (1990) and Goswami (2006). 
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RQO\ WDNHQE\QHXURVFLHQWLVWVZKRSUHIHU WRDVVHVV WKHLURZQ ILHOGDVVXSHULRUíIDU IURPLW
Historical references suggest that some authors in the educational field also hold this view110.
Neuroscience
Education
Views of such ‘neuroscience Æ education’ hierarchies are detected in my emergence corpora 
when critically analysing how neuroscience and education arH WDONHG DERXW í IRU LQVWDQFH
how the collaboration is referred to, how relations between educationalists and neuroscientists 
are presented, and how arguments are justified. One example from the corpora which 
indicates a view of a pre-eminence of neuroscience is seen in Donaldson’s work from 1895, 
where it is stressed that “nurture is to be considered of much less importance than nature” (p.
344) and “education must fail to produce any fundamental changes in the nervous system” (p. 
343). Similar notions are found in Thorndike’s work (1923) where the original structure and 
activities of the neurones are said to be primary in ‘the successful operation of a behaviour 
series’. A later historical reference is seen in the yearbook of the National Society for the 
Study of Education from 1978, where numerous “noted scholars in the neurosciences ... were 
asked to bring their knowledge to interested workers in other fields” (Chall & Mirsky, 1978a, 
p. xiii). The yearbook therefore comprises papers solely from neuroscientists, and a few 
psychologists, who elaborate on neuroscientific aspects which might have implications for 
education. Only in the preface and the final summary does one find notes from the 
HGXFDWLRQDOLVWV í WKH LQVWLJDWRUV RI WKH \HDUERRN SURMHFW í ZKHUH OLQHV RI DUJXPHQW DUH
justified by statements such as, ‘neuroscientists are saying to educators that...’ and ‘the 
neuroscientists have presented evidence here that...’ (Chall & Mirsky, 1978b). Despite being 
noted that “it is hoped that the findings and insights from neuroscience will be added to what 
ZH >HGXFDWLRQDOLVWV@ DOUHDG\ NQRZ í QRW UHSODFH LW´ S  LW FDQ EH DUJXHG WKDW WKH
yearbook gives an overall impression consistent with a top-down view of ‘what neuroscience 
can bring to education’.
The examples above show texts from the 19th and 20th centuries that appear to consider 
neuroscientific findings as being somewhat ‘superior’ to educational knowledge. What is 
interesting to note, though, is how this perception of the relation between neuroscientists and 
                                                          
110 As seen in Chall and Mirsky (1978a, 1978b). 
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educators is also consistent with the different top-down models of the relations between brain, 
mind, behaviour, and environment which were central at the academic level in the 19th and 
20th centuries (cf. figure 5.4-5.7). What is also noteworthy is that even if there is a change to 
bidirectional and reciprocal models in the 21st century (cf. figure 5.8), findings from my 
critical discourse analysis show that even in the 21st century one can find traces of top-down 
views where findings from neuroscience are seen as being in a superior position to inform and 
help educators and teachers. This appears most markedly within the position of over-
enthusiasts, in neuromyths and in the so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industry. This assertion 
is due to the notion that many neuromyths and over-enthusiastic actors from the ‘brain-based’ 
learning industry are inclined to draw conclusions directly from neuroscientific findings and 
apply them to educational practice. Neuroscientific explanations (whether they are 
misinterpreted or not) are thus used as a significant ‘informer’ that can advise teachers and 
schools how best and most efficiently to teach children in accordance with their brains. One 
can thus argue that neuroscientific findings appear to have been given a dominant role in 
shaping educational recommendations, whilst educational aspects have been overrun111.
Moreover, in addition to this branch of over-enthusiastic actors, findings from my analysis 
also show how a top-down perspective is also found (often implicitly) amongst authors 
holding a position of cautious optimism. Such top-down ‘neuroscientists Æ educationalists’ 
views are particularly found in texts warning against neuromyths. Here, teachers and schools 
are often depicted as ‘ignorant’, ‘naïve’, ‘preferring broad brush messages with a big picture’, 
‘preferring to be told what works’, and in a position to ‘be easily misled’ by neuromyths 
suggested by misinformed brain-based learning industries. On the other hand, neuroscientists,
in these instances, are often more likely to be portrayed as the ‘saving party’ who ‘have much 
to teach educators’112. Even if these authors advocate reciprocal collaboration in educational 
neuroscientific work, one can find tendencies in their texts to take a top-down view, where 
neuroscientists are portrayed as being able to offer ‘ignorant’ teachers help and guidance113.
                                                          
111 Again it should be noted that this top-down relationship between neuroscience and education does not imply that it is 
neuroscientists per se who hold such perceptions. This is, for instance, the case with numerous overly-enthusiastic actors 
(many of whom have no formal degree in neuroscience), who contribute to forming neuromyths by misinterpreting 
neuroscientific data and translating them directly into educational recommendations. Further discussions about the 
neuromyths and ‘misinformed’ translations from the neuroscientific level to the educational level will be presented in the 
chapter concerning hegemonic relations (chapter 6) and recontextualisation processes (chapter 7 and 8). 
112 As seen in McCall (1990) and Goswami (2006). 
113 Aspects of power and hegemony concerning relationships between education and neuroscience will be further discussed 
in chapter 6 concerning ‘hegemonic relations’ in the educational neuroscience discourse.  
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In addition to this top-down perception, my critical discourse analysis of the 
emergence corpora indicates that there is another frequently-held view regarding the 
relationship between education and neuroscience. This view describes a more balanced 
understanding of the relationship, as it stresses that the relationship between neuroscientists 
and educators must be one of mutual and reciprocal collaboration. In comparison with top-
down assessments of how ‘superior neuroscientists can inform education’, voices for 
reciprocal collaboration also stress how educationalists have valuable knowledge to give to
neuroscientists114. In representations like these, neither neuroscience nor education are
considered to be superior to the other, as both parties are acknowledged as being significant 
contributors in educational neuroscientific work.   
Neuroscience Education
In line with representations regarding mutual and reciprocal collaboration between 
educationalists and neuroscientists, in my analysis I often found statements concerning 
different levels of analysis, in addition to representations concerning the importance of 
environmental and social factors. In this viewpoint, educationalists are not placed under the 
dominion of neuroscientific theories, since each discipline seems to be acknowledged for its 
own differences in theories, methods, and philosophies. This further indicates that the 
‘neuroscience ÅÆ education’ view often goes hand in hand with both the discursive position 
of cautious optimism and the perception of a model of bi-directional links which can be 
drawn between factors of the brain, mind, behaviour and environmental. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that perspectives of reciprocal collaboration and mutual dialogue appear to 
be found in the major fraction (i.e. cautious optimism) within educational neuroscience’s 
FRQWHPSRUDU\DFDGHPLFOHYHOíGHPRQVWUDWHGKHUHE\9DUPDHWDO
[B]ridging the divide that separates the education and neuroscience disciplines requires bridging the 
divide that separates the education and neuroscience communities ... [W]e should remain cautious in our 
optimism. Education research and neuroscience can inform each other, but within limits, which we have 
yet to discover ... [A] strategy is for education researchers and neuroscientists to view themselves as 
collaborators, not competitors, in the pursuit of knowledge (Varma et al., 2008, p. 149).  
Even if many within the current educational neuroscience discourse appear to consider the 
relationship between education and neuroscience as one of reciprocal collaboration, my 
textual analysis shows that it is not always explicitly stressed which discipline should be 
                                                          
114 As seen in Peterson (1984), Blakemore et al. (2004), Blakemore and Frith (2005b), Ansari and Coch (2006), Fischer et al. 
(2007), and Varma et al. (2008). 
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joined in such mutual collaboration. Should the collaboration be between education,
psychology, and neuroscience, or should it consist of education and cognitive neuroscience?
And indeed, should this latter link include or exclude the discipline of psychology? In order to 
answer this, it DSSHDUV WKDWíGHVSLWH WKHQDPH DOORFDWHG WR WKH DFDGHPLFSURMHFWí WKHUH LV
common agreement that this complex cross-disciplinary endeavour should not exclude any 
discipline pertaining to educational neuroscience115. This implies that disciplines (and sub-
disciplines) such as neurobiology, neurochemistry, clinical neurology, cognitive neuroscience, 
social cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, educational psychology, developmental 
psychology, and education are potential disciplines for collaborative wRUNíLWLVHYHQQRWHG
that socio-political theories and other social theories are important since they can help by 
illuminating more political and societal aspects of educational neuroscience. 
Overall, therefore, it appears that the history of the academic level of educational 
neuroscience indicates a relationship which has moved from a top-down view where 
neuroscientists should inform educationalists, as often found from the late 19th up to the mid-
20th centuries, to a contemporary view of reciprocal collaboration where neuroscientists and 
educationalists inform each other116. It can further be argued that this shift corresponds with 
shifts in perceptions concerning causal relations between the brain, mind, behaviour, and
environment. 
Changes in justifications of narrations  
The last discursive aspects of change that will be discussed, is changes in how discursive 
narrations and relations have been justified throughout the history of educational 
neuroscience. Changes of justifications within the educational neuroscience discourse are 
closely linked to changes in ideas pertaining to key narratives around brain, mind, behaviour, 
and environment, in addition to how the relationship between educationalists and 
neuroscientists are understood. For instance, my critical discourse analysis of historical texts 
indicates that, from the late 19th century up until the mid-20th century, one tended to perceive 
                                                          
115 As seen in Blakemore et al. (2004), Ansari and Coch (2006), Fischer et al. (2007), and Varma et al. (2008). 
116 In addition to these two views, one can also argue that there is a view which perceives the relations as education т 
neuroscience, as it is deemed that neuroscience has nothing to do with the field of education. Such a view of the 
relationship between education and neuroscience often appears to take the form of apprehension, and one gets the 
impression that authors attempt to ‘protect’ education from cannibalisation, neurosciences, ‘biologisation’ of education, 
reductionism, and de-professionalization. Again, it can be argued that such apprehension and censure seems more like a 
reproach of over-enthusiasts, and not the discursive position of cautious optimism found in the majority of educational 
neuroscience discourse. 
184 
 
linkages between the brain, the mind, and behaviour (and later also education) in accordance 
with top-down models and, accordingly, one was also inclined to hold a top-down view where 
neuroscientists were, either explicitly or implicitly, deemed ‘superior’ and thus able to inform 
educationalists. Furthermore, analytical findings from the same period and in the same way, 
indicate how theories, ideas, and relational views appear to be justified and anchored in 
neuroscience. References demonstrating such justification, for instance, are statements such 
as “the neuroscientific evidence presented is reassuring”, “recent neuroscientific discoveries 
also point to...”, and “the neuroscientists have presented evidence here that...” (Chall & 
Mirsky, 1974b, pp. 371-372), in addition to statements such as “[n]ew understandings of the 
triune brain ... can carry school organization and practice to a far more sophisticated level and 
bring educators more enjoyable and satisfying conditions of work” (Hart in Sylwester et al., 
1981). In the same way, later justifications of narrations, theories, ideas, and relational views 
found in texts from the 21st century, seem to have shifted in accordance with the shift in key 
perceptions within the discourse. Authors are now more inclined to understand the 
educational neuroscience endeavour as a complex task with bi-directional links between the 
brain, mind, behaviour, and the environment. Accordingly, key discursive narrations, 
positions, and an emphasis on reciprocal collaboration are justified by claims that 
educationalists and neuroscientists can inform each other117.
Furthermore, and more importantly, my critical discourse analysis is also suggestive of 
DQRWKHUVKLIWLQMXVWLILFDWLRQGXULQJWKHODVWFRXSOHRIGHFDGHVíQDPHO\WRDPRUHSURPLQHQW
neoliberal and political justification, particularly within the educational domain. The 
argument for claiming that the educational neuroscience discourse appears to have more 
justification in neoliberal political aspects in the 21st century is based on a shift in 
argumentation found in the historical series of texts in the corpora. Such neoliberal notions
are often found in how authors justify the educational neuroscience endeavour by bringing 
into play certain neoliberal buzzwords such as ‘evidence based’, ‘efficiency’, ‘a science of 
education’, ‘scientifically grounded’, ‘what works’, and other more market-oriented 
terminology (cf. Fairclough, 2010; Karlsen, 2006). Thompson (1986), for instance, 
demonstrates such neoliberal justification by claiming that:
More generally, education, a multibillion dollar industry in the United States alone, strives to achieve 
the most effective and meaningful learning. The science most basic to all these conditions and 
                                                          
117 As seen in Peterson (1984), Blakemore et al. (2004), Blakemore and Frith (2005b), Ansari and Coch (2006), Fischer et al. 
(2007), and Varma et al. (2008). 
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HQGHDYRXUV LV WKH QHXURELRORJ\RI OHDUQLQJ DQGPHPRU\íKRZ WKHEUDLQ FRGHV VWRUHV DQG UHWULHYHV
memories (Thompson, 1986, p. 941). 
Additionally, in Ansari and Coch’s (2006) article, one can find similar neoliberal undertones, 
as statements are made regarding “policymakers’ call for ‘scientifically based practice’”, on 
how to “maximise eventual benefits”, as well as direct references to the What Works 
Clearinghouse’s political webpages, along the lines of, “More focused scientific analysis of 
popular educational approaches will not only lead to better understanding of ‘what works’
(Institute for Educational Sciences, 2013), but also an understanding of why and how it does 
or does not work” (Ansari & Coch, 2006, pp. 148-149)118. In Fischer and colleagues’ article 
(2007), it is noted that this new approach of mind, brain, and education ‘can inform effective 
practice’ and ‘optimise effective learning’, and when talking about ‘effectiveness of 
schooling’ they state that:
Empirical research on the effectiveness of schooling and education has become more common, thanks 
in part to international comparisons of schools’ achievement and classroom practice ... Thanks to this 
kind of research, policy makers and practitioners can begin to base their decisions about educational 
practice and institutions on empirical evidence rather than opinions, fashions, and ideologies (Fischer et 
al., 2007, pp. 1-2). 
References such as these do indeed demonstrate that many within the educational 
neuroscience discourse demonstrate traces of a neoliberal rationality in their argument and 
justification. However, even if certain narratives in the discourse of educational neuroscience 
appear to be justified in relation to certain neoliberal political aspects, it should be noted that 
neoliberal justifications are an addition to justifications of reciprocal collaboration, warnings 
against neuromyths, and an emphasis on cautious optimism. Moreover, and even more 
importantly, neoliberal tendencies do not solely appear in the educational neuroscientific 
discourse – quite the contrary. A neoliberal ideology appears to have flourished in society at 
large since the 1980s and 90s, and continues into the 21st century. Numerous authors have 
noted this general shift in political ideology and how it appears to affect disciplines such as 
medicine and education, as more focus is on efficiency, results, evidence-based practices, 
decentralisation, and other economic and market governed philosophies (Karlsen, 2006; 
Fairclough, 2010)119. This further demonstrates the intertextual and interdiscursive 
                                                          
118 What Work Clearinghouse (WWC) was established in 2002 as an initiative of the Institute for Education Sciences (IES) at 
the U.S. Department of Education. 
119 Neoliberal and political tendencies in the discourse of educational neuroscience pertaining to the recontextualisation of 
educational neuroscience into, indeed, the political field, are further discussed in chapter 7  
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connections which can be drawn between the discourse of educational neuroscience and other 
GLVFXUVLYHDVSHFWVLQH[WHUQDOILHOGVíDJDLQHPSKDVLVLQJWKHFRPSOHxity of aspects relevant to 
understanding educational neuroscience’s growth and development. 
Summary of the critical discourse analysis and discussion  
The aim of this chapter has been to critically analyse and discuss aspects pertaining to the 
emergence and development of the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. 
In order to fully elaborate on the ways in which educational neuroscience evolved from the 
late 19th century up to the present 21st century, I argue that relations between educational 
neuroscience and the field of prior discourses must be analysed, in addition to an analysis of 
relations found within the discourse. Regarding the former, it is noted that educational 
neuroscience is emerging from a field of prior discourses pertaining to what is known today 
as cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education. I have further argued that 
certain critical discourse theories can be brought forth in order to explain this development 
process – in particular, theories on problematisation of discursive boundaries in the field of 
prior and external discourses, crossing of borderlines, negotiation of discursive elements, and 
a ‘reweaving’ and re-articulation of existent discursive elements into new discursive 
articulations. Attention in this chapter has also focused on certain individual and collective 
emergence strategies and how, for instance, different actors’ narrations and justifications of 
central educational neuroscientific topics have contributed to the discourse’s development. In 
light of discursive narrations and themes, I have further suggested that there are certain 
intertextual aspects that recur throughout the history of educational neuroscience, whereas 
other discursive elements have changed íVXFKDVWKHSHUFHSWLRQof the brain-mind-education 
relation. Whilst this chapter has analysed the emergence and development of educational 
neuroscience’s academic level, the next chapter will continue by presenting a critical 
discourse analysis of the hegemonic relations found at this discursive level. 
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Chapter 6 
Hegemonic relations in educational neuroscience  
 
Whereas the previous chapter presents an analysis of how the academic level of educational 
neuroscience emerged from the 19th century to the present day, this chapter will present a 
critical discourse analysis of hegemonic relations pertaining to educational neuroscience’s 
academic level. My analysis of hegemony will, in essence, examine whether or not certain 
representations, positions, ideologies, and practices are more dominant than others and, 
furthermore, consider the ways in which these discursive aspects are aligned in certain 
hegemonic relations. A critical analysis of hegemony is valuable, because this type of 
discursive investigation can reveal certain points of tension within the educational 
neuroscience discourse, and illuminate how different actors struggle to gain hegemony for 
specific discursive representations, ideologies, subject positions, or practices. 
Hegemonic relations at educational neuroscience’s academic level  
In my analysis of educational neuroscience’s hegemonic relations, attention is particularly
paid to three major ‘sites of struggles’. These sites of tension frequently appeared in my 
literature searches and are therefore viable points for a hegemonic analysis120. The respective 
sites of struggles are as follows:
- struggles between different levels of analysis.
- struggles between interpretations vs. representations.
- struggles between the academic level and policymakers and the public.
By focusing on ‘sites of struggles’ within the educational neuroscience discourse and between
the discourse and other related fields, one builds an expedient foundation for discussing 
                                                          
120 In my general literature search for the hegemony corpora, over a thousand academic texts were screened through the 
use of a set of review criteria, with the aim of mapping out certain general ‘sites of struŐŐůĞƐ͛ о Ğ͘Ő͘ ƚŽƉŝĐƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ are 
ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ о ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ͘ dŚis is because sites of struggles in a discourse make 
viable points for entry when analysing hegemonic relations, since tension and debate can expose discursive hierarchies and 
power relations (Fairclough, 2010). Based on this general mapping of the discourse, a set of 29 texts representative of these 
sites of struggles were selected for the hegemony corpora (see appendix B).  
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aspects pertaining to hegemony. Not only will discursive ‘sites of struggles’ present a basis 
for critically discussing negotiations of discursive representations, ‘sites of struggles’ are also 
relevant when examining notions of authority, power relations, different actors’ and groups’ 
strategies, and other hegemonic relations within and between discourses. In order to give a 
comprehensive presentation and discussion of educational neuroscience’s hegemonic 
relations, accounts of the three respective ‘sites of struggles’ are presented in the following 
section. Critical discourse theories are drawn upon in each account, in order to give a 
theoretical underpinning for the analysis and discussion of the respective hegemonic aspects.
 
Struggles between different levels of analysis 
When analysing hegemonic relations pertaining to educational neuroscience’s academic level, 
RQHSDUWLFXODUDQGUDWKHUREYLRXVµVLWHRIVWUXJJOH¶LVLGHQWLILHGíQDPHO\WKDWZKLFK,KDYH
labelled with the umbrella term struggles between different levels of analysis. This ‘site of 
struggle’ encompasses numerous points of tension, although each of these hegemonic tussles,
in one way or another, are related to negotiations between different levels of analysis in the 
linking of neuroscience and education. To reiterate what was noted in the last chapter 
regarding changes in educational neuroscience’s narrations, it was stressed that 
representations regarding ‘different levels of analysis’ are often used when indicating 
differences in theory, method, data, analysis, philosophies, language, and other dissimilarities 
between the fields of education, neuroscience, and psychology121. Figure 6.1 provides a model 
for clarifying the levels of analysis in educational neuroscience and the different research 
aspects to which each level pertains. Despite being a rather simplistic model, which only 
illustrates three rather general levels of analysis, the model shows that educational 
neuroscience research encompasses different levels of methods, theories, and data for each of 
the three academic disciplines. 
Figure 6.1: Different levels of analysis relevant for educational neuroscience research.
Level of: NEUROSCIENCE BRAIN e.g. observable neurobiological and neurochemical signals
Level of: PSYCHOLOGY MIND e.g. hypothesis of cognitive functions, such as reading abilities
Level of: EDUCATION BEHAVIOUR e.g. observable behaviour, such as improved reading skills
                                                          
121 As seen in Sylwester et al. (1981), McGuinness (1987), Bruer (1997), Byrnes and Fox (1998a), Berninger and Corina 
(1998), Ansari and Coch (2006), Varma et al. (2008). 
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Different levels of analysis complicate the endeavour to link education and neuroscience. Not 
only are there issues connected with different philosophies, theories, methods and data, but 
the levels of analysis also bring different actors onto the stage (e.g. researchers). Since these 
actors are from different disciplines, they are likely to have different scientific backgrounds 
and schooling, hold different research agendas, and even have different opinions and values 
with regard to the educational neuroscientific research endeavour. For example, a 
neuroscientist will focus on the role of glutamine and NMDA receptors in the hippocampus 
and how this can affect long-term potentiation relevant to memory performance (cf. 
Gazzaniga et al., 2009)122, whereas an educationalist may be more interested in how a child’s 
family background can be indicative of his or her likelihood of educational success (cf. 
Bernstein, 2000). It is therefore reasonable to think that different levels of analysis in 
educational neuroscience are connected with how different actors perceive and approach the 
discourse. One can further speculate that these differences result in disagreement, 
negotiations, and hegemonic struggles concerning the way in which the educational 
neuroscience endeavour should be perceived and pursued. For this reason, educational 
neuroscience’s different levels of analysis constitute a central site of potential struggle in the 
discourse. To elaborate on this, in the following section I will present a range of struggles 
found between different levels of analysis, before discussing my analytical findings with 
reference to hegemonic relations. 
My analytical findings show numerous ‘points of tension’ related to different levels of 
analysis, both within the educational neuroscience discourse and between the discourse and 
other related fields. In fact, all 29 texts in the hegemony corpora show traces of educational 
neuroscience’s different levels of analysis, but the texts vary in:
- which different level of analysis they present;
- how implicitly or explicitly these ‘points of struggles’ are presented;
- the ways in which struggles are presented (i.e. if they have the form of negotiation, or if only one side in 
the debate is acknowledged).
                                                          
122 The brain area hippocampus appears to play a key role in memory and a central aspect here is long-term potentiation 
(LTP). LTP indicates the process of long-term strengthening of a synapse, which is of interest because changes in synaptic 
strength between neurons are the most likely mechanism for learning and memory. When it comes to the process of LTP, it 
is shown that N-methyl-D-asparate (NMDA) receptors are located on the dendritic spines of postsynaptic neurons that 
show LTP. It is further known that glutamate, the major excitatory transmitter in the hippocampus, can bind with NMDA 
receptors, and this makes glutamate relevant with regard to LTP (Gazzaniga et al., 2009, pp. 356-360).  
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With regard to the first point, the different levels of analysis in a text focus on concepts such 
as: negotiations concerning ‘individual cognition versus collective cognition’; debates 
concerning ‘nature versus nurture’; or negotiations around ‘natural sciences versus social 
sciences’. A more detailed account of the different struggles over levels of analysis found in 
the hegemony corpora of educational neuroscience is listed in the following table.
Table 6.2: Struggles over ‘levels of analysis’ found in the hegemony corpora.
Type of struggle identified References of where it was found
Neuroscience vs. education
Anderson & Reid (2009); Ansari et al. (2012); Campbell (2011); 
Carew & Magsamen (2010); Christodoulou & Gaab (2009); 
Dekker et al (2012); della Chiesa et al. (2009); Ferrari (2011); 
Hardiman et al. (2012); Hook & Farah (2013); Hruby (2012); Kraft 
(2012); Mason (2009); Perkins (2009); Pickersgill (2013); Stein & 
Fischer (2011); Tommerdahl (2010); Varma et al. (2008);
Willingham (2009).
Neuroscience & cognitive psychology vs. 
education
Ferrari (2011); Goswami (2008); Greenwood (2009); Pasquinelli 
(2013).
Cognitive neuroscience vs. cognitive psychology Bruer (2006); Weisberg et.al. (2008).
Neuroscience vs. cognitive sociology Cerulo (2010); Mercer (2013).
Neuroscience vs. cognitive neuroscience vs.
psychology vs. educational theory vs. classroom
Tommerdahl (2010).
Social studies of neuroscience (constructivism) 
vs. empirical neuroscience (realism)
Choudhury et.al. (2009).
Nature vs. nurture Gelman & Taylor (2010); Goswami (2008); Logan & Johnston 
(2007).
Biology vs. environment Ansari et al. (2012); Goswami (2008).
The level of the brain vs.
the level of mind and behaviour
Perkins (2009); Stein & Fischer (2011); Weisberg et al. (2008).
The level of the biological vs. the level of 
cognitive      vs. the level of behavioural
Anderson & Reid (2009).
The brain (a part) vs. the body as a whole Hruby (2012); Kraft (2012); Pickersgill (2013).
Individual cognition vs. social cognition Mercer (2013).
Natural sciences vs. social sciences Ansari et al. (2012); Cerulo (2010); Choudhury et al. (2009); della Chiesa, et al. (2009); Kraft (2012); Mercer (2013); Perkins (2009); 
Pickersgill (2013); Willingham (2009).
Natural science (descriptive) vs.
artificial science (normative)
Choudhury et al. (2009); Willingham (2009).
Basic science (fundamental research) vs.
engineering science and craft
Perkins (2009).
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Table 6.2 shows the struggles and negotiations found in the hegemony corpora, and it is clear 
that the texts have somewhat different focuses of attention. However, even if the texts vary in 
their focus, they all touch on aspects concerning the different levels of analysis found between 
QHXURVFLHQFH DQG HGXFDWLRQ í ZKHWKHU D ODUJH-scale focus concerning natural sciences as 
opposed to social sciences, or a smaller-scale focus of individual cognition as seen in contrast 
to collective cognition. By comparing these texts, one can also identify certain ‘points of 
struggle’ which are more frequently negotiated than others. Unsurprisingly perhaps, one of 
the most negotiated struggles detected in the corpora is between the discipline of neuroscience 
and that of education. This general point of tension, for example, can be detected in Anderson 
and Reid (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Ferrari (2011), and Varma et al. (2008).
Other central and frequently negotiated ‘points of struggles’ found in the corpora are debates 
regarding biological explanations and environmental explanations123, nature versus nurture124,
and the more overarching topic of natural sciences as opposed to social sciences, the 
humanities and the arts125. Figure 6.3 is based on my findings and illustrates some of the most 
frequent struggles found at educational neuroscience’s academic level. 
Figure 6.3: Struggles between levels of 
analysis pertaining to educational 
neuroscience’s academic level.
Struggles between academic disciplines 
Considering that most of the texts analysed either implicitly or explicitly touch upon struggles 
over different levels of analysis between the disciplines of neuroscience and education, and/or 
related academic subdisciplines, a clarification of this hegemonic struggle is in order. What 
can be noted is that struggles between disciplines pertaining to the educational neuroscience 
                                                          
123 As seen in Ansari et al. (2012), and Goswami (2008).  
124 As seen in Logan and Johnston (2007) and Gelman and Taylor (2010). 
125 As seen in Cerulo (2010), della Chiesa, Christoph, and Hinton (2009), Kraft (2012), Mercer (2013), and Perkins (2009). 
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endeavour appear to be fought from different approaches – it being from educationalists, 
neuroscientists, educational neuroscientists, cognitive neuroscientists, social cognitive 
neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, cognitive sociologists, educational psychologists, etc. 
Negotiations can further be seen to target somewhat different hegemonic relations between 
disciplines or groupings of disciplines. For example, Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, and 
Gray (2008) argue that the neuroscientific discipline, with its neuroscientific explanations, 
tends to dominate over psychological explanations, whilst Ansari, De Smedt, and Grabner 
(2012) note that the disciplines of cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology often 
have a dominant role over education. Choudhury and colleagues (2009, p. 73) similarly 
comment on “the widely assumed truth of reductionism in cognitive neuroscience ... 
perceived to be represented by authoritative brain scans”, and Pickersgill (2013, p. 333)
claims that “the power of neuroscience is evident in a variety of social realms”. In addition,
Tommerdahl (2010, p. 99) notes: “the impression that the brain sciences are declaring 
hegemony over a process that should be more holistic, encompassing the whole human 
instead of reducing the act of learning to change in a collection of neurons", and Cerulo 
(2010) argues that cognitive neuroscience dominates research and thoughts in numerous 
disciplines within social sciences, further noting that:
Over the past 50 years, cognitive neuroscience has emerged as the dominant player in research on 
thought. In an effort to keep their voices heard, social psychologists, anthropologists, political scientists 
and even economists have joined cognitive neuroscientists in lively dialogue. But many sociologists are 
stubbornly clinging to the sidelines, honoring í DQG LQ VRPH FDVHV VWUHQJWKHQLQJ í ULJLG LQWHOOHFWXDO
boundaries (Cerulo, 2010, p. 115 [sic.]).
Varma and co-workers (2008, p. 145) consider both scientific and pragmatic concerns 
relevant to bridging the disciplines of education and neuroscience, and they also note that 
“what is problematic is eliminative reductionism ... the doctrine that neuroscience 
H[SODQDWLRQV VKRXOG UHSODFHíQRW MXVW DQFKRURU HQULFKíEHKDYLRXUDO H[SODQDWLRQV´ ,Q WKH
same way, it is argued by Kraft (2012) that “neurosciences dominate today’s discourse” 
because:
neuroscientific thinking seems to be able to dominate education rather easily and without great 
UHVLVWDQFHHVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH ILHOGVRIHDUO\FKLOGKRRGHGXFDWLRQ LQVWUXFWLRQDQG OHDUQLQJíPDLQO\E\
simplifying educational processes and by reducing the complexity of the educational task to a mere 
‘relationship problem’ (Kraft, 2012, p. 386).
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Other references to hegemonic ordering pertaining to the educational neuroscience endeavour 
can be found in Anderson and Reid (2009) and Bruer (2006). Whereas the majority of authors 
from the corpora argue that neuroscience and cognitive psychology overrun the discipline of 
education, Anderson and Reid (2009) and Bruer (2006) take another approach by claiming 
that it is cognitive psychology which is being ignored by both the cognitive neuroscience 
discipline and the discipline of education. Bruer’s argument is that, on the one hand, neuro-
scientists ignore psychology since cognitive neuroscience presupposes cognitive psychology; 
on the other hand, however, educationalists overlook psychological research because they are 
“fascinated with synapses and brain images” (Bruer, 2006, pp. 104-105). 
Overall, findings from my critical discourse analysis of educational neuroscience’s 
academic level indicate numerous references to hegemonic struggles between the disciplines 
of neuroscience, psychology, and education. Even if these textual references take slightly 
different approaches to the struggle, a majority of the texts seem to claim that the discipline of 
neuroscience holds a dominant role. However, as we will see from findings presented in the 
next section, neuroscience’s dominant role is not necessarily attributable solely to the 
neuroscientific discipline.
Struggles between nature and nurture, between biology and environment 
Findings from my critical discourse analysis identify a closely related and more overarching 
intertextual struggle regarding educational neuroscLHQFH¶V GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV RI DQDO\VLV í
namely negotiations between nature and nurture, or, in other words, between biological 
explanations and environmental explanations. For instance, Logan and Johnston (2007, pp. 
674-676) discuss the “wedge between nature and nurture” and argue that “the attempt to push 
either genes or experience to the foreground” can be seen as a result of “deep-seated 
tendencies to maintain strict separations between nature and nurture, instinct and learning, 
innate and acquired”. Similarly, Stein and Fischer (2011) draw attention to the struggle 
between nature and biological explanations on the one hand, and nurture and environmental 
explanations on the other, and further link this to educational neuroscience: 
A seductive temptation in building MBE [mind, brain, and education] is reductionism in analysing 
phenomena that are studied at several levels of analysis or from different basic viewpoints. The 
WHQGHQF\WRRIIHUXQLGLPHQVLRQDOVROXWLRQVWRPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDOSUREOHPVLVJUHDWíGLVFXVVLQJDPXOWL-
level issue as if it can be reduced to one level, or treating a multi-viewpoint issue as if one viewpoint is
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essential and the other can be omitted or neglected. For example, the press commonly present findings 
from biological methods, such as genetics and neuroscience, as if they involve ‘harder’, more 
VXEVWDQWLDO PRUH VFLHQWLILF NQRZOHGJH í SULYLOHJHG UHODWLYe to psychological and cultural methods, 
which are marginalized as ‘soft’, needing to be reduced to biological ‘causes’ (Stein and Fischer, 2011, 
p. 59).
Stein and Fischer (2011) point explicitly to the struggle fought between education and 
neuroscience and how this can be related to hegemonic tussles existing between genetic and 
biological explanations of the ‘hard’ sciences set against the ‘softer’ explanations of nurture, 
environment, and social factors. The dominating role attributed to biological ‘causes’ in this 
combat is further evident in the statement that the standard conception is one “in which 
scientists hand over their results from on high to educators in the trenches” (Stein & Fischer,
2011 p. 59).
A related site of tension, which is also found in the hegemony corpora, is the struggle 
between ‘the brain as a part’ versus ‘the individual as a whole’. In this respect, it is noted by 
Kraft (2012) that over the last couple of decades, the brain has become ‘culturally charged’. In 
this statement, Kraft argues that “the brain becomes something like the ‘legacy of the 
subject’” (p. 387), because the qualities and functions of the individual as a whole become 
reduced to the brain as a part. Examples of what Kraft calls ‘a reduction of the whole to the 
brain’ are seen in proclamations such as “dehydration is bad news for your brain” (Wighton, 
2007), “a good novel makes the brain smarter” (NRK, 2013) RU³VQDFNIRUWKHEUDLQíWKLVLV
the food that can protect your brain and help it think, perform, and remember better”
(Dagbladet, 2011). These statements reduce the qualities of the subject as a whole to aspects 
of the brain, and are just as absurd as saying, ‘my brain went out shopping today’ or ‘my 
intestines are hungry’. With this tendency to conflate the organism as a whole to the brain, the 
complex brain “serves as a kind of medium for the reduction of complexity” (Kraft, 2012, p.
387). Negotiations regarding conflation of the brain (a part) to the individual (the whole) are 
further explained by Mercer (2013), when he argues that one can also find a common 
tendency to let a focus on individual cognition dominate over collective cognition: 
In recent years, researchers in evolutionary psychology and anthropology have proposed that the 
distinctive nature of human cognition is the product of our evolution as social beings; we are born with 
“social brains” that enable us to manage complex social relationships in ways other animals cannot ... 
However, I argue that its current conceptualization is too narrow and individualistic; the concept should 
be redefined to take account of the distinctive human capacity for thinking collectively ... and in 
particular to the social and cognitive processes involved in education (Mercer 2013, pp.148-149). 
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With his argumentation, Mercer (2013) indicates the tension and hegemonic relations found 
within levels of analysis between biological and natural explanations of cognition seen in 
relation to more collective and social explanations of cognition. Another pertinent article, 
from Choudhury and colleagues (2009, p. 71), points to “the dichotomy between nature and 
culture often apparent in neuroscience”. The problem with this dichotomy, as argued by the 
authors, is that:
biological claims free the person from the social and cultural complexities surrounding her ... These 
kinds of reductionistic models confine mental [processes] to the individual, minimizing the role of 
social, cultural or political contexts surrounding the person (Choudhury et al., 2009, p.71). 
Through such statements, Choudhury and her co-workers suggest a state of natural and 
biological dominion in the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse, even 
referring to this tendency as a ‘colonialism’ of neuroscientific and biological claims into more 
social fields such as education. Overall, therefore these analytical findings from my 
hegemony corpora show that there are points of tension and hegemonic struggles between 
different levels of nature and nurture, the biological and environmental, and the individual 
and collective, pertaining to the educational neuroscience discourse. 
Struggles between natural sciences and social sciences 
Discourse analytical findings from my hegemony corpora also suggest a third struggle 
between different levels of analysis related to educational neuroscience’s DFDGHPLF OHYHO í
namely the hegemonic struggle between natural sciences on the one hand, and social sciences, 
the humanities and the arts on the other. In regard to this, Willingham (2009) highlights 
certain issues in educational neuroscience arising from the distinctions between natural and 
artificial sciences: 
Natural sciences, like neuroscience, are descriptive; the aim is to discover principles that describe neural 
structures and functions, and in so doing to bring order and comprehensibility to data. Artificial sciences 
[like education] are normative. Their aim is not the description of the natural world as it exists, but the 
creation of an artefact, designed to serve a specific goal, within a particular environment ... The artefact 
to be created in education is a set of pedagogic strategies and materials (Willingham, 2009, p. 544). 
Following this clarification of scientific distinction, Willingham asks how the natural and the 
artificial sciences are related, and answers his own question by claiming that “natural science 
can inform artificial science” (2009, p. 544). This informative status ascribed to natural 
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sciences suggests a pre-dominant role in negotiations found in different levels of analysis 
between neuroscience and education. However, and as will be discussed in the next section, 
this informative status of natural science and neuroscience over education is not 
unproblematic and can lead to further tension and struggles regarding dissimilar goals, levels 
of analysis, and problems of translation (Willingham, 2009). Perkins (2009) also draws
attention to struggles between the two fields of sciences, claiming the existence of differences 
between what might be called ‘basic science’ such as neuroscience, and ‘engineering science’ 
such as education. Distinctions between the two camps of science are further used in order to 
explain possible issues faced by educational neuroscience. 
It is argued here that to speak to the classroom, neuroscience has to shout across two gaps. The first and 
most familiar are different levels of explanation. The second concerns the epistemological contrast 
between explanation theories and action theories, roughly the contrast between basic science on the one 
hand, and engineering science and craft on the other ... [E]xplanation theories are claims about the 
world, true or false, and subject to disconfirmation in the Popperian tradition. Action theories are less 
claim-like and more tool-like ... Engineering science tends to be seen as playing second fiddle to basic 
science, with its fundamental research (Perkins, 2009, pp. 170-172).
Perkins (2009) is referring to a site of struggle found between education and neuroscience, 
which arises from deeper dissimilarities between the two fields of basic science and 
engineering science. The relation between these two fields of sciences is not balanced because 
neuroscience, as a basic science, appears to be more dominant than the engineering science of 
education. As a note about this imbalance, Perkins (2009) warns about the establishment of ‘a 
pecking order’ between neuroscience and education. 
Overall, findings from my critical discourse analysis show that negotiations and 
struggles between different levels of analysis are frequently mentioned by authors working at 
the interface of educational neuroscience. However, the exact sites of tension vary from
negotiation between i) disciplinary differences between, for instance, neuroscience, cognitive 
science, and education ii) nature set against nurture, in addition to biology as opposed to 
environment, and iii) struggles between the field of natural sciences, on the one hand, and 
social sciences, the humanities and the arts on the other. Different focuses of attention 
notwithstanding, there seems to be a general consensus amongst numerous actors that the 
field related to neuroscience is perceived to hold a more dominant role than the field of 
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education126. In order to expound on this, the following sections move from a descriptive 
presentation of discourse analytical findings to a more critical discussion of hegemonic 
struggles over different levels of analysis between education and neuroscience. 
Hierarchy between neuroscience and education: actualities or outdated ideas?
There are numerous hegemonic struggles between educational neuroscience’s different levels 
of analysis and it is interesting to investigate the degree of impact these discursive tussles 
have within the academic level of discourse. For example, is there really a hegemonic struggle 
fought between nature and nurture, or is this negotiation over biological explanations versus 
environmental explanations about outdated ideas which have little relevance to the current 
discourse? One can similarly ask if neuroscience is correctly seen to hold a hegemonic power 
dominion over education, or if this impression is seldom actualised beyond mere warnings of 
potential dominance and reductionism? Is there a hegemonic ordering of levels of analysis at 
the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse or not?
Traces of hegemonic relations 
As previously shown, one of the most prominent hegemonic struggles identified in the 
hegemony corpus is the tussle between neuroscience and education. In this relationship, 
neuroscience is assumed to hold the most dominant status, although the amount of power and 
significance attributed to it varies amongst authors127. My argument that there is a tendency to 
designate a hegemonic status to neuroscience over education is supported by other research
findings from literature reviews and other analyses of the educational neuroscience discipline. 
Samuels (2009, p. 45; p. 51), for instance, points to similar hegemonic ordering by claiming 
that “neuroscience has arguably taken the lead in this [mind, brain, and education] endeavour 
... To date, the field appears to favour reports that foreground neuroscience, and treat 
education as background or context”. Traces of neuroscientific dominion within the 
educational neuroscience discourse are also found in the emergence analysis – presented in 
the previous chapter – regarding changes in educational neuroscientific narratives and 
                                                          
126 This is, for example, seen in the texts by Anderson and Reid (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Perkins (2009), 
Willingham (2009), Stein and Fischer (2011), Ferrari (2011), Kraft (2012), and Mercer (2013).  
127 As seen in the text by Ansari et al. (2012), Cerulo (2010), Choudhury (2009), Kraft (2012), and Pickersgill (2013).  
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discursive positions, where it is argued that neuroscientists are often ascribed a more 
‘significant’ and ‘informative’ role over education128.
Representations of hegemony, where neuroscience is alleged to have a more dominant 
role over education, are apparent in the discourse’s academic level and the ensuing critical 
question, therefore, is to ask how this representation is presented. Does the discursive 
convention of neuroscientific hegemony implicitly embody a certain set of knowledge or 
presuppositions, and does it include implicit meanings from discursive positions? In response 
to these questions I am inclined to answer yes í representations of a hegemonic dominance of 
neuroscience over education appear to embody certain sets of knowledge, presuppositions, 
and implicit meanings. One aspect of knowledge, which often implicitly or explicitly follows 
statements of neuroscientific hegemony, is accusations of reductionism, where neuroscience 
is considered to override educational explanations. It should also be noted that it is warnings
against reductionism that are most strongly voiced in debates, and that these warnings are 
most commonly uttered by actors from the discursive position of ‘cautious optimism’. This 
tendency of referring to reductionism, when warning against neuroscientific domination, is 
even seen in some of the text extracts shown in the previous sections129. If we look further at 
what these warnings against reductionism denote, it is generally argued that neuroscientific 
dominion can lead to a reductionist ordering between the levels of analysis found at the level 
of the brain (neuroscience), the level of the mind (cognitive psychology), and the level of 
behaviour (education). If we again demonstrate by the model of different levels of analysis, 
the reductionistic ordering favouring neuroscience at the top level, can be illustrated with 
downward lines of causation (as shown in figure 6.4). The issue at stake with such top-down 
KLHUDUFKLF RUGHULQJ RI FDXVDWLRQ LV WKDW HGXFDWLRQíZLWK LWV HGXFDWLRQDO WKHRULHVPHWKRGV
explanations, language, philosophies, values and goals – becomes reduced under cognitive 
and neuroscientific power130.
                                                          
128 For a more detail account see page 179-181 in the previous chapter of emergence.  
129 See the previous quotes by Willingham (2009), Stein and Fischer (2001), Pickersgill (2013), and Varma et al. (2008).  
130 As seen in the text by Willingham (2009), Stein and Fischer (2001), Pickersgill (2013), and Varma et al. (2008). 
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Figure 6.4: A top-down perspective on different levels of analysis.
Hegemonic and reductionistic ordering in the partnership between neuroscience and education 
can also be linked to a particular subject position, which in the previous chapter I labelled 
apprehension. The apprehensive often take a guarded and rather reluctant stand toward 
educational neuroscience, and they are often of the opinion that neuroscience ‘has nothing to 
do within the realm of education’ or that it is a bridging project too far or too immature131.
Reluctance to take neuroscientific findings into consideration in educational matters is often 
due to arguments of neuroscientific dominance, reductionism, and conflation of different 
levels of analysis. By using similar reductionist perceptions as shown above, it is argued that 
educational theories, methods, philosophies, values, goals, and practices are at risk of being 
overrun by the neuroscientific field. It is often further argued that to prevent neuroscientific 
cannibalisation, educational de-professionalisation, and the complete ruination of the art of
teaching, it is better in principle for education to avoid a partnership with neuroscience 
altogether (Schumacher, 2007; Davis, 2004). Based on such apprehensive standpoints, it is 
often noted by other actors that “education has been the more ambivalent partner” in the 
educational neuroscience project (Samuels, 2009, p. 45). And indeed, these assertions from 
the apprehensive position towards neuroscience explain why so many educationalists (and 
often educational theorists) are ambivalent and reluctant concerning educational neuroscience. 
It is debatable as to whether or not the position of apprehension is overly protective against 
new influences in education, and it should be noted that the position has indeed met with
                                                          
131 As seen by Bruer (1997; 2006), Davis (2004), Mayer (1998), and Schumacher (2007). 
Level of: NEUROSCIENCE BRAIN e.g. observable neurobiological and neurochemical signals
Level of: PSYCHOLOGY MIND e.g. hypothesis of cognitive functions, such as reading abilities
Level of: EDUCATION BEHAVIOUR e.g. observable behaviour, such as improved reading skills
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criticism for being too pessimistic and unwilling to adapt to novel knowledge132. However, 
these debates and censure notwithstanding, what is interesting to note from a critical discourse 
analytical perspective, is that the discursive position of the apprehensive takes a firm stand 
against the idea of a powerful and dominant neuroscience. Instead of arguing that 
neuroscience can inform education, this stance gives the impression of taking the opposite 
position, by claiming that neuroscience has nothing to do with the realm of education. The 
hegemonic struggles between neuroscience and education are therefore fought in both 
directions.
With regard to how ideas of hegemonic ordering between neuroscience and education 
are represented, another critical discourse analytical aim is to investigate if narrations of 
neuroscientific domination are represented indirectly or explicitly, deliberately or 
unintentionally. On this note, it appears that most of the texts analysed in the hegemony 
corpus present struggles between neuroscience and education explicitly and deliberately. 
Deliberate expressions of hierarchic ordering between neuroscience and education, for 
instance, are evident when authors specifically explain, argue, and negotiate about struggles 
fought between levels of analysis. In his account of critical discourse theories, Fairclough 
(2003) labels such dialogical statements as either attributes or modalised assertions, where 
the former indicates explicit quotes or expressions of other voices of possibilities in a debate, 
whereas the latter are statements open to other possibilities. Discursive ideas, concepts, and 
ideologies can also be expressed implicitly and even unintentionally by actors within the 
discourse. Implicit and subtle expression of representations should not go unnoticed, because 
subtle manifestations can either indicate a strategy to naturalise certain ways of being, 
thinking, and acting in the discourse, or, more importantly, they can indicate that a certain 
representation has already become naturalised within the discourse, since actors 
unintentionally talk and act along these lines of thought (cf. Fairclough, 2010). 
Even if most of the texts analysed show dialogical negotiations of the struggle between 
neuroscience and education, there are some where a hegemonic ordering appears to be 
manifested somewhat implicitly and is non-modalised. An example of this is the text by 
Carew and Magsamen (2010), where one receives the impression that a hierarchic order is 
                                                          
132 As seen in Varma et al. (2008) and Cerulo (2010). A similar reluctance towards natural scientific explanations in the 
educational domain is also noted by Haworth and Plomin (2011), who argue for bringing genetics and education together. 
They further note that “influential research will come from the integration of both genes and environments and their 
interplay to understand learning and achievement at school” (p. 553), but the integration has been slow, partly because 
educational research has largely disregarded the impact of genetic influences in educational aspects.   
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subtly manifested within the text. Again, it is neuroscience which is allocated the most 
dominant role in the educational neuroscience partnership, but in contrast to other texts in the 
hegemony corpus, Carew and Magsamen neither explicitly consider, nor discuss, the 
hierarchic dominion of neuroscience. Instead, the text conveys an assumption that 
neuroscience can, and should, “inform” and “help” education, which, in the view of Carew 
and Magsamen, is “good news, because more than ever, we need to figure out how to teach 
our children how to learn” (2010, p. 685). By frequent use of similar statements and the quote 
shown below, it is evident that neuroscience is designated a predominant role as a significant 
informer that can rescue educators and help them to ‘finally’ understand how to teach children 
to learn. 
The U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, called the state of education in America a national 
public health crisis. American children are not excelling. Test grades show it. Innovation and creative 
thinking are not being taught, practised, or nurtured in children’s lives. Industry and business are 
concerned that we are not producing engineers, mathematicians, scientists, and physicists ... And this is 
not simply a national problem: it is global ... How can neuroscience help? What can neuroscientists do 
about any of this? (Carew & Magsamen, 2010, p. 685). 
What is problematic with allegations like these, firstly, is the implicit impression conveyed 
about teachers who have not yet been able to ‘figure out’ how to tHDFKFKLOGUHQíWKDWLVXQWLO
recently, when they have had help from neuroscientists. Secondly, it is problematic as to how 
the text makes use of statements suggested by authorities, such as the U.S. Secretary of 
Education and the industry and business’ opinions, to underline certain arguments. Numerous 
statements are also generalised or presented as facts without necessarily being so, such as 
“American children are not excelling”, “industry and business are concerned”, and “it is a 
global problem”133. What also appears to be problematic with this text is the ways in which 
the authors present the “Neuro-Educational” endeavour. The blending of neuroscience, 
psychology, cognitive science, and education, is presented as a rather straightforward 
translation task, and there is not a single reference to issues related to cautious approaches, 
different levels of analysis, or other difficulties with regard to WKHEUDLQíPLQGíHGXFDWLRQOLnk.
The following text extract demonstrates some of these implicit assertions:
Imagine being able to use what we know about the rules of learning to design a classroom that actually 
made kids smarter ... [We could] imagine a million things that are all possible when fuelled by 
                                                          
133 For instance, is the statement “American children are not excelling” generalised and exaggerated because, firstly, it does 
not indicate some children, but American children as an overall group? Secondly, “they are not excelling” indicates that 
overall they are inferior (in school), but surely, there are several aspects in which ‘American children’ are doing superbly.  
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evidence-based rigorous neuroscience research that can be translated to practical application and tested 
for their efficacy through the creation of research schools, informal learning testing, and other measures. 
These game-changers for education and learning are within our reach (Carew & Magsamen, 2010, pp. 
685-686). 
According to Fairclough’s theories on hegemony, these representations of a supreme neuro-
science and neuroscientists’ potential to help education are non-modalised assertions because 
the statements leave no room for other possibilities. Some statements in Carew and 
Magsamen’s text even appear to be what Fairclough calls assumptions, since they are even 
less dialogical and simply take a vision for granted (cf. Fairclough, 2003). Implicit and non-
modalised assertions, and assumptions of neuroscientific hegemony, are noteworthy, because 
they indirectly convey an idea of a discourse with little room for dialogical negotiations 
between the level of neuroscience and education.
(YHQLIWKLVH[DPSOHLVEDVHGRQDVLQJOHWH[WíZKLFKLQIDFWLVWKHonly text in the 
hegemony corpus showing traces of strong non-modalised and non-GLDORJLFDODVVXPSWLRQVí
one must be aware that numerous other texts pertaining to the educational neuroscience topic 
exist which convey similar and less radical assertions of hegemonic ordering between 
neuroscience and education. Some of these examples, for instance, are found amongst those 
actors who enthusiastically claim that the linking of neuroscience and education produces a 
‘natural science of education’. Such statements subtly denote a predominant role to 
neuroscience by claiming that it is an “ideal basis from which to grow a science of education” 
or from which to “develop the science of teaching”. Statements such as these appear to be 
quite common and can be found in authors working at the interface of education and 
neuroscience134, and even the OECD’s renowned project report on educational neuroscience 
bears the title ‘Understanding the brain: The birth of a learning science’ (OECD, 2007a). I 
will argue that arguments for crafting ‘a natural science of learning’ are problematic and lean 
towards issues of reductionism, because statements like these give the impression that 
learning primarily can, and should, be explained by the natural sciences. Again we touch on 
the problem of conflating different levels of analysis between the brain, mind, and education, 
because more biological and neuro-cognitive causes seem to hold a sturdier and more 
‘scientific’ explanation for learning than ‘softer’ social and environmental hypothesis of 
                                                          
134 As seen in the texts Ansari et al. (2012, p.107), Greenwood (2009, p. 553), Tommerdahl (2010), and Pasquinelli (2011). 
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learning135. Since these texts, perhaps unintentionally, give a predominant role to the natural 
VFLHQFHVíDQGDOVR implicitly conflate the different levels of analysis between neuroscience 
and education with their calls for ‘a natural science of education¶í,ZLOODUJXHWKDWWKH\DUH
at risk of conveying ideas of hierarchic ordering in the educational neuroscience discourse. 
These examples are just some illustrations of subtle and indirect manifestations of a 
hierarchic ordering within the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. In 
my opinion, the important thing to remember is that one should be aware of such subtle, and 
perhaps unintentional, manifestations of a pre-dominant neuroscience within the educational 
neuroscience discourse. Not only will I argue that such implicit manifestations of hierarchic 
ordering inhibit open discussion and awareness of potential issues and possibilities in the 
endeavour to link the different levels of analysis between the brain, mind, and education. But 
I will also argue that representations such as these contribute to distributing and naturalising
ideas of neuroscientific predomination and reductionism, to the disadvantage of education136.
This is important because “naturalised discursive conventions are effective mechanisms for 
sustaining and reproducing cultural and ideological dimensions of hegemony” (Fairclough, 
2010, p. 129).  
Based on my critical discourse analysis, it appears that the field of neuroscience is 
often given a somewhat predominant role in the educational neuroscience relationship. The 
ensuing questions are: why is neuroscience so often considered to be powerful? How has it 
managed to gain a more hegemonic role in the educational neuroscience discourse and why 
does a ‘natural science of learning’ sound so appealing to some actors within the field? One 
explanation for this might be that the long-held assumption within the wider academic 
discourse that natural sciences with their ‘basic and fundamental explanations’ are more 
sound than explanations suggested by ‘softer’ fields within the social sciences, the 
humanities, and the arts (McChall, 1990; Perkins, 2009; Willingham, 2009). Similarly, 
because education is often believed to have “inherent weakness and neglect of evidence in the 
formulation of educational theory” the field is at risk of being swayed by actors who suggest 
                                                          
135 This argument should be seen in relation to the critical realistic approach to educational neuroscientific research which I 
propose in chapter 2. My preliminary point in this respect is that a critical realistic perspective can help to illuminate how 
certain disciplines (e.g. neuroscience) are more ‘basic’ than other disciplines (e.g. education), but how one cannot reduce or 
conflate one ‘strata’ to another. As a means of combining research from different ‘strata’, critical realists propose a 
ƚƌĂŶƐĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇŵŽĚĞŽĨƐƚƵĚǇоĂmode which I combine with educational neuroscientific research in my final reflections 
in chapter 9. 
136 If a representation is frequently presented within a discourse, it will become common, less questioned, and thus more 
naturalised. What is of note with naturalised ideas is that they hold a relatively hegemonic position in the discourse, in that 
they have become so frequently represented that they appear obvious and almost beyond all doubt (Neumann, 2010). 
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more ‘scientifically based’ learning theories (Kraft, 2012, p. 392). These aspects are discussed 
in more detail later in the chapter, but for the moment it can be noted that a problem with 
educational neuroscience is that this linkage, at first sight, gives the impression that 
neuroscience can provide a more ‘scientific’ understanding of learning. The notion that some 
actors and groups working at the interface of education and neuroscience also convey 
implicit, and perhaps even unintentional, statements of hierarchic orderings and visionary 
ideals of ‘a science of learning’, can strengthen the idea that neuroscience holds a dominant 
role in the partnership. However, as shown above, one should be cautious about assumptions 
concerning a predominant and ‘informative’ neuroscience, because these ideas are at risk of 
conflating different levels of analysis. 
A muddled discussion  
Apart from frequent negotiations over the hegemonic dominion presumed to be held by 
neuroscience, my critical discoursHDQDO\VLV LQGLFDWHVDQRWKHUDVSHFWZRUWKQRWLQJíQDPHO\
that the debate regarding different levels of analysis between neuroscience and education is 
confusing. This is because these hegemonic struggles are fought from the viewpoint of many 
GLVFLSOLQHV í educationalists, neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, educational 
neuroscientists, cognitive neuroscientists, social cognitive neuroscientists, educational 
psychologists, etc. My findings also show that hegemonic struggles conducted between these 
disciplines and sub-disciplines often end in disarray, due to confusion over which disciplines 
are included in the educational neuroscience endeavour and which are not. For example, this 
is apparent in the ways in which texts represent ideas of hegemonic dominance. Although 
numerous texts from the corpora note how neuroscience has a dominant role over 
education137, other texts stress that it is neuroscience and cognitive psychology that dominate 
education138, or that it is neuroscience and education which hold a dominant role over 
psychology139. The latter claim of hierarchic ordering is often stated by Bruer (1997; 2006), as 
he claims that both cognitive neuroscience and education tend to neglect the field of cognitive 
psychology. Bruer further argues that the endeavour to link education and neuroscience “is a 
bridge too far” (Bruer, 1997; 2006). When analysing the educational neuroscience discourse, 
                                                          
137 As demonstrated in the text by Stein and Fischer (2001), Choudhury (2009), Cerulo (2010), Ansari et al. (2012), Kraft 
(2012), Carew and Magsamen (2010), and Pickersgill (2013).  
138 As seen in texts by Goswami (2008), Greenwood (2009), Ferrari (2011), and Pasquinelli (2013). 
139 As seen in texts by Bruer (2006) and Anderson and Reid (2009).  
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however, one receives the impression that the discipline tends to encompass the field of 
cognitive psychology. In fact, a majority of the authors in the corpora explicitly stress that 
cognitive psychology is a central part of the educational neuroscience collaboration, and that 
one cannot link the level of the brain with the level of behaviour without including the 
middle-step of the mind140. Bruer’s argument against the educational neuroscience venture 
therefore falls short of its target because of confusion concerning which disciplines are
included in educational neuroscience. 
However, as well as the confusion over which disciplines to include in the educational 
neuroscience endeavour, the numerous perspectives and approaches taken in the struggles 
between different levels of analysis contribute to the uncertainty. As already mentioned, there 
is negotiation between nature versus nurture, between biological explanations set against 
environmental explanations, between the brain as a part versus a more holistic view of the 
individual, between individual cognition seen in contrast to collective cognition, and between 
the natural sciences as opposed to the social sciences, the humanities and the arts. Different 
approaches to educational neuroscience’s levels of analysis, in addition to struggles over the 
hierarchic ordering found therein, make the discussion unclear and I will argue that the 
multifaceted debate often leads to unnecessary accusations and misunderstandings amongst 
educationalists, neuroscientists, and cognitive psychologists. For example, this could be the 
case with Bruer’s (1997; 2006) accusations against educational neuroscience for neglecting 
FRJQLWLYHSV\FKRORJ\ LQ LWVZRUNíDQDUJXPHQWZKLFKVHHPV WRrun off target, because the 
discipline does indeed have a central enterprise which links the level of the brain (i.e. 
neuroscience), the level of the mind (i.e. cognitive psychology), and the level of behaviour 
(i.e. education)141. Misunderstandings over disciplinary objectives arise in educational 
neuroscience debates, and groups that initially appear to hold conflicting perspectives can 
actually hold relatively similar views. Comparable perspectives notwithstanding, some actors 
continue their quarrel due to confusion related to unclear educational neuroscientific 
REMHFWLYHV FRQILJXUDWLRQ DQG DLPV í VXFK DV ZKLFK GLVFLSOLQHV DQG VXE-disciplines are, or 
should be, accounted for in the educational neuroscience endeavour. This can lead to debates 
where the various groups fail to listen to each other. 
                                                          
140 As seen in Goswami (2008), Anderson and Reid (2009), Ferrari (2011), Greenwood (2009), Pasquinelli (2013), and 
Tommerdahl (2010). 
141 As seen in Goswami (2008), Anderson and Reid (2009), Ferrari (2011), Greenwood (2009), Pasquinelli (2013), and 
Tommerdahl (2010). 
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Traces of warnings and outdated ideas 
When reading articles on the topic of educational neuroscience, as the text extracts in the 
previous sections illustrate, one receives the impression of a hierarchic ordering where 
neuroscience holds a dominant role over education. In critical discourse analysis, however, it 
is important to look beyond explicit statements in an individual text, in order to grasp nuances 
of the larger context. An argument is seldom presented only in black and white, and this
appears to be the case with concepts of a neuroscientific power dominion at educational 
neuroscience’s academic level. The critical question worth asking is whether or not the 
complexity and reality of educational neuroscience has perhaps become condensed in claims 
of neuroscientific dominance. Do statements of hegemonic ordering within educational 
neuroscience reflect beliefs of existing power hegemony, or are they warnings against 
potential hegemonic outcomes? The difference may seem trivial, but when analysing the 
nature of a discourse, the line between rhetorical claims and the embodied meaning of these 
claims is essential. 
To answer these questions, we need to look again at the hegemony corpora, and the 
ways in which texts represent ideas of struggles over hierarchic orderings of educational 
neuroscience’s different levels of analysis. Moreover, even if numerous texts explicitly 
present statements of hierarchic dominion and reductionism, they do not necessarily convey 
the idea that a strict state of hegemony actually exists within the educational neuroscience 
discourse. Instead it appears that the texts either express:
- notions of outdated ideas, or
- warnings of potential hegemonic and reductionistic outcomes
Statements communicating ‘warnings against’ or ‘we are past such ideas now’, are found in 
many tussles between different levels of analysis at educational neuroscience’s academic 
level. One such example is identified in discussions where education and neuroscience are 
linked to the time-honoured debate between nature as opposed to nurture. When analysed 
more thoroughly, these negotiations often indicate that the ‘either-or’ struggle between 
different levels of analysis is outdated and that researchers today have moved away from a 
‘nature or nurture’ perspective. As an alternative to this ‘outdated either-or idea’, several texts 
in the corpus convey an idea of ‘nature and nurture’ where biological explanations are not set 
in stark opposition to environmental explanations. For example, this is seen in Ansari et al. 
(2012), Goswami (2008), Logan and Johnston (2007), and in Gelman and Taylor (2010, p. 
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393). In the latter text, it is even noted how “The contrast between nature and nurture is 
powerful in its simplicity, yet every student of developmental psychology is quickly taught 
that framing the question as an “either-or” debate is too simple”. Such negotiations of 
hegemony between nature and nurture, biology and environment, imply that we are past ideas 
of ‘either one or the other’. The nature-nurture struggle is therefore perhaps more an echo of 
old debates rather than statements of existing order of a nature-hegemony in the educational 
neuroscience discourse.
This applies to other struggles found between levels of analysis in educational 
neuroscience, and the picture appears more nuanced when investigated in detail. Just as 
numerous texts convey that the question is not one of either nature or nurture, either
biological or environmental explanations, one also receives the impression that actors within 
the discourse do not think along the lines of either neuroscience or education. This is of 
interest, as many of the texts analysed explicitly refer to both neuroscientific dominance and 
reductionism of education142. How, then, can these texts also convey ideas of a more balanced 
relationship? Analytical findings from my hegemony corpora show that numerous authors 
present statements of discursive hierarchies, neuroscientific dominance, and reduction of 
education as general warnings of possible discursive outcomes143. When writing texts, many 
authors follow a general argumentation structure along the lines of a problem-solution 
structure, where problems are presented, and warnings stated, before a solution is suggested. 
Similar lines of argumentation are found in my hegemony corpus, as several authors start by 
presenting the problem of different levels of analysis, continue by warning against top-down 
and reductionistic ordering between neuroscience and education, before suggesting a solution 
of reciprocal collaboration and bi-directional links between the level of the brain 
(neuroscience), the level of the mind (cognitive psychology), and the level of behaviour 
(education). This implies that even if a text explicitly mentions neuroscientific hegemony and 
reduction of educational explanations, these statements are mere rhetoric in a rhetorical 
argument, rather than expressions of belief that hegemonic dominance exists within the 
discourse of educational neuroscience. Such argumentative dispositions and rhetoric
(exemplified below in table 6.5) are, for instance, seen in the texts by Varma and colleagues 
                                                          
142 As seen in Stein and Fischer (2001), Choudhury (2009), Cerulo (2010), Ansari et al. (2012), Kraft (2012), Pickersgill (2013). 
143 As seen in Varma et al. (2008), Goswami (2008), Choudhury et al. (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Tommerdahl 
(2010), and Stein and Fischer (2011). 
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(2008), Tommerdahl (2010), Choudhury and colleagues (2009), Goswami (2008), 
Christodoulou and Gaab (2009) and Stein and Fischer (2011).
Common line of argument: 
Problem: Different levels of analysis between the brain, mind, and education.
Warning: Top-down and reductionistic line of causation between neuroscience and education.
Solution: Bi-directional links and reciprocal collaboration between neuroscience, psychology and education.  
Table 6.5: Common line of rhetorical argument found in educational neuroscience debates.
From a critical discourse theoretical point of view, what is interesting is that by providing 
warnings over hegemonic neuroscientific dominance and reduction of education, certain 
aspects of the nuanced picture in the educational neuroscience discourse have been condensed 
in order to fit a problem-solution rhetoric. By this, I mean that the scenario of a top-down 
‘neuroscience Æ education’ ordering does not necessarily correspond with how many actors 
understand the situation at academic level. Nevertheless, it seems that authors still warn
against neuroscientific hegemony and reductionistic scenarios, because such rhetoric provides 
a good argumentative strategy for stressing the importance of reciprocal collaboration and 
cautious approaches to educational neuroscience’s complex enterprise. This is because an 
argument against, and a denaturalising of, hegemonic orderings between neuroscience and 
education leads to an expectation that the author will present an alternative and ‘better 
VROXWLRQ¶WRWKHSUREOHPíLQWKLVFDVHWKHµVROXWLRQ¶RIWHQEHLQJUHFLSURFDODQGEL-directional 
bridges between education and neuroscience. Text-analytically speaking, a message presented 
by use of a problem-solution strategy may be more influential, since the author explicitly 
demonstrates how this ‘solution’ is better than others. Such argumentative strategies are also 
significant, because “a significant target of hegemonic struggle is the denaturalisation of 
existing conventions and replacement of them with others” (Fairclough, 2010, p.129). Even if 
the rhetorical ‘outcome’ of such argumentative strategies benefits these actors, because they 
support a balanced relationship between neuroscience and education, I will argue that such 
rhetorical strategies are ambiguous as they also convey a picture of a discipline ‘ruled by 
neuroscience’. Actors working at the interface of educational neuroscience should be careful 
when using hegemonic scenarios in their ‘problem-solution’ argumentation, because this type 
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of rhetorical strategy can reduce part of the complex concept of the educational neuroscience 
relationship. 
In this respect, it should also be noted that ideas of bi-directional arrows were
discussed in the previous emergence chapter, where it was argued that the educational 
neuroscience discourse has moved from the idea of top-down causation between 
‘neuroscience Æ education’ often held until the 1970s and 1980s, to a more bi-directional 
view of correlation between ‘neuroscience ÅÆ cognitive psychology ÅÆ education’. Thus, 
statements of hegemonic ordering, in addition to rhetorical argumentation, are also seen as 
notions that were more common decades ago. Overall then, it is apparent that instead of ideas 
of hegemonic ordering in the discourse, most authors in the contemporary debate perceive the 
different levels of analysis in educational neuroscience as being part of a complex set of 
dynamic relations, which are mostly in a state of reciprocal collaboration between education, 
cognitive psychology, and neuroscience144. Statements of hegemonic struggles and 
negotiations over levels of analysis are mostly used as rhetorical warnings and proclamations 
of outdated ideas, rather than representations of believed actualities.
What about educational practice and the voice of teachers? 
Concepts of change and struggles over representation are central to any discourse analysis of 
hegemony. Even when there seems to be an apparent lack of discursive change and conflict, 
this can be significant, because lack of negotiations means that one discursive ‘reality’ has 
attained hegemonic dominance over other discursive representations (Fairclough, 2010). With 
regard to the academic level of educational neuroscience, findings from my analysis show that 
many actors acknowledge the complex set of relations found between its different levels of 
analysis, and that a common aim is to craft bi-directional links and reciprocal collaboration 
between neuroscience, psychology, and education. However, my findings further indicate that 
despite recognition concerning different levels of analysis in educational neuroscience, there 
is one OHYHO LQ SDUWLFXODU ZKLFK UHSHDWHGO\ VHHPV WR EH QHJOHFWHG LQ WKH GHEDWH í QDPHO\
educational practice. This neglect is surprising considering that ‘the level of education’ is 
such a central aspect of educational neuroscience. However, my findings show that
                                                          
144 As seen in Ansari et al. (2012), Greenwood (2009), Mason (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Ferrari (2011), and 
Stein and Fischer (2011). 
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representations of ‘the level of education’ tend to encompass educational research and 
educational theory, but omit educational practice and the voice from educational 
practitioners, teachers, and students. This marginalisation of ‘the level of educational practice’ 
in the educational neuroscience debate is noteworthy and should be examined more 
thoroughly.
First of all, neglect of educational practice is demonstrated by the marginal role of the 
voice of teachers and other educational practitioners in debates at the academic level of the 
educational neuroscience discourse. Out of 29 articles analysed in the hegemony corpora, 
only one LVZULWWHQE\DWHDFKHUíQDPHO\*UHHQZRRG¶VDUWLFOHZLWKWKHDSSRVLWHWLWOH
‘Where are the educators? What is our role in the debate?’. It states that: 
By joining forces educators can develop a more precise research basis to improve their practice and not 
be dependant upon translators or others who do not have classroom expertise. Educators need to take an 
active role, bringing their expertise, along with those working in other disciplines, to develop the 
science of teaching (Greenwood, 2009, p. 553).
Although this is the only article actually written by an educational practitioner, some of the 
other texts also refer to the level of educational practice. For instance, there are references to 
educational practice in statements such as “mission of building bidirectional and substantive 
connections between practice and research” (Christodoulou & Gaab, 2009, p.556), and “a 
symbiosis between researchers and educators”, which are seen as being aligned with “the 
classical division of theory and practice” (Stein & Fischer, 2011, p.58). However, references 
to educational practice do not necessarily imply that the voice of teachers is actually heard 
and taken into consideration. In other words, one can easily put forward statements on behalf 
of teachers and educational practitioners. The question, however, is whether these statements 
are the author’s presumption of teachers’ opinions, or if they are actually based on dialogue 
with teachers themselves. Some articles in the corpora appear to make statements on behalf of 
teachers, without necessarily consulting with them. This is seen in Mason’s (2009) article 
where he discusses ‘frequent teacher misconceptions’ such as left-and-right brain teaching, 
and notes that such misinformation is often found in schools because it is attractive to “the 
practitioners of education, who need ‘broad brush messages’ and prefer to be told ‘what 
works’” (p. 548). Not only does such a statement present teachers in a poor light, it also 
makes prior judgments about their preferences, values, and opinions, since it is claimed that 
they prefer ‘broad brush messages’ and to be told ‘what works’ without even referring to a 
single teacher. Similar statements and prejudgments implicitly made on behalf of teachers are 
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found in other texts as well145. The problem is that teachers’ views do not necessarily 
correspond to those ascribed to them by educational researchers, psychologists, and 
neuroscientists. By presenting such prejudices in journal articles without including teachers 
and practitioners’ actual opinions, the educational neuroscience debate amongst researchers 
can easily become unbalanced and biased against the level of educational practice. 
However, it should be noted that some of the articles in the corpora do make an effort 
to explicitly include teachers and educational practitioners’ voices in the debate at the 
academic level of the discourse. A study by Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012),
for instance, investigates the prevalence of neuromyths in education by carrying out a large 
observational survey of 242 teachers. The argument for their research approach is that 
“[d]espite concerns regarding the rapid proliferation of neuromyths (...), not much is known 
about the prevalence of neuromyths among professionals in the field of education” (Dekker et 
al., 2012, p. 1). Another text in the corpora which also refers to teachers, is by Hook and 
Farah (2013). These authors similarly start their article by noting that relatively little of the 
debate regarding educational neuroscience has investigated teachers’ expectations and views. 
Following this, they present in-depth interviews where they investigate educational 
practitioners’ view regarding neuroscientific research. By directly addressing teachers in their 
surveys, both Dekker and co-workers (2012) and Hook and Farah (2013), draw attention to 
the more marginalised group of teachers and educational practitioners at the academic level in 
the educational neuroscience discourse. However, although some articles explicitly address 
the role of teachers, the majority of texts at the academic level of the discourse either 
completely neglect this role, or simply point to issues regarding educational practice without 
referring directly to teachers’ opinions or views146. It is therefore evident that teachers 
themselves seldom enter, or are invited to enter, into the academic debate regarding 
educational neuroscience. 
In addition to the marginalised voice of teachers, there is another group which appears 
to be even more neglected at the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse –
voices of students. In texts analysed in the corpus, there was scarcely a mention of students’ 
role in the educational neuroscience enterprise. One of the few texts which explicitly 
mentions the role of students is the article by della Chiesa and colleagues (2009, p. 24), where 
in a footnote at the end of the paper they write: “It is interesting to note that students and 
                                                          
145 As seen in Carew and Magsamen (2010), Pasquinelli (2011), and Goswami (2008). 
146 As seen, for instance, in Mason (2009), Goswami (2006), Carew and Masamen (2010), and Pasquinelli (2011). 
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parents generally remained uninvolved in the project most of the time, which could be ... 
because these groups are not used to being part of strategic planning in education context”. 
The neglect of students’ voices in the educational neuroscience enterprise, as della Chiesa and 
colleagues (2009) note, is not necessarily limited to the case of the educational neuroscience 
project per se, because it is a problem when designing educational programmes in general. 
However, even if neglecting students’ expertise and opinions is a common problem in 
educational projects, this does not justify actors within the educational neuroscience discourse 
doing so as well. Indeed, I will argue that much benefit can be obtained from taking students’ 
voices into consideration in the more practical and classroom-related side of educational 
neuroscientific work. One example which can illustrate is Wilson, Dehaene and colleagues’ 
(2006) project about the learning computer game ‘The Number Race’ for remediation of 
dyscalculia. Based on neuroscientific and cognitive theories “of the cerebral representation of 
number and the hypothesis that dyscalculia is due to ‘core deficit’ in number sense or in the 
link between number sense and symbolic representations”, the research group designed an 
adaptive game software for children with mathematical learning difficulties (Wilson et al., 
2006, p. 1). Design of the educational software is underpinned by expertise in cognitive 
neuroscience of mathematics, educational learning theories by Vygotsky, and game design 
theories. Children’s expertise and experience of the game, however, was not considered until 
the final stage of the project, when a group of nine children with mathematical learning 
difficulties tested the game147. As the researchers themselves admitted, results from testing the 
educational neuroscientific computer game showed that “children became bored with the 
software”, and the “levels of the software were too easy for most children, and the software 
too slow to adapt to their initial ability” (Wilson et al., 2006, p.12). This demonstrates that 
even if the software game were successful in theory, it failed in practice since it did not 
manage to engage with its target group of children (Howard-Jones, 2010). Had there been
more collaboration with children and their expertise throughout, the project could have 
prevented this poor and unengaging software design, and thus the example again underlines 
the importance of also taking the level of educational practice into consideration in 
educational neuroscientific work. 
                                                          
147 It must be noted that the researchers used data simulation and learning algorithms during the design process, and that 
they “tested the design of [their] algorithm by developing a Matlab model which simulates a child playing the game” 
(Wilson et al., 2006, p. 8). However, it is debatable if technical data simulation of a child’s knowledge and responses should 
be used instead of the experience of children themselves. Data simulation can, of course, be a significant aid in software 
designs, but it should not replace children’s expertise.  
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I will argue that educational practice is an important level of the educational neuro-
science endeavour, primarily because this is the level where educational neuroscience is 
ultimately manifested within the classroom. Even if numerous authors mention the theory-to-
practice issue, and call for more reciprocal collaboration with educational practitioners, not 
many researchers explicitly incorporate the voices of teachers and students when working at 
the interface of educational neuroscience. This aspect is particularly important with reference 
to critical discourse theories, where it is stressed that exclusion from debates and negotiations 
can lead to a marginalised group of actors within the discourse (Fairclough, 2010). 
Furthermore, if voices of teachers and students are not considered, the level of educational 
practice is at risk of becoming conflated and reduced to the level of educational theory. Such 
a reduction is not beneficial, because there is a significant difference between educational 
theories and educational practice, since the practical side includes deeper practical knowledge 
regarding the ‘art of teaching’, pedagogical strategies, interaction between teachers and 
students, ethical considerations, and other essential aspects of real-world learning within the 
classroom. By neglecting the voices and the expertise of teachers and students, the 
educational neuroscience endeavour is at risk of crafting a hegemonic ordering where theory 
and research dominate over the life and practices of the classroom. 
Reduction and marginalisation of educational practice is not advantageous, and an 
interesting ensuing question is why one can find such marginalisation of educational practice 
within the educational neuroscience discourse. What can possibly explain this hegemonic 
ordering, when the majority of actors within the discourse stress the importance of reciprocal 
collaboration and awareness of different levels of analysis? One possible explanation is that 
the conflict between theory and practice is ongoing within numerous disciplines in the larger 
academic and scientific discourse. For example, conflicts between theory and practice can be 
found within medicine, clinical psychology, business, engineering, social work, agriculture, 
public administration, journalism, and law (Hatasa, 2013; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006).
According to critical discourse theories, discourses are intertwined with one another, and 
aspects of one discourse are thus likely to affect aspects of another (Fairclough, 1992, 2010;
Neumann, 2010). The resilient hegemonic struggle between theory and practice in the larger 
academic and scientific discourse is therefore also likely to affect and be reflected within the 
discourse of educational neuroscience. Conversely, seeing the durability of this theory-
practice struggle one can indeed wonder why this conflict has not yet been resolved and why 
it even had a chance to be reintroduced to such a novel discourse as educational neuroscience. 
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I will argue that this issue can be partly clarified by the power of discourse, since certain 
discursive structures consolidate and institutionalise certain ways of acting, thinking and 
being in the world (cf. Fairclough, 1992, 2010; Neumann, 2010). This is also the case with the 
larger scientific and academic discourse, which subliminally naturalises and preserves certain 
hegemonic orderings just by the power of its discursive regularities and structures. 
An example is the practice of publishing academic articles. Such a discursive practice 
implies that an author has research findings or expertise knowledge, which are deemed 
worthy of publication by a peer review board. Additionally, having academic articles 
published also implies that the author knows how to structure and write an academic article, 
such as using technical language, argumentative rhetoric, etc. As we can see, the mere act of 
publishing an article in a scientific journal requires specialised knowledge of which actors 
outside the academic research community may be unaware. By using this example, I am not 
implying that all teachers (or all students for that matter) lack the knowledge to publish 
articles within scientific journals. However, the way in which the scientific discourse is 
structured, organised, and institutionalised within academia, can make it more difficult for 
certain groups at the outskirts to get admission and access to the discourse148. In other words, 
these groups tend to become marginalised and unheard at the academic level, due to the subtle 
hierarchic ordering found within the structure of the discourse itself. This does not only apply 
to the publishing of academic articles, because it is not necessarily easy for people outside the 
scientific research community to even access research articles in scientific journals. Not only 
can journal articles be written in highly technical language with difficult theories and method-
logical terms, many journals are also restricted or excessively expensive to get hold of by the 
public, with the exception of academic researchers who have free and easy access to millions 
of journal articles and library archives via their university or research group. Academic 
seminars, conferences, and other arenas can have similarly implicit discursive restrictions for 
people outside or on the margins of the academic level of the discourse. This can further 
prevent educational practitioners, teachers, students, parents, and others outside a confined 
academic discourse from making their voices heard in the academic educational neuroscience
                                                          
148 Even if voices from teachers (and also students and parents) are difficult to find within the academic level of discourse 
(where texts usually are published in peer-reviewed journals), it should be noted that voices relevant to educational 
practice are often found in other channels such as scholarly magazines. This is of note since it undermines the notion that 
voices from educational practitioners themselves are not likely to be heard within the academic level of the educational 
neuroscience discourse. This is also of note with respect to the literature search for my hegemony corpora, since criteria for 
this corpus were designed to locate texts solely from the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse (and 
hence texts from grey literature such as scholarly magazines were excluded from the search).  
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debate. This, in turn, can make it difficult for researchers to comprehend the opinions of the 
practitioners often involved in their research.
Besides being a restricted discourse which makes it difficult for practitioners to be heard 
in the negotiations, another factor helps to explain why educational practice often becomes 
marginaliVHG ZLWKLQ HGXFDWLRQDO QHXURVFLHQFH í WKH ODFN RI D FRKHUHQW ERG\ RI SUDFWLFDO
educational neuroscientific applications. Numerous authors at the academic level stress that at 
the moment there is no comprehensive body of educational neuroscientific practices, and no 
intervention tools or teaching strategies which can be directly used in the classroom 
(Simmonds, 2014). The few concrete practical contributions which have been agreed on by 
educational neuroscientists are aspects such as ‘physical activity and exercise increase 
efficiency of neural networks and can thus appear to improve academic achievement’, ‘sleep 
is important for consolidating the day’s learning in long-term memory’, and that there appear 
to be some ‘negative effect of stress and anxiety on learning’ (Howard-Jones, 2014a).
Numerous authors stress that “there is a scarcity of rigorous research from the neuroscience 
community that is readily translatable” and that this lack of practical applications is because 
of the discourse’s novelty, and that one still has to tread carefully when making links between 
neuroscientific theories and educational practice interventions149.
Lack of a solid body of practical educational neuroscientific contributions can help to 
explain the marginalised role of educational practice within the academic level of discourse. 
Firstly, it appears that the theoretical link between neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and 
theoretical educational explanations, is easier to sustain than a connection to the next level, 
that of practical implications for teachers and students. As this last step actually takes 
theoretical considerations into practical applications, it is understandable that numerous 
researchers close off their discussions before even venturing into this ethical and practical 
minefield. The problem, as I will argue, is that by stopping short of the level of educational 
practice, a gap is left, vague and empty. Unfortunately, this gap is left for teachers or, even 
worse, for neuromyths and commercial “brain-based” learning programmes to fill. 
This brings us to the concept of ‘neuromyths’, the second aspect which creates hurdles 
for the level of educational practice. Neuromyths is an umbrella term which encompasses 
misinterpretation, oversimplification, generalisation and other misconceptions with regard to 
neuroscientific findings. With reference to educational neuroscience, a neuromyth therefore 
                                                          
149 As seen in Hardiman, Rinne, Gregory, and Yarmolinskaya (2012, p. 137), and Christodoulo and Gaab (2009). 
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often implies a misconception about an educational neuroscientific statement (Goswami, 
2006). This happens when neuroscientific results are misunderstood and too hastily 
transferred directly from the level of the brain ‘down to’ the level of the classroom (cf. figure 
6.4). What is so difficult about neuromyths is that they often have a grain of truth within 
them, but which has become distorted during the translation process from the level of 
neuroscience to the level of education (Howard-Jones, 2010). As such, they are often passed 
on as so-called “brain-based” facts about learning, without actually being ‘facts’. In addition 
to neuromyths, there are ‘edu-myths’ within the educational neuroscience discourse (Hruby, 
2012). These edu-myths, or behaviour-myths, are equally confusing and as big an issue at the 
level of educational practice as neuromyths, although here it is educational or behavioural 
characteristics that have become misinterpreted, oversimplified, or generalised. For example, 
this is seen in the enduring support for learning styles, despite the lack of quality research 
demonstrating any significant effect on student achievement (Hruby, 2012; Christodoulou & 
Gaab, 2009). Occurrence of educational misconception is also noted by Ansari and colleagues 
(2012): 
neuroscientists are frequently ignorant about progress that has been made in educational research and, 
consequently, will misrepresent or underestimate current research on learning and instruction ... 
Furthermore, neuroscientists are largely unaware of the current pedagogical approaches used in schools 
and, therefore, lack an actual overview of what is being taught in schools, how this is taught, and what 
expectations are being set by curricula etc. (Ansari et al., 2012, p.112). 
Regarding edumyths, however, it appears that within the educational neuroscience discourse,
occurrences and issues related to them are not as frequently considered as neuromyths. With 
references to hegemonic theories, this imbalanced attention to misconception is significant,
and I will argue that misinterpretation of educational theories and practices is as severe an 
error as misinterpretation of neuroscientific theories. 
What is problematic with neuromyths and edumyths is that they are most apparent 
within the level of educational practices (Hruby 2012). One reason for this may be that 
neuromyths and edumyths are often presented as clear applications, educational instructions, 
or teaching programmes. Consequently, they become much more useful and manageable in a
classroom setting than, for instance, an educational neuroscientific research paper with 
technical language and vague practical recommendations. Another reason why neuromyths 
and edumyths are widely distributed within schools and classrooms is because of the 
commercial ‘brain-based’ learning industry. These commercial industries make a profit by 
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targeting individual schools and teachers in order to sell teaching programmes, seminars, 
courses, and books which, arguably, offer effective ‘brain-based’ learning strategies (Fischer, 
Goswami, & Geake, 2010; Goswami, 2006)150. The problem, however, is that distribution of 
neuromyths and edumyths within the practical field complicates not only the role of teachers, 
but also how other actors working at the interface of educational neuroscience regard teachers 
and educational practitioners. This is evident in many texts in the hegemony corpora, and one 
often finds statements such as “a frequent teacher misconception is ...” (Mason, 2009 p. 548), 
“here apparently was a biological explanation for past educational failings and a scientific, 
neurological basis for educational reform that might satisfy their [teachers] many critics”
(McChall, 1990, p. 888), and as the following extract from della Chiesa and his co-workers 
suggests:
Practitioners ... were generally delighted by the outcomes of our project (sometimes even a little too 
much. [Often, they too quickly accepted hypotheses and transformed them into “facts”, thus 
contributing to the development of new neuromyths, mostly without being aware of this]). (della Chiesa
et al., 2009, p. 21 and the corresponding footnote set in brackets). 
When analysing the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse one receives the 
impression that a ‘blame-game’ is being played out concerning the distribution of neuromyths 
íDQGVRPHWLPHVDOVRHGXP\WKV8VXDOO\LWLVWKHµQDwYH¶WHDFKHUVZKRDUHKHOGUHVSRQVLEOH
for ‘expecting too much too fast’ from the educational neuroscientific community, for having 
‘unrealistic expectations’, or for falling prey to unscientific neuromyths and the so-called 
“brain-based” learning programmes151. Neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, and 
educational researchers, on the other hand, are portrayed in a much more favourable light as 
they appear to be ‘informers’ who need to “better prepare teachers to be thoughtful” and 
“help educators interpret and apply these findings in classrooms” (Hardiman et al., 2012, p. 
137). Statements referring to such hierarchic dominance between researchers and teachers 
may be articulated implicitly and even unintentionally, but one nevertheless gains an overall 
impression of teachers as being held in much lower esteem than the more ‘scientific’ research 
community. This implicit hierarchic ordering between ‘naïve’ teachers and ‘helping’ 
researchers further clarifies why teachers and educational practitioners have such a 
marginalised role within the educational neuroscience discourse. 
                                                          
150 A more thorough account of neuromyths, edumyths, and the so-called “brain-based” learning industry can be found in 
chapters 7 and 8, where educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to public and political fields are analysed.  
151 As seen demonstrated in Ansari et al. (2012), Mason (2009), and Hardiman et al. (2012). 
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In my opinion, what is problematic with this tendency is that teachers are unfairly 
blamed for a situation which is not completely their fault. Firstly, it is unjust to call teachers 
‘naïve’ when the scientific and academic level of discourse is often inaccessible to them. 
Secondly, implicit and deep-rooted hierarchic orderings between researchers and practitioners 
do not help in this matter, because the ‘blame-game’ can easily be turned the other way round, 
since the scientific research community seldom corresponds directly with teachers, students, 
and other educational practitioners. If the voice of teachers had been more frequently heard in 
the educational neuroscientific debate, then perhaps the research community would have been 
more attentive to their expectations, opinions, and misconceptions. A third point is that 
teachers are often in the direct crossfire between students and parents’ expectations, directives 
and pressures from school administrators, political requests, and attention from the public 
media. Their role is therefore ‘sandwiched’ between the public community and the research 
community, with each party often having unrealistic expectations of the others. It is precisely 
this state of pressure which commercial ‘brain-based’ learning industries appear to thrive on, 
as they offer ‘effective’ and ‘scientifically brain-based’ learning programmes to schools and 
teachers. To render teachers as naïve and passive actors, therefore, is a perception based on a
situation where the whole context has not been taken into consideration. There are both 
discursive structures and other discursive actors who are implicated in the state of educational 
practitioners, and I will argue that a neglect of teachers and students’ voices worsens these 
issues rather than helps to solve them152.
Struggles between representations and interpretations 
Apart from struggles over different levels of analysis seen between neuroscience and 
education, my critical discourse analysis also identifies another site of tension within the 
DFDGHPLF OHYHO í FRQIOLFWs between interpretations and representations of educational 
neuroscientific findings. Such conflicts are not so much a struggle played out between 
different actors SHU VH í rather they are a matter of incoherence in the ways in which 
educational neuroscientific representations are presented, transferred, and understood at 
                                                          
152 In chapter 9, I present some final reflections concerning the educational neuroscience discourse. Central in this respect 
are the different levels of analysis in educational neuroscientific endeavours, the marginalised role of educational practice 
which is often noted, and issues related to reductionistic perspectives. As an alternative way of approaching these matters 
(viz. the model presented in figure 6.1 and 6.4), I present a transdisciplinary model for understanding the educational 
neuroscience discourse (cf. critical realism and critical discourse analysis).  
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different stages and between different actors working at the interface of educational 
neuroscience. In the hegemonic corpora one finds numerous references to such tensions.
Goswami (2008) and Hruby (2012), for example, talk of incoherence between correlational 
findings and causal interpretations, and Kraft (2012) similarly notes that there is a tendency to 
conflate neuroscientific cause and educational effect. Choudhury and colleagues (2009, p. 64) 
note that there are “discrepancies between what the science directly demonstrates and what 
the representations of science tell us”, and della Chiesa and colleagues (2009) note how 
neuroscientists are often incapable of communicating their research findings properly to 
educationalists and politicians. Based on my findings from the hegemony corpora, I argue that 
discursive tension arises from disjointedness in what I call ‘the line of transference’. This line, 
which I have illustrated in table 6.6, indicates how educational neuroscientific representations 
are usually transferred between different stages and different actors.
- What educational neuroscientific research demonstrates
o The level of the brain (e.g. neuroscience)
o The level of the mind (e.g. cognitive psychology)
o The level of behaviour and the social (e.g. education)
- How educational neuroscientific research is represented
o by scientists
o by public actors (e.g. the media and the “brain-based” industry)
o by political actors (e.g. policymakers and other interest actors)
- How educational neuroscientific research is understood
o by other academics and researchers
o by teachers and students
o by the public
o by policymakers and interest actors
Table 6.6: Educational neuroscience’s line of transference.
The first stage in this model of transference includes research pertaining to educational 
neuroscience and what this research demonstrates. This stage will therefore also cover the 
different levels of analysis found between the brain, mind, and behaviour and the social.
Negotiations concerning different levels of analysis have already been discussed in previous 
sections, where it was noted that translation problems can easily occur between neuroscience, 
cognitive psychology, and education, due to disciplinary differences in vocabularies, methods, 
220 
 
data, theories, and philosophies153. Given that such disciplinary translation problems have 
already been discussed, and those pertaining to the political and public level of the discourse 
are thoroughly analysed in the next chapter154, this section will not elaborate on each stage in 
the line of transference model. Instead, it will elaborate on some general characteristics which
result in transference incoherence problems found in the hegemony corpora.
Parts of the discursive tensions which arise between what research demonstrates, how 
it is represented, and how this research in turn is understood by different actors at the 
interface of the educational neuroscience discourse, are interlinked with the problem of 
correlation set against causation. Many of the texts in the hegemony corpora implicitly touch 
RQ WKH FRUUHODWLRQíFDXVDWLRQ LVVXH155, and the issue is explicitly discussed by Goswami 
(2008), Choudhury and colleagues (2009), Hruby (2012), and Kraft (2012). The problem is 
that there appears to be a tendency to conflate correlational findings to causational 
interpretations. In other words, researchers working at the interface of education and 
neuroscience often present their findings as correlational data, but when these correlational 
representations are passed along the line of transference, they sometimes become translated 
into causational data. However, although several authors from the hegemony corpora discuss
this ‘point of tension’ in the educational neuroscience discourse, translational errors between 
correlation and causation occur more frequently at the interface between the academic level 
and other related fields (such as the public and political fields)156, and not necessarily within 
the academic level per se.
Another aspect which highlights translation errors along educational neuroscience’s
line of transference, is that neuroscientists use a technical language which is often 
inaccessible to actors outside the neuroscientific discipline157. According to critical discourse 
theories, technical language, jargon, and vocabularies can make a field inaccessible to people 
outside the discipline. In previous sections it has been shown how this appears to be the case
                                                          
153 As noted in Willingham (2009), Varma et al. (2008), Tommerdahl (2010), and Ansari et al. (2012). 
154 Considering that the discourse of educational neuroscience is intertwined with other discourses and thus has a complex 
set of relations between different discourses, actors, institutions, and even across time and geographical space, I will 
inevitably encounter certain problems in my presentation, since one topic can be relevant with regard to hegemonic 
relations (presented in chapter 6), and to recontextualisation processes in other fields (presented in chapter 7 and 8). This is 
indeed the case at this point, since here one touches on certain hegemonic struggles and translation problems, which arise 
between the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse and other related discourses such as public and 
political discourses. Thus, only the most relevant aspects related to the hegemony concept are presented at this point, 
whereas related recontextualisation aspects will be further discussed in chapter 7.  
155 As seen in Greenwood (2009), Weisberg et al. (2008), Perkins (2009), and Pickersgill (2013). 
156 For further analysis and discussion see page 273-280 in chapter 7.  
157 As noted in della Chiesa et al (2009), Willingham (2009), Tommerdahl (2010), and Perkins (2009). 
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within the educational neuroscience discourse. Regarding translational inconsistencies, the 
problem is therefore that translation errors are more likely to occur, since neuroscience’s 
technical language makes it difficult for non-experts and actors from other disciplines to re-
present neuroscientific narrations. This can be exemplified by brain images in neuroscientific 
research, since these models often result in translation errors when interpreted by non-experts 
unaware of the complex processes such neuroscientific models represent158.
Yet another aspect is identified in the hegemony corpora with respect to incoherence 
between demonstration, representations, and interpretation of educational neuroscientific 
UHVHDUFK í QDPHO\ µWKH VHGXFWLYH DOOXUH RI QHXURVFLHQWLILF H[SODQDWLRQV¶ 7KLV SKrase was
originally suggested by Weisberg and colleagues (2008), when they showed how non-expert 
subjects tend to judge neuroscientific explanations more favourably than experts in cognitive 
QHXURVFLHQFHíDUJXDEO\EHFDXVH WKH VHHPLQJO\PRUH µVFLHQWLILF¶Dnd ‘definite’ character of 
neuroscientific data is more attractive than ‘vague’ interpretational data. The seductive appeal 
of neuroscientific explanations has become entrenched within the academic level of the 
educational neuroscience discourse. In my hegemony corpora, 20 per cent of the texts 
explicitly refer to neuroscience’s appeal159, and many others implicitly refer to this by 
mentioning the dominant and fascinating appeal that neuroscientific explanations have within 
academic and social fields160. For instance, Pasquinelli (2011) talks of a ‘neuromania’, which 
affects sciences and the general public, noting how ‘the brain-hype’ and fascinating brain 
images seem to enthral part of the educational community, the public society and popular 
culture. Also, Cerulo (2010, p.115) notes that “[t]he brain is hot ... and cognitive 
QHXURVFLHQWLVWV KDYH LW 7KHVH VSHFLDOLVWVZDQW WR WHDFK XV DERXW LW í HYHQ KHOS XV WRXU WKH
brain via fMRIs, PET scans, and other “tangible” images”. Hardiman and colleagues (2012, p. 
137) further note that this seductive appeal of neuroscientific explanations is often manifested 
in popular media where, unfortunately, “subtle details and carefully stated conclusions may be 
overshadowed or ignored in order to generate attention-grabbing headlines”. Based on these 
and similar references from the critical discourse analysis, it appears that the appeal of 
neuroscientific explanations is also a point of struggle found within the educational 
neuroscience discourse and, particularly, between different stages of the discourse’s line of 
transference. 
                                                          
158 As noted in Weisberg et al. (2007), Pasquinelli (2011), and Pickersgill (2013). 
159 Seen in Goswami (2008), Ferrari (2011), Pasquinelli (2011), Dekker et al (2012), Hardiman et al (2012), and Hruby (2012). 
160 As seen in Varma et al. (2008), Cerulo (2010), and Pickersgill (2013). 
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If one considers the seductive power neuroscience apparently has, it is understandable 
that difficult neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to translation errors when being 
transmitted between different stages within the educational neuroscience discourse. This type 
of translation error, arising from the appeal of neuroscience, is found, for instance, at the level 
of educational practice. In a study by Dekker and colleagues (2012), a large observational 
survey was designed in order to investigate misconceptions and neuromyths amongst 242 
primary and secondary school teachers. The results show that teachers answered correctly 70 
per cent of the general knowledge statements regarding the brain, and that they believed in 49 
per cent of the neuromyths presented to them in the study. Dekker and colleagues research 
further indicates that:
[m]ore general knowledge also predicted an increased belief in neuromyths. These findings suggest that 
teachers who are enthusiastic about the possible application of neuroscience findings in the classroom 
find it difficult to distinguish pseudoscience from scientific facts. Possessing greater general knowledge 
about the brain does not appear to protect teachers from believing in neuromyths (Dekker et al., 2012, 
p.1). 
These findings correspond with the survey carried out by Weisberg et al. (2008), which 
suggests that non-experts, whether laypersons or even students in cognitive neuroscience, 
tend to evaluate explanations with neuroscientific information more favourably than is 
justified. The enthralling appearance of neuroscientific explanations therefore appears to 
seduce teachers as well íDQGSDUWLFXODUO\Whose interested in the brain (Dekker et al., 2012). 
This is significant with regard to translation inconsistencies in educational neuroscience, 
because the implications of neuroscience’s fascination can help to clarify occurrences of 
misinterpretations, misconceptions, and neuromyths at the level of educational practice. 
However, when discussing occurrences of misinterpretations of educational neuroscientific 
research, I will again argue that one should be careful not to censure teachers too hastily. As 
previously mentioned, this is the level where educational neuroscientific research and theories 
ultimately become manifested in recommendations and practical applications for teachers and 
students. There is, therefore, a significant ‘transference distance’ between what researchers 
demonstrate, how it is represented, and how this is finally understood amongst teachers. 
Translation fallacies may emerge at different stages, and because of different actors in the 
transference process, one should guard against blaming teachers for errors, which may have 
occurred before the translated material appeared in the classroom. For instance, it is said that 
neuroscientists generally lack the ability to present their research findings to actors outside 
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their own field, as noted by della Chiesa and his co-workers in their analysis of a 
collaborative project on educational neuroscience:
Most speakers [brain researchers] were not very effective at communicating their knowledge because 
they rarely considered the audience and/or purpose. Accordingly, their presentations were too technical, 
cutting edge, and therefore mainly incomprehensible for lay persons ... As a result, neuroscientists often 
provided masses of information relevant only to their peers, in effect drowning findings significant for 
educators in a flood of technical information ... Neuroscientists were often not willing to sacrifice their 
own professional goals to promote a more fruitful exchange with the education community (della 
Chiesa et al., 2009, p.20).
Some responsibility for the problems regarding transference inconsistency should therefore 
also rest on the shoulders of the researchers who represent these findings in the first place. 
This can also be seen in light of the issues related to hegemonic struggle over theory and 
practice, educational practitioners’ marginalisation in discursive negotiations, and what can 
appear as a rather closed research community with difficult vocabulary and inaccessible 
expertise knowledge. 
A related translation error, which also helps to explain translation inconsistencies, is the 
notion that some neuroscientists appear to make education-related assumptions without 
necessarily referring to educational theories or research161. Kraft (2012) elaborates on this 
when he states that a conflation of cause and effect can be found in educational 
neuroscientific work where neuroscientists make unjustified assumptions with regard to 
educational theories and practical implications of their findings.  
[W]e see the typical logic of neuroscientific texts dealing with classroom education and schools, namely 
the conflation of cause and effect. The cause is encoded in neuroscience and is stated in neuroscientific 
terminology, while the effect is stated in everyday language with no reference to the results of research 
in pedagogy and education. This leaves us with the impression that it is possible to proceed directly 
from neuroscience to pedagogy, making the pedagogical conclusions seem grounded in neuroscience 
(Kraft, 2012, p. 393). 
According to Kraft (2012), conflation of neuroscientific cause and pedagogical effect readily 
occurs if neuroscientists make assumptions about possible implications of their research for
the level of educational practice. I therefore further argue that tendencies to make assumptions 
without educational references can be linked to what previously is noted concerning
hierarchic struggles between the ‘hard sciences’ of neuroscience and the ‘softer’ and more 
‘hypothetical’ field of education. First of all, one receives the impression that education 
                                                          
161 As noted by Ansari et al. (2012) and Kraft (2012). 
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sometimes functions as a platform where neuroscientists discuss ethical questions, such as 
VRFLDO LPSOLFDWLRQV RI QHXURVFLHQWLILF ILQGLQJV í SHUKDSV because the ‘softer’ field of 
education, with its reliance on interpretational data, has a less stringent tradition in its peer-
reviews than the ‘hard’ peer-reviews in neuroscience. Secondly, one receives the impression 
that education, in contrast to neuroscience, is a concept to which almost everyone can relate í
for instance, most of us have been in school for at least thirteen years, and thus have some 
personal experience of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ teaching strategies. Accordingly, one gains the 
impression that neuroscientists sometimes make educational assumptions based more on a lay
person’s idea of education than on educational and pedagogical research (cf. edumyths). The 
problem with this, as already mentioned by Kraft (2012), is that causation becomes encoded 
within the neuroscientific representations, whilst educational practices become conflated with
neuroscientific effects. Again one can find intertextual and interdiscursive relations to 
hegemonic struggles between neuroscience and education, theory and practice, and natural 
science versus social science and the art of teaching. 
My findings indicate that there is an over-emphasis on neuroscientists as ‘transmitters’ 
and an under-representation of educational voices in the educational neuroscience discourse. 
In addition to the explanations presented above, I will present critical discourse theories 
regarding hegemonic power relations in order to elucidate this tendency further. I have
previously shown how neuroscience appears to dominate within the discourse and that natural 
scientific and neuroscientific narrations are often considered to be more ‘scientifically valid’ 
than other representations162. Of note in this respect is how critical discourse theories claim 
that hegemonic representations of the world are less problematised than other narrations í
often because their discursive conventions have become naturalised within the discourse 
(Fairclough, 2010). The somewhat naturalised ‘scientific authority’ often ascribed to the 
neuroscience discourse, illuminates why neuroscientific explanation is often judged more 
favourably, why it has a fascinating and seductive appeal, and why it is less likely to be 
questioned than other explanations. Additionally, other hegemonic power relations can 
contribute to the explanation. For instance, a ‘closed’ educational neuroscientific research 
FRPPXQLW\ í ZLWK LWV WHFKQLFDO YRFDEXODU\, complex explanations, and difficult 
methodologies – can contribute to explaining translation issues. This is because research 
communities which are inaccessible to practitioners at the margins of the discourse can 
                                                          
162 As seen in Anderson and Reid (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Perkins (2009), Willingham (2009), Stein and 
Fischer (2011), Ferrari (2011), Kraft (2012), and Mercer (2013). 
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contribute toward maintaining translation inconsistences and misinterpretations, since 
relatively little communication and knowledge distribution occurs between the ‘inside’ and 
the ‘outside’ of the academic discourse. However, problems related to poor knowledge 
communication between actors, are not only relevant for researchers and practitioners, 
because educational neuroscientific research is also picked up by actors from other 
disciplines. This is evident, for instance, in hoZUHVHDUFKILQGLQJVDUHLQWHUSUHWHGíDQGLQWXUQ
UHSUHVHQWHG í E\ DFWRUV ZLWKLQ GRPDLQV VXFK DV WKH SXEOLF PHGLD GLVFRXUVH WKH SROLWLFDO
discourse, and also the field of the ‘brain-based’ learning industry163. Again, the problem is 
that these fields are not necessarily experts in either neuroscience or education, and thus there 
is a potential risk of translation errors. What makes matters even more problematic is that 
actors within the media, political organisations, or ‘brain-based’ learning industries often aim
WR VSUHDG WKHVH µUHVHDUFK ILQGLQJV¶ WR D VXEVWDQWLDO SXEOLF DXGLHQFH í LQ FDWFKy popular-
scientific articles, in political reports, or in commercial ‘brain-based’ learning programmes164.
Research pertaining to educational neuroscience is therefore liable to be incorrectly 
interpreted by non-experts, before these (mis)interpretations are presented to a wider 
audience. Popularisation of neuroscientific ideas about learning may lead to misconceptions
and ‘neuromyths’ within the public discourse (Haridman et al., 2012), and, if frequently 
presented, these (mis)representations can be circulated within the public discourse as accepted 
common knowledge regarding ‘brain facts’ (cf. Fairclough, 1992, 2010; Neumann, 2010). 
Mass circulation of popularised neuro-ideas is problematic, since it spreads inaccurate ‘brain 
facts’ within the public discourse. Distribution of educational neuroscientific misconceptions
also complicates the situation for educational practitioners since “the popularisation of 
neuroscientific ideas DERXWOHDUQLQJíVRPHWLPHVOHJLWLPDWHVRPHWLPHVPHUHO\FRPPHUFLDOí
poses a real challenge for classroom teachers who want to understand how children learn” 
(Hardiman et al., 2012 p. 135). Again we see how different discourses pertaining to 
educational neuroscience are intimately entwined with one another, and how aspects within 
one discourse (e.g. popularisation of ‘brain facts’ within the societal discourse) may influence 
and strengthen issues within a related discourse (e.g. misconceptions regarding educational 
neuroscientific narrations within educational practice). Since educational practitioners often 
occupy a position in between research communities and the public discourse, teachers may be 
                                                          
163 As noted in Hardiman et al. (2012), Dekker et al. (2012), Ansari et al. (2012), and Pickersgill (2013). 
164 Further elaboration on these aspects will be presented in the next chapters, where a critical discourse analysis of 
educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to the public level and the politic level is presented.  
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subjected to translational errors from both the academic community and from actors within 
the public discourse. 
Even if there are discursive tensions regarding transference inconsistencies between 
what educational neuroscience demonstrates, how this is represented, and how this in turn is
interpreted and understood, my analytical findings also show that many authors suggest
‘solutions’ to these translation issues. The majority of these solutions are in line with a 
cautious and optimistic approach, such as the following quote from Goswami:
When evaluating neuroscience research, it is important to be vigilant: correlations are still correlations 
... it is of course critical to check the quality of the science cited ... and to distinguish correlational data 
from causal data (Goswami, 2008, pp. 386-396). 
In line with such critical awareness and optimistic caution, one can also find a recurring 
emphasis on the importance of mediators, translators, and middlemen who can aid the 
translation process of educational neuroscience165. It is additionally noted that the 
establishment of educational neuroscientific courses and communities also helps to build
more expertise in transferring educational neuroscience between different stages and levels 
within the educational neuroscience discourse166. However, and in line with critical discourse 
analysis, I also argue that it is important to be vigilant about hegemonic and dominant 
tendencies when attempting to build research schools and mediators. It appears that 
educational neuroscience is still encumbered by its previous history of neuroscientific and 
theoretical power domination. Educational practice, however, repeatedly appears to be 
marginalised in discursive negotiations, and the inaccessibility of the educational 
neuroscientific research community may increase this research-theory gap. Educational 
neuroscientific research schools and the training of mediators and middlemen can therefore 
benefit from more dialogue with teachers and students. This can help the research community 
to gain insights into the way in which transference inconsistencies occur, and how to improve 
their communication with teachers, media, policymakers and other actors at the margins of 
the academic field. In addition, reciprocal dialogue between practitioners and researchers can 
also strengthen teachers’ expectations of what educational neuroscience can contribute in the 
classroom, in addition to strengthening their ability to critically read and expose 
misconceptions of ‘neuromyths’ or ‘edumyths’ at the level of educational practice. 
                                                          
165 As seen in Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Choudhury et al. (2009), and Hardimann et al. (2012). 
166 As seen in Ansari et al. (2012), Campbell (2011), and Dekker et al. (2012). 
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Overall, it appears that inconsistencies along educational neuroscience’s line of 
WUDQVIHUHQFHRFFXUGXHWRQXPHURXVIDFWRUVíIURPWHFKQLFDODQGLQDFFHVVLEOHQHXURVFLHQWLILF
vocabulary to the resonance of a domination of ‘hard’ and ‘robust’ natural sciences over more 
vague educational ‘hypothesis’ concerning the art of teaching. This explains why there are
struggles and confusion within and between different stages of educational neuroscience’s 
line of transformation. To prevent circulation of translation errors within and between the
discourses, I argue that better communication between each stage of educational 
neuroscience’s line of transference is essential. It is not only the responsibility of non-experts 
to improve their neuroscientific knowledge to achieve better communication. Research 
communities should also take more responsibility for clarifying their representations. Again 
we touch on the notion of breaking down hierarchic relations, in order to create more equal 
bonds between researchers, practitioners, and other actors working at the interface of 
educational neuroscience. 
Struggles between the academic level and policymakers and the public 
In my critical discourse analysis of the hegemony corpora, another site of struggle is
identified í namely struggles between the academic level of educational neuroscience on the 
one hand, and the political and public level on the other167. Della Chiesa and colleagues 
(2009, p. 18), for instance, suggest that the learning society “places high demands on 
education systems. At the turn of the century, breakthroughs in neuroscience brought brain 
research to the centre of research on learning, and educational policymakers are looking to 
this new research to shed light on critical issues in education policies and practices”. 
Pasquinelli (2011) also elaborates on the increased political and public demands for education 
and claims that education is in need of reform:
Knowledge- and evidence-based approaches to education put forward the fact that educational systems 
are inadequate to provide an answer to the challenges of the 21st century and claim that education 
should be guided by scientific principles rather than by intuition and professional wisdom only (or, 
worst, by tradition) ... The time has come for a new science of learning to rise, which is structured 
                                                          
167 This point of tension, as with inconsistencies arising along educational neuroscience’s line of transference, is located at 
the interface between the academic level of educational neuroscience and related fields of policymakers and the public. 
Aspects found at this merging point are relevant, both with regard to hegemonic relations (viz. the current chapter) and 
educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation processes (viz. chapter 7 and 8). The following section will therefore present 
findings related to this ‘site of tension’ as represented in my hegemony corpora, whereas related discussions in the 
recontextualisation chapters will touch upon these aspects by use of representations found in political and public fields.   
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around cognitive and neuroscience, investigates topics that stem from educational problems, and rest on 
rigorous forms of in-laboratory and in-vivo evaluation (Pasquinelli, 2011, p.186). 
The “potential of neuroscience to serve as a platform for evidence-based education” and how 
“neuroscience creates an ideal basis from which to grow a science of education” is also noted 
by Ansari and colleagues (2012, pp.106-107). On account of this, they claim that 
“neuroscience is one of the fields of inquiry that funding agencies and policymakers have 
turned to for answers to large-scale educational problems”. Tommerdahl (2010, p. 107) uses
similar neoliberal and political rhetoric for a “foundation of the new science of evidence-
based education”, Goswami (2008, p. 396) notes how cognitive neuroscience “enables an 
evidence base for education in which mechanisms of learning can be precisely understood”, 
and Carew and Magsamen (2011, p. 658) appeal to political neoliberal ideologies by claiming 
that Neuro-Education can create more effective teaching methods, better curricula, and 
ultimately inform and transform educational policy. 
Neuro-Education initiatives can help frame issues and make the case for far-sighted education policies 
that make evidence-based sense for children’s development. The bottom line is that everyone wins ... 
For each young mind served by Neuro-Education knowledge, all societies have the opportunity to 
UHJDLQORVWJURXQGíDQGEXLOGWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUEHWter academic achievements and opportunities for both 
young people and society at large (Carew & Magsamen, 2011, p. 687).
One therefore receives the impression that many authors from the hegemony corpus make use 
of a rhetoric containing traces of neoliberal ideologies, which calls for evidence-based 
education and an effective ‘science of learning’168. However, one can also identify actors 
within the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse who take a contrasting 
standpoint on such neoliberal ideologies. Hardiman et al. (2012), for instance, claim that: 
While educational policies and practices continue to focus strongly on the product of learning (mainly 
through standardized testing), our experience with teachers demonstrated that they tend to be more 
concerned with the process of learning ... As we have chased the shortsighted goals of No Child Left 
Behind, our focus has shifted away from children as learners and toward school and teacher 
accountability based on standardized testing. The neuroedXFDWLRQPRYHPHQWíZKLFKLVVKDUSO\IRFXVHG
on how FKLOGUHQ OHDUQíZRUNV DJDLQVW WKLV IL[DWLRQ RQ WHVW VFRUHV (Hardiman et al., 2012, pp.138 & 
142). 
                                                          
168 The neoliberal ideology has its origins within the economic discourse, as it has been seen to denote economic principles 
related to effectiveness, market individualism, free trade, and market competition (Olssen, 2006). In recent years, however, 
the neoliberal ideology has experienced a renaissance amongst politicians and principles, because economic market-
management has also been transferred to other areas such as medicine and education. This has led to a paradigm change in 
education, since neoliberal ideas of market individualism, privatisation, decentralisation, competition, efficiency, and 
accountability, focus on test results, and new public management has become more prominent in the 21st century’s 
educational discourse (Karlsen, 2006). See chapter 7 for further analysis and discussion of relevant political texts.  
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Similarly, Choudhury and her co-workers (2009, p. 68) note that “scientists are working at a 
time of unprecedented politicization through commercialization of research”, whilst Hruby 
(2012, pp. 17-18) claim that “educational neuroscience requires ... a commitment to 
preserving the integrity of its work against misuse by marketers, policymakers, and 
polemicists”. Thus, after analysing texts in the hegemony corpora, one receives the 
impression that the discursive negotiation between the academic level of educational 
neuroscience and the public and political level is not a clear-cut struggle with two distinctive 
sides. First of all, one finds a struggle between what society at large expects from education 
and the nature of the educational enterprise. Secondly, one also finds a struggle over 
ideological perspectives internally within the academic educational neuroscience discipline. 
As these struggles touch on the next chapter’s main topic of educational neuroscience’s 
recontextualisation into public and political fields, only the most central aspects pertaining to 
hegemonic relations are presented in the following section.
Struggles concerning society’s expectations of education
If we start by looking at struggles concerning policymakers and the public’s expectations of 
education, it is argued that society’s expectations of education rose after the introduction of
the ‘knowledge society’ in the 21st century. Increased focus on human capital as a significant 
factor for individual and national success in the 21st century’s global market has, accordingly, 
increased pressure on education. Many policymakers call for effective and high quality 
educational systems, business entrepreneurs claim that education systems do not produce
enough highly skilled engineers, media broadcast PISA results demonstrate poor student 
performances and educational practitioners’ lack of quality teaching strategies, and parents 
call for better teachers for their children’s education169. Calls for high quality educational 
systems put pressure on educational communities, and one receives the impression that 
society’s expectations of education have turned into political and public requests to raise the 
standards of education170. This is of interest to discursive hegemonic relations because it 
appears that society at large has gained a significant power dimension in educational 
discourse during the 21st century. By linking this tendency with the discourse of educational 
neuroscience, I argue that increased public and political attention to the educational system 
                                                          
169 As argued by Pasquinelli (2011), and della Chiesa et al. (2009) from the hegemony corpora, and as shown by other 
authors such as Karlsen (2006), OECD (2007b), and VG (2013).   
170 These notions are underlined by findings from the recontextualisation corpora, as presented in chapter 7 and 8.  
230 
 
has put actors at the academic level of educational neuroscience in a rather ambivalent 
position in the struggle. On the one hand, it is often alleged by the public and policymakers 
that education and the educational system do not satisfy society’s rising expectations for 
schooling in the 21st century’s knowledge society171. On the other hand, however, it appears 
that neuroscience is perceived as a ‘remedy’ for reversing falling standards in education by 
crafting an ‘evidence base for education’ and a ‘new learning of science’172. Consequently, 
the discipline of educational neuroscience appears to have taken centre stage in the social-
political and neoliberal debate regarding education, through being suggested as an almost 
tailor-made solution for creating effective, evidence-based learning strategies for use in 
classrooms. 
From a critical discourse theory perspective, there are a number of aspects concerning 
hegemonic relations and power dominion which are worth mentioning with regard to political 
and public interest in education. It can be argued that public and political actors have gained a 
significant degree of power when it comes to educational considerations during the 21st
century (cf. Karlsen, 2006; OECD, 2007b). Accordingly, society’s expectations for education 
appear to have more influence over the way in which education is organised and structured, 
which expectations teachers and school administrators strive to fulfil, and which educational 
values, ideas and ideologies are implicitly being suggested over others. Without going into the
detail of these tendencies, it should be noted that the power possessed by political and public 
actors has certain implications. Education is an academic profession, which must consider 
numerous aspects concerning the individual as a learner, social aspects of learning, practical 
pedagogical strategies, curriculum edicts, and directives from school administrators and the 
national government. Education is therefore a complex social practice, which is liable to 
change in accordance with alterations in political ideologies, public values, and educational 
philosophies and ideas. I argue that there should be a power balance here, and that a 
hegemonic dominance where political ideologies and public requests impose too heavily on
education, will reduce educationaO LQVLJKWV WR WULYLDOLWLHV 7KH HGXFDWLRQ FRPPXQLW\ í ERWK
SUDFWLWLRQHUVDQGUHVHDUFKHUVíKDYHYDOXDEOHHGXFDWLRQDODQGSHGDJRJLFDONQRZOHGJH, and it 
is important that these voices do not become marginalised in the discourse. The education 
profession has expertise in educational and social thinking which can contribute to significant 
perspectives when shaping educational goals, whilst educational practitioners can help by
                                                          
171 As noted by Carew and Magsmen (2011) in the hegemony corpora and by other actors such as OECD (2007b). 
172 As seen demonstrated in the text by Pasquinelli (2011), Goswami (2008), and Ansari et al. (2012). 
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adjusting policymakers’ and the public’s expectations so that they are more in line with what 
is achievable in education. Together, this can contribute towards a more beneficial
relationship between the public, policymakers, and the education profession. Considering that 
education, public expectations, and policymakers’ requests is a significant aspect of 
educational neuroscience as well, the endeavour to turn these hegemonic struggles into a 
balanced dialogue is also highly relevant for the educational neuroscience discourse. 
Struggles over ideological perspectives within the academic level
Related to the above, are the struggles one finds between different ideological orientations 
internally at the academic level of educational neuroscience. What becomes clear after 
analysing the hegemony corpora is that the use of neoliberal argumentation and demands for 
more efficient educational systems is not confined to actors within the public and political 
OHYHORIGLVFRXUVHíDFWRUVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKHacademic discourse also have traces of neoliberal 
rationalities in their argumentations. This is already evident both implicitly and explicitly in 
texts, for instance when the importance of educational neuroscience is stressed by arguing for 
‘more evidence base’, ‘new science of learning’, ‘effective teaching strategies’, ‘improved 
education policies and curricula’, ‘improved student results’, and other similar neoliberal 
arguments173. One therefore finds a neoliberal ideological orientation amongst numerous 
actors within the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. However, even if 
many DXWKRUVZLWKLQWKHHGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQFHGLVFRXUVHíGHOLEHUDWHO\RUXQLQWHQWLRQDOO\
íPDNHXVHRIQHROLEHUDOLGLRPVLQWKHLUargumentation, one can also find authors within the 
discourse who appear to take a stand against this market-political management ideology. 
Instead of arguing for more evidence-based and effective teaching strategies for improving 
students’ learning outcomes, these actors emphasise the importance of ‘the children as 
learners’174. The argument used is that educational neuroscience is concerned with the process 
of learning and this has to be acknowledged as a highly complex process: Not only should
learning encompass individual neurobiological and cognitive aspects, the process of learning 
should also encompass societal, pedagogical, interactional, and ethical considerations of 
education.
                                                          
173 Seen in Carew and Magsamen (2011), Tommerdahl (2010), Pasquinelli (2011), Ansari et al. (2012), and Goswami (2008). 
174 As seen in Hardiman et al. (2012), and Hruby (2012). 
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I argue that this hegemonic struggle is highly significant and it is important for actors 
within the academic level of educational neuroscience to be aware of what this ideological
struggle implies. By following neoliberal argumentation for ‘effective teaching strategies’, 
‘rigorous test regimes’, and ‘better student results’175, we are at risk of submitting a one-sided 
version of how people learn, dominated by ideas around ‘hard evidence’ and ‘science of 
learning’. Actors within educational neuroscience’s academic level should therefore be 
careful not to take such reductionistic steps, because neoliberal argumentation has the 
potential to undermine central aspects concerning the more educational, social, human, and 
ethical side of the learning process. Moreover, considering that a majority of people within 
the academic level of educational neuroscience argue for a reciprocal collaboration between 
neuroscience and education176, authors should be wary of which ideological orientation they
(perhaps unintentionally), adopt. Based on my analytical findings I will argue that awareness
of ideological orientation is particularly important, because there is confusion and hardly any 
negotiation over which ideological orientation should be held within the academic level of the 
educational neuroscience discourse. Some authors convey a ‘taken for granted’ notion that
educational neuroscience adheres to the ideology of neoliberalism177; others convey the view 
that educational neuroscience holds an ideology more in line with socialisation and 
solidarity178; whereas others make no explicit claim of ideological orientation but nevertheless 
appear to have implicit ideological undertones which stray in different directions179. This 
implicit struggle and confusion over ideological positions suggests that the discourse of 
educational neuroscience has not yet settled on a clear ideological affiliation. These findings
also suggest that ideological orientations have not yet received much attention, and ideologies 
relevant to educational neuroscience have therefore not been made an explicit site of debate
and negotiation within the discourse. Bearing in mind the struggle to craft reciprocal 
collaboration between neuroscience and education, I consider it essential that actors within 
the academic level of educational neuroscience become aware of the subtle political and 
ideological struggle played out within the discourse.
                                                          
175 As seen in the texts by Carew and Magsamen (2010), and Pasquinelli (2011). 
176 As seen in Ansari et al. (2012), Greenwood (2009), Mason (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Ferrari (2011), and 
Stein and Fischer (2011). 
177 As seen demonstrated in Carew and Magsamen (2010), and Pasquinelli (2011). 
178 As seen demonstrated in Hardiman et al. (2012). 
179 As seen in the texts by Tommerdahl (2010), Goswami (2008), and Ansari et al. (2012). 
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Summary of the discussion
This chapter has considered sites of negotiation and struggle, notions of power, dominance, 
marginalisation, and hegemonic relations related to the academic level of the educational 
neuroscience discourse. With reference to my critical discourse analysis of the hegemony 
corpora, three major sites of hegemonic struggles are identified. The first conflict is struggles 
fought out at different levels of analysis between neuroscience (the level of the brain), 
cognitive psychology (the level of the mind), and education (the level of behaviour and the 
social). The second site of hegemonic struggle is inconsistencies and conflicts between what 
educational neuroscience research demonstrates, how research is represented, and how these
representations in turn are interpreted and understood. The third site is struggles between the 
academic level of educational neuroscience and political and public fields. The fact that there 
are hegemonic struggles within and between the academic level of educational neuroscience 
and other related fields, and the fact that these discursive issues and combats are unresolved
and still up for negotiations means that the educational neuroscience discourse is, in other 
words, in a continual state of change. 
Considering that educational neuroscience is a relative young discipline, hegemonic 
struggles are to be expected. In fact, I argue that negotiations are crucial in the work of 
establishing a discourse since these debates contribute to shaping the structure, organization,
aim, values, practices, and knowledge of the educational neuroscience discourse. However, it 
must be remembered that the larger order of academic and societal discourses encompasses
certain hegemonic relations, which easily can be conveyed into the academic level of the 
educational neuroscience discourse. Such hegemonic relations can for instance be found 
between the ‘harder’ natural sciences and the ‘softer’ social sciences, humanities and arts, 
between theory and practice, between representations and interpretations, between academic 
communities and the public and policymakers’ requests of academia, and also between 
neoliberal ideologies and other ideologies in the society. Even if these hegemonic struggles 
are an issue, since they readily can become naturalised and replicated within educational 
neuroscience’s discursive structures and regularities, I argue that there is indeed room for
negotiations and resistance. The academic level of educational neuroscience has an advantage 
in its novelty, since the entire discourse is in a state of adjustment. Discursive representations, 
values, relations, and practices are continually being shaped by discursive transgression, re-
articulation, and negotiations, and thus also old and institutionalised academic, philosophical, 
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and societal ‘ways of thinking’ are open for debate. Instead of uncritically reintroducing old 
discursive conventions, which implicitly embody certain hegemonic relations, actors within 
the discourse of educational neuroscience should view these ‘naturalised’ discursive
conventions with a critical eye. Our overall academic and societal discursive boundaries will 
ultimately confine the way in which we understand and perceive concepts pertaining to 
educational neuroscience, but I suggest that this is an opportunity for actors at the academic 
level to transgress old discursive boundaries for thinking. Take, for instance, the time-
honoured boundary between the natural sciences and the social science found within the 
larger, academic, scientific and philosophic discourse. Will not this categorisation between 
natural sciences and social sciences restrict how we perceive disciplines such as education and 
neuroscience, and will not this categorisation also affect how we think about educational 
neuroscience? Bearing in mind the relentless hegemonic negotiations and struggles resulting 
from this scientific classification, one can indeed wonder if this way of representing reality 
offers the best possible way of thinking. In saying this, I do not argue that one should abandon 
all familiar ways of understanding scientific classifications. Rather, I suggest that certain 
inconsistencies and struggles fought over, for instance, educational neuroscience may be due 
to unprofitable and more deep-rooted discursive categorisations and structures within a larger 
academic and/or societal order of discourse. I think educational neuroscience has already 
made a major leap across discursive boundaries by linking neuroscience, cognitive 
psychology, and education, and this has been due to, and also contributed to, significant 
changes in the way we perceive aspects of nature, nurture, brain, mind, education, and 
learning. However, I will argue that critical thinking and constant caution as regards 
‘naturalised’ and ‘unprofitable’ discursive representations can help to bring hegemonic 
relations of power up for negotiation in the educational neuroscience discourse. 
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Chapter 7 
Recontextualisation over structural borders 
 
Educational neuroscience is a growing international discourse within academia, but the topic 
is not restricted to the academic sphere DORQHíDOVRRWKHUDQGH[WHUQDOILHOGVDSSHDUWRKDYH
caught interest in the linkage between education and neuroscience. For instance have 
numerous policymakers and intergovernmental interest actors commissioned projects on the 
linkage of education and the brain (e.g. OECD, 2007a; TeacherNet, 2007; US Department of 
Education, 2010). There is in addition a growing body of media articles and pop-scientific 
books on the topic of learning, education, and the brain (e.g. BBC, 2013; The Guardian,
2004), and an array of commercialized ‘brain-based’ learning programs such as Brain Gym®, 
Brainboxx, and Starskills are promoted on the international market. Also video-game 
companies such as Nintendo (2014) have started to sell brain training games such as ‘Big 
Brain’ and ‘Brain Age: train your brain in minutes a day!’, and there has even become an 
international market for cognitive enhancers such as smart drugs and smart foods proclaiming 
to improve learning and memory (Nootropics: Smart Drugs, 2014). Considering that previous 
chapters have focused on the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse, the 
following chapter will focus on how educational neuroscience also is in interaction with fields
outside academia. The concept of recontextualisation is thus apposite, since this discourse 
analytical notion is concerned with how a discourse is distributed, internalised, re-articulated 
and re-contextualised within other fields (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2010).
Aims in this chapter are, accordingly, to investigate how, where, and how extensive the 
academic level of educational neuroscience has become recontextualised over structural
borders and into public and political fields. The chapter will first provide accounts of some 
general findings from the literature search and discourse analysis, before recontextualising 
principles and strategies are more thoroughly compared and discussed. Overall, this will 
contribute to an outline of how the academic level of educational neuroscience is interactively 
linked to other public and political fields.
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Educational neuroscience recontextualised to public and political fields 
A fundamental question for this chapter is whether or not educational neuroscience is
distributed to other discourses. The answer to this question is ‘yes’ and, indeed, it was quite 
obvious from the onset that my research findings would show traces where educational 
neuroscience is recontextualised over structural borders and into public and political fields.
For instance did my different key word searches result in over 364 million hits related to 
educational neuroscience in the public internet search engine Google, where news articles, 
policy reports, blogs, governmental and organizational webpages, commercial learning 
programs and businesses, pop-scientific books and courses are featured180. The amount of 
texts related to education and neuroscience found in public spheres becomes even more 
apparent if one comperes these 364 million hits with the 123 000 hits showing in academic 
literature searches for the emergence and hegemony analysis (e.g. in academic library 
catalogues and Web of Science). Based on these findings it is evident that aspect from the 
educational neuroscience discouUVHDUHWDNHQXSE\RWKHUVRFLDOILHOGVíILQGLQJVZKLFKDOVR
concur with other authors such as Corballis (2012), Ritchie, Chudler, and Della Sala (2012),
and O'Connor, Rees, and Joffe (2012). However, this general finding is not particularity 
informative by itself and questions which ought to be answered is where and how extensive 
educational neuroscience has become recontextualised to other areas: Which fields are
significant when it comes to topics related to education and neuroscience outside the 
academic field? Is the linkage of education and neuroscience just a brief footnote to the 
academic sphere, or has this discourse been taken up more extensively within public and 
political fields? Findings from my literature search and critical discourse analysis indicate
four areas in particular where educational neuroscience is recontextualised, namely:
- in brain-based educational products 
- in the media 
- amongst policymakers
- amongst intergovernmental organizations and other interest groups
These four areas are not exhaustive in showing traces of educational neuroscience, and other 
fields within the public and political field can also be relevant for a recontextualisation
analysis. Nevertheless, the areas of media, brain-based learning industries, policymakers, and 
                                                          
180 Most of the hits related to education and neuroscience in the public search engine Google are from year 2000 and 
onward, strengthening the hypothesis from the emergence chapter that the 1990s and 2000s are the decades where 
educational neuroscience became more firmly established as a discipline (and discourse).  
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interest groups appear to be of analytic value since together they cover a substantial 
proportion of the public and political domain. They also seem appropriate, since they 
frequently appear in my literature searches. Thus, I will focus my critical discourse analysis 
on these four defined areas in order to better analyse educational neuroscience’s
recontextualisation to the public and political level of the discourse.
Apart from noting where and how extensive educational neuroscience is recontext-
ualised across structural borders, it is also interesting to investigate how this process occurs. 
How is educational neuroscientific articulated and set in relation to ‘old’ representations in 
new discourses? Is the new field colonized by the academic level of educational neuroscience, 
or do actors within these public and political fields actively adapt and make use of educational 
neuroscience within their own area? Which internalisation processes can be found and can 
traces of changes in discursive and social practices be found? The following sections will 
elaborate upon these questions, as analytical findings related to the recontextualisation 
process for the four topics of brain-based learning industry, media, policymakers, and other 
interest actors are presented. However, it must be noted that the ways in which these four 
groups represent educational neuroscience are likely to vary. This has already been indicated 
by the findings from my general literature search, as these results show not only that 
representations vary between groups, but also that representations of educational neuroscience 
differ within groups. A text from the media can, for instance, bear a closer resemblance to 
texts by policy actors than to other media texts, and vice versa. What this implies is that one 
should be careful to not to generalise across the group as a whole, because there are indeed 
similarities and variations within and between the four topic-areas. Nevertheless, the texts 
analysed appear to have some broader discursive similarities, and the first part of the analysis 
will therefore focus on some overall tendencies in the respective fields of brain-based learning 
industries, media, policymakers, and interest groups. Next, a comparison of the fields is 
provided, where particular attention is paid to how the discourse (and practices) of 
educational neuroscience are colonised and/or appropriated within each field. The last section 
provides more critical discussion of educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation processes, 
as links are drawn between manifestation of ideological rationalities, texts, and discursive and 
social practice.
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The brain-based learning industry 
One of the areas within the public field to which educational neuroscience has been
recontextualised is brain-based education. The scale of this dissemination can, for instance, be 
shown by the results from the general internet search conducted, which gave a total of 287 
million hits with the specific key word combination of ‘brain-based learning’ and ‘brain-
based education’. It can further be noted how the field appears to have grown substantially 
during the last decades, and even the ‘brain-based education’ label appears to encompass an 
DUUD\ RI GLIIHUHQW WH[WV í FRYHULQJ HYHU\WKLQJ IURP HGXFDWLRQDO WKHRULHV based partly or 
entirely on neuroscience, to educational material and products more loosely inspired by 
principles related to neuroscience (Sylvan & Christodoulou, 2010). Here, I will investigate the 
area often referred to as the ‘brain-based learning industries’ and thus Sylvan and 
Christodoulou’s (2010, p. 2) definition of brain-based educational products is appropriate, 
since this sub-categorisation of the brain-based education ‘brand’ focus on “products [that] 
are generally available for purchase and marketed toward educators with claims of explicit 
connections between the program and neuroscience”. Based on this definition, a literature 
search was conducted and a total of six brain-based learning industries and their respective 
HGXFDWLRQDO SURJUDPV ZHUH FKRVHQ IRU WKH FULWLFDO GLVFRXUVH DQDO\VLV í QDPHO\ Brainboxx 
(2014), Brain Gym® (2014), Starskills (2014), Scholastic (2014), Kagan (2014), and 
LearningRx (2014)181.
When it comes to the question of how the brain-based learning industries represent, 
incorporate, and recontextualise the educational neuroscience discourse, the first thing to be 
noted is that these brain-based educational programs make a point of stressing that their 
programs and learning techniques are based on science (particularly brain science), and 83 per 
cent of the texts use phrases like “research has shown”, “compelling brain research 
concludes”, and “brain science proves that ...”182. A second and related finding from my 
analysis is that a majority of the brain-based educational programs tend to represent 
neuroscientific and educational research rather generally, simplistically, and/or out of context, 
while the learning techniques themselves are meticulously explained183. The ‘brain based’
                                                          
181 It must be noted that I do not intend to evaluate the educational and neuroscientific validity of these six brain-based 
educational programs per se, since my focus of attention is to critically analyse how these commercialized programs 
recontextualise the educational neuroscience discourse within their field. 
182 As seen demonstrated in Brainboxx (2014), Brain Gym® (2014), Starskills (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
183 Seen in Brainboxx (2014), Brain Gym® (2014), Scholastic (2014), Starskills (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
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aspect, which these programs advertise, is, in other words, vaguely expressed or entirely 
sidestepped. The following extract from Kagan illustrates this:
Compelling brain research concludes that music has the power to reduce stress, enhance cognitive 
functioning, and improve productivity and creativity. The human brain is an amazing instrument that 
can be tuned to perform optimally with the right kind of music. Music for the Mind™ is a collection of 
beautifully-orchestrated compositions that resonates with listeners of all levels, enhancing mental 
performance (Kagan, 2014).
In this extract from Kagan’s educational product Music for the Mind™, brain research is used 
to justify the effect of music on mental performance. However, no references to cognitive 
neuroscientific or educational neuroscientific research are offered, and no explanation of the 
exact reason why music can enhance cognitive functions is presented. Even if it is stated 
elsewhere in the webpages that “music at 60 beats per minute such as the Music for the Mind 
series and the Brain Boosters series helps calm and focus students” (Kagan, 2014), the exact 
neuroscientific basis for Kagan’s “brain boosting music” is general and sparse. A similar and 
perhaps more convincing ‘brain based’ explanation is found in the text by LearningRx. The 
webpage to this brain-based learning program has an appealing and high-quality appearance 
to it, flourishing with fancy brain images, and the argumentation behind LearningRx’s brain 
training program gives the impression of rather accurate representations of educational 
neuroscientific research:
7KHEUDLQ¶VDELOLW\WRDGDSWDQGJURZíUHRUJDQL]LQJQHXUDOSDWKZD\VDQGHYHQFUHDWLQJQHZRQHVíLV
called “neuroplasticity”. Neuroplasticity is the science behind brain training and the basis of each of the 
LearningRx Brain Training programs ... LearningRx brain training exposes each student to a 
customized series of intense mental workouts. To perform these workouts, the brain is forced to 
strengthen, reorganize and even create new neural pathways. In other words, brain training “rewires” 
the brain to perform more efficiently than ever before (LearningRx, 2014).
The problem is that these educational neuroscientific representations are taken from a much 
more complex scientific context, providing only a rather general presentation of the concept 
of neuroplasticity and learning. This general presentation of educational neuroscience further 
makes it possible for LearningRx to jump straight to a specific recommendation of their brain 
training prRJUDPíVHHPLQJO\ZLWKRXWDQ\FRQWUDGLFWLRQ to the concept of neuroplasticity. If 
one consults more scientifically-sound literature on neuroplasticity and learning, however, a 
different picture emerges. It is generally accepted within neuroscientific and educational 
neuroscientific communities that learning and neuroplasticity are related, because learning 
involves changes in the patterns of neural connectivity – whether involving synaptic 
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strengthening (or weakening) between neurons, or even development of neural connections
through the growth of synapses and/or axons (Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Gazzaniga et al.,
2009). What is also accepted, but is missing from LearningRx’s explanation, is that changes 
in patterns of neural connectivity can occur due to different kinds of experience and can lead 
to short-term or long-term changes (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). What this implies is that various 
H[SHULHQFHVí VXFKas navigating a taxi in a big city (Maguire et al., 2000), playing video-
games (Owen et al., 2010) or learning how to juggle184 (Draganski et al., 2004) í can lead to 
changes in neural connectivity. How long these changes last varies depending on training and 
further practising of the skill, because unexploited neural pathways often undergo synaptic 
weakening and ‘pruning’ in order to cut back on infrequently used connections185 (Blakemore 
& Frith, 2005a). Moreover, changes in neural connections are often task-specific, meaning 
that neural changes due to, for instance, juggling will mainly lead to changes in task-specific 
brain regions such as areas associated with storage and processing of complex visual motion
(Draganski et al., 2004). This implies that LearningRx’s claim that their brain training 
programs “rewire the brain to perform more efficiently than ever before” is misleading, since 
the same also can be said of juggling, navigating a taxi, learning to knit, flying a kite, or 
playing a video-game. Brain training may indeed lead to changes in neural connections, but 
the essential question is whether these programs lead to long-term changes, and whether
efficiency benefits in one specific brain area can be translated into other, dissimilar tasks, or 
lead to improved general cognitive functions (Owen et al., 2010; Ritchie et al., 2012).
Considering that LearningRx (2014) does not offer any scientific evidence of long-term and 
improved cognitive functions beyond the training tasks, their promise that “brain training 
physically reorganizes neural pathways, creating faster, smarter brain for a lifetime!” appears
to be unwarranted. 
Another finding from my critical discourse analysis is that much of the science 
represented in brain-based educational programs is presented as ‘facts’ and ‘truths’. The 
brain-based learning texts thus suggest that ‘this is just how it is’186. Such suggestions can, for 
instance, be seen in statements using vocabulary with non-modalised assertions and 
                                                          
184 Draganski and colleagues (2004) found that individuals who learned how to juggle showed structural changes (bilateral 
expansion in grey matter) in brain areas associated with storage and processing of complex visual motion. The changes 
were however selective and passing, because after three months without practicing juggling the grey matter in these 
respective brain areas had decreased. 
185 This process is captured by the phrase ‘if you don’t use it, you lose it’, although, it must be stressed that this phrase may 
be misleading, because weakening of synaptic connections are important parts of natural brain development and learning 
throughout our lives (Bruer, 1999; Gazzaniga et al., 2009).   
186 As seen in Starskills (2014), Scholastic (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
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assumptions that leave no room for other possibilities (cf. Fairclough, 2003), as exemplified 
by the following quote from Scholastic: 
[O]ur own “neurological style” influences the way we teach. Each one of us has a left-, a right-, or a 
middle-brain preference ... For instance, if you are right-dominant, it is your intuitive, emotional right 
hemisphere that guides the decisions you make throughout the day. If you are left-brain dominant, it is 
your sequential, time-oriented left hemisphere which tells you how to think, what to believe, and what 
choices to make (Scholastic, 2014). 
Modalised PDUNHUVíVXFKDVµQHXURORJLFDOVW\OHmay influence the way we teach’ or ‘each of 
us can have a left-, a right- or a middle-EUDLQSUHIHUHQFH¶íOHDYHVWDWHPHQWVRSHQIRUGLDORJXH
and alternative perceptions on the matter (cf. Fairclough, 2003). When Scholastic chose to 
exclude such modalised markers, however, they convey the idea that ‘this is just how it is’ by 
simply taking the assumption of a left-, right-, and middle-brain style for granted. What 
further makes this non-modalised statement problematic is that the educational neuroscientific 
‘fact’ that is established is in fact a neuromyth. Even if our brain can be anatomically 
categorised into a left and a right hemisphere, it is commonly agreed within the educational 
neuroscientific community that one cannot talk of hemispheric dominance in people. This is 
because we make use of numerous parts of the brain simultaneously when we perform 
cognitive tasks, and not just parts allocated to one of the hemispheres (Alfernik & Farmer-
Dougan, 2010; Corballis, 2012; Gazzaniga et al., 2009; Geake, 2008; Howard-Jones, 2010; 
Ritchie et al., 2012). To categorise people according to statements of left- or right-brain 
learning styles is therefore an overly simplistic representation of neuroscientific research. 
All brain-based educational programs analysed in this study, as the examples above 
illustrate, represent educational neuroscientific research generally, simplistically, out of 
context, as ‘undisputed facts’, and/or inconsistently with representations of research at the 
academic level of educational neuroscience discourse187. Lack of scientific evidence to 
support their educational programs is also evident in all the texts analysed, and thus the entire 
brain-basis of these businesses becomes dubious. In order to counteract this, though, it 
appears that actors in this field use a strategy of presenting simplistic scientific explanations 
and/or using non-modalised vocabulary. A common tendency in all programs analysed is for 
instance a jump directly from an (educational) neuroscientific statement X to the effects of a 
learning program Y, but this is done without providing an accurate explanation for why the 
                                                          
187 Seen in Brainboxx (2014), Brain Gym® (2014), Scholastic (2014), Starskills (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
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brain-based educational program is effective188. Considering these rather vague, simplistic, 
and incoherent links to brain science, one can further suggest that it is difficult for users to see 
precisely which aspects of the learning program are (supposedly) based on neuroscience and 
whether or not this neuroscientific basis is in agreement with representations found in 
educational neuroscientific research communities. 
Considering that sound scientific evidence for brain training programs is difficult to 
come by (Owen et al., 2010), then why does this industry still choose to promote their 
programs as being based in brain science? Why does this field have an interest in educational 
neuroscience, what appears to be the motive behind the incorporation of educational 
neuroscience, and who do brain-based learning industries attempt to reach with their 
programs? Findings from my analysis indicate that a motive for incorporating educational 
neuroscientific representations into these programs is to sell a product189. All six texts 
analysed appear to use a ‘brain-base’ in order to gain credibility for the product they are 
seOOLQJ íwhether brain-friendly teaching tools, books, DVDs, brain-boosting music CDs, 
personalised brain trainers, or courses with tuition fees up to $ 650. These agents’ interest in 
educational neuroscience therefore appears to be a commercial one, because they all seek to 
make a profit by selling products. When it comes to who the brain-based learning industry 
targets, I will argue that a chief audience is teachers and parents. This is evident in statements 
such as “Teaching is so much easier and more successful when you do it the brain-friendly 
way ... Become a brain-friendly teacher with these tools, tips, and structures!” (Kagan, 2014),
“If your child is experiencing recurring struggles with grades, reading, homework, or 
attention, you need a brain trainer” (LearningRx, 2014), and “Starskills provides quality early 
learning resources for educators of babies, toddlers, pre-schoolers, Kindy and K-3 children” 
(Starskills, 2014). It thus appears that the industry’s interest in educational neuroscience is to 
use it to construct a seemingly ‘valid’ brain-basis to help sell learning products to teachers 
and parents. 
Other significant findings relate to how the brain and children/individual’s learning are 
represented in brain-based programs. All texts suggest that one can optimise the brain just by 
EHLQJH[SRVHG WR WKHULJKWNLQGRIVWLPXOLíwhether VAK learning styles or brain-boosting 
music190. This is also apparent in Brain Gym® (2014), when they claim that their 26 Brain 
                                                          
188 Seen in Brainboxx (2014), Brain Gym® (2014), Scholastic (2014), Starskills (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014).  
189 As seen in all of the ‘brain-based’ learning text, as referred to in the previous footnote. 
190 As seen in Brainboxx (2014), Scholastic (2014), Starskills (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
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Gym® movements will “often bring about dramatic improvements in areas such as: 
concentration and focus, memory, academics [such as] reading, writing, math, test taking” 
(Brain Gym®, 2014). Stimuli recommended by Brain Gym’s ‘learning through movements’ 
program include crawling, yawning, drawing symbols in the air, pushing so-called ‘buttons’ 
on the body, and doing the thinking-cap movement, described here by Khalsa, Morris, and 
Sifft (1988) and Sifft and Khalsa (1991)191:
Positive points: The positive points are neurovascular holding points on the frontal eminences found 
halfway between the eyebrows and the hairline. When lightly held, by oneself or another, these points 
are thought to be helpful to repattern conditioned responses to emotionally charged thoughts about 
people, places, memories, tasks, and environmental factors (Khalsa et al., 1988, p. 54).
Thinking cap: Individual gently unrolls the folds of the outer ear three times from top to bottom (Sifft & 
Khalsa, 1991, p. 1013).
Cognitive enhancement stimuli suggested by the different brain-based learning programs all 
appear to be rather easy-to-do activities1926LPSOHOHDUQLQJWHFKQLTXHVíZKHUHLWLVSURPLVHG
that ‘pushing brain buttons’ and listening to ‘brain-boosting music’ will optimise cognitive 
functions í can understandably be seen as tempting selling points for learning programs. The 
problem, however, is that these representations reduce complex cognitive learning processes 
to simplistic activities. What my discourse analysis shows is that the individual as a whole 
tends to be conflated to his or her brain193. The brain is also frequently presented as something 
mechanical, objectified and almost separated from the child/individual (see table 7.1). 
1RWDEO\ WKLV YLHZ RI WKH LQGLYLGXDOíEUDLQ UHODWLRQ RIWHQ FR-occurs with views that it is 
parents’ or teachers’ task to improve children’s brains194. This can be seen in statements such 
as “we can actually grow better brains in our children” (Kagan, 2014), “Starskills will help 
parents and educators to activate your child’s cognitive development” (Starskills, 2014), and 
“...helping educators create more cooperative, interactive classrooms that produce smarter, 
more caring and cooperative students” (Kagan, 2014) [my italics]. These tendencies are 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter, but for now it should be noted that such 
presentations conveys rather simplistic ideas of the brain, the individual child, and the 
learning process. 
                                                          
191 The developers of Brain Gym® own the copyright for the Brain Gym movements, preventing me from describing them in 
detail. Thus, the report from Khalsa et al. (1988) and Sifft and Khalsa (1991) is used to illustrate some of the activities. 
192 Seen in Brainboxx (2014), Brain Gym® (2014), Scholastic (2014), Starskills (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
193 As seen in Scholastic (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
194 As seen in Brain Gym® (2014), Starskills (2014), Kagan (2014), and LearningRx (2014). 
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Table 7.1: Examples of how brain-based learning industries represent educational neuroscience [my italics].
 
Representations where the 
individual is conflated to 
his/hers brain
Representations of the 
brain/cognition as something 
mechanical, objectified or detached 
from the individual
Representations regarding children’s 
learning, success, and parents 
responsibility to ensure this 
“Dr. Kagan’s extensively-
researched book distils the 
world of brain science into 6 
essential principles that will 
align your teaching with 
how your students’ brains 
naturally learn ... When we 
understand how brains best 
function, we can align how 
we teach with how brains
best learn” (Kagan, 2014). 
“[T]eaching is generally a 
delightful experience when 
we focus on activities that 
students’ brains enjoy 
doing” (Kagan, 2014).
“Brain training physically 
reorganizes neural 
pathways, creating a faster, 
smarter brain for a 
lifetime!” (LearningRx,
2014). 
“If you are left-dominant, it
is your sequential, time-
oriented left hemisphere 
which tells you how to think,
what to believe, and what 
choices to make” 
(Scholastic, 2014). 
“Train the brain. Get 
smarter” (LearningRx,
2014). 
“With over 200 sports, 
games, activities, and 
energizers, they [Kagan’s 
learning games] vary 
greatly. Many are brain 
breaks you can use in the 
classroom” (Kagan, 2014).
“Train the brain. Get smarter” 
(LearningRx, 2014). 
“[W]e can actually grow better brains 
in our children” (Kagan, 2014).
“Starskills will help parents and 
educators to activate your child’s 
cognitive development” (Starskills,
2014).
“The human brain is an amazing 
instrument that can be tuned to perform 
optimally with the right kind of music” 
(Kagan, 2014).
“Don’t “settle” for the brain you think 
you were born with. Whatever your age 
or situation, you really can experience 
the life changing benefits of a faster, 
smarter brain” (LearningRx, 2014). 
“[T]his assessment will give you a 
detailed look at what’s going on in your 
child’s brain” (LearningRx, 2014).
“Brain Buttons: This free brain exercise 
increases blood flow to the brain. The 
extra blood flow, the extra water, 
switches the brain ON, improves 
attention required for learning & 
performing” (Brain Gym, 2014). 
“... how to boost your child’s 
intelligence by creating a home 
environment conductive to learning” 
(Kagan, 2014).
“He [Dr. Kagan] has dedicated his 
life’s work helping educators create
more cooperative, interactive 
classrooms that produce smarter, more 
caring and cooperative students” 
(Kagan, 2014).
“The tracks on each CD are selected 
and arranged specifically for their 
tempo and composition too boost 
brainpower and promote peak 
performance” (Kagan online, 2014).
³/HDUQLQJ5[EUDLQWUDLQLQJíGRQHRQH-
on-RQHLQDFRDFKLQJHQYLURQPHQWí
raises IQ by an average of 15 to 20 
points, which statistics link to higher 
salaries. In fact, a study by the US 
Department of Labor Statistics showed 
that a gain of even 10 IQ points can result 
in a $ 9,000 to $18,000 increase in annual 
earning ... LearningRx brain training is 
proven to increase IQ by an average of 
15 points or more. That means for every 
dollar spent on brain training, there’s a 
return of $127 over a client’s lifetime”
(LearningRx, 2014). 
“The Starskills 40 Weeks Program is 
designed for children aged 0-5. It is a 
weekly program that provides a literacy 
and numeracy introduction and focus ... 
After nearly 50 years of research, there is 
HYLGHQFHíERWKTXDQWLWDWive (data-based) 
and qualitative (reports of parents and 
WHDFKHUVíWKDWHDUO\LQWHUYHQWLRQ
increases the developmental and 
educational gains for the child, improves 
the functioning of the family, an reaps 
long-term benefits for society” 
(Starskills, 2014). 
“5DLVLQJVPDUWHUFKLOGUHQícreating an 
enriched learning environment. There are 
many ways to be smart. And there are 
many ways to enrich your home to 
develop your child’s multiple intelligence 
... [W]e will focus on how to boost your 
child’s intelligence by creating a home 
environment conductive to learning. 
Think of it as Feng Shui for the brain” 
(Kagan, 2014).
“If you are missing some resources in the 
key categories of intellectual 
development, you may want to take this 
imbalance into consideration as you 
select your next gift or plan your next 
investment in your child’s education and 
brain development (Kagan, 2014). 
“Starskills is unique in that it aims to 
make the most of these CRITICAL times 
of learning for children to give children 
the start they need to set them on the road 
to success” (Starskills, 2014).
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The media 
Another area to which educational neuroscience is recontextualised is the media. In order to 
find media texts with a significant readership, I focus on texts from some of the largest 
newspapers in the UK and USA. Accordingly, target-specific searches and following of 
reference cues for news stories related to education and neuroscience were conducted across
international media agencies such as BBC, The Times, and The New York Times. The wide 
dissemination of educational neuroscience can be seen from internet searches on (e.g.)
‘education, neuroscience’, which produced over 6 500 hits directly related to news articles in 
the media195. Based on my literature search related to the recontextualisation of educational 
neuroscience, a total of ten media texts were selected for critical discourse analysis (see 
appendix B-D).
What first can be noted concerning the ways in which media represent educational 
neuroscience is that journalists also stress that their texts are based on science (particularly 
brain science)196. Findings further indicate that neuroscientific and educational neuroscientific 
research is simplistically and generally represented in 70 per cent of the media texts197. The 
use of generalisations and simplistic accounts may not be surprising, considering that media 
articles often have a limit of only one or two pages, and the story thus has to be short and to 
the point. Nevertheless, this lack of explanatory scientific accounts is problematic, because 
journalists can easily end up twisting or quoting research out of context and thus create
representations inconsistent with common understandings at the academic level of educational 
neuroscience. This can occur when journalists leap from a scientific hypothesis to faulty
conclusions. Where educational neuroscientific explanations are sparse and no reference to 
original scientific research is offered, it can also be difficult for readers to spot inadequate 
interpretations of scientific research. As an illustration of representations not in line with 
those found at the academic level, the article ‘How music can boost your child’s brainpower’ 
states:
[N]euroscience is now proving [that] music gives a child’s brain a massive boost, and it appears to be
the only activity that can actually increase their biologically determined IQ ... especially if it’s done 
between birth and seven years old. This is the period when the braiQ LVDW LWVPRVWPDOOHDEOHíZKDW
                                                          
195 Additional literature searches with different key word combinations, such as ‘classroom, learning, brain, neuroscience’, 
further increased the number of hits relevant to the topic.  
196 As seen in BBC (2013), Carey (2009), Carlyle (2014), Hammond (2013), James (2014), Jha (2012), The Guardian (2004), 
Whipple (2012), and Wighton (2007).  
197 In BBC (2013), Carlyle (2014), James (2014), Jha (2012), The Guardian (2004), Whipple (2012), and Wighton (2007). 
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VFLHQWLVWV FDOO ³SODVWLF´íZKHQQHXUDO FRQQHFWLRQV DQGSDWKZD\V DUHEHLQJPDGH IRU WKH IXWXUH/LNH
most parents, my wife Clair and I didn’t want to be pushy with musical instruments for our five children 
... But now I’ve looked at the research I realise we really should have been making them play piano in 
WKHLUQDSSLHVíZKHQWKH\DUHUHDG\WRKROGDQLQVWUXPHQWLVDOPRVWWRRODWHIRUWKHFRJQLWLYHEHQHILWV
of music to work their magic (James, in The Times, 2014).
Based on neuroscientific research which ‘proves’ that music increases children’s ‘biologically 
determined IQ’, James argues for early music training for 0-7 year olds and that music should 
be a compulsory subject in the educational curriculum (James, 2014.). I argue, however, that 
too hasty conclusions are drawn in this media article198. Even if some researchers have shown 
that there is a correlation between significant music training (such as playing the violin) and 
structural changes in the organization of the human brain (Elbert et al., 1995; Hutchinson, 
Lee, Gaab, & Schlaug, 2003; Schlaug, Jäncke, Huang, Staiger, & Steinmetz, 1995)199, I doubt 
that any scientists would readily say that they have proven a link between early music training 
and increase of biologically determined IQ. Firstly, both the word ‘proof’ and the phrase 
‘biologically determined IQ’ are expressions most authors within the educational neuro-
science discourse would avoid. This is partly because ‘proof’ and ‘determined’ denote a 
strong degree of absoluteness, which many educational neuroscientists are cautious in 
claiming. Caution is also necessary because concepts of IQ and intelligence are often 
perceived more as a social construct, rather than a single process or faculty which biologically 
determines an individual’s intelligence, as distinct from other human faculties such as 
learning and memory (Mackintosh, 2011). Secondly, whilst numerous researchers have found 
changes in the human brain due to music training, these are often changes in cortical 
organization that reflect our nervous system’s plastic ability to acquire and retain a new skill 
(Gazzaniga et al., 2009). Changes in cortical organizations and larger cortical areas do not,
however, automatically imply ‘increased IQ’. Thirdly, this media article suggests that music 
WUDLQLQJHDUO\LQDFKLOG¶VOLIHíLHEHIRUHWKHDJHRIVHYHQDQGSUHIHUDEO\µZKHQWKH\VWLOO are 
LQ WKHLU QDSSLHV¶ í DOVR refers to the issues of early training, critical periods, and enriched 
environment. Within the educational neuroscientific research community there is a common 
consensus that the notion of ‘critical periods’ in a child’s cognitive development has inspired 
                                                          
198 Considering that James does not list any scientific references, it is difficult to know exactly where he gets his assertions 
ĨƌŽŵоƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ͘ 
199 The study by Elbert et al. (1995) on violin players found that these musicians had a larger cortical area dedicated to 
representing sensations from the fingers than non-musicians. The size of the cortical representations did also seem to be 
larger for those who began training before the age of 12 years. Structural changes in the brain were also noted by Schlaug 
et al. (1995), when they found that professional musicians who had begun musical training before the age of 7 had larger 
anterior corpus callosum than non-musicians. The researchers further suggested that the data indicate a difference in 
interhemispheric communication and a possible hemispheric asymmetry of sensorimotor areas. 
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spurious recommendations for early training and enriched environment (Anderson & Della 
Sala, 2012; Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Howard-Jones, 2010). Indeed, there is a common 
agreement amongst educational neuroscientists that synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning (i.e. 
the making, strengthening, and weakening of synaptic connections) occur in the early period 
of a child’s life. But this early time is commonly understood as a time of sensitive periods (not 
critical periods) in a child’s cognitive development. This means that there appear to be subtle 
alterations in the brain’s ability to be shaped by environmental factors, and thus there may be 
some optimal phases for a child to learn certain aspects and skills (such as playing the piano). 
Rather than closing windows of time where a skill has to be learned, however, these phases 
are flexible and one can also learn such skills later in life í but perhaps with a bit more effort 
(Anderson & Della Sala, 2012). It can therefore be argued that calls for early learning and 
enriched environment in order to ensure that children do not miss any ‘critical’ periods of 
learning are (scientifically speaking) unwarranted recommendations. Additionally,
educational neuroscientific work has never conclusively demonstrated the beneficial effects of 
enriched environments, but has shown that deprived environments and lack of stimulation can 
have negative effects on cognitive development200. Any child brought up in normal conditions 
will encounter the necessary experiences for optimal learning (such as learning to speak a 
language), because our social environment provides us with the stimuli we need to interact 
with our social world (Anderson & Della Sala, 2012; Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Howard-
Jones, 2010). Overall, LWFDQWKHUHIRUHEHDUJXHGWKDWWKLVPHGLDDUWLFOHíZKLFKUHFRPPHQGV
parents to teach children ‘in their nappies’ to play a music instrument since this will increase a 
FKLOG¶VµELRORJLFDOO\GHWHUPLQHG,4¶íincludes representations out of line with the views of
the academic community of educational neuroscience. 
As well as generalising and quoting research out of context, my findings also show 
that many journalists construct their texts as if they are ‘neutral reports’ which merely echo 
what researchers themselves say. Journalists frequently use phrases such as ‘neuroscientists 
say’, ‘brain imaging reveals’, ‘neuroscience is now proving’ or, as in these two statements:
                                                          
200 The research upon which much of the ‘hysteria’ for enriched environment and early learning is based, is studies by 
Diamond et al. (1987) and Greenough, Volkmar, and Juraska (1973) where it was showed that rats in enriched 
environments had better cognitive development than rats raised in deprived environments. A number of issues arise when 
one transfer these results to children, though. Firstly, these studies were conducted on rats and can thus mainly say 
something about rats’ environments and cognitive development. (It would be unethical to conduct similar studies on 
human participants, particular children). Secondly, the deprived rat-group in these studies were in cages with no 
stimulations whatsoever, whilst the so-called ‘enriched’ environment were fabricated laboratory settings which by no 
means were more ‘enriched’ than rats’ natural habitat in the wild. These studies therefore say more about the effects of 
deprived environments on cognitive development and learning, rather than effects of enriched ones (Howard-Jones, 2010).  
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“Intensive exercise improves the academic performance of teenagers, according to new 
research” (BBC, 2013), and “The larger the canvas, the more it develops the creativity side of 
the brain, especially in scholarly children, according to Professor Joan Freeman” (Carlyle, 
2014). It appears that journalists protect themselves by using these (seemingly) neutral 
formulations, because this strategy helps to shift the responsibility of the statement over to the 
scientist rather than WKHMRXUQDOLVWíDIWHUDOOLWLVQRWWKHjournalist who claims that drawing 
on larger canvases develops the creative side of the brain, but the scientist. Moreover, this 
strategy not only makes it possible for journalists to hide behind ‘what researchers say’; 
frequent references to science also add scientific validation and a notion of ‘authority’ to 
media stories. What complicates the matter further is that journalists often seek sensational 
stories with attention-grabbing headlines, and thus rather far-fetched studies may be 
promoted. A text illustrating this is ‘How to boost the brain’ by Wighton published in The 
Times in 2007. With reference to the looming exam period for students taking GCSEs, A 
levels and university finals, Wighton (2007) presents research which shows “the best ways to 
increase intelligence”. In addition to tips such as “feed your brain [with] omega-3 fatty acids”, 
“the smell of lavender boosts concentration”, “say yes to smart drugs” and “a cup of cocoa 
before bedtime boost your IQ”, one can also find references to the beneficial effects of 
chewing gum: 
Chewing gum seems to improve people’s memory and ease exam stress, say researchers at Reading 
University. The study based on 75 people found that those who chewed gum performed better on 
memory tests than those who did not. Another study, at Texas University, shows that the marks of 
students allowed to chew gum were on average three per centage points higher compared with those 
who did not. Some studies suggest that chewing gum can increase blood flow to the brain by 25 per cent
(Wighton, 2007).
Throughout this media story there are numerous research references, which, on the face of it, 
support the ‘brain-boosting activities’ presented. The scientific validity of these studies can, 
however, be disputed. Take, for instance, the claim that chewing gum improves people’s 
memory. This idea appears to have it basis in studies on chewing gum and cognitive skills, 
like the one by Wilkinson, Scholey, and Wesnes (2002). Numerous researchers have 
attempted to modify or replicate the original studies (Baker, Bezance, Zellaby, & Aggleton, 
2004; Tucha, Mecklinger, Maier, Hammerl, & Lange, 2004), whilst other authors working at 
the interface of neuroscience and education have been more critical to claims related to gum-
chewing and cognition (Allen, Norman, & Katz, 2008; Ritchie, Chudler, & Della Sala, 2012;
Smith, 2009). Findings from these studies on the cognitive effect of chewing gum are, 
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however, inconclusive. Some researcher found no effects of chewing gum on memory tasks 
(Allen et al., 2008), whilst findings from other studies suggest that chewing gum increase jaw 
activity which, in turn, may increase blood flow to the brain (Onozuka et al., 2002), but there 
is disagreement if this further leads to enhanced cognitive cognition. Inconclusive findings 
notwithstanding; it has been noted by Ritchie et al. (2012) that none of these studies are 
conducted outside a laboratory context and that none of them assess the effects of chewing 
gum on children’s learning. The scientific validity of the beneficial effects of chewing gum 
and improved learning in students can therefore be deemed dubious. 
My findings also show that non-modalised articulations and assumptions are frequent 
in media presentations of topics related to educational neuroscience. This strategy can, as 
previously noted, close texts from dialogue, because non-modalised vocabulary leaves no 
room for other possibilities and thus creates the impression that the representations are 
indisputable facts (cf. Fairclough, 2003). Compared to brain-based learning industries, 
though, these journalists are more moderate in their use of non-modalised PDUNHUV í D
tendency amongst media texts is usage of non-modalised words in the headline and abstract, 
before presenting a more moderated and nuanced picture throughout the article201. This can be 
demonstrated by The Times article ‘Pre-school learning gives teenage brains a boost’, where 
it in the abstract further is stated that “Pre-school children who visit the zoo and have access 
to books and other cultural activities have more developed brain as teenagers, scientists said 
yesterday’ (Whipple, 2012 [non-modalised words in italics]). The text recites a study 
concerning the early years of children and their cognitive development, where children are 
revisited at age 18 in order to measure the thickness of different parts of their brains. It is then 
stated that children who had more intellectual stimulation early in their lives (aged four) had 
WKLQQHUFRUWH[DVWHHQDJHUV³íLPSO\LQJSHUKDSVFRXQWerintuitively, it was better developed” 
(Whipple, 2012). Only in the last paragraph is another, and more cautious, account presented,
as it is noted that “Bruce Hood ... said the research was interesting, but he would like to see 
more evidence of a knock-on effect in behaviour and intelligence aged 18, rather than just 
physical brain size” (Whipple, 2012). The view presented by Professor Hood is a significant 
aspect with relation to educational neuroscience’s academic level, because it reflects a more 
nuanced and cautious view on the correlation between brain size and intelligence (Hood, 
2014). What is noteworthy, though, is how this perspective is only acknowledged by a brief 
insertion at the bottom of the media article. Consequently, a significant and much more 
                                                          
201 As seen in BBC (2013), Carlyle (2014), Jha (2012), The Guardian (2004), Whipple (2012), and Wighton (2007). 
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cautious aspect related to environmental, genetic and epigenetic factors in cognitive 
development and intelligence is neglected from media’s presentation. Even more 
significantly, with respect to lack of cautious perspectives, is that no references are made to 
the academic educational neuroscientific literature, which warns about overly simplistic 
presentations of young children’s cognitive development, frenzy for ‘critical’ periods and, as 
previously argued, unwarranted recommendation of enriched environment (cf. Anderson & 
Della Sala, 2012; Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Howard-Jones, 2010). What is problematic with 
such unbalanced presentations in the media, I will argue, is that catchy headlines and 
simplistic accounts of learning and the brain are given more salience than nuanced and more 
scientifically based representations of educational neuroscience. 
My findings also show how certain ‘catchwords’ and phrases reappear amongst media 
WH[WV7KLVQRWLRQRILQWHUWH[WXDOLW\íLHWKDWWH[Ws builds upon other texts (Fairclough, 2003)
íFDQEH VHHQ LQKRZ WKHEUDLQ WKH LQGLYLGXDOFKLOGDQG WKHSURFHVVRI OHDUQLQJ WHQG to be 
presented (see table 7.2). The phrase ‘brain boost’ is used by 60 per cent of the media texts
analysed202, references to the brain and IQ/intelligence occurs in 50 per cent203, and the 
catchword ‘brainpower’ is found in 40 per cent of the articles204. Apart from intertextuality in 
the form of explicit words, one can also find recurrences of certain expressions that convey 
rather incongruous perspectives of the brain, the child, and the learning process, such as 
phrases where characteristics of the individual as a whole are conflated to his or her brain205.
Another frequent representation is of the brain and/or cognition as something objectified í a
mechanism which can be ‘boosted’ or ‘empowered’ to ‘generate’ higher IQ and cognitive 
benefits just by the right kind of food, hobbies, music, or other environmental stimuli206. This 
can also be linked to media audiences, as many media texts communicate to parents and/or 
learners207. An illustrative example is Carlyle’s article ‘10 fun ways to boost your child’s 
brain power’ in The Times (2014), where parents are encouraged to make their children try 
“IQ-enriching hobbies” such as playing the violin, running, playing with gender-opposite 
toys, cooking, or playing video-games such as Grand Theft Auto208. These activities will, 
arguably, “produce shiny, happy children” and can “generate often surprising cognitive 
benefits” (Carlyle, 2014). Expressions like these are noteworthy since perhaps
                                                          
202 As seen in BBC (2013), Carlyle (2014), Hammond (2013), James (2014), Whipple (2012), and Wighton (2007).  
203 As seen in Carlyle (2014), Hammond (2013), James (2014), Whipple (2012), and Wighton (2007). 
204 As seen in Carlyle (2014), Hammond (2013), James (2014), and Wighton (2007). 
205 As seen in Caryle (2014), Jha (2012) and Whipple (2012). 
206 As seen in Carlyle (2014), James (2014), The Guardian (2004), Whipple (2012), and Wighton (2007).  
207 As seen in Carlyle (2014), Hammond (2013), James (2014), The Guardian (2004), Whipple (2012), and Wighton (2007).  
208 A video game which has received particular attention and critique for being a too violent and controversial action game for kids.  
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unintentionally, they over simplify the complexity of the brain, the individual child and the 
learning process. 
Almost every media article analysed (80 per cent) seems to present neuroscience 
and/or education simplistically, out of context, or inconsistently, compared to representations 
found at the academic level. They also have few, if any, complete references to original 
scientific research209. Journalists are more likely to refer to other media texts (often within the 
same media agency), rather than referring to primary scientific sources. A problem when 
journalists ‘borrow’ from other media texts is that stories can move further and further away 
from the original source, and thus the likelihood of misinterpretation of scientific findings 
increases. Consideration of some phrases within a chain of media texts (connected by their 
references to one another) can reveal the ways in which journalists end up twisting 
statements. A case in point involves two New York Times articles from the literature search, 
where the title ‘How exercise could lead to a better brain’ (Reynolds, 2012, 18 April) has 
ended up in the spin-off headline ‘Jogging your brain’ (Parker-Pope, 2012, 20 April). The 
former title is a more modalised representation, whereas the latter spin-off title is closer to 
DEVXUGLW\WKDQDQ\WKLQJHOVHíVXUHO\\RXFDQQRWJRRXWµMRJJLQJ\RXUEUDLQ¶OLNH\RXJRRXW
walking your dog. 
The media thus convey some rather unscientific representations of educational 
neuroscientific concepts, and one might think that the number of media presentations 
inconsistent with the academic level would decrease in accordance with time of publication í
the newer the article, the more we have come to know about the linkage of education and 
neuroscience, and hence there should be fewer misrepresentations. However, it appears that 
the time of publication, whether 2004 or 2014, does not correlate with the scientific accuracy
of the media articles. It should also be stressed that, even if most of the texts analysed have 
inaccurate scientific representations of educational neuroscience, there are some media 
articles with a more critical, nuanced and cautious representation210, particularly is the article 
‘Beware ‘brain-based learning’ in The Times (S. Rose, 2013), in line with educational 
neuroscience’s academic level. Ironically, this article is not written by a journalist but by a 
SURIHVVRU LQ QHXURVFLHQFH í D QRWH ZKLFK PDy explain the scientific accuracy of Rose’s 
representation of concepts related to educational neuroscience. Nevertheless, and based on my 
                                                          
209 BBC (2013), Carey (2009), Carlyle (2014), James (2014), Jha (2012), The Guardian (2004), Whipple (2012), Wighton (2007).  
210 As seen in Hammond (2013) and S. Rose (2013).  
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findings, many media texts appear to incorporate and recontextualise the academic level of 
educational neuroscience in order to create and ‘sell’ a sensational story to their readers. 
Table 7.2: Examples how the media represents educational neuroscience [my italics].
Representations where the 
individual is conflated to 
his/hers brain
Representations of the 
brain/cognition as something 
mechanical, objectified or 
detached from the individual
Representations regarding children’s 
learning, increase of intelligence, success, 
and parents/the learners responsibility to 
ensure this
“Studying young minds, and 
how to teach them ... The 
findings, mostly from a 
branch of research called 
cognitive neuroscience, are 
helping to clarify when young 
brains are best able to grasp 
fundamental concepts” 
(Carey, 2009). 
“...by preschool, the brain can 
begin to grasp informal 
geometrical definitions” 
(Carey, 2009).
“Here’s the latest health 
research to help you give your 
brain the maximum gain ... 
Feed your brain ... A short 
daytime nap can also keep 
your brain sharp” (Wighton, 
2007). 
“Drink water. Our brains are 
80 per cent water, so 
dehydration is bad news for 
your brain” (Wighton, 2007).
“A cup of cocoa before 
bedtime could boost your IQ 
... They [scientists] said this 
could be especially beneficial 
to older brains” (Wighton, 
2007).
“Pre-school learning gives 
teenage brains a boost” 
(Whipple, 2012).
“[M]usic gives a child’s brain
a massive boost” (James, 
2014). 
“Exercise ‘boosts academic 
performance’ of teenagers” (BBC, 
2013).
“Music may be absolutely the best 
all-round activity to produce shiny, 
happy children but, if they struggle 
with violin practice, there are other 
hobbies that can generate often 
surprising cognitive benefits” 
(Carlyle, 2014).
“10 fun ways to boost your child’s 
brain power” (Carlyle, 2014).
“How to boost the brain” (Wighton, 
2007). 
“How music can boost your child’s 
brainpower ... [N]euroscience is 
now proving [that] music gives a 
child’s brain a massive boost, and it 
appears to be the only activity that
can actually increase their 
biologically determined IQ”
(James, 2014).
“Does listening to Mozart really 
boost your brainpower?” 
(Hammond, 2013).
“We are all a unique mix of 
individual preferences, and research 
suggests we learn best or “switch 
on” to learning when our dominant 
preference is met” (The Guardian, 
2004).
“Listening to a good tune can boost 
your learning and concentration” 
(Wighton, 2007).
“Pre-school learning gives teenage 
brains a boost ... Pre-school 
children who visit the zoo and have 
other cultural stimulation have 
more developed brains as 
teenagers” (Whipple, 2012).
“Violin, running, meditation, Grand Theft 
Auto ... these are the IQ-enriching hobbies 
your children should be trying ...
Neuroscientists say the most valuable activities 
LPSURYH³H[HFXWLYHIXQFWLRQ´íWKHDELOLW\WR
plan, concentrate, focus and remember. It’s 
these abilities, rather than raw IQ scores, that 
research suggests are the best predictors of 
academic and life success” (Carlyle, 2014).
“They [the authors of the study] claimed that 
since every 15 minutes of exercise improved 
performance by an average of about a quarter 
if a grade, it was possible children who carried 
out 60 minutes of exercise every day could 
improve their academic performance by a full 
JUDGHíIRUH[DPSOHIURPD&WRD%RUD%WR
an A” (BBC, 2013).
“Drama lessons don’t raise IQ as music lessons 
do, a study in Toronto among six-year-olds 
showed. But they do have other positive 
cognitive benefits, particularly in social 
interaction and adaptability” (Carlyle, 2014).
“There is a way in which music can make a 
difference to your IQ, though ... Jessica Grahn, 
a cognitive scientists at Western University in 
London, Ontario says that a year of piano
lessons, combined with regular practice can 
increase IQ by as much as three points” 
(Hammond, 2013).
“But, for me, the biggest revelation was the 
fact that several studies over the past few years 
have found that early music training can 
increase a child’s IQ by as much as 7.5 points 
when you start by the age of 2 and continue 
with it for six years. Even one year’s worth can 
give them an extra three points” (James, 2014).
“With exams looming, what are the best ways 
to increase intelligence? ... Here’s the latest 
health research to help you give your brain the 
maximum gain; Get sweaty, feed your brain, 
rock on, go lavender, take a break, say yes to 
smart drugs, relax your body, sleep on it, learn 
a skill, chew gum, drink water, lay off the 
technology, take testosterone, think global, 
don’t see red” (Wighton, 2007).
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Policymakers 
Apart from the media and brain-based learning industry, the academic level of educational
neuroscience is recontextualised to the field of governmental policymakers. As with the two 
former fields, the political field is also a complex area of study and only a fraction of it can be 
analysed in this research. The following analysis is therefore based on policy documents by 
English and American policymakers wherein one can find traces of education and neuro-
science. By use of literature search based on recontextualisation criteria, the texts by Allen 
MP and Smith MP (2008) [UK], Federal Register (2001) [USA], Government Office for 
Science (2012) [UK], TeacherNet (2007) [UK], and US Department of Education (2010,
2012) are chosen for the corpora, since they seem to provide an adequate assortment of the 
ways in which educational neuroscience’s academic level is disseminated to the field of 
policymakers. As with the previous two recontextualisation analyses, my aim is not to analyse 
the educational and neuroscientific validity of political texts per se, but rather to examine how 
educational neuroscience is distributed and recontextualised within the field of policy agents 
and policymakers.
The first question to be answered is to what degree educational neuroscience is 
recontextualised to the political field. Findings from my literature search show significant 
traces of educational neuroscience amongst policymakers, even if dissemination to the 
political domain appears less common than within the field of media and brain-based learning 
industry. Within the political field in the US a key words search related to ‘education, 
neuroscience’ in US Department of Education gave 2 702 hits, while a similar search in UK 
Department for Education gave a total of 136 hits, both resulting in texts in form of 
conferences, presidential speeches, political blogs, national strategy plans for education, and 
initiatives related to brain research on cognitive development and early learning and 
childcare211. An example from the UK is the summer school programme for disadvantaged 
pupils in 2011, where it in the announcement by Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg is said 
how “the extra ‘brain training’ will include catch-up classes such as literacy and numeracy 
boosters ... This is £ 50 million-worth of extra brain training giving tens of thousands of 
disadvantaged pupils a flying start at secondary school” (Department for Education, 2012). A
similar political intervention with reference to education and neuroscience is seen in the 
                                                          
211 Examples from the US are BRAIN Working Group (2014), Brenchley (2011), Bush (1990), Fowler (2013), US Department 
of Education (2011), and US Department of Health & Human Services (2014), whilst examples from UK are Allen MP 
(2011a), Department for Education (2013a, 2013b), and Department for Education and Teather MP (2011).  
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music project Astar, where the Scottish Government and Royal Scottish National Orchestra 
gave out free classical CDs to every new-born child in Scotland with the aim of “helping your 
baby’s brain develop” (Royal Scottish National Orchestra, 2012; The Scottish Government, 
2013). It is therefore evident that educational neuroscience is recontextualised to the political 
field, and it is therefore relevant to ask how educational neuroscience is represented, 
articulated and related to previous aspects within the political discourse. 
When it comes to how policymakers represent educational neuroscientific topics, my 
findings show that many of the texts make references to neuroscientific research and scientific 
evidence. This can be seen in how 66 per cent of the political texts use phrases akin to 
‘research has shown’212 and 50 per cent use the words ‘scientific evidence’213. What further is 
of note is that all texts use a vocabulary echoing certain neoliberal ideas214. I argue that this 
latter finding is of particular interest, as a neoliberal ideology, in relation to educational 
policy, is distinguished by its logic of globalised and knowledge-driven economy. In such 
neoliberal rationality, particular emphasis is put on effectiveness, profitable input-output 
measurements, evidence-based and scientific knowledge of ‘what works’, in addition to 
underlying notions of the importance of education, knowledge and innovation for the success 
of individuals, companies, and the national state (Becker, 2006; Chiapello & Fairclough, 
2002)215. In my textual analysis, traces of neoliberal ideology can be identified by the way in 
which policymakers articulate their messages and by use of certain ‘buzz-words’ associated 
with neoliberal perspective. Table 7.3 show some excerpts where traces of neoliberal 
rationality can be seen, and in addition the following extract from Allen and Smith (2008) 
demonstrates how traces of neoliberalism are manifested in a political text related to 
education and neuroscience: 
We hope that [this publication] offers a clear, evidence-based analysis followed by proven and practical 
actions to improve our society more effectively and less expensively than current policy allows ... It costs
far more to help a teenager who has become entrenched in the kind of disadvantage described above,
caught up in negative and destructive cycles of behaviour, than it would to stop him or her from falling 
behind in the first place by helping his or her family at the earliest stage of its development ... The Early 
Intervention policy pragmatism started to meet scientific and evidence-based analysis as around this 
time more and more work was becoming evident to me and many others on what happens to children’s 
                                                          
212 In Allen and Smith (2008), Government Office for Science (2012), TeacherNet (2007), and US Department of Education (2012). 
213 Seen in Allen and Smith (2008), Government Office for Science (2012), and US Department of Education (2012). 
214 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), Federal Register (2001), Government Office for Science (2012), TeacherNet (2007), US 
Department of Education (2010), and US Department of Education (2012).  
215 See the glossary for further elaboration on neoliberalism.   
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brains between the years of 0-3. An evidence base was beginning to accumulate on the fantastic ability 
of the brain to expand in the very early years (Allen & Smith, 2008, pp. 4-17 [my italics]).
A neoliberal rationality is even more evident if one considers the overall argumentation and 
logic used in Allan and Smith’s political report, as it is stressed how neuroscientific research 
on early brain development provides an ‘evidence base’ for childcare and educational 
practice. This neuroscientific evidence can, it is argued, ensure ‘cost-effective’ intervention 
which will benefit the individual, families and our society in how it “enables young people ... 
to achieve much more of their potential at school, obtain qualifications and jobs, build their 
own happy and functional families and reduce the likelihood of a lifetime on benefit, in 
expensive drug rehabilitation or being dealt with by the criminal justice system” (Allen & 
Smith, 2008, p.17). Concerning neoliberalism, it indeed appears that Allan and Smith (2008) 
use the logic of knowledge-driven and evidence-based economy in their argumentation for 
early intervention. 
Other traces of neoliberal rationalities in political texts can be seen in the roundtable 
event hosted by the UK Government Office for Science (2012), where the links between 
(neuro)scientific evidence and (educational) policy-making are stressed in terms like “it [is] 
crucial that evidence and insights from the behavioural sciences make an effective
contribution to policy making” (p. 2), and “the co-sponsors emphasised the need for 
government to continue raising its game on testing and evaluating interventions so that it can 
really understand what works, and if something does not work, why it does not” (p. 2). The 
importance of neuroscience in education, in addition to the establishment of universal design 
in education, is similarly stressed by the US Department of Education (2010, p. 1) when
noting that “[t]he challenging and rapidly changing demands of our global economy tell us 
what people need to know and who needs to learn. Advances in learning sciences [i.e. 
cognitive science and neuroscience] show us how people learn”. These and similar findings 
give the impression that there is manifested a neoliberal ideological undertone in all the 
political texts analysed (see table 7.3). Many texts also appear to connect the benefit of a 
neuroscientific ‘evidence-base’ with ‘what works’, more efficient learning, improved 
academic outcomes, cost-efficient policy interventions, and success for individuals and 
society. However, I argue that the linkage of educational neuroscience with neoliberalism 
within the political field is not that surprising. If one considers recontextualisation principles 
in critical discourse theories, it is notable how discourses become re-contextualized and re-
articulated as ‘new’ concepts are set in relation to ‘the old’ discourse’s principles (Fairclough, 
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2010). In this case, the ‘old’ political discourse has long been seen as influenced by neoliberal 
ideology (Fairclough, 2005; Lauder, Brown, Dillabough, & Halsey, 2006), and thus it is to be 
expected that policymakers may appropriate the ‘new’ discourse of educational neuroscience 
into their own political fields by relating these academic representations to neoliberal 
rationality. It may be interesting to ask about the implications of this political strategy of 
FRQQHFWLQJHGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQWLILFDVSHFWVZLWKQHROLEHUDOUDWLRQDOLW\íDQLQTXLU\IXUWKHU
pursued in the chapter’s last section.
When it comes to the ways in which educational neuroscience is recontextualised
within the political field, findings from my discourse analysis show that most policymakers 
seem to use educational neuroscience in order to create an ‘evidence-base’ or a ‘scientific
grounding’ for their political suggestions. Strategies using educational neuroscience in order 
to craft an evidence-base appear to be linked to an underlying intention to ‘sell’ political 
arguments216. This motive for using educational neuroscience in political arguments can 
further be seen in relation to the audience these policymakers target, because findings indicate 
that political texts often appealed to other political actors (i.e. 50 per cent of the texts217) or to 
teachers and schools (i.e. 33 per cent of the texts218). Another finding reveals that policy-
makers are a bit more careful in their statements and use more modalised words in their texts
than brain-based learning programs and many of the media articles analysed. Many of the 
political texts (i.e. 50 per cent of the texts219) are more modest in their statements, using 
phrases such as “can be”, “may be”, or even providing other perspectives on a matter. 
However, even if some political texts use modalised statements concerning educational 
neuroscience, this does not necessarily imply that their statements are in line with the 
academic level of the discourse. My findings show that 50 per cent of the political texts have 
representations inconsistent with the academic level220, whereas the other 50 per cent appear 
to have representations more in line with the academic level of educational neuroscience221.
Furthermore, time of publication does not correspond with the scientific accuracy of the 
educational neuroscience representations in political texts, and both scientific and unscientific 
representations are therefore found regardless of publication date. Examples of 
                                                          
216 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), Government Office for Science (2012), TeacherNet (2007), US Department of 
Education (2010), and US Department of Education (2012) 
217 As seen in Allen & Smith (20089, Government Office for Science (2012), and US Department of Education (2012). 
218 As seen in TeacherNet (2007) and US Department of Education (2010) 
219 As seen in Federal Register (2001), Government Office of Science (2012), and TeacherNet (2007). 
220 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), TeacherNet (2007) and US Department of Education (2012). 
221 As seen in Federal Register (2001), Government Office of Science (2012) and US Department of Education (2010). 
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representations more in agreement with the academic community of educational neuroscience 
can be found in the US Federal Register (2001), where it is stressed that there is a need for 
more research to link neuroscientific theory with educational practice. Even if this political 
text is from 2001, a time when educational neuroscience was barely established as an 
academic discipline, the same caution, and calls for more research, can be found at the current
academic level (Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Varma, McCanliss, & Schwartz, 2008). In the 
political text from the UK roundtable discussion regarding behavioural science and policy 
making, one can also find more academically consistent and cautious representations of 
educational neuroscience. Even if one gains the impression that neoliberal ideas are accepted 
(such as the importance of efficiency, what works, and focus on evidence), the “appropriate 
role for neuroscience evidence for government educational policy” is open to “lively 
discussion” (Government Office of Science, 2012, p. 6). Similar cautious approaches are seen 
in the more academic level of educational neuroscience, where it is often stressed that caution
is needed when drawing links from neuroscientific findings to recommendations for
educational practice and policy (cf. Bruer, 1998; Goswami, 2006).
Such academically consistent representations of educational neuroscience do not, 
however, compensate for the fact that half of the political texts analysed present ideas that do 
not correspond with educational neuroscience’s academic level222. An example of such 
representation is provided by the teaching and study materials posted at UK government’s 
information page TeacherNet (2007)223. The aim of TeacherNet is to supply teachers with 
“guidance material [that] contains what could be termed essentials of good practice, generic to 
all phases of education ... [introducing] some of the research that underpins current thinking 
on effective teaching and learning” (p. 1). Research references are then drawn to neuroscience 
and cognitive psychology: 
[I]deas about the brain, learning, and how to promote it, are developing rapidly and teachers cannot 
easily keep track of changing ideas ... “The learning gap is the difference between what we know about 
effective learning and what is currently happening in the classroom” (Mike Hughes, 1999, p. 17). The 
challenge is to try to close that ‘learning gap’ and search for ways to teach pupils and structure their 
learning that are as effective as we can make them (TeacherNet, 2007).
                                                          
222 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), TeacherNet (2007), and US Department of Education (2012). 
223 The respective information under ‘Supply Teaching/Study Materials’ (TeacherNet, 2007) was found in UK government’s 
National Archives with the note “A new UK Government took office on 11 May [i.e. 2010; Cameron ministry]. As a result the 
content on this site may not reflect current Government policy”. The text was nevertheless easily accessible from UK 
government’s website by a general internet search at the time I conducted my critical discourse analysis in May 2014. 
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Following this note, a presentation of ‘effective’ classroom and behavioural management is 
made and different learning styles such as accelerated learning, the VAK model, and multiple 
intelligences are offered (TeacherNet, 2007). The problem, however, is that these practical 
learning principles are criticised by numerous educational neuroscientists as neuromyths
(Alfernik & Farmer-Dougan, 2010; Franklin, 2006; Howard-Jones, 2010; Sharp, Bowker, & 
Byrne, 2008). Accelerated learning, the VAK model, and multiple intelligence, in varying 
degrees, build on ‘learning style theories’ and Howard Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory 
(MI theory) where a central nexus is that individuals have different preferred learning or 
thinking styles (Dunn & Griggs, 2000; Gardner, 1983). Take, for instance, WKH9$.PRGHOí
a model based on the idea of sensory modalities and that our neurological ‘wiring’ 
predisposes us to learning styles which correspond to visual, auditory, or kinaesthetic inputs 
(Dunn & Griggs, 2000). In accordance with this, the UK government’s TeacherNet states:
The VAK model emphasises the preferences individuals have for visual, auditory or kinaesthetic 
learning. VAK characteristics: 
o Visual - learners prefer to see information: they like reading text or looking at diagrams.
o Auditory - learners prefer to hear information: they like listening, talking. 
o Kinaesthetic - learners prefer to learn by doing: they like moving, manipulating, touching. 
 7KLV KDV LPSRUWDQW LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WHDFKLQJ í WHDFKHUV VKRXOG DFNQRZOHGJH DQG FDWHU IRU WKH
distribution of preferred styles amongst learners (TeacherNet, 2007). 
The idea of VAK learning styles is, however, not compatible with educational neuroscientific 
research. First of all, categorisation of children into visual, auditory, or kinaesthetic learners is 
usually done in form of limited questionnaires where an individual’s dominant learning style 
is identified based on a total scores of V, A or K’s on options such as “On a long journey I 
like to look at the scenery or read a book [V]; On a long journey I can’t wait until we stop so I 
can walk around [K]; On a long journey I like to listen to music or talk to the other travellers 
[A]” (Brainboxx, 2014). The categorisation of children based on such unsophisticated 
questionnaire designs is questionable; to further implement learning styles accordingly is even 
more dubious (Howard-Jones, 2010). Secondly, in educational neuroscientific research it is 
commonly agreed that multiple strategies for learning are beneficial, because this can provide 
a child with numerous strategies for problem solving and learning across environmental 
settings. To focus on one particular ‘style’ rather than a broad set of learning skills may
therefore be more of a disservice than an aid when it comes to learning (Alfernik & Farmer-
Dougan, 2010). Besides, even to talk of singular processing and learning styles is paradoxical,
since there is a consensus within the educational neuroscience research community that one 
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should be careful in isolating a task (such as listening to lectures) into a single brain function 
(hearing) and a corresponding brain area (such as primary auditory cortex). Our brain is 
complex, and when we perform cognitive tasks we make use of interconnected and parallel 
processing modules where numerous parts of the brain are activated simultaneously
(Gazzaniga et al., 2009). Thirdly, no evidence has as yet emerged from neuroscience or 
educational research of any benefits in categorising and teaching students in accordance to 
their sensory modality (Howard-Jones, 2010; Sharp et al., 2008). Based on these arguments, it
is therefore significant that the VAK learning model has gained a widespread popularity 
amongst teachers and how some schools have even decided to label their student in V, A, or 
K t-shirts and badges according to a child’s preferred learning style (Franklin, 2006; Geake, 
2008). The fact that this unwarranted use of learning styles also has been promoted at the UK 
government’s information page for teachers is, perhaps, even more surprising. Even though 
the text published at UK government’s TeacherNet website only provides a brief account on 
the ‘effective and good practice’ of the VAK-model, and even if it is noted that “all learners 
can benefit from multi-sensory approaches to learning” (TeacherNet, 2007), the fact that 
neuromyths such as VAK learning styles, accelerated learning and multiple intelligence are
promoted through this political channel is worthy of criticism. 
Another text worth mentioning for its unscientific use of educational neuroscientific 
representations is ‘Early Intervention: Good Parents. Great Kids. Better Citizens’ by MPs 
Allen and Smith (2008). This political report argues for the importance of the social policy 
‘Early Intervention’, and references to neuroscience are used to argue that the 0-3 age range is 
the vital period for early interventions, because “the more positive stimuli a baby is given, the 
more brain cells and synapses it will be able to develop” and “the structure of the developing 
infant brain is a crucial factor in the creation (or not) of violent tendencies”. The result of an 
early intervention policy “will be a pro-social child who is likely to be happier, healthier and 
more intelligent than one who has been deprived of these essentials for positive growth”, it is 
argued, and this will benefit the individual child, the family, and the society at large (Allen & 
Smith, 2008, pp. 57-58). However, issues arise due to emphasis on children’s cognitive 
development and what the authors call “the significance of ‘sensitive windows’”224. This can 
                                                          
224 I will argue that the phrase ‘sensitive windows’ is paradoxical, because on the one hand it seems to indicate ‘sensitive periods’, 
while it on the other hand indicates ‘closing windows’ adherent to critical periods. (Besides, the idea of a ‘sensitive’ window is 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ͕ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ǁŝŶĚŽǁ ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ĂƐ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ŽƉĞŶ Žƌ ĐůŽƐĞĚ о ŶŽƚ ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ͘Ϳ tŝƚŚŝŶ
educational neuroscience’s academic level it is agreed that cognitive development should be seen as sensitive periods rather than 
critical periods and closing windows of time wherein a certain skill must be learned (Blakemore & Frith, 2005a). 
260 
 
be demonstrated by Allen and Smith’s example on the suggested consequences of extreme 
neglect of children: 
[The image] illustrate the negative impact of 
neglect on the developing brain. The CAT 
scan on the left is from a healthy three year 
old child with an average head size (50th per 
centile). The image on the right is from a 
three year old child following severe sensory
deprivation neglect in early childhood whose 
brain is significantly smaller than average 
and has abnormal development of cortex 
(cortical atrophy) and other abnormalities 
suggesting abnormal development of the 
brain (Allen & Smith, 2008, p.59).
The brain image is taken from Perry’s (2002) study on Romanian orphans, and the 
consequences of these orphans experience of physical neglect and sensory deprivation is said 
to be shown in the CAT scan. The problem, though, is that this brain image which compares a 
‘normal’ and an ‘extremely neglected’ child is somewhat questionable in its validity. Gillies 
(2013) notes this and argues that the journal where Perry’s article was published was short 
lived and was, indeed, a “scientifically dubious journal”. Moreover, the article itself is of poor 
quality “providing next to no details of the methodology pursued or the clinical history of the 
children scanned” (Gilles, 2013, p. 9). Consequently, the image of the two children’s brains is 
problematic as evidence, because no explanation of what conditions are defined under 
‘normal’ or ‘extreme neglect’ is provided. Besides, no measurement scale is provided in the 
picture, which makes comparison of the two brains difficult to validate. Overall, then, the 
frequently cited brain image, which originally derives from Perry’s (2002) article, is not a 
scientifically valid image regarding the relation of extreme neglect and brain size225. In 
addition to this, issues arise due to Allen and Smith’s (2008) mis-representation of 
neuroscientific research on synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning (viz. ‘sensitive windows’) in 
                                                          
225 What further is worth mentioning is that this simplistic picture has become a well-cited picture within the political and 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ĨŝĞůĚоƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝŶ ƚĞǆƚǁŚĞƌĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ĞĂƌůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ (e.g. Reilly, 2012; 
Sinclair, 2007). Allen has for instance made the same (and scientifically dubious) picture a cover illustration in the political 
follow-up reports ‘Early Intervention: The Next Steps’ (Allen MP, 2011b) and ‘Early Intervention: Smart Investment, Massive 
saving’s о this time the ‘shrunken brain’ image is coupled with gold-bars representing the cost taxpayers have to pay for 
ineffective early childcare and education interventions (Allen MP, 2011a). Again the problem is that the argumentation 
leans towards misinterpretations of scientific findings, wherein one can see an exaggerated frenzy over a child’s early 
stages of life when it comes to cognitive development.  
261 
 
their argument for early learning, positive stimuli and enriched environments in a child’s early 
phases of life. As previously noted, is it a common agreement within the academic 
educational neuroscientific community that normal upbringing within normal social 
environments is sufficient for normal cognitive development, and that it is more correct 
talking of sensitive periods rather than critical ones (cf. Anderson & Della Sala, 2012; 
Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Howard-Jones, 2010). Allen and Smith (2008) are not alone in 
this misrepresentation and references to the critical early years of children’s life can also be 
seen in many other political texts arguing for social and educational interventions226.
What is also of note regarding Allen and Smith’s (2008) political report is how they 
couple their argument for early intervention with economic models for effective investments.
Particularly is Allen and Smith’s early intervention argument based on the economic model of 
human capital investments by James Heckman and a model recited from Wave Trust:
The picture strongly suggests that an investment fulcrum lies in ‘primary prevention’ focused on ‘at 
risk’ groups under the age of three [graph 1] ... The following graph from the Nobel prize-winning 
economist, James Heckman, tells a similar story by showing the return on investment in learning, by 
age [graph 2] ... The messages contained in these graphs are hardly surprising in light of the fact that the 
human brain has developed to 85 per cent of its potential at age three (and 90 per cent at age four). The 
financial investment is of course important, but only insofar as it maximises the investment in personal 
attention from the caregiver to the 0-3 (Allen & Smith, 2008, pp.46-48 [see graphs below]). 
Graph 1:        Graph 2:
                                                          
226 As seen in US Department of Education (2012), Department for Education (2013b), Department for Education and Teather MP 
(2011), Leadsom MP (2012), The Scottish Government (2013), and US Department of Health & Human Services (2014).  
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One the face of it, this input-output reasoning of brain development and political investments 
may seem plausible, particularly when such illustrative graphs are used. The problem is that 
the validity of the ‘brain-base’ for these two models, and thus also Allen and Smith’s 
argument, can be disputed. Based upon concepts of critical and sensitive periods of brain 
development, Heckman (2008) makes a graphical expression using basic economic models 
which show a significant decrease for public investment after the age of three. The 
conclusion, as argued by Heckman and colleagues, is that “at the youngest ages, it is possible 
to form ability and create the complementarity that characterizes late adolescent and early 
adult human capital investment processes. Thus early interventions targeted toward the 
disadvantaged [those that do not provide enriched environments for their children] can be 
highly effective. Later investments are not” (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, & Masterov, 2006, 
p. 800).
The problem with this, as argued by Howard-Jones (2014b), is that the graphical 
expression of human capital investment (shown by the down-sweeping curve in graph 2) is 
based upon an assumption that the brain is a constantly developing and unitary entity. This is,
however, a misrepresentation of educational neuroscientific research, because scientists say 
that cognitive development in humans occurs at different rates up to early adulthood, 
sometimes occurring in an irregular fashion, and that learning arises from a range of neural 
interconnections covering numerous cognitive skills. Heckman’s model is also a 
mathematical graphical expression, not a graph plotted on the basis of empirical data. This is 
problematic since the entire model, and the respective theory, is based on premises of 
mathematical functions concerning brain development and investment expenditure that are
not correlated with empirical data on children’s cognitive development (Howard-Jones, 
2014b). The neuroscientific underpinning of the model on early investments in 0-3 year olds 
is therefore sparse. I will suggest that similar critique applies to graph 1, since presumably
this model is also based on identical over-simplifications of research on cognitive 
development227. It can therefore be argued that Allen and Smith’s (2008) report has an 
unwarranted basis in educational neuroscientific research; and additionally that Allen and 
Smith contribute to ‘the myth of three’ by using these models in argumentation for early 
intervention policies. This is important considering the authority and potential influence of 
                                                          
227 No references to the primary paper are given in Allen and Smith’s (2008) report, and it is therefore difficult to locate the original 
source which this model is taken from. The two graphs are, however, strikingly similar in their appearance.  
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these authors in their status as policymakers, particularly in view of the number of other 
policy actors who refer to Allen and Smith’s report228.
Overall, my analysis indicates variation in how educational neuroscience is presented 
in political texts: some policymakers suggest representations in agreement with academic 
communities, whereas other present simplistic accounts more resembling neuromyths (see 
table 7.3). A common tendency is that they all re-articulate educational neuroscience within a 
neoliberal rationality. These findings are discussed later in the chapter, as attention is paid to 
issues arising due to policymakers’ influential power as premise contributors to other sectors. 
Interest actors and interest groups 
The last field to be addressed is that related to larger intergovernmental actors and interest 
groups. With this category I attempt to capture larger groups of actors, independent 
institutions, and organizations with an interest in educational neuroscience, but which are 
neither governmental policymakers nor profit-based companies such as brain-based learning 
industries. Interest groups and organizations can play important roles in shaping discourses 
and it is therefore interesting to investigate how educational neuroscience is recontextualised 
within this field. Based on literature searches related to selection criteria for the 
recontextualisation analysis, five interest groups and their respective texts have been selected 
í QDPHO\ &I%7 (GXFDWLRQ 7UXVW (2014), EU (2012), OECD (2007a), The Royal Society 
(2011b), and Wellcome Trust (2014).
If we start by looking at the recontextualisation of how educational neuroscience is 
articulated within the field related to interest actors, findings from the discourse analysis show 
that there are frequent references to topics related to educational neuroscience. All the 
documents use the phrase ‘research has shown’ (i.e. 100 per cent of the texts229) and almost 
all of them use the word ‘evidence’ (i.e. 80 per cent of the texts230). In every text analysed, 
representations of educational neuroscience appear to be nuanced, cautious, and accurate, and 
the texts therefore seem to have a close resemblance to educational neuroscience’s academic 
level. There is a predominance of representations in line with presentations from the academic 
                                                          
228 References are for instance found in The Centre for Social Justice (2011), Department for Education’s Munro review of the child 
protection system in England (Munro, 2011), and MP Leadsom’s ‘Two is Too Late’ conferences (2012), whereupon numerous also 
have recited variations of the (flawed) models and/or the (flawed) brain scan of the ‘neglected child’ shown ĂďŽǀĞоĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐ
Heckman’s model also used by UNICEF and the European Social Observatory (2011).  
229 As seen in CfBT (2014), EU (2012), OECD (2007a), The Royal Society (2011b), and Wellcome Trust (2014). 
230 As seen in CfBT (2014), OECD (2007a), The Royal Society (2011b), and Wellcome Trust (2014). 
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Table 7.3: Examples of how the policymakers represent educational neuroscience [my italics].
Representations wherein one can see a neoliberal vocabulary Repr. where neuroscience is used as a political argument 
“...implement learning assessment systems, and ensure program effectiveness and 
accountability” (US Department of Education, 2012).
“We hope that it offers a clear, evidence-based analysis followed by proven and practical 
actions to improve our society more effectively and less expensively than current policy 
allows” (Allen & Smith, 2008. p.4)
“It costs far more to help a teenager who has become entrenched in the kind of disadvantage 
described above, caught up in negative and destructive cycles of behaviour, than it would to 
stop him or her from falling behind in the first place by helping his or her family at the 
earliest stage of its development” (Allen & Smith, 2008, p.12).
“An evidence base was beginning to accumulate on the fantastic ability of the brain to expand 
in the very early years ... it seemed ever more obvious that if we could equip the parents or 
parent to optimise (usually) maternal responsiveness and their impact on their 0-3 year-old 
children, we would be laying secure and strong foundations for all of the work that the public 
sector did thereafter – in the pre-school, primary and secondary and teenage years. Crucially, 
it would enable public expenditure to become developmental and not just remedial” (Allen & 
Smith, 2008. p.16)
“It was crucial that evidence and insights from the behavioural sciences made an effective 
contribution to policy making ... In addition, the Co-sponsors emphasised the need for 
government to continue raising its game on testing and evaluating interventions so that it can 
really understand what works, and if something does not work, why it does not” (Government 
Office for Science, 2012, p. 2).
“There then followed a lively roundtable discussion on the appropriate role for neuroscience 
evidence for government education policy: ... The important role that long-term economic 
modelling and statistical evidence can play in government policy making was mentioned, for 
example, to determine the real world outcomes of investment in early learning” (Government 
Office for Science, 2012, p. 6).
“This section is based on the basic premise that effective teaching leads to effective learning
... [Chapter 3] looks at the issue of behaviour and behaviour management in the light of 
recent research ... It offers practical advice in the management of pupils with emotional and 
behavioral problems in the classroom and considers how to maximise their learning” 
(TeacherNet, 2007).
Principles and guidelines have been established for universal design in education based on 
decades of research and are known as Universal Design for Learning (UDL). The UDL 
principles reflect the way students take in and process information. Using them to develop 
goals, instructional methods, classroom materials, and assessments, educators can improve 
outcomes for diverse learners by providing fair opportunities for learning by improving access 
to content ... The definition of UDL that appears in the Higher Education opportunity Act of 
2008 (103 U.S.C. § 43) has come to dominate the field because of its broad applicability and 
its research foundation in the learning sciences, both cognitive and neuroscience” (US 
Department of Education, 2010, p.7) 
“Department will promote initiatives that increase access to high-quality programs, improve 
the early learning workforce, build the capacity of states and programs to develop and 
implement comprehensive early learning assessment systems, and ensure program 
effectiveness and accountability” (US Department of Education, 2012).
“David Willetts highlighted the importance of understanding behaviour in order to 
develop sound public policy, particularly in a world where resources are tight and policy 
making is inevitably about trade-offs. Picking up on earlier discussion about the role of 
neuroscience evidence on development in early years had played in public debate on 
education policy and allocation of funds, he emphasised how important it is for the 
external behavioural science community to input to government policy making and to 
challenge government decisions if they believe they are not based on evidence or based 
on partial evidence. He concluded by challenging the behavioural science community to 
further engage with government and communicate what they know more effectively”
(Government Office for Science, 2012, p.7).
“...improving learning in the 
earliest years. The years from 
birth through 8 are the most 
critical for brain development, 
and significant evidence from 
research and evaluation 
demonstrate that participants in 
high-quality early learning 
programs will lead to both short-
and long-term positive outcomes 
for all children” (US 
Department of Education, 2012)
“It is identified in the chart 
below, which graphically 
reveals the correlation between 
age at the point of intervention 
and ease of bringing about 
change in the human brain (...) 
The blue line shows the very 
young brain’s enormous 
capability for change, and how 
this rapidly diminishes well 
before the child starts school. 
The red line shows where we 
spend our money to change 
human behaviour” (Allen & 
Smith, 2008). 
“Neuroscience has drawn 
attention to ... Therefore, the 
most effective learning 
experience are...” (U.S. 
Department of Education,
2010).
“The United States cannot 
prosper economically, 
culturally, or politically if major 
parts of our citizenry lack strong 
educational foundation, yet far 
too many students are not served 
by our current one-size-fit-all 
education system. The learning 
sciences [i.e. cognitive science, 
neuroscience, education, and 
social science; p.5] and 
technology can help us design 
and provide more effective 
learning experiences for all 
learners” (US Department of 
Education, 2010, p.7).
Other:
“Human infants arrive ready to 
be programmed by adults” 
(Allen & Smith, 2008, p.56).
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community of educational neuroscience in all the interest actors’ texts, in contrast to what is 
found in texts within the field of policymakers (where 50 per cent of the texts have more 
academically consistent representations), media (viz. 10 per cent), and the brain-based 
learning industry (viz. 0 per cent). In relation to this, it can also be noted that texts from 
interest groups are in general larger in scope and more comprehensive than texts from the 
other fields. That is to say, four of the interest groups (cf. OECD, CfBT, Royal Society, and 
Wellcome Trust) have instigated extensive projects (with subsequent analysis and reports) 
related to the topic of education and neuroscience. In the course of these projects, actors from 
interest groups have actively engaged and collaborated with researchers from the academic 
discourse. This is seen in the instigation of project-related research workshops, 
transdisciplinary networks, seminars, collaboration with researchers to analyse and write 
reports231, or as noted in the foreword of OECD’s report “The purpose of this novel project 
was to encourage collaboration between learning sciences and brain research on the one hand, 
and researchers and policymakers on the other hand” (2007, p. 3). Dialogue and collaboration 
between interest actors and academics can further be seen in the ways in which educational 
neuroscience is articulated, and helps to explain why the representations presented in interest 
actors’ texts bear closer resemblance to values, ideas, and knowledge found at the academic 
level of the educational neuroscience discourse. This is seen in articulations such as “We
believe that a constructive balance between enthusiasm and scepticism, combined with better 
knowledge exchange between scientists and practitioners…” (Royal Society, 2011b, p. 2),
“We conclude that teachers’ desire to implement interventions based upon neuroscience is 
evident, but it is running ahead of the evidence base” (Wellcome Trust, 2014, p. 1), and as 
demonstrated in the following extract from the OECD:
With such a strRQJIRFXVRQFRJQLWLYHSHUIRUPDQFHíLQFRXQWULHVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\íWKHUHLVWKHULVN
of developing a narrow understanding of what education is for. Far from the focus on the brain 
reinforcing an exclusively cognitive, performance-driven bias, it actually suggests the need for holistic 
approaches, which recognise the close interdependence of physical and intellectual well-being, and the 
close interplay of the emotional and cognitive, the analytical and the creative arts (OECD, 2007, p.154). 
Emphasis on cautious approaches and reciprocal collaboration between educational neuro-
scientists and policymakers is prominent in the academic discourse, in contrast to the fields of 
brain-based learning industries, media, and policymakers. In the field of interest actors 
however, and as the above quotes demonstrate, these notions of caution and collaboration are
                                                          
231 As seen in CfBT (2014), OECD (2007a), Royal Society (2011b), and Wellcome Trust (2014).  
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more detectable. The only exception is the CfBT report (2014) where my discourse analysis 
suggests a notable lack of educators’ view regarding educational neuroscience. The same goes 
for the brief text on an EU webpage (EU, 2012) where some academically inconsistent 
references are presented regarding early stimulating environments, brain development, and 
the critical first three years of a child’s life. 
My analysis further indicates DQRWKHU WHQGHQF\íQDPHO\LQWHUHVWDFWRUV¶ WHQGHQF\WR
couple educational neuroscience with neoliberal rationalities. 80 per cent of the texts analysed 
appear to have a neoliberal vocabulary232, which in turn may be a manifestation of an 
underlying neoliberal rationality found amongst these groups. Just like texts from policy-
makers, the combination of educational neuroscience with neoliberal rationalities is a re-
articulation where the ‘new’ academic level of discourse (i.e. educational neuroscience) is set 
in relation to ‘old’ discursive rationalities in the field of interest actors (i.e. neoliberalism). As 
with policymakers, these interest groups can be seen to be influenced by neoliberal ideas in 
the form of political engagement and/or economic interests (cf. Guile, 2006; Karlsen, 2006; 
Rizvi & Lingard, 2006). Demonstration of interest actors’ re-articulation of educational 
neuroscience in a neoliberal phrasing can for example be seen in CfBT Education Trust’s text 
(2014) where frequently reoccurring expressions such as ‘school effectiveness’, ‘evidence for 
education’, ‘the best effect’, ‘the value of randomised control trials’ and emphasis on the 
‘hard science’ of neuroscience are given. The latter can be seen in the report’s reoccurring 
representations regarding ‘nature of intelligence’ (where is the social aspect?), the claim that 
computer programs can be more cost-effective teachers than human teachers (2014, p. 12; p. 
14), and that no educators or teachers are used in CfBT’s research. The neglect of educational 
and social perspectives, and the promotion of ‘hard-science’ as an evidence base for cost-
effective educational interventions, are interesting, particularly considering that CfBT is an 
educational trust. Other examples of neoliberal vocabulary can be seen in table 7.4 and in the 
following statement:
We are looking for interventions or approaches that use understanding from neuroscience research 
about the mechanisms of learning to improve education ... Successful proposals will build on the 
existing evidence about effective teaching and learning practices, and explain how these practices could 
be made more effective or efficient using evidence from neuroscience (Wellcome Trust, 2014). 
In this extract, it is apparent that neuroscience is seen as an ‘evidence base’ and ‘the scientific 
base’ for education. This is noteworthy, since an emphasis on evidence-based practice and 
                                                          
232 As seen demonstrated in CfBT (2014), EU (2012), OECD (2007a), and Wellcome Trust (2014). 
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policy is a recurring theme in neoliberal ideologies, as revealed in the neoliberal idea “that 
there is ‘one best way’ of doing things revealed through the ‘science’ of society” (Lauder et 
al., 2006, p. 3). Moreover, the neoliberal agenda in education has increasingly become 
focused on effectiveness, outcome measurement, and ultimately social efficiency and social 
benefits (Fairclough, 2005; Rizvi & Lingard, 2006). This neoliberal rationality is also 
manifested in these interest groups’ texts and a recurring argument seems to be that:
i) neuroscience can be an evidence-base for education, which in turn,
ii) can provide answers to the mechanism of learning (cf. ‘what works’), that sequentially,
iii) can craft more effective classroom strategies and improved student outcomes, which overall,
iv) will lead to wider social benefits.
Further, and more critical, discussion of this neoliberal rationale set in relation to the 
educational neuroscience discourse will be presented later in this chapter. 
If we move to questions as to why these interest actors have an interest in educational 
neuroscience, it appears from my analysis that interest actors think that the linkage of 
education and neuroscience could be an important dimension of the study of learning and 
education. The general aim, accordingly, appears to be to inform the public, teachers, and, 
particularly, policymakers with regard to the potential benefits of neuroscience in education. 
Information is chiefly offered by providing comprehensive reports, often written in 
collaboration with scientific communities233. Besides providing information to the public at 
large, another explicit aim of these texts is to create dialogue between researchers and policy-
makers, to help in making evidence-based policy relevant for education234. These aims can be 
demonstrated by the following quote from the Royal Society’s Brain Wave project:
In the module, ‘Neuroscience, Education and Lifelong Learning’ we aim to: i) develop a framework to 
better communicate advances in neuroscience research to policy makers and the teaching community; 
ii) facilitate a dialogue between neuroscientists, policy makers and the teaching community; iii) identify 
current and future impacts of neuroscience research, including wider societal/ethical perspectives and to 
describe these in terms of policy and teaching outcomes (Royal Society, 2011b, p. 27). 
Considering that many of these interest groups have an agenda closely related to a neoliberal 
rationality, one wonders if an underlying, and more ideological, motive for their interest in 
educational neuroscience is to create a socially effective educational system, beneficial for 
knowledge-driven and evidence-based economy within the global marketplace. This notion 
                                                          
233 As seen in CfBT (2014), OECD (2007a), Royal Society (2011b), and Wellcome Trust (2014). 
234 As seen in CfBT (2014), OECD (2007a), EU (2012), Royal Society (2011b), and Wellcome Trust (2014). 
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will, however, be the topic of more critical reflection in the next section, where discussion of 
the previous analytical findings is presented. 
Table 7.3: Examples of how the policymakers represent educational neuroscience [my italics]. 
 
Representations wherein one can see the linkage of educational neuroscience and neoliberal rationality
“We are looking for interventions or approaches that use understanding from neuroscience research 
about the mechanisms of learning to improve education. The interventions or approaches should aim to 
improve pupil attainment, especially that of disadvantaged pupils. Successful proposals will build on the 
existing evidence about effective teaching and learning practices, and explain how these practices could 
be made more effective or efficient using evidence from neuroscience.” (Wellcome Trust, 2013, online).
“The aims of the Wellcome Trust’s Education and Learning Strategy 2010–20 include ‘to explore how 
neuroscience is being used to inform teaching and learning’, ‘to evaluate the strength of the evidence’ 
and, where possible, ‘to develop further investigations into how neuroscience can improve the quality of 
education’” (Wellcome Trust, 2014, p.1)
“Educational neuroscience is generating valuable knowledge to inform educational policy and practice: 
On many questions, neuroscience build on the conclusion of existing knowledge and everyday 
REVHUYDWLRQEXWLWVLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQLVLQHQDEOLQJWKHPRYHIURPFRUUHODWLRQWRFDXVDWLRQí
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHPHFKDQLVPVEHKLQGIDPLOLDUSDWWHUQVíWRKHOSLGHQWLI\HIIHFWLYHVROXWLRQV´(OECD, 
2007, p.17). 
“Growing understanding of the neurological basis of learning could help most individuals to become 
fulfilled and productive members of society who can respond with resilience to changing circumstances 
in their lives” (Royal Society, 2011, p. 19). 
“The report contains important information for teachers, schools and policymakers about where to 
position neuroscience knowledge for best effect in the system and where not to over-emphasise its 
importance” (CfBT, Elwick, 2014, p. 4).
“The [neuroscience] workshops were delivered in two ways, to explore the effectiveness of each 
method. Delivering workshops by computer is a cheaper alternative to training and using ASTs 
[Advanced Skills Teachers] and for budgetary reasons may be favourable to schools” (CfBT, Elwick, 
2014, p. 12).
“But the neuroscientific contribution is important even for results already known because: i) it is 
opening up understanding of “causation” not just “correlation”; and moving important questions from 
the realm of the intuitive or ideological into that of evidence. ii) by revealing the mechanisms through 
which effects are produced, it can help identifying effective interventions and solutions” (OECD, 2007, 
p.153).
This [educational neuroscience] needs to be a reciprocal relationship ... to sustain the continuous, bi-
directional flow of information necessary to support brain-informed, evidence-based educational 
practice ... practitioners should systematically examine their effectiveness and provide classroom results 
as feedback to refine research directions (OECD, 2007, p.158).
At the same time, neuroscientific considerations continue to be only marginally present in policymaking 
... integrating the result of recent scientific breakthroughs in the field could help design more effective 
policies for reducing poverty and social exclusion, but could also be incorporated into policies for public 
health, education and juvenile justice (EU, 2012, p.2).
Strengthening the science base for education: It [neuroscience research] is therefore a tool for science-
based education policy, which can help assess the performance and impact of different educational 
approaches. In addition, neuroscience can provide knowledge of how education offers wider policy 
benefits, in health, employment and wellbeing (Royal Society, 2011, p.19).
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Critical discussion of educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation 
This chapter has so far presented findings from my critical discourse analysis, with the aim of
describing and discussing the ways in which the academic level of educational neuroscience 
is represented, rearticulated and recontextualised within the fields of brain-based learning 
industries, media, policymakers, and interest actors. The remaining sections of this chapter 
will take the analysis and discussion one step further. To start with, the four fields’ different 
recontextualisation processes are seen in relation to one another. Following this, I discuss 
central findings from the analysis in relation to a critical discourse theoretical framework. 
Attention is particularly given to the relationship of educational neuroscience with neoliberal 
ideology, in addition to issues related to representations of education, the learning process, 
and the individual child.
 
Comparison of colonisation-appropriation dialectics  
Recontextualisation of a discourse into other fields can occur through different processes, 
because fields may have dissimilar discursive and structural premises and their social agents 
may act differently when new discourses are incorporated. When investigating how fields 
represent educational neuroscience we can compare their representations in terms of how 
concretely or generally, how scientific or unscientific elements are articulated, what motives 
the actors seems to have with their texts, as well as characteristic ways of arranging, 
explaining, and legitimizing statements (cf. Fairclough, 2003; 2010). Furthermore, and in 
order to capture the nuances of these recontextualisation processes, one can make use of the 
concept Chouliararki and Fairclough (1999) term ‘colonisation-appropriation dialectic’. Here 
the ambivalent character of the process is captured by focusing on how recontextualisation:
- can be seen as the colonisation RI RQH ILHOG E\ DQRWKHU í LQ WKLV UHVSHFW whether educational 
neuroscience appears to have colonised public and political fields;
- can also be seen in how the ‘old’ field appropriates the new discourse í for example, whether public 
and political fields appear to actively adopt and incorporate educational neuroscience into their fields.
The colonisation-appropriation dialectic is essential in a recontextualisation analysis, because 
it accentuates the discourse theoretical notion that there is interaction between discourses. 
Recontextualisation of the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse should 
therefore not be seen as a direct transmission from academia and to other societal fields, 
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because these fields (with their discursive structures and social actors) hold power to change, 
adapt and appropriate aspects of a new discourse into their own. The degree of colonisation
and appropriation will therefore vary across each and every recontextualisation SURFHVV í
sometimes it is the ‘new’ discourse which colonise the ‘old’, or the ‘old’ discourse which
appropriates the ‘new’, unless, of course, the recontextualisation occurs in a more interactive 
colonisation-appropriation dialect between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ discourses. Due to this, the 
concept is further useful as a node for comparison in my analysis, since gradation of 
colonisation-appropriation in recontextualisation processes will also depend upon the relation 
between agents of the ‘new’ educational neuroscience discourse and agents of the ‘old’ 
recontextualising fields (Fairclough, 2010). 
Findings from my discourse analysis show that educational neuroscience is 
recontextualised in both similar and different ways in the fields of brain-based industries, 
media, policymakers, and interest actors. A common tendency within all the four fields is 
references to science, and particularly neuroscience. The majority of these references occur by 
use of phrases like ‘research has shown’ (found in 85 per cent of the texts in corpora), albeit, 
exact literature references to original research papers are seldom provided. Such similarities 
notwithstanding, the academic accuracy and the motive for re-presenting educational 
neuroscientific accounts seem to differ amongst the four fields. Findings show that the brain-
based learning industry has the most inaccurate presentations of educational neuroscience í
evident from the large amount of general, simplistic, unscientific and non-modalised
educational neuroscientific statements found in all of the brain-based educational programs
analysed. Following brain-based educational programs in its academic inaccuracy is the 
media, where 80 per cent of the texts represent educational neuroscience unscientifically or 
SDUWO\XQVFLHQWLILFDOO\íRIWHQE\XVHRIVHQVDWLRQDOKHDGOLQHVDQGVLPSOLVWLFDFFRXQWVTexts 
by policymakers have a more serious appearance than media texts, but one can also here find 
representations in 50 per cent of the texts that are not in line with the academic community of 
educational neuroscience. Of the four fields it is interest actors who have most academic 
accuracy in their presentations, since all texts have representations consistent with 
representations from the academic level of educational neuroscience. 
Difference in academic consistency can further be related to what seems to be the 
actors’ motive for incorporating educational neuroscience and who the texts’ audience appear 
to be. When it comes to brain-based learning industries, I have previously suggested that their 
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motive for using educational neuroscience is to build authority, validation, and a ‘brain-base’ 
for their educational products íZKLFKthey attempt to sell to parents and teachers. I argue that 
a similar motive is found in many media texts, as educational neuroscience seems to be used 
in order to justify sensational stories, which media ‘sell’ to a public audience. When it comes 
to policymakers, it can appear that topics related to educational neuroscience are used as 
political tools in order to validate statements. This time, however, I will suggest that the aim 
of this educational neuroscientific justification is often to ‘sell’ a political argument and/or to 
PRELOLVHSXEOLFVXSSRUWíwhether political arguments to other political actors or justification 
of political initiatives to the public. The motive for interest actors’ use of educational 
neuroscience differs from the three other fields, because it appears that interest actors neither 
use science in order to build validation, nor do they use scientific authority to ‘sell’ 
arguments, products or stories. Instead, it looks as if interest actors work together with 
educational neuroscientific research communities to produce SURMHFWVDQGUHSRUWVíRIWHQZLWK
the explicit aim of informing and building collaboration between researchers and 
policymakers. However, even if the explicit motive is to promote collaboration, one might 
speculate that some of these interest actors have an underlying motive based on the logic of a
neoliberal, globalised and knowledge-driven economy.
Based on these findings, I will draw attention to the different fields’ colonisation-
appropriation gradation in the recontextualisation process of educational neuroscience’s 
academic level. Firstly, the significant amount of scientifically inconsistent representations, 
particularly in brain-based educational programs, media texts, and in some texts by policy-
makers, is, I argue, more suggestive of appropriation strategies rather than colonisation
strategies. This is because one can assume that there would be more scientifically justifiable 
representations in the texts if agents from the academic level had colonised these fields, in 
contrast to cases where external agents adopt ‘new’ educational neuroscientific aspects and 
place these in relation to ‘old’ elements in public and political discourses. Secondly, 
considering that educational neuroscience appears to be used to gain authorisation and 
validation of certain perspectives, one can further argue that these agents have actively 
incorporated ‘new’ discursive DVSHFWVLQWRVWUDWHJLHVSXUVXHGZLWKLQWKHLUµROG¶ILHOGíWKDWLV
to ‘sell’ educational programs (brain-based industries), sensational stories (the media), or 
political arguments and interventions (policymakers). I therefore suggest that 
recontextualisation processes found within brain-based industries, media, and also partly 
within the field of policymakers are dominated by appropriation strategies. The relationship 
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between these agents of these fields and academic agents of educational neuroscience is,
arguably, dominated by a one-way conversation, where educational neuroscience is 
uncritically presented without support from scientists. The field of interest actors is the only 
field that does not appear to be dominated by appropriation strategies and one-way
conversations. Almost all of the interest groups and organizations have, as I have shown, 
more academically respectable representations of educational neuroscience and many even 
explicitly promote collaboration between researchers and policymakers. The majority of 
interest actors have also approached the educational neuroscientific community in order to 
instigate collaborative projects and reports. More balanced appropriation-colonisation
reconciliation strategies are thus found within the field of interest actors, and associations 
between these actors and academic agents resemble relationships of collaboration rather than 
‘one-way dialogues’.
It is important to note whether or not recontextualisation processes between academia 
and social fields are dominated by ‘one-way’ or two-way dialogues. One-way dialogue is 
problematic because it can lead to uncritical readings of scientific literature, unscientific re-
interpretations, and misinformed re-presentations of educational neuroscience. In my text 
material, this is seen in how academically inconsistent and unwarranted VAK-learning styles,
and recommendations for the use of multiple intelligence theories, are promoted by the UK 
Governments teacher platform ‘TeacherNet’. Not only are such unscientific linkages between
neuroscience and education challenging because they reach a large audience; they are also 
problematic in light of the implicit authority policymakers hold in their position. National 
governments, represented by policymakers, are ‘premise contributors’ and have significant 
influence not only when it comes to forming interventions and policies, but also on public 
opinion and knowledge. It is therefore noteworthy that representations not in line with 
educational neuroscientific research are manifested in many political texts and distributed 
through political channels. 
These issues are not only found in the field of policymakers, because brain-based
learning industries and the media make statements which are inconsistent with the academic 
level of educational neuroscience. Even if these fields do not have as significant an influence 
as policymakers, media and brain-based learning industries have a more prominent proportion 
of unscientific information in their texts, and both have a considerable audience in the public 
domain. For example, as Goswami (2006) notes, some teachers receive more than 70 emails a 
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year urging them to buy brain-based educational programs or advising them to sign up to 
courses in brain-based learning. Media texts and brain-based educational programs are, 
furthermore, often presented as ‘undoubted facts’ and scientific explanations behind their 
media stories or learning techniques are often sparse, general, or simplistically presented in 
comparison to the academic level. This complicates the matter, since it become difficult for 
WKHUHDGHUVRIWKHVHWH[WVíwhether SDUHQWVWHDFKHUVVWXGHQWVRURWKHUVíWRLGHQWLI\LOORJLFal
arguments. These outcomes triggered by uncritical representations in the public and political 
level of discourse are challenging, since they can contribute in the distribution of neuromyths 
and edumyths, which, in turn, can reduce the credibility of more academically sound work 
from the educational neuroscience research community. In this respect it is interesting to ask 
why there appear to be so much difficulty in presenting educational neuroscience in 
accordance with what researchers say? And why do some agents, whether journalists, brain-
based learning agencies, policymakers, or perhaps some interest actors, seem to be so 
fascinated by educational neuroscience in the first place? In order to illuminate these 
questions, aspects of causation-correlation translation and the appeal of neuroscientific 
explanation will now be presented.
Correlation versus causation 
Uncritical readings of educational neuroscientific literature and unscientific representations of 
research can frequently be identified in texts within the public and political field, but it would 
be too hasty a judgement to claim that the authors of these texts deliberately misrepresent 
educational neuroscientific statements. There may of course be cases where authors are aware 
that they are ‘twisting the truth’ a bit in order to craft a sensational story, to strengthen an 
argument, or to market educational programs. These deliberate strategies notwithstanding; I 
argue that there are aspects inherent in discursive structures and in ‘the order of things’ which 
may contribute to the (perhaps unintentional) crafting of neuromyths, edumyths, and 
misrepresentations of educational neuroscience (cf. Fairclough, 2010). In order to 
demonstrate my point, I will draw attention to the correlation versus causation problem,
which makes it difficult to represent educational neuroscience in accordance to what 
researchers say. Many texts in the recontextualisation corpora implicitly touch upon the 
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FRUUHODWLRQíFDXVDWLRQ LVVXH235, as they have a tendency to conflate correlational findings to 
causal interpretations and representations. Conflation of correlation to causation can occur 
because researchers who work at the interface of education and neuroscience often present 
their findings as correlational data. When these correlational representations are passed along 
what I call the ‘line of transference’, however, they sometimes become translated into 
causational data by actors outside the research community such as journalists, brain-based 
learning entrepreneurs, or even policymakers and other interest actors. 
What research often demonstrates: correlational data
How research is often represented in academia: correlational representation
How research is often understood externally: causational interpretation
How research is often represented in external texts: causational representations
Figure 7.5: Example of translation inconsistency between correlational data and causational interpretations.
The difference between ‘correlation’ and ‘causation’ is significant, because whereas the term 
correlation indicates that X can be significantly associated with Y, the term causation has a 
more substantial denotation since it states that X causes Y. Confusion of correlational and 
causational factors can occur due to various reasoning errors, where the most basic example is 
when one mixes up the meaning of ‘being associated with’ and ‘being a cause of’. This 
logical error can be exemplified by an example, where ‘pedestrians walking when the signal 
is red’ (X) is correlated with getting ‘hit by a car’ (Y), but the statement get a completely 
different meaning if one says that ‘walking when the signal is red’ (X) causes one to be ‘hit 
by a car’ (Y). Everyone who has been in a hurry, or crossed a quiet street in the middle of the 
night, knows for sure that one can cross on red light without being knocked down by a car 
(although, of course, it is still not advisable). Another and more complicated reasoning 
fallacy, which confuses correlational factors and causational factors, is called the syllogistic 
fallacy. The formal structure of this fallacy, also known as ‘affirmation of the consequent’, is 
if A is true, then B is true; B is true; therefore A must be true (Hruby, 2012). The issue at 
stake in this reasoning fallacy is that it cripples attempts to identify causation from correlation 
                                                          
235 As seen demonstrated in BBC (2013), Carlyle (2014), James (2014), Jha (2012), Whipple (2012), Wighton (2007), 
Brainboxx (2014), Brain Gym (2014), Scholastic (2014), Kagan (2014), LarningRx (2014), and Allen and Smith (2008).  
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data, in that one uses a faulty logic of reverse inference: ‘A causes B’ is distorted to also 
imply ‘B causes A’. An example of such incorrect circular reasoning might be: if your car is 
out of fuel (A), it will not run (B); and your car does not run (B), therefore it must be out of 
fuel (A). The problem with this reverse inference is that there can be other valid and possible 
explanations for a broken-down car (Hruby, 2012), but when making a syllogistic fallacy one 
conflates the correlation data into causation data and thus makes an incorrect circular 
reasoning. In my text material, some examples of logical fallacies of correlation-causation 
conflation include how neuroscientific correlational data between gum chewing and increased 
blood flow in the brain is transferred to causational data between gum chewing and improved 
memory (seen in Wighton, 2007), and texts where rats’ brain development and deprived 
laboratory environment is presented as a causational link between enriched home 
environments and a child’s cognitive development (seen in James, 2014; Kagan, 2014). The 
scientific underpinning is indeed educational neuroscience, but I argue that the transfer of 
scientific data is faulty. In texts where this is the case, brain-based learning entrepreneurs, 
journalist, or even policymakers and interest actors have ended up making statements with a 
core of truth, but their presentations are far removed from the more scientific presentations 
found at the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse.  
One can easily, and unintentionally, suggest faulty reasoning and neuromyths by 
confusing correlational data with causational data, and such flawed reasoning seems to occur 
when educational neuroscientific research are recontextualised into public and political 
fields236. The resulting question is why these reasoning fallacies tend to arise along the 
transference line of educational neuroscience? Why is correlation versus causation a problem 
when it comes to the recontextualisation of educational neuroscience over structural borders
and into other fields? One possible explanation is that most neuroscientific research and 
neuroimaging data is correlational data. Since most neuroscientific researches do not provide 
information about causation, this makes them susceptible to transfer error, where correlation 
is confused with causation (Goswami 2008; Hruby 2012). Additionally, causal data appear to 
be more ‘appealing’ than correlational data (Weisberg et al., 2008). The appeal of 
neuroscientific data will be explained in the next sub-section, but for now it can be noted that 
the seemingly more ‘scientific’ and ‘definite’ trait of causational neuroscientific data often 
appears more attractive than ‘vague’ correlational data (Weisberg et al., 2008). Another 
                                                          
236 As seen in BBC (2013), Carlyle (2014), James (2014), Jha (2012), Whipple (2012), Wighton (2007), Brainboxx (2014), Brain 
Gym (2014), Scholastic (2014), Kagan (2014), LarningRx (2014), and Allen and Smith (2008).  
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factor, which can help to illuminate the correlation-causation error, as mentioned in chapter 6, 
is that neuroscientists often use technical language, which can be difficult for actors outside 
the neuroscientific discipline to understand. In accordance with critical discourse theories, 
technical language, jargon, and vocabularies can make a field inaccessible for people outside 
the discipline, and in previous discussions it was shown how this can appear to be the case 
within the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. The problem is therefore 
that errors of correlation-causation reasoning are more liable to result in transfer errors, since 
neuroscience’s technical language makes it difficult for non-experts to distinguish causation 
from correlation (Hruby 2012). Considering that external actors from the media, brain-based
learning industries, policymakers and other interest groups are not necessarily experts in 
either neuroscience or education, there is a potential risk that transfer errors occur when they 
appropriate educational neuroscience into their fields. 
 
The appeal of neuroscience  
In order to clarify public and political actors’ tendency to misrepresent educational 
neuroscientific research, another aspect identified in my text material can be deployed í
namely what has been called the seductive allure of neuroscientific explanations. This 
expression is somewhat of a catchphrase within parts of the educational neuroscience 
discourse, as it describes the fascinating appearance neuroscientific explanations and brain 
images seem to have. The phrase was originally suggested by Weisberg and colleagues 
(2008), when they examined why explanations with neuroscientific information seem to 
generate more public interest than explanations without neuroscientific information. In order 
to test whether neuroscientific explanations interfered with people’s ability to critically 
evaluate the logic of an explanation, groups of ‘naïve adults’, ‘students on neuroscience 
courses’, and ‘neuroscience experts’ were given similar explanation assessment tasks 
(Weisberg et al., 2008). The findings were remarkable, showing that neuroscience 
explanations do indeed appear to be appealing, especially to laypersons and students:
Our most important finding concerns the effect that explanatorily irrelevant neuroscience information 
has on subject’s judgements of the explanations. For novices and students, the addition of such 
neuroscience information encouraged them to judge the explanations more favourably, particularly bad 
explanations ... The students in the cognitive neuroscience class showed no benefit from training, 
demonstrating that only a semester’s worth of instruction is not enough to dispel the effect of 
neuroscience information on judgements of explanations (Weisberg et al., 2008, p. 7).
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Weisberg and colleagues’ research show how non-experts tend to judge neuroscientific 
explanation more favourably than experts in cognitive neuroscience. Other authors have 
expounded on the findings by Weisberg et al. (2008) and related these notions more explicitly 
to the case of educational neuroscience. There is often talk of a ‘neuromania’ which affect 
both sciences and the general public, and how ‘the brain-hype’ and fascinating brain images 
seems to enthral part of the educational community, the public society and popular culture 
(Hardiman et al., 2012; Pasquinelli, 2011).
These views correspond well with my findings concerning recontextualisation of the 
educational neuroscience’s academic level, and thus a clarification of ‘neuroscience’s 
persuasive appeal’ may help to shed light upon the tendency to misrepresent scientific 
research within the public and the political levels of discourse. One useful example in this 
respect is how brain images used in educational neuroscientific research can lead to 
translation errors when interpreted by non-experts. Brain images are commonly used in 
neuroscientific studies as a way to present research findings from brain scans technologies 
such as fMRI and PET scans. By scanning the brains of participants when they execute 
cognitive tasks, such as working memory assignments or linguistic tasks, one can identify 
brain areas activated during the performance by measuring changes in metabolism correlated 
with neural activity (Gazzaniga et al., 2009)237. After decoding and comparing different brain 
scans from a study, some revised brain images are often presented where brain areas 
associated with the relevant cognitive task are shown (see figure 7.6). 
Figure 7.6: This brain image is 
just an example of how fMRI scans 
commonly are presented in order 
to show activity in different brain 
areas during cognitive tasks.
                                                          
237 See the glossary in appendix A for further explanation on fMRI and PET-scan. 
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What appears to be problematic with brain images, and what complicates the transfer of 
educational neuroscientific research, is that these images are often misinterpreted and given 
undue salience. Misinterpretations can, first of all, arise because one can get the impression 
that a brain image presents the exact brain area responsible for ‘naming letters’, ‘reading’, or 
‘recalling memories’. That is, however, not the case. Brain images are correlational data, not 
causational data, because they “identify anatomical correlates of cognitive processes” 
(Gazzaniga et al., 2009, p. 152). This implies that brain areas identified in scans are the 
regions in the brain most significantly associated with a specific cognitive task function. This 
does not mean that these brain areas exclusively govern a certain cognitive function, because 
other areas may be responsible for this cognitive function. 
A second misconception, which is related to the first, is that brain images can give the 
impression that only parts of the brain are activated at any given time. Again, this is a 
misinterpretation, because the brain does not execute only one specified task at a time. The 
brain is multi-functional and can cope with numerous tasks simultaneously, so there will 
always be neural activity in every part of the brain no matter what cognitive-specific task is 
being performed (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). For example, if a person is engaged in a difficult 
object-recognition task, one may detect activation in task-specific brain regions, but neural 
activation may also be located in other areas related to visual stimuli processing, pattern 
recognition, naming of colours, and even long-term memory recall of similar objects seen in 
the past. Additionally, there will be neural activity in the brain regions for somatosensory 
inputs (e.g. information about touch, temperature, and limb position) and for the autonomic 
nervous system (which controls activities of the heart), not to mention other brain regions,
which may be activated if the participant is uncomfortable in the noisy fMRI machine or if 
they are hungry and start thinking about what to eat for lunch. All these neural activities are 
detected in brain scans, but to avoid cluttered and unreadable images all non-related activities 
are excluded so that only neural activity related to the task-specific performance is shown 
(Gazzaniga et al., 2009).
A third misinterpretation is that brain images are photographs of a single brain scan. 
This is not the case, because brain images undergo processes of subtractions where non-task 
activDWLRQVDUHH[FOXGHGíLWLVWKHUHIRUHQRWDVQDSVKRWRIDEUDLQSHUVHEXWUDWKHUDPRGLILHG
image. Moreover, the final brain image presented is usually not a photograph from one 
person’s brain scan, but rather a fusion of all the participations’ brains scans in a specific 
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study. This fusion is done in order to correlate overlapping brain areas with neural activity for 
a cognitive task, and thus exclude areas which may have been involved due to other and 
‘interfering’ non-task activities. The making of a single brain image therefore implies a
complex process of normalisation, subtraction, and extraction of neural data. Brain images are 
therefore far from real life ‘photographs’ of a single brain and should be understood as 
models, which represent areas of statistical significance for anatomical correlation to 
cognitive processes (Gazzaniga et al., 2009; Pasquinelli, 2011). Considering that brain images 
resemble more a basic map of brain activity statistically correlated with a cognitive task, it is 
further disputed as to whether these technical images can really say something about our 
complex cognitive processes. In this respect it has been noted that use of brain scans is like 
trying to comprehend how a complex organisation works just by measuring electricity usage 
in different offices í such measurements can tell us something about how activity is 
distributed and varies over time, but would say less about the actual work being done (Wastell 
& White, 2012).
Brain images therefore have certain implications and limitations, and these are usually 
acknowledged by educational neuroscientists when they present and interpret such models. 
However, the problem with brain images, as with neuroscientific explanations, is that non-
experts are seldom aware of the complex processes these models represent. Experts in 
neuroscience are able to pick up on the correlational data and subtle nuances implied by these 
images, whilst laypersons in public and political fields may readily simplify, overlook, 
misinterpret, and confuse neuroscientific correlational data with causational neuroscientific 
explanations. If one also considers the persuasive appeal of neuroscientific explanation, it is 
understandable that misrepresentation occurs. Overall, and seeing that similar types of 
transfer error can be identified in 100 per cent of the brain-based educational programs, in 60 
per cent of the media texts, and in 50 per cent of texts by policymakers in my study, this is 
significant. Even if it is difficult to assess the degree of intentional misrepresentation in the 
discourse of public and political actors, ideas regarding the persuasive appeal of complicated 
educational neuroscientific research can help to clarify how misinterpretations can also appear 
unintentionally when educational neuroscience is recontextualised to other fields.  
Non-experts are liable to misrepresent educational neuroscience, and I argue that 
certain issues arise when such misrepresentations occur in public and political fields. One 
central aspect, which complicates the matter, is that brain-based learning industries, media, 
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and political agents’ interpretations of educational neuroscience are often distributed in 
political reports, pop-science articles, brain-based educational programs, in news articles and 
other mass-media texts. If these actors’ interpretations of science are not in line with those of 
the academic community, misconceptions of educational neuroscience are in danger of being 
distributed to a large audience. Moreover, if certain sets of educational neuroscientific 
misinterpretations are repeatedly disseminated within societal discourse there is a probability ,
in accordance with critical discourse theories (cf. Fairclough, 2010), that these narratives
become part of common public knowledge and beliefs. Mass-dispersion of popularised neuro-
ideas not only spreads inaccurate ‘brain facts’ within the public discourse, but also 
complicates the situation for educational practitioners, because popular understanding is liable 
to influence knowledge and practice at the level of teachers, students, and school 
DGPLQLVWUDWRUV )DXOW\ UHDVRQLQJ DQG UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK WKH DFDGHPLF OHYHOí
intentional or otherwise í can therefore have significant consequences, because educational 
neuroscientific research often ends up at the level of the classroom, where its applications 
ultimately affect children and teachers. When correlational data in educational neuroscientific 
research communities becomes distorted into apparently robust causal representations and 
interpretations at the public and political level, this can give rise to dissonance regarding the 
assumed implications and effects educational neuroscientific findings can have for 
educational practice. 
In relation to the academic level of educational neuroscience this is important, because 
numerous researchers emphasise that educational neuroscience encompasses different levels 
of analysis and, hence, that there is a ‘gap’ between findings related to microbiological 
processes in the brain and more social and practical aspects in educational settings. This ‘gap’ 
does not mean that cognitive neuroscientific research and educational research cannot be 
interlinked, but nor does it imply that neuroscientific explanations can be translated directly 
into causal explanations, implications, and effects on educational practice. Instead, numerous 
academics argue that one has to be careful when connecting aspects from different levels, so 
that one does not reduce explanations from one level to explanations in another.
Neoliberal ideologies in text, discursive practice, and social practice 
Within critical discourse theories, the relation between text, discursive practice, and social 
practice is essential, because it captures how discursive and social practices are manifested in 
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linguistic form (Fairclough, 1992). The critical aspect of discourse analysis is often linked to 
this aspect, and here discursive aspects are often related to ideology and power. In doing so, 
Fairclough draws upon a critical concept of ideology and understands “ideologies to be 
significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relation, social identities), 
which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practice, and 
which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination” 
(Fairclough, 1992, 2010). In the following sections the recontextualisation of the academic 
level of educational neuroscience to the public and political level is examined using this 
framework. Attention will therefore be given to traces of ideology found in the public and 
political fields’ representations of educational neuroscience (i.e. texts), and how this may 
reveal certain constructions of social relations and identities pertaining to the discourse of 
educational neuroscience (i.e. discursive and social practice). The first section will focus on 
the linkage of educational neuroscience and neoliberalism found in the political field, whereas 
the last section will elaborate upon how neoliberal rationalities within the public field can be 
seen to influence understandings of educational practice, identities, and relations between 
parents and children.
The product of learning versus the process of learning 
Findings from my discourse analysis show how aspects related to educational neuroscience 
are particularly related to a neoliberal rationality amongst policymakers (seen in 100 per cent
of the texts) and amongst interest actors (seen in 80 per cent of the texts). A critical question
is therefore whether neoliberal rationality contributes to constructing our understanding of 
educational neuroscience? I begin by examining the ways in which neoliberalism has been 
combined with educational neuroscience in the political field. I have previously noted how 
this can be seen manifested in a particular, recurring argument: Firstly, it is argued by policy 
actors that neuroscience can be seen as a new ‘science of learning’ which can serve as an 
evidence-base for education. It is further argued that by providing new insights into how 
people learn í WKH PHFKDQLVP RI OHDUQLQJ í QHXURVFLHQFH FDQ SURYLGH DQVZHUV WR µZKDW
works’ in education. This new evidence-base for educational practice can further contribute to
crafting more effective classroom strategies and improving students’ academic outcomes. 
Improved student outcomes are profitable for the child’s success in education and also later in 
life, it is argued, and this will ultimately benefit society as a whole in the form of a better 
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workforce and growth of the nation’s human capital238. In this neoliberal agenda at the 
political level, it appears that attention is focused on evidence-based education, effectiveness, 
and outcome measurement of the products of learning. 
A neoliberal agenda with an economic logic and focus on the outcomes of learning is, 
however, not new within educational policy and has been associated with governmental 
policymakers and intergovernmental actors since the early 1990s. When it comes to policy-
makers, it has been noted how “education [is made] a function of economic policy in the 
knowledge economy” (Rizvi & Lingard, 2006, p. 259). Numerous authors concur and argue 
that education is influenced by neoliberal market mechanisms, as policymakers submit to 
principles of efficiency, input-output applications, national competitiveness, concepts of the 
knowledge economy, standards-based accountability systems, privatisation, decentralisation,
and calls for evidence-based practice (Bridges, 2008; Feuer, Towne, & Shavelson, 2002;
Lauder et al., 2006). It is similarly claimed that interest actors and intergovernmental 
organizations such as the EU and OECD have neoliberal educational policies (Guile, 2006;
Karlsen, 2006; Rutkowski, 2007), and that:
…the OECD agenda in education has increasingly become tilted towards social efficiency, as it has 
promoted a particular ideological view of educational aims linked to the requirements of a global
knowledge economy and a range of ideas about educational governance derived from the new theories 
of public management, which increasingly promote corporatized and privatized administration of 
education, outcome measures, and knowledge as commodity (Rizvi & Lingard, 2006, p. 248).
Fairclough (2003, p. 58) also elaborates upon the neoliberal economic and political discourse 
seen in educational fields, and notes how this ideology’s value system is highly associated 
with the assumption that “anything which enhances ‘efficiency and adaptability’ is desirable”. 
Despite its solid position as a political ideology, the neoliberal agenda in education has been
met with a mixed welcome and has created profound debate since its arrival in the early 
1990s. The dispute can be understood as a tension between those who promote neoliberal and 
economic agendas in education, and those who support more social democratic values in 
educational affairs. Lauder and colleagues (2006) encapsulate the debate by noting that: 
…contemporary societies are marked by deep tension and contradictions between the notions of 
education and democratization and global change ... First, it has become increasingly clear that a 
QXPEHU RI LGHDV DVVRFLDWHGZLWK SURJUHVVLYH VFKRROLQJ í VXFK DV LQFOXVLRQ í KDYH ODSVHG DV QDWLRQ-
states focus on the role of education in global economic competition and in particular with raising 
                                                          
238 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), Federal Register (2001), Government Office for Science (2012), TeacherNet (2007), US 
Department of Education (2010), and US Department of Education (2012).  
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‘standards’ ... Secondly, the focus on skill-based education has marginalized the diverse forms of 
cultural knowledge available to students in schools and higher education (Lauder et al., 2006, p. 19).
Those who advocate neoliberal management methods in education argues that (some) market 
mechanisms are beneficial, since free market competition and consumer choice in the 
educational sector will contribute to improving the quality of educational services. Emphasis 
is often put on rigid and effective research into ‘what works’ in education since “a focus on 
rigorous experiments evaluating replicable programs and practices is essential to build 
confidence in educational research among policymakers and educators” (Slavin, 2002, p. 15).
On the other hand, those who are against neoliberal models argue that economic logic has 
nothing to do with social fields such as education. Schools, teachers, and particularly pupils 
ought to be shielded from competition, efficiency, standardised testing, accountability, and 
input-output regulation, such as documentation of investment and results. Focus on efficiency, 
rigid definitions of evidence, ‘what works’, and universal classroom designs reduce the 
complex nature of education to a narrowly defined ‘gold standard’ for classroom practice. It is 
further argued that by perceiving education as business íZKLFKRXJKWWREHHYLGHQFH-based 
DQGJRYHUQHGE\HFRQRPLFPDUNHWSULQFLSOHVíHGXFDWLRQWKHFKLOGDQGWKHOHDUQLQJSURFHVV
are placed in an instrumental frame (Biesta, 2007; Fairclough, 2003). The problem is that 
attention is no longer focused on the process of learning, but rather on standardised tests of 
the outcomes of learning, which in turn measure whether education is efficient and profitable 
(Hardiman et al., 2012). But can the quality of education be measured by pupils’ test scores? 
Is the grade of a B or an A on standardised math tests indicative of effective education, and is 
it reasonable to compare and rank different school areas (and even nations) based on pupils’
test scores? What about the learning process itself? Is it not this, rather than final test 
measurements, that should be indicative of good education? And what about factors which are 
GLIILFXOW WR PHDVXUH E\ VWDQGDUGLVHG WHVWV í VXFK DV the ability to cooperate, aspects of 
creativity, and values such as justice anGGHPRFUDF\íZLOOWKHVHEHFRPHOHVVLPSRUWDQWXQGHU
the ‘teach to the test’ regime? Indeed, the overall problem is not so much with measurements 
of learning outcomes per se, but rather with the underlying shift in ideology of which this 
instrumental input-output measurement forms a part, since essential values and social 
principles of education are at risk of succumbing to neoliberal influences. 
In light of this, I argue that certain issues arise when the academic level of educational 
neuroscience is recontextualised and associated with neoliberal rationalities within the 
political level. Firstly, difficulties arise due to political neoliberal rationality and its focus on 
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evidence-based educational practice. Neuroscience is, as indicated by my findings, often 
perceived as a suitable scientific basis for educational practice. Already we run into problems,
because what is perceived as ‘evidence’ differs between political actors, educationalists and 
neuroscientists. Political fields with strong neoliberal agendas often hold rather narrow 
definitions of ‘evidence’, which is understood to mean findings from robust scientific 
research, preferably conducted by use of the ‘gold standard’ of randomised control trials 
(RCT). It is further posited that evidence from such research will tell us ‘what works’ in 
education, so that one can initiate efficient and universally designed education practices for 
improved teaching and learning (Biesta, 2007; Wastell & White, 2012). Emphasis on such a
narrow definition of ‘evidence’ can be illustrated by the US Federal Register’s notice for 
research grants on their educational neuroscience project where, under ‘priority’ for project 
applications, it is noted that “For research questions that cannot be answered using a 
randomized assignment experimental design, the proposal should spell out the reason why 
such a design is not applicable and why it would not represent a superior approach” (Federal 
Register, 2001, p. 66252). Similar emphasis on robust evidence which can provide effective 
strategies and ‘what works’ can also be seen in a political text by the US Department of 
Education (2010, p. 7), where it is noted how neuroscience and cognitive science can help in 
making “universal designs for learning” that will provide “more effective learning 
experiences”, and in the following text extract from CfBT Educational Trust’s report: 
To date, despite the growing literature, there has been little robust research into where to position 
neuroscience knowledge and how to use it. Even the most ardent enthusiasts have limited themselves to 
action research-style project designs with groups of enthusiastic teachers. This innovative research 
project used a randomised control trial in order to assess the value of neuroscience teaching among Year 
7 pupils, and present some encouraging findings in terms of the effect such teaching might have on 
pupil’s beliefs about their own intelligence. The report contains important information for teachers, 
schools and policymakers about where to position neuroscience knowledge for best effect in the system 
(CfBT, 2014, p. 4). 
My argument is that narrow definitions of evidence are partly associated with neuroscientific,
rather than educational, research. This is because the nature of neuroscience is more open to 
‘robust’ research methods such as RCTs with laboratory setups, easily controlled factors, and 
their provision of ‘cause-and-effect answers’. Much educational research, however, is unable
to satisfy neoliberal standards for what counts as evidence. Not only is much educational 
research focused on qualitative modes of study, but the nature of education is also closely 
interrelated to studies of complex social matters which are difficult to condense within 
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randomised control trials. I will therefore suggest that the supposed ‘robustness’ of 
neuroscience over educational research helps to explain why numerous policy actors give 
credence to neuroscience as a promising ‘evidence base’ for education. 
Overall, what appears to be a problem is that what counts as ‘evidence’ within the 
political neoliberal field is often in conflict with the perceptions of the educational 
neuroscientific research community. Indeed, neuroscientific research makes more use of
laboratory research, confined factors, and randomised control trials. But within the 
contemporary academic level of educational neuroscience, it is felt that neuroscience neither 
provides ‘cause-and-effect answers’ for how we learn (cf. the discussion regarding causation-
correlation), nor does it provide universal designs for ‘what works’ in education (cf. Anderson 
& Della Sala, 2012; Blakemore & Frith, 2005a). Moreover, the academic level of educational 
neuroscience has a central focus on education and its research is therefore also concerned 
with social factors and variables that naturally occur in social contexts related to the learning 
process. In consideration of the double-sided nature of the discipline, I argue that what ought
to be perceived as ‘evidence’ within the educational neuroscience discourse does not
necessarily coincide with narrow definitions of evidence found within a neoliberal and 
political level of discourse. This is because narrow definitions of evidence will favour
neuroscientific research and constricted educational research methods (such as RCTs), at the
expense of more complex and qualitative educational research. In light of this argument, 
political and neoliberal calls for neuroscience to be used as an ‘evidence-base’ for education 
is controversial, particularly if these calls are founded on a narrow definition of ‘evidence’. I
argue that educational neuroscience draws strength from its complex nature, combining 
natural and social aspects of learning, but if the discourse wants to maintain its integrity as a 
transdisciplinary discipline, its members ought to be wary of underlying political and 
ideological currents, which can impede the discipline’s complex social and educational 
perspectives. 
This brings us to my second claim, as I argue that certain issues also arise when 
political neoliberal ideologies in turn influence the academic level of the educational 
QHXURVFLHQFHGLVFRXUVHíSDUWLFXODUO\LIDFWRUVtherein are unaware of the implicit difficulties 
created by a neoliberal value system. What I mean by this is that discourses are liable to 
influence one another, and thus one can suggest that it is not only educational neuroscience 
that is recontextualised within the political field, but also that aspects of the political and 
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neoliberal discourse will influence the academic level (cf. Fairclough, 2010). This appears to 
be the case, because if we look back at texts analysed in the hegemony chapter, one sees that 
numerous texts from the academic level of discourse have traces of neoliberal vocabulary and 
rationality. This is evident both implicitly and explicitly in texts, for instance in the following
academic statement which calls for a rigorous neuroscientific evidence-base for education: 
Knowledge- and evidence-based approaches to education put forward the fact that educational systems 
are inadequate to provide an answer to the challenges of the 21st century and claim that education 
should be guided by scientific principles rather than by intuition and professional wisdom only (or, 
worse, by tradition) ... The time has come for a new science of learning to rise, which is structured 
around cognitive and neuroscience, investigates topics that stem from educational problems, and rests
on rigorous forms of in-laboratory and in-vivo evaluation (Pasquinelli, 2011, p. 186 [sic.]).
Tommerdahl (2010, p. 107) uses similar neoliberal and political rhetoric for the “foundation 
of the new science of evidence-based education”. Ansari and colleagues (2012, p. 107) also 
talk of evidence-based education, noting that “neuroscience is one of the fields of inquiry that 
funding agencies and policymakers have turned to for answers to large-scale educational 
problems”. Carew and Magsamen (2011) appeal to political neoliberal ideologies by claiming 
that ‘Neuro-Education’ can create more effective teaching methods, better curricula, and 
ultimately inform and transform educational policy. Finally, Goswami (2008 p. 396) stresses
how cognitive neuroscience “enables an evidence base for education in which mechanisms of 
learning can be precisely understood”. Traces of neoliberal ideology are therefore also 
manifested within the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse. 
The central and critical question is whether this neoliberal undertone is intentionally 
used by these academic actors as a socio-political argument for neoliberal ideologies, or if 
these authors merely use contemporary ‘catchphrases’ without being aware of the neoliberal 
ideology which lies behind the idioms. If the former is the case, and educational 
neuroscientific actors deliberately make use of a neoliberal agenda, then this can be seen as a 
strategy for manifesting an ideological premise within their text. However, if actors 
unintentionally make use of neoliberal phrasings, then this may indicate that the academic 
level of the educational neuroscience discourse is under the influence of political and 
neoliberal ideologies without being aware of it or the implications of these ideological 
rationalities. Unintentional adoption of ideological undercurrents by academics may be
understandable, if one considers that policymakers and interest actors often initiate substantial 
research projects and UHVHDUFKJUDQWVíRIWHQZLWKFRPSUHKHQVLYHGLUHFWLYHVIRUWKHintended 
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research. Since research directives are liable to echo political ideology and perspectives – for 
example by emphasising rigorous methods like RCT (seen in CfBT, 2014, and Federal 
Register, 2001 í DFDGHPLFV PD\ also readily adopt such perspectives as a strategy for 
obtaining research grants. I argue that what is problematic with an uncritical adoption of 
ideological rationalities is that educational neuroscientists may manifest and reproduce 
neoliberal rationalities within their discourse but without being aware of the implicit premises 
of this ideology.
I suggest that unintentional ideological adoption frequently happens, considering that 
numerous authors within the academic level of the educational neuroscience discourse 
implicitly hold dual ideological perspectives. On the one hand, it is common within the 
educational neuroscience discourse to emphasise reciprocal collaboration between 
neuroscience and education, and the important perspectives on complex social relations
within the learning process which educational researchers and practitioners can contribute 239.
It is therefore a paradox that the same educational neuroscientific community also echoes
neoliberal rationalities, with an instrumental focus on ‘evidence-base’, ‘outcome 
measurements’, the ‘science of learning’, ‘rigorous laboratory-research’ with ‘randomised 
controlled trials’, and research into the ‘the mechanism of learning’240. Within the educational 
field, where debates concerning the logic of the knowledge economy have simmered since the 
1990s, these ‘buzz words’ are strongly associated with neoliberalism. Moreover, many 
educationalists see this neoliberal rationality as constructing an instrumental and simplistic 
understanding of educational research, the learning child, complex social relations, and a 
reduction of the learning process to learning outcomes. It is understandable that many 
educational neuroscientists, particularly those with a neuroscientific or psychological 
background who may not have encountered this ideological debate, adopt ideological 
rationalities without being aware of the longstanding controversy around them. Nevertheless, 
I argue that it is important for members of the educational neuroscientific community to 
become critically aware of their own ideological positioning, so that they not unintentionally 
undermine values important for education241. Instead of uncritically reproducing neoliberal 
ideologies, I suggest that actors from educational neuroscience’s academic level have a
significant opportunity to contribute to a shift in focus. Not only can the discourse’s
                                                          
239 E.g. as seen in Varma et al. (2008), Goswami (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), and Stein and Fischer (2011).  
240 E.g. as seen in Pasquinelli (2011), Ansari etal. (2012), Tommerdahl (2010), Goswami (2008), Carew & Magsamen (2011). 
241 This is also of note with regards to the resistance educational neuroscience meets within the educational sphere.  
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highlighting of the complex and variable social side of education act as a counterweight to a
strict and narrow neoliberal focus, but educational neuroscience’s aim of understanding how 
ZH OHDUQí LHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKHprocess RI OHDUQLQJí FDQalso help to counterbalance the
neoliberal focus on the products of learning and test scores (cf. Hardiman et al., 2012). The 
discourse of educational neuroscience is still in its early stages and as an academic and 
reciprocal cross-disciplinary endeavour, I suggest it can benefit by discussing its educational 
and political ideological orientation, instead of uncritically accepting ideologies suggested by 
intergovernmental organizations and policymakers. 
Reduction of the learning process and the individual child 
Whereas policymakers and interest actors at the political level tend to couple educational 
neuroscience with a neoliberal rationality, findings from my analysis indicate other tendencies 
at the field of media and brain-based learning industries. These two public fields have, as 
already shown, the greatest number of unscientific representations of educational 
QHXURVFLHQFH í IRU H[DPSOH, in simplistic presentations of science used in order to sell 
sensational stories or brain-based learning programs. Within a critical discourse analytical 
framework, frequent misrepresentations are significant, because these can contribute to the 
construction of certain understandings of reality (cf. Fairclough, 2010). The issue I want to 
highlight in the following section concerns the ways in which media and the brain-based 
learning industry tend to depict the individual child and the learning process, and how this in 
turn can construct certain social practices by implicitly defining social relations and identities. 
My argument, based on my discourse analytical findings, is that these two fields 
repeatedly reduce both the learning process and the individual child to mechanical and 
instrumental conceptions. This instrumental perception can particularly be demonstrated by 
two examples from the corpora. Firstly, it is evident that the individual child is conflated to 
properties of his or her brain, for instance by attributing personal skills to aspects of the brain.
Conflation of the whole (the learning child) to one of its parts (the brain) is seen in several 
media texts and brain-based educational programs, revealed in statements like “focus on 
activities that students’ brains enjoy doing” (Kagan, 2014), “feed your brain ... dehydration is 
bad news for your brain” (Wighton, 2007), “how to teach young brains” (Carey, 2009), and 
“it is your sequential, time-oriented left hemisphere which tells you how to think” (Scholastic, 
2014) (see also table 7.1 and 7.2). Secondly, instrumental perceptions of the child and 
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learning processes are seen in how cognition and learning are presented as something 
mechanical, objectified and almost external to the learner, evident in statements like “we can 
actually grow better brains in our children” (Kagan, 2014), and in how cognition and the brain 
is described as ‘brainpower’ that can be ‘activated’, ‘tuned to perform optimally’, ‘boosted’,
‘generated’ or ‘switched on’ by, for instance, SXVKLQJ FHUWDLQ µEUDLQ EXWWRQV¶ í activities 
which will ultimately “produce shiny, happy children”242.
I argue that instrumental and objectified conceptions of the child and the learning 
process, and the conflation of characteristics of individuals to their brains, are representations 
which are generally in conflict with the views of the academic community of educational 
neuroscience (cf. Kraft 2012; Wall, 2004). Most educational neuroscientists are cautious in 
ascribing characteristics of the individual to her/his brain (Kraft, 2012), since it is 
scientifically meaningless to say that one should “focus on activities that students’ brains
enjoy doing” or “how to teach young brains geometry”. The brain does not have feelings and 
cannot enjoy or dislike anything; nor can it hear what a teacher says or see which geometrical 
figures a teacher draws on the blackboard. The child, on the other hand, has feelings and can 
hear and see and learn. I further argue that it is scientifically illogical to say that one can ‘turn 
on’ cognition in a child. The brain, cognition, and also cognitive development are not 
something that FDQEHVZLWFKHGRQRURIIíLWKDVRQHVWDWHRQO\ZKLFKLVon (one is clinically 
dead otherwise, since bodily functions like breathing and heartbeat cannot function without 
brain activity). ‘Boosting’ and ‘tuning’ of ‘brainpower’ by presenting a child with enriched 
HQYLURQPHQWVRUFHUWDLQVWLPXOLíVXFKDVµEUDLQ-boosting hobbies’ or making them chew gum 
í DOVR FRQWUDGLFW WKH HGXFDWLRQDO QHXURVFLHQce research community’s conception of the 
learner and the learning process. The word ‘brainpower’ is problematic, since the only 
‘power’ one can measure in the brain is the increase or decrease of neural activity in certain 
brain areas (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). Intensification of neural activity in the brain is, however, 
not an indicator for learning or ‘boosted IQ’, because neural activity in different parts of the 
brain will be amplified depending on the activity in progress íwhether singing a song or 
catching a ball. Increases in neural activity often happen automatically and the perception that 
‘brainpower’ is something the child or even parents can boost, just like turning up the stereo, 
does not correspond with what is known in academia. 
                                                          
242 As also demonstrated in BBC (2013), Brain Gym® (2014), Carlyle (2014), James (2014), Kagan (2014), Starskills (2014), 
The Guardian (2004), Wighton (2007), and Whipple (2012). See table 7.1 and 7.2. 
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I further suggest that the main problem with brain-based learning industries and the 
media’s misrepresentations of the brain, cognition, the individual child, and the learning 
process, is that these presentations are liable to construct (unscientific) knowledge of reality. 
Because these texts reach a rather substantial audience, misrepresentations are also liable to 
manifest themselves in discursive and social practices within the public field (cf. Fairclough, 
2010). The critical question, then, is what effects such a mechanical and instrumental focus on 
children and learning might have on public understandings of individuals, social relations, and 
practices? Besides from presenting statements which do not correspond with contemporary 
science, what is really problematic in articulating the brain, cognition, children, and learning 
processes within an instrumental and mechanical framework?
In order to answer these questions, I will highlight three recurring and problematic 
perceptions found within the field of media and brain-based learning industries. Apart from 
spreading unscientific knowledge regarding educational neuroscientific matters, I argue that 
the following are examples of unhelpful relations and practices at the public level: 
i) Detachment of the child from the learning process
ii) Simplification of the learning process
iii) Children’s learning is a parental responsibility 
The first issue that reverberates in discursive and social practice is the detachment of the child 
from the learning process. By repeatedly conflating characteristics of the child and the brain,
and presenting both the brain and cognition as almost objectified and external from the 
individual, the learning process is separated from the child. By constantly making statements 
such as ‘it is your left hemisphere which tells you how to think’ or ‘by pre-school the brain 
can begin to grasp geometric definitions’, the media and brain-based learning industry are 
constructing a representation of reality where the individual is detached from the learning 
process. In such an instrumental and objectified view of the learning process, one can easily 
be persuaded that it is not the child who struggles with geometry, but his or her brain that 
simply cannot grasp this mathematical concept. I argue that such detachment of the child from 
the learning process is problematic, because it takes away the child’s responsibility for 
learning. Moreover, by objectifying the brain into an external mechanism disconnected from
the individual, one is at risk reducing children’s sense of agency within the learning process. 
Detachment of the child from the learning process poses significant challenges to important 
aspects of learning, such as motivation, drive for improvement, feeling of reward for effort, 
responsibility and sense of ownership of one’s learning progress. 
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Mechanical misrepresentations of educational neuroscientific concepts do not only 
relieve the child of responsibility for learning. Instrumental representations also trivialise the 
neurobiological, cognitive, and social processes of learning. This simplification of the 
learning process is connected to the objectification and mechanisation of the brain and 
cognition, where the process of learning is understood as having an instrumental input-output 
logic. This is seen in the frequent assumption that just by presenting a child with the right 
NLQGRIVWLPXOLDW WKHULJKW WLPHí LWEHLQJµEUDLQ-training’ or ‘brain-ERRVWLQJPXVLF¶í WKHQ
one will optimise brainpower so that the child becomes smarter. What trivialises the learning 
process even further is that media and brain-based learning industries tend to suggest rather 
sensational and easy-to-do strategies for ‘boosting brainpower’. Indeed, they present the
alluring idea that one just can ‘push brain buttons’, ‘chew gum’, ‘pop smart pills’, ‘go for a 
run’, or ‘play an instrument’ to become smarter. The issue with such misrepresentations is 
that the media and brain-based learning industry reduce the complex neurobiological, 
cognitive, and social process of learning into a simplistic and mechanical input-output logic,
where it even is suggested that drinking a cup of hot chocolate before bedtime can make you 
clever (see table 7.1 and 7.2).
The third issue concerning discursive and social practices is that children’s learning is
increasingly becoming the parents’ responsibility. If learning implies correct input for 
beneficial output and if it appears that children’s agency in the learning process is reduced, 
then someone external has to ensure that ‘the child’s brain becomes optimised’. One can 
assume that much responsibility is devolved WR WHDFKHUV í JLYHQ WKDW HGXFDWLQJ FKLOGUHQ LV
their job – but, surprisingly, many media texts and brain-based educational programs also 
have a strong appeal to parents. This can be seen in tips regarding “how to raise smart kids”, 
suggestion that “parents should make their children play musical instruments when in their 
nappies”, recommendation for “creating enriched home environments”, and suggestions for 
“brain-boosting hobbies your child must try”. The ‘growing’ and ‘producing’ of smart 
children is also often presented as something parents must do in order to make sure their 
children succeed in school and also later in life. I further argue that this can be linked to 
general trends in society, where attention to human capital and competition within the global 
market has made it increasingly important for individuals to succeed in education as this will 
determine success later in life. It has accordingly become important to gain educational 
advantage outside standard school settings, since this is seen to improve school outcomes and 
give students a head start in educational competition. In light of this, I suggest that the 
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importance of individual success in the global knowledge-economy, and a frenzy for early 
cognitive development and enriched home environments, have fostered a market for brain-
based learning programs and media stories on brain-boosting techniques. It therefore appears 
that parents are increasingly being made accountable for producing ‘shiny, happy and smart 
children’. These views are problematic, since they contribute in the construction of particular 
practices and social relations. The accountability of parents for optimising their child’s brain 
not only helps to strengthen the marketplace for unwarranted brain-based learning tools and 
sensational (but unscientifically based) media stories, but also promotes the idea of passive 
children who are detached from their brains, their cognition, and their learning process. 
Previous sections discussed the political field and the neoliberal rationalities 
manifested within it, but there also appears to be certain echoes of neoliberalism in how
education and neuroscience are represented in the public field. Neoliberal ideology suggests
an instrumental view of education, as can be seen in the jargon of input-output rationalities, 
efficiency, and measurements of products and results (Fairclough, 2003). I have argued that 
similar instrumental views are echoed in mechanical and objectified descriptions of the 
child’s brain, cognition, and the learning process, found in numerous media texts and brain-
based education programs. Wall has made related connections in her study on ‘mothering in 
the age of new brain research’ (Wall, 2004, p. 41), noting that claims about early education 
and brain stimulation have placed significant accountability on mothers “with whom the 
majority of responsibility for child outcome is placed”. Although Wall studies the child 
rearing advice literature and discourse, and not the educational neuroscience discourse as 
discussed in my current study, she has drawn similar links to neoliberalism by noting how 
“many of the taken-for-granted understandings that underlie the parenting advice based on 
new brain research also mesh with the tenets of neo-liberalism” and how “[numerous authors 
have] noted a seeming shift in child rearing ideology toward maximizing and perfecting 
children” (Wall, 2004, p. 46). It is argued that the ideological undercurrent here is the 
neoliberal construction of social problems as problems for the individual (Fairclough, 2000;
Wall, 2004), which in turn underscores the idea that parents are accountable for the potential 
í DVZHOODVWKHIDLOXUHíRIWKHFKLOGDVDVHOI-reliant entrepreneur of the future. This linkage 
to neoliberalism also corresponds with findings from my critical discourse analysis, where it 
is almost taken for granted that parents must ensure the ‘brain-boosting’ and ‘production’ of 
smart children in order to guarantee their success later in life.
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Instrumental rationality, specialisation of systems and means-ends agendas found 
within the modernisation process have also been noted by Habermas (1984), and Fairclough 
has further drawn links between contemporary society and neoliberal discourse by claiming 
how “specialization of systems depends upon a development and refinement of an 
‘instrumental rationality’ in which action is strategic – people act (and act upon other people) 
in ways which are oriented to achieving results, greater ‘effectivity’ or ‘efficiency’ and so 
forth” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 110). Again, this resonates with my findings from the media and 
brain-EDVHG OHDUQLQJ LQGXVWU\¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI HGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQFHíDQG LQGHHGDOVR
with how policymakers rearticulate educational neuroscience within a neoliberal framework 
with a focus on finding a neuroscientific evidence-base for ‘what works’ and effective 
classroom strategies. Accordingly, one can draw on Habermas’ (1984) analysis of the modern 
discourse, with its ‘colonisation of the lifeworld by systems’, and make similar links 
concerning the recontextualisation of educational neuroscience to the public and political 
field. By recontextualising topics relevant to educational neuroscience within an instrumental 
and objectified framework, the focus is drawn away from a complex neuro-biological,
cognitive, and social learning process to a simplistic and instrumental input-output 
mechanism of learning. Moreover, the link between education and neuroscience also appears
to be used as a strategic action oriented toward means-end rationalities, where a common goal 
amongst policymakers, brain-based learning industries, and media is the production of 
‘smarter children guaranteed success later in life’. This strategic action is additionally seen in 
how public and political agents act (and act upon parents, teachers, and children) in order to 
‘produce smarter children’, and to achieve higher IQ scores, improve educational results, 
more effective teaching strategies, rigorous test regimes, individual success, a capable 
workforce, and overall societal effectiveness243. The problem is that colonisation of the 
lifeworld by systems can end up reducing aspects of education, the child, and the complex 
learning process to trivialities. Conversely, educational neuroscience is concerned with the 
complex process of learning where, indeed, it is acknowledged that learning not only 
encompasses individual neurobiological and cognitive aspects of learning, but also the 
societal, pedagogical, interactional, and ethical aspects of education. Studying the influence of 
ideological undercurrents from the political and public fields on these complex processes 
UHODWHGWROHDUQLQJLVWKHUHIRUHHVVHQWLDOIRUWKHGLVFRXUVHíSDUWLFXODUO\LISXEOLFDQGSROLWLFDO
                                                          
243 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), BBC (2013), Brain Gym® (2014), Carlyle (2014), CfBT (2014), James (2014), Kagan 
(2014), Starskills (2014), TeacherNet (2007), The Guardian (2004), Wighton (2007), Whipple (2012), Government Office for 
Science (2012), US Department of Education (2010), and US Department of Education (2012).  
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understandings contribute to shaping public knowledge, social relations and practice in a way 
that impedes the important strides made by the more serious academic community of 
educational neuroscience. 
Summary of the discussion 
In this chapter I have shown how the academic level of the educational neuroscience
discourse is recontextualised in the fields of brain-based learning industry, media, policy-
makers, and interest actors. My analytical findings show that the brain-based learning industry 
has most inaccurate presentations of educational neuroscientific research (in 100 per cent of 
the texts), followed by brain-based educational programs (viz. 80 per cent), and text by 
policymakers (viz. 50 per cent). From this, I argue that the fields are suggestive of 
appropriation strategies rather than colonisation strategies, as relationships between these 
agents and academic agents are dominated by a one-way dialogue where educational 
neuroscience is often uncritically presented without support from scientists. One-way 
dialogue is problematic in that it can lead to uncritical readings of scientific literature, 
unscientific re-interpretations, and misinformed re-presentations of educational neuroscience. 
Findings from my discourse analysis, as well as indicating translation inconsistencies 
occurring along educational neuroscience’s line of transference, also show how aspects of
educational neuroscience are particularly related to a neoliberal rationality. This is seen in all 
the texts by policymakers, and in 80 per cent of the texts by interest actors. In the critical 
discussion of these findings, I reflect over issues related to ideological under-currents in the 
discourse, views related to the product of learning versus the process of learning, and
difficulties arising when ideological rationalities are uncritically and unconsciously adopted 
by actors within the educational neuroscience discourse. In the final discussion, problems are 
raised, related to representations in media and the brain-based learning industry. Here, my 
argument is that these two fields repeatedly reduce the learning process and the individual 
child into mechanical, objective, and instrumental conceptions. These representations are in 
conflict with perceptions held at the academic level, since the educational neuroscientific 
research community emphasises the importance of both individual neurobiological and 
cognitive aspects of learning, as well as the societal, pedagogical, interactional, and ethical 
considerations of education.
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Chapter 8 
Recontextualisation over scalar borders 
 
In previous chapters, it was noted how educational neuroscience is prominent as an academic 
discipline internationally, and also how topics pertaining to educational neuroscience have 
been recontextualised to other public and political fields. In this chapter, the focus of attention 
will be on how the discourse is recontextualised from an international to a national scale by 
analysing the ways in which educational neuroscience has been recontextualised to Norway. 
In order to investigate recontextualisation processes over scalar borders, traces of educational 
neuroscience are studied within academic, public and political fields in Norway. The reason 
Norway was chosen for this study is partly due to my Norwegian nationality and the resulting, 
inherent understandings of national academic, public and political discourses. I also argue that 
Norway is a valuable case study, because it appears that this country only recently developed 
an interest in the linkage of education and neuroscience. Seeing that Norway gives the 
impression of being at a rather early phase in the introduction of educational neuroscience, it 
can thus act as an abundant source of evidence when investigating recontextualisation
processes. In light of this, the overarching aim is to investigate the ways in which educational 
neuroscience is represented in a Norwegian context: how is educational neuroscience viewed
by academics in Norway, how do media present this topic, and which views are taken into 
considerations in Norwegian educational policy documents? Are any of these three fields 
more prominent in representing educational neuroscience than the others, and how do their 
representations correspond with the international academic discipline of educational 
neuroscience? In order to address these questions, the chapter commences by presenting
findings from my critical discourse analysis of how educational neuroscience is
recontextualised in the academic, public, and political field in Norway. Following this, 
comparisons will be drawn to the international educational neuroscience discourse, before a 
more critical discussion of the recontextualisation processes found in Norway is presented.
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Educational neuroscience recontextualised to Norway 
My general literature searches show that traces of the linkage between education and 
neuroscience are rare in Norway, in comparison to previous literature searches. To a certain 
extent this is to be expected, considering that search criteria were restricted to Norwegian 
national borders, whereas previous international searches do not have such constraints. Even 
so, it is obvious that there are fewer relevant Norwegian texts than might have been expected 
in a nation where the discourse of educational neuroscience is already established as a distinct 
discipline (such as in England or the USA). The lack of textual references does not, however, 
indicate that linkages of education and neuroscience are non-existent within Norwegian fields. 
Literature searches for relevant Norwegian texts generated 452 849 hits, indicating that topics 
pertaining to educational neuroscience have caught the interest of some actors in Norway. In 
order to elaborate upon these findings the following sections discuss educational 
neuroscience’s recontextualisation in the academic-, public-, and political field in Norway í
including relevant comparisons with the international level of discourse. Even if comparison 
between a single country and an international context is not really a fair comparison, due to 
quantitative differences, analogies between Norwegian and international discourses of 
educational neuroscience are nevertheless SUHVHQWHGíDOEHLWDVDFRPSDULVRQIRUWKHSXUSRVH
of context resemblances and not as an attempt to suggest significant correlations between the 
two.  
 
The Norwegian academic field 
Considering that the central nexus in this PhD-project is the international and academic level 
of the educational neuroscience discourse, I begin by discussing how educational 
neuroscience is recontextualised to the academic field in Norway. Firstly, it must be stressed 
that educational neuroscience has not, so far, become firmly established as an academic 
discipline or even as a significant cross-GLVFLSOLQDU\ SURMHFW LQ 1RUZD\ í DW OHDVW QRW LQ
comparison to the level at which it is found amongst universities and research groups 
internationally. The literature searches and discourse analysis conducted for Norwegian 
academic texts pertaining to educational neuroscience therefore have slightly different criteria 
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than my analysis related to the international academic field of educational neuroscience244.
Literature searches for the Norwegian academic analysis include, for instance, a broader range 
of pertinent disciplines, and the chosen texts feature educational neuroscience less explicitly 
than most texts within the international and academic field. Nevertheless, a total of eight texts 
were selected for the final analysis of educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to the 
1RUZHJLDQDFDGHPLFILHOGíWREHSUHFLVH Kennair (2008), Nielsen (2011), Lindholm (2012),
Solli (2010), Lunde (2011), Egge (2012), Sund (2014), and Dehaene (2014). These texts are 
published in academic journals ranging from psychological- and educational journals to 
scholarly magazines such as ‘Lektorbladet’, ‘Skolelederen’, and ‘Rus & Samfunn’245. This 
collection demonstrates the diversity of disciplines, and their respective journals, wherein one 
can find topics pertaining to education and neuroscience in Norway.
If we start by looking at how these Norwegian academic texts represent, incorporate, 
and recontextualise the educational neuroscience discourse, some findings should be 
highlighted. Firstly, many of the WH[WVIRXQGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHVHDUFKíDQGDOVRper cent of 
the academic texts selected for the final corpora246 í GR not write about linkages between 
education and neuroscience per se, but focus on an overarching debate concerning the linkage 
between natural sciences (viz. nature and biology) and social sciences. One example is the 
text by the evolutionary psychologist Kennair (2008), who claims that one can find a futile 
“either-or-thinking”, a “biophobia” and “bio-naivety” amongst Norwegian social scientists. 
Another example is provided by the sociologist Nielsen (2011), who reflects upon the 
relevance of biological explanations (e.g. neuroscience) in humanistic and social sciences 
(e.g. gender research). Nielsen neither discounts biological explanations, nor does she 
uncritically advocate ELRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHV LQVRFLDOVFLHQFHVíHPSKDVLV LV LQVWHDGSXWRQ
different levels of analysis and the challenges this brings forth:
Natural sciences do not represent any final or objective truth, rather, they constantly try to approach it, 
just like the social sciences. It is, at the same time, important to be aware that questions both can and 
should be asked at different levels and that these cannot be reduced to one another (Nielsen, 2011, p. 
293 [my translation]). 
The crucial point in this respect is, in accordance to Nielsen (2011), that one has to 
acknowledge which research questions can be answered by biology and which questions can 
                                                          
244 For a comprehensive clarification on the criteria used for my literature search and critical discourse analysis see page 
113-118 in chapter 4 in addition to appendix B.  
245 Correspondingly these can be translated ‘Teachers’ Magazine’, ‘The School Leader’, and ‘Drugs & Society’.   
246 This can for instance be seen in Kennair (2008), Nielsen (2011), and Lindholm (2012).   
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be answered by social sciences. These two examples are just a fraction of the material found 
on this topic, as my literature search reveals that academic articles problematizing “the gap” 
between natural sciences and social sciences appear to have grown in number during the last 
few years. One particular catalyst for this increased discussion appears to be the Norwegian 
television program ‘Hjernevask’ (‘Brainwash’), which is a pop-scientific documentary on 
nature-nurture debates that was aired in 2010 (NRK, 2010)247. Despite it being a media 
SURJUDPíDQGGHVSLWH WKHFULWLcism WKH VKRZKDV UHFHLYHG IRU LWV LQWHUYLHZSUHVHQWDWLRQVí
Brainwash caused a significant academic and public debate. Not only does the show appear to 
have provoked discussions concerning biological and sociological explanation in social 
sciences, but it also seem to have drawn attention towards the borderlines between strongly-
held academic traditions and disciplines in Norway248.
Despite this overarching debate concerning biological explanations in social sciences, 
results from my literature search and discourse analysis also identify academic texts on the 
specific linkage of education and neuroscience249. The way in which these academic texts 
present the relation between education and neuroscience differ, as do the authors’ views on 
the advantages of such linkages. For instance, Egge (2012) and Sund (2014) present 
interviews with a biological psychologist and with brain scientists respectively, as they 
elaborate on practical aspects of education and neuroscience. Solli (2010) also presents an 
interview, but this is with an educationalist, who express surprise over political request for 
more neuroscientific perspectives in pre-school research, whereas Lunde (2011) has an article 
on the use of cognitive enhancers to increase academic performance, and how usage of such 
‘smart pills’ is growing within academia in Norway. It is interesting that 80 per cent of the 
Norwegian academic texts on the linkage of education and neuroscience convey a top-down 
view where neuroscience is hierarchically superior to education250. An example of this is the 
text ‘How the brain learns’ by Egge (2012). The text is published in a journal for 
schoolteachers and is based on an interview with the biological psychologist Sigmundsson. 
                                                          
247 Brainwash is a documentary series co-produced and presented by the renowned Norwegian comedian and sociologist 
Harald Eia. In each episode Norwegian and foreign researchers are interviewed on topics related to the nature-nurture 
debate. After being questioned on sensitive thematic such as “gender”, “gay/straight”, “violence” and “the parental effect” 
Norwegian social scientists are, more often than not, shown to reject biological explanations in these matters. In stark 
contrast to clips from international researchers, who are featured as they criticise Norwegian scientists’ for their lack of 
nuanced views on reciprocal influences between nurture and nature. Brainwash has received significant amount of critique 
for its pop-scientific staging, as it is claimed that the program has “the intention of knocking Norwegian scientists off their 
perches”, making them appear ignorant and ridiculous in the presence of prominent international researchers (Bjørkeng, 
2011).  
248 As seen mentioned in Nielsen (2011), Lindholm (2012), and Vassnes (2010).  
249 As seen in Solli (2010), Lunde (2011), Egge (2012), Sund (2014), and Dehaene (2014).  
250 As seen in Solli (2010), Egge (2012), Sund (2014), and Dehaene (2014).  
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Sigmundsson is introduced with the quote “Through my knowledge of biology and brain 
science, I have also learned a lot about learning. It is therefore nearly impossible [for me] not 
to have any opinions about schools and education” (p. 14 [my translation]), before his 
criticism of the Norwegian educational system is presented. His criticism centres on
educationalists’ neglect of taking biological and psychological research into consideration and 
how “contemporary education suffers from fear of biology ... It seems that everything 
remotely resembling biological explanations is kept at arm’s length” (Sigmundsson, in Egge, 
2012, p. 14). A proposal for “an ideal timetable” for the first four years in school is then 
suggested, “founded in biological research conducted to discover how the brain learns best” 
(p. 16). The proposed recommendations for school practice are neither too controversial, nor 
do they seem to diverge much from presentations found within the international and academic 
level of the educational neuroscience discourse251.
However, the ways in which Egge and Sigmundsson present the linkage of education 
and neuroscience seem to denote a subtle top-down view where neuroscientific and biological 
explanations are given predominance at the expense of educational and social theories. I argue
that this is due to the overall structure, phrasing, and presentation in the article, which seem to 
denote an idea of a superior brain-scientific research that can come to the aid of 
educationalists. This can be seen in how the contemporary Norwegian school system is 
presented as a failure in that it “produces educational losers” (Egge, 2012, p. 14) and the 
suggested solution is to start building educational practice on biological and psychological 
knowledge of “how the brain learns best”. Even though a link is drawn between education, 
psychology, and brain science, no clarification of the precise nature of this linkage is given, 
nor are any relevant educational or social perspectives offered regarding the topics discussed. 
This neglect of educational and social perspectives is especially noticeable in the repeated 
stressing of the phrase “how the brain learns best” (instead of “how the child learns best”), 
which contributes to an impression that the complex process of learning is reduced to a focus 
on individual biological and cognitive neuroscientific perspectives. Conflation of qualities of 
the whole child (viz. learning) to its parts (viz. the brain) has already been elaborated upon in 
previous chapters, but it is worth mentioning that such reduction of the child, as a complex 
                                                          
251 Example from Sigmundsson’s timetable proposed for schools: “Start the day with 30 minutes physical activity. This gives 
better order in class” and “Most important is individual supervision, many repetitions and challenges, everything after the 
[individual’s] level of skills” (Egge, 2012, p.16). 
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learning individual, does not correspond with the general values of the international and 
academic level of educational neuroscience. 
It is not only in the texts by Egge (2012) where one finds a top-down view where 
educational and social perspectives are subtly neglected in the linkage of neuroscience and 
HGXFDWLRQí WKH WH[W ‘Music lessons improve learning’ by Sund (2014) also appears to have 
similar top-down perspectives. Sund notes “how playing musical instruments has a positive 
effect on children’s intelligence” (p. 7 [my translation]) by referring to an interview with two 
VFLHQWLVWV í WR EH SUHFLVH WZRneuroscientists. Although this article is about a topic highly 
relevant for education, educational theories appear to be neglected. Some reference is made to 
educational practice, however, as the author mentions the head teacher of a Norwegian culture 
and music school and her views on the ‘effect of musical lessons’. “She can confirm that she 
observes cases where pupils having success at the culture school also have success at school.
She [the head teacher] thinks this is causHG E\ WKHLUPXVLF OHVVRQV í OHVVRQVZKHUH SXSLOV
become familiar with using relevant skills and where they acquire the ability to work in a 
thorough and structured way” (Sund, 2014, p. 9). I argue, however, that this ‘confirmation’ of 
the effect of music lessons is dubious, since the author commits the syllogistic fallacy. This 
reasoning fallacy, as mentioned in chapter 7, blurs the lines between causation and correlation 
by using a faulty logic of reverse inference and circular reasoning by confusing ‘A causes B’ 
to also imply that ‘B causes A’ (cf. Hruby, 2012). In this case, how can one know if a child 
who is successful in school gets his or her diligent and structured study skills from music 
lessons, or if diligent and structured children are the ones most likely to apply for, and 
succeed in, music education? 
Another example of a top-down perception of the linkage between education and 
neuroscience is the public lecture held by Dehaene (2014) in association with Kavli Public 
Lecture in Trondheim. Dehaene is a French cognitive psychologist who focuses on brain areas 
relevant for reading and mathematics, and in the occasion of Kavli Week in Norway in 2014 
he held an open lecture titled ‘The matter of education’ (Dehaene, 2014). In public 
announcements of this lecture, both distributed in the local newspaper and amongst faculty 
and staff of the University of Trondheim (NTNU), educators and teachers were particularly 
encouraged to attend. In the lecture program posted at NTNU’s webpages it was, for instance,
stated that:
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Stanislas Dehaene will talk about what happens in our brains when we learn to read and calculate, and 
how this knowledge can be used by educators ... The lecture will be an eye-opener and will fascinate 
educators concerned with the contested issues of how we learn to read, calculate, and of pathologies like 
dyslexia (NTNU, 2014 [my translation]).
Despite invitation for educationalists to attend, the presentation held by Dehaene was of a 
technical nature, in that he used difficult neuroscientific theories and complex neuro-
methodological graphics. Overall, the lecture appeared to be highly specialised in its form and 
the language used was difficult to understand for anyone without an academic background in 
cognitive psychology or neuroscience. After about 50 minutes of lecturing on intricate topics 
such as “How learning to read changes the cortical networks for visual language” and “The 
VWFA connects preferably to temporal and inferior frontal language areas”, approximately 5 
minutes were dedicated to “Consequences for education” (Dehaene, 2014). The bullet-points 
presented under this slide were short and seemed to lack in-depth understanding of 
educational theories and practices relevant in these matters. In one of Dehaene’s bullet-points 
for educationalists, for instance, he concludes WKDW ³PDQ\ FKLOGUHQ FDQ VWUXJJOH WR UHDG´ í
surely an observation one can make just by poking one’s head into any regular classroom. As 
such, Dehaene’s lecture on “the matter of education” appears to present a top-down view,
where cognitive psychological and neuroscientific theories are put forward as aids for 
educationalists, but where few, if any, substantial links are drawn with educational theories.
One final and, in my view, important aspect with regards to the Norwegian context is 
that my analytical findings did not identify a single reference to the international discipline of 
educational neuroscience (or Brain, Mind and Education if one prefers) in any of the eight 
Norwegian academic articles252. This is significant, particularly as many of these texts 
explicitly mention linkages between education and neuroscience. The question, though, is 
whether these authors are familiar with the established international discipline of educational 
neuroscience (but chose not to mention it in their texts), or if these authors are unaware that 
such an international discipline on the linkage of education, psychology and neuroscience 
even exists. This aspect, in addition to the findings already mentioned above, will be further 
discussed, and critically reflected upon, later in this chapter.
                                                          
252 That is, neither in Kennair (2008), Nielsen (2011), Lindholm (2012), Solli (2010), Lunde (2011), Egge (2012), Sund (2014), 
nor Dehaene (2014).  
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If we shift focus to a comparison between a Norwegian context and the international level of 
the educational neuroscience discourse, certain aspects ought to be highlighted. What first can 
be noted is that the most significant difference between educational neuroscience’s dispersion 
internationally and in Norway is, as I argue, found within academia. Whereas educational 
neuroscience has become established as a distinct academic discipline internationally during 
WKHODVWGHFDGHVíLQGHHG this is the central nexus of my dissertation íWKHOLQNDJHEHWZHHQ
education, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience has not so far managed to gain the same 
foothold within the Norwegian academic field. This is, first of all, evident in the few hits 
resulting from literature searches for Norwegian academic articles pertaining to education and 
neuroscience. The minimal impact of educational neuroscience within the Norwegian 
academic field can, secondly, be demonstrated by the lack of academic debates, conferences, 
and collaborative research projects on the topic. Thirdly, whereas the majority of international 
academic texts on educational neuroscience are published in high ranking peer-reviewed 
journals (such as ‘Educational Researcher’ and ‘Journal of Philosophy of Education’), 
Norwegian articles on the specific linkage between education and neuroscience are not 
IHDWXUHG LQ UHQRZQHG1RUZHJLDQ HGXFDWLRQDO MRXUQDOVí UDWKHU WKH\ DUHRIWHQ IRXQG LQ OHVV
distinguished scholarly magazines such as ‘Lektorbladet’ and ‘Skolelederen’. This reinforces 
the impression that prominent academic debates on educational neuroscience are relatively 
absent within the Norwegian academic field. A fourth and even more striking aspect, which
speaks to the lack of recontextualisation within the Norwegian academic field is that not one 
of the academic texts mention the international discipline of educational neuroscience (or 
0LQG%UDLQDQG(GXFDWLRQíWKLVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWWKH\DOOZULWHDERXWWRSLFVFRQQHFWHG
to such linkages. 
Even if debates concerning educational neuroscience appear to be relatively absent in 
more distinguished Norwegian academic journals, these journals do publish discussions 
regarding disciplinary intersections between natural and social sciences. The debates are 
centred on a range of themes, from nature-nurture debates to discussions on biology versus 
sociology, but a common trait is whether or not one should take natural scientific explanations 
into consideration in social sciences253. I suggest that this can be seen as an overarching
scientific debate that implicitly touches upon numerous aspects that are also highly relevant 
for the specific linkage between education, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience (viz. the 
educational neuroscience discourse). This more general scientific debate is of note, since it is
                                                          
253 This can for instance be seen in Kennair (2008), Lindholm (2012), and Nielsen (2011).  
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suggestive of a growing problematization of borderlines between natural sciences and social 
sciences within the academic field in Norway. My earlier emergence analysis suggests that 
similar problematization of discursive borderlines between natural and social sciences are 
found in the earliest stages of educational neurosciences’ development internationally (viz. 
chapter 6). Time will show if a more prominent academic debate concerning linkages of 
education and neuroscience may also grow out of this increasing problematization of 
traditional scientific borderlines in Norway.  
Another aspect of overarching nature-nurture debates within the Norwegian academic 
field is how many of the authors appear to hold relatively similar views, regardless of whether
or not they argue for using more natural scientific explanations in social research. I suggest, 
moreover, that the different ‘stands’ taken in this matter are more like strategies used by 
authors in order to protect their disciplinary traditions, rather than any denial of possible 
connections between natural and social explanations in human behaviour and social matters. 
This can be seen in all three articles concerning the overarching scientific debate, where it is 
acknowledged that the nature-nurture question ought to be perceived as a complex 
relationship, wherein one can find reciprocal influences between the two. The texts 
accordingly express an awareness of different levels of analysis between social and natural 
scientific disciplines, where problems of reductionist approaches are addressed254. These 
views are in accordance with the position ‘cautious optimism’ in the international academic 
debate on educational neuroscience, as reciprocal collaboration, caution regarding
reductionism, and different levels of analysis are also emphasised here, although with 
reference to the specific linkage between education, psychology and cognitive neuroscience 
and not to the general linkage between social scientific and natural scientific explanations. 
The Norwegian academic texts that actually mention an explicit linkage between 
education and neuroscience however, differ from other international academic texts regarding 
educational neuroscience. It has previously been stressed that a common view amongst 
educational neuroscientists in the international discourse is a cautious optimism, which 
stresses reciprocal collaboration between the disciplines of education, psychology, and 
neuroscience. In Norway, though, four out of the five academic articles on the specific linkage
of education and neuroscience seem to convey a top-down view, in which neuroscience is 
                                                          
254 As seen in Kennair (2008), Lindholm (2012), and Nielsen (2011).  
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almost represented as a superior “advisor” which can help to answer educational questions255.
Whereas one of these texts expresses aversion to such disciplinary relations, the remaining 
three authors seem to express an optimistic tone regarding neuroscientific guidance in 
educational matters. This optimistic top-down view of a neuroscientific-education relation is 
particularly notable, considering that two of these texts are written by educationalists (cf. 
Egge, 2012; Sund, 2014). In parallel to findings from the emergence analysis (viz. chapter 6), 
it can be mentioned that a similar top-down view is found in discursive texts from educational 
neuroscience’s earlier stages in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The Norwegian public field 
When it comes to recontextualisation of educational neuroscience to the public field in 
Norway, my analysis also indicates traces of the linkage of education and neuroscience. In 
comparison to the literature search for academic texts, searching for public texts related to 
education and neuroscience is less challenging, as it produces numerous media texts and 
brain-based learning programs. Of the relevant literature, 16 texts were chosen for the final 
corpRUD í  RI WKHVH EHLQJ PHGLD DUWLFOHV IURP well-known Norwegian news agencies, 
whereas the remaining two texts are brain-based educational programs256.
These public texts can be loosely grouped into four recurring topics: i) the pop-
scientific debate on natural sciences vs. social sciences, ii) smart-drugs, iii) sensational stories 
on aspects pertaining to neuroscience and education/learning, and iv) brain-based educational 
programs257. Five media articles from the corpora can be categorised in the first group as they 
are on topics related to disciplinary debates on ‘the gap’ between natural sciences and social 
sciences (i.e. Time, 2011; Vassnes, 2010) íKHQFHDOVROLQNDJHVEHWZHHQQDWXUHand nurture as 
well as between neuroscience and social sciences/education (i.e. Ebdrup, 2014; Monsen, 
2010; Time, 2012). As with some of the texts from the academic field, many of these media 
articles appeared as a result of the pop-scientific show ‘Brainwash’ and the academic and 
public debate which emerged in its wake. Intertextual references associated with Brainwash’s
nature-nurture discussion are therefore also found within the public field, revealing both 
                                                          
255 As seen in Dehaene (2014), Egge (2012), Solli (2010), and Sund (2014). 
256 See the method chapter and appendix B-D with regards to selection criteria and detailed reference list of the corpora.  
257 These four topics frequently reoccur in texts from my literature search for the Norwegian public level. Since texts chosen 
to the final corpora should be representative for the respective level under analysis, it is, accordingly, essential that texts 
chosen for my discourse analysis represent these four topics.  
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criticism and counter-arguments related to claims that Norwegian social scientists do not take 
biological explanations into considerations in their research. An example of a critical stance 
towards so-called ‘biological aversion’ amongst researchers is the text ‘The problem of social 
sciences’ (Vassnes, 2010). Through references to the philosopher Daniel Dennett, it is argued 
that Norwegian social scientists “haven’t paid attention in class” when it comes to biological 
explanations in social and human behavioral research:  
In USA and other countries one has moved away from post-modernism, and there is a new spirit within 
social and human sciences. A reason for this is that one is now taking seriously the wave of new insights 
from disciplines such as neuroscience, behavioural genetics, psychology, and biology. These [insights] 
have shown that the premises which traditional social sciences have been built on, like the idea that we 
are born as “blank slates”, are not correct ... Norwegian social scientists have, however, shown little 
interest ... Today we have to acknowledge that they [social scientists] have failed in many areas: the 
school is just one example, gender equality policy is another (Vassnes, 2010 [my translation]).
Similar criticism of sociologists’ aversion to biological explanations is also found in the text 
‘Educators’ fear of biology produces losers in school’ (Monsen, 2010) íDJDLQEDVHGRQDQ
interview with the biological psychologist Sigmundsson. As with the interview presented in 
the academic text, this media article also elaborates upon Sigmundsson’s critique of the 
Norwegian educational system, arguing instead that scientifically based knowledge from 
biological psychology and neuroscience should be translated into educational practice and 
applied in schools. Nevertheless, criticism of social scientists and their alleged aversion for 
biological explanation does not go unchallenged, and findings from my analysis can also 
indicate a stance that speaks up for the humanities and social sciences. One such text is an 
interview with the international philosopher Raymond Tallis in the text ‘Neuro this and neuro 
that’ (Time, 2011):
It is time for humanists to answer back to over-enthusiastic psychologists and brain scientists, says the 
British critic Raymon Tallis [sic.] ... Attempts to bring cognitive psychology and brain science into 
humanities and social sciences end up in an eradication of the specifically human factors in research, he 
claims. This is one of the reasons he considers that the results often become trivialised, such as how 
artwork can be a source of delight (because it triggers biological reward systems) (Time, 2011 [my 
translation]).
Tallis’ critique of the array of research areas that are emerging in the wake of brain sciences 
(such as neuro-law, neuro-economy, neuro-technology, and neuro-literature) is further 
elaborated. His biggest concern is what happens when the belief that “we are our brain” is 
supplemented with what Tallis claims is “an exaggerated confidence that evolutionary 
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explanatory models can explain our behaviour, our society, our culture, and our values” 
(Time, 2011 [my translation]). The central point is, as noted in the text, that certain aspects 
ZLWKLQKXPDQLWLHVDQGVRFLDOVFLHQFHVFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGE\EUDLQVFLHQFHVí³LWLVdoubtful 
as to how much one can understand of an artwork by perceiving it as a form of stimuli for an 
brain developed in an evolutionary way”. 
What is interesting to note from my discourse analytical findings is that Norwegian 
neuroscientists themselves agree with Tallis. For instance, Kenneth Hugdahl, professor in 
biological psychology at Bergen University, stresses, in an interview, that “…it is the brain 
sciences that are frequently asked to answer life’s big and smalO TXHVWLRQV í,W ZRXOG EH
fantastic if brain scientists could achieve just half of what people expect from us” (Hugdahl 
cited in Time, 2012, p. 20 [my translation]). Similar notions are expressed in the article 
‘Educationalists should stay away from brain sciences’ (Ebdrup, 2014) where several Danish 
neuroscientists are interviewed on the linkage of education and neuroscience: “The brain 
sciences cannot tell us how teachers can best arrange their teaching in school ... One has to 
remember that they “only” offers biological explanations” (Ebdrup, 2014 [my translation]).
These examples from the discourse analysis therefore suggest that there is a popular-scientific 
debate within the public field, wherein one can find different positions concerning the linkage 
of neuroscience/ biological explanations and education/social sciences. The resulting 
question, which will be critically reflected upon later in this chapter, is how this polarisation 
in the Norwegian debate corresponds with views held internationally. 
The second set of media texts consists of articles on the topic of smart drugs íDWRSLF
which has caused a noticeable public debate in Norwegian media and which is represented in 
the corpora by Byrkjedal and Misje (2013) and Visjø (2014). Both texts stress the novel issue 
of cognitive enhancers in academia and how the international trend of using illegal smart 
drugs such as Ritalin has increased in popularity amongst Norwegian university students. 
‘Smart drugs’ is a term for pharmaceutical stimulants that enhance a person’s cognitive ability 
íIRU LQVWDQFHE\HQDEOLQJDSHUVRQWRFRQFHQWUDWHEHWWHURQD WDVNRUE\LQFUHDVLQJOHYHORI
dopamine in the brain (qualities to be found e.g. in medicines prescribed for ADHD, 
narcolepsy, and Alzheimers). These cognitive enhancers are used by students to help them 
study more effectively, and to get better scores in tests and exams. There are no accurate 
statistics on use of cognitive enhancers in Norway, but results from a study on students’ 
health and well-being show that use of cognitive enhancers in higher education in Norway has 
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increased from 1,4 per cent in 2010 to 4,2 per cent in 2014 (Nedregård & Olsen, 2014; Visjø, 
2014). Even if Byrkjedal and Misje (2013) and Visjø (2014) appear to be concerned about the 
use of smart drugs, othHU DQGPRUH HQWKXVLDVWLF YLHZV DUH DOVR SUHVHQWHGí IRU LQVWDQFH E\
Sterri from the Student Union in Oslo, who argues that “We are born with different skills and 
different capacities. Some people have a head start and a better ability to concentrate, and I
don’t see the problem in taking pills if one hasn’t been born with the same possibilities” 
(Sterri cited in Byrkjedal & Misje, 2013 [my translation]). Without elaborating further on 
cognitive enhancers and the related ethical considerations, these texts represent a growing 
public concern and debate regarding the increased use of illegal smart drugs by Norwegian 
students. 
The third and largest group of public texts in the corpora consists of media articles 
where brain science is used to create rather sensational stories regarding social and/or 
educational topics258. Findings from my discourse analysis show how these public texts 
represent, incorporate, and recontextualise educational neuroscience. First, this group consists
of media texts published by well-known Norwegian media agencies such as VG, NRK, and 
Dagbladet (often published online as well as in print), where stories are usually short with a 
scope-limit between one and two pages. These texts often make use of neuroscientific 
perspectives in order to illuminate social or behavioural issues í for instance learning 
difficulties and ADHD (Henriksen, 2005), exams and study tips for students (Nydal & 
Asland, 2007), early learning and toddlers’ language skills (Andreassen, 2014), social 
behaviour in teenagers (Holst & Hansen, 2011), gender and school structure (Holterman, 
2010) and the effect of stress in early childhood (Yttervik, 2012) (see table 8.1). Many of 
these texts also seem to show fascination for, and perhaps uncritical confidence in,
neuroscientific explanations. Brain science is often used to explain or elucidate social 
phenomenon, paying little or no attention to social explanations or critical reflections259. A
general tendency amongst texts in this group seems to be for journalists to use sensational and 
attention-JUDEELQJ KHDGOLQHV í RIWHQ ZLWK WKH UHVXOW WKDW VWDWHPHQWV DUH VLPSOLVWLFDOO\ DQG
incorrectly presented in comparison to representations found in contemporary science articles.
However, introductory and sensational statements tend to become more nuanced later in the 
media stories, when insights from specialists are used to elaborate the topic. Use of attention-
                                                          
258 As seen in Henriksen (2005), Nydal and Asland (2007), Knudsen (2010), Holst and Hansen (2011), Yttervik (2012), 
Andreassen (2014), and Holterman (2010).  
259 As seen in Henriksen (2005), Knudsen (2010), Yttervik (2012), Andreassen (2014), and Holterman (2010). 
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grabbing headlines which later become more moderate can, for instance, be seen in the texts
‘Jogging makes the brain bigger’ (Knudsen, 2010), ‘Teenagers have unfinished brains’
(Holst & Hansen, 2011), and in the following text extract by Yttervik (2012):
New report concerning children: High levels of stress leads to smaller brains. Prolonged stress and lack 
of care will lead to children having smaller brains and make them losers in school, research shows ... 
“New neuroscientific research show that prolonged stress influences the hippocampus in the brain. This 
can damage cognitive functions such as memory and impede the ability to learn”, says professor in 
children and youth mental health Willy-Tore Mørch at University of Tromsø (Yttervik, 2012 [my 
translation]). 
In this excerpt, there is a significant difference between the journalist’s introductory statement 
and the statement given by the specialist in children’s mental health. Firstly, the journalist 
does not use any modalised markers, whereas the professor is more careful in his expressions. 
This can be illustrated by how the professor use expressions like “stress influences the 
hippocampus” in comparison to “stress leads to smaller brains” or “this can damage cognitive 
functions such as memory and impede the ability to learn” in contrast to the journalist’s 
phrase “[this] makes them losers in school”. Comparison also shows how the journalist 
appears to ‘twist’ the scientist’s statements, in addition to drawing overly hasty conclusions 
from what has been said. For example has the statement ‘…impede the ability to learn’ 
become ‘…ORVHUVLQVFKRRO¶íDOHDSLQthe argumentation which, as an educationalist, I feel is
suspect, because impeded learning abilities do not necessarily make a child a loser in school. 
A similar hasty conclusion is drawn concerning neuroscience, when the journalist suggests 
that “stress leads to smaller brains”. This sentence, I argue, changes a neuroscientific 
representation concerning structural differences in hippocampus between children who have 
been brought up in affectionate environments and children who have not, to implying a
reduction in the entire size of the brain260. Yttervik (2012) thus commits a gross over-
simplification in his representation of educational neuroscience, as contemporary 
neuroscientific research emphasises that structural changes in one brain area do not imply 
either a reduction or increase in the size of the entire brain (cf. Hood, 2014).
There appears, therefore, to be a tendency amongst some journalists to jump too 
quickly from (educational) neuroscientific statements to sensational and simplistic 
representations. However, it is difficult to say if this leap from cautious and correlational 
explanation to sensational and causational explanations is made intentionally in order to sell 
                                                          
260 A similar representation is found in Knudsen (2010), as also this journalist claims how “jogging makes the brain bigger”. 
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these stories, or whether it is a lack of critical readings. Nevertheless, it is challenging when 
the media present simplistic accounts regarding QHXURVFLHQFHDQGRUHGXFDWLRQíSDUWLFXODUO\
when such accounts do not correspond with representations from contemporary science. The 
media’s uncritical reading and misrepresentation of educational neuroscientific statements are 
problematic since they can lead to the spread of neuromyths within the public arena.
The last group of text from the public field consists of Norwegian ‘brain-based’ 
educational programs. As in my analysis of the international brain-based learning industry, 
my Norwegian literature searches and discourse analysis focus on learning products for 
purchase, which make claims for connections between these educational material and brain 
science (cf. Sylvan & Christodoulou, 2010). Based on this definition, two Norwegian brain-
based learning industries and their respective educational programs were chosen for the 
DQDO\VLVíQDPHO\Memolife (2014) and the Bravo games (Intempo, 2014). What should first 
be noted, when identifying how these brain-based learning industries represent and 
recontextualise the educational neuroscience discourse, is that both texts offer learning 
products and training-games that will VXSSRVHGO\ LPSURYH FRJQLWLYH IXQFWLRQV í DV VHHQ LQ
learning material such as ‘Memo language’ and ‘Memo gym’ (Memolife, 2014) and ‘Bravo 
games and courses’ (Intempo, 2014). The clients for these ‘brain-based’ educational 
programs differ, though, as Memloife seems to target a wide public audience, ranging from 
parents and students to people who want to “become a leader at work”, whereas Intempo’s 
Bravo games more specifically target parents and pre-school teachers of children aged 0-3
years. Both texts emphasise that their programs and learning techniques are based on brain 
science, often using phrases like “brain science shows that ...”, “research shows ...”, and “new 
brain science confirms that ...” (Intempo, 2014; Memolife, 2014). Other findings from the 
discourse analysis indicate that both Memolife (2014) and Intempo (2014) represent 
neuroscientific and educational research rather generally, simplistically and, at times, 
detached from a larger scientific context. As an illustration, Memolife bases its products on 
accelerated learning, multiple intelligence, VAK-learning styles, and left/right dominant 
hemispheres. The following extract is from Memolife’s webpage where ‘left/right dominant 
hemispheres’ is used as an argument for different learning styles: 
The brain’s two sides, the left and the right hemisphere, have completely different qualities and 
completely different methods for learning. If you master how to combine these qualities you will also 
become a master in learning! ... Numerous people have a dominant right or left hemisphere ... The left 
hemisphere attends to our language with words and sentences. It undertakes different types of analysis 
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with, for instance, number, sequences, and mathematics, and it is the part that builds on logic and 
rationality. The right hemisphere uses bodily sensation inputs in form of pictures and visualisation, 
sounds, smells, taste, and other bodily perceptions in its work. This part also takes care of music, 
rhythm, rhyme and is constantly seeking overview and unity (Memolife, 2014 [my translation]).
In this excerpt, topics related to the brain are represented in order to demonstrate differences 
in people with left- and right hemispheric dominance and, furthermore, how these people 
should make the best use of learning techniques appropriate to their leading hemispheric 
qualities. However, no references to cognitive neuroscientific research or educational 
neuroscientific research are provided, and no explanation is provided for why people with an 
assumed right or left hemispheric domination ought to use different learning techniques. In 
addition, the most significant problem with Memolife’s text is that notions regarding right-
and left hemispheric domination do not correspond with contemporary educational 
neuroscientific research. Numerous theorists and researchers within educational neuro-
scientific communities have, as previously mentioned, established concepts of right- and left 
hemispheric learning styles as neuromyths (Alfernik & Farmer-Dougan, 2010; Howard-Jones,
2010; Ritchie et al., 2012). Even if our brain can be anatomically categorised into left and 
right hemispheres, and even if one can find a cerebral asymmetry of functions (for instance,
Broca’s and Wernicke’s language areas are usually found in the left hemisphere) (Gazzaniga, 
Ivry, & Mangun, 2009), it is commonly agreed within the research community that one 
cannot talk of hemispheric dominance in people. Our brain has a complex set of neural 
networks between different brain areas and a process of parallel interconnected functioning is 
occurring between these areas whenever we execute cognitive tasks. In other words: when we 
perform cognitive tasks, we make use of numerous parts of the brain simultaneously. Some 
cognitive tasks may activate one hemisphere more than the other, but there is no reason to 
suppose that individuals differ markedly in which side of the brain is activated during any 
given learning activity (Corballis, 2012; Geake, 2008). Thus, to categorise people according 
to statements of left- or right-brained learning styles is too simplistic, and is a 
misinterpretation of educational neuroscientific research. Another narrative which differs 
from academic representations is the repeated objectification and mechanisation of the brain 
found throughout Memolife’s texts. This is for instance seen in the statement “become friends
with both hemispheres”, “the brain uses our senses actively” and “activate both hemispheres” 
(Memolife, 2014 [my italics]). As previously argued, this is a way of representing the 
relationship between the individual and his/her brain that few educational neuroscientists 
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would support, because such depictions presents the brain as something objectified and 
almost detached from individuals. 
Similar ‘brain based’ explanations are also seen in materials produced by Intempo
(2014). Results from my analysis indicate that this commercial education program 
encompasses fewer and less recognizable misrepresentations and neuromyths than Memolife 
(as the latter builds on the criticised VAK-model, accelerated learning, and neuromyths of 
right/left hemispheric domination). Intempo also makes use of representations that are
allegedly science-based, but which on closer examination differ from representations found in 
academic disciplines of cognitive neuroscience and educational neuroscience. The following 
extract provides an illustration: 
The child is ready to explore and investigate sooner than parents and most personnel in pre-schools are 
prepared for. Few know that the most important time IRUWKHFKLOGKDVSDVVHGíEHIRUHRQHKDs realised 
it. Development in this period has lifelong effects. One can, by the use of Bravo games, give children 
daily sensory inputs to ensure that the brain builds enough networks ... We encourage everyone who is 
working together with children between 0 and 3 years to actively use language and the senses. Sensory 
experience creates a connection in the brain and the more connections and networks of connections a 
child gets early in life, the easier the child learns later on (Intempo, 2014 [my translation]).
Later in the text it is even stressed that “older kids can also play [with Bravo games], but the 
brain is most responsive to stimulation during the first three to four years, so start as early as 
possible!” and “such extra early and comprehensive efforts promotes learning and can prevent 
reading and writing difficulties” (Intempo, 2014). Based on statements like these, it appears 
that educational products, courses, and learning techniques marketed by Intempo are built 
upon the assumption that various sensory experiences and stimuli between the ages of 0 to 3 
years will create important neural connections and networks crucial for successful learning 
later in life. A further issue is that Intempo (2014) provides no explicit literature references 
for the claims made regarding the brain, cognitive stimulation and early learning261. This is 
problematic, because lack of references to original research makes it difficult to validate the 
scientific basis for the Bravo games. Despite Intempo’s lack of scientific references, one can 
find numerous neuroscientists and educational neuroscientists ZKRZULWHRQVLPLODU WRSLFVí
                                                          
261 The only reference offered is to a report by Vista Analysis, which is commissioned by Intempo’s investors Ferd Social 
Entrepreneurs. Sections of this analysis are presented in Intempo’s webpage where one for instance can read about how 
extra early intervention (i.e. in the ages of 0-3 years) is profitable when it comes to cost-effective investments in human 
capital. However, this assessment is built upon Heckman’s theory and model ĨŽƌ ĞĂƌůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ о Ă ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ
previously in this dissertation was shown to have significant flaws in its argumentation (see page 261-262). Hence, the only 
reference offered in the Bravo game is a report commissioned by Intempo’s investors and which, additionally, is partly built 
upon the much criticised work by Heckman. 
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albeit that these academics tend to argue against the idea of effective early learning and 
cognitive stimulation, and this notion is even known as ‘the myth of three’ (Anderson & Della 
Sala, 2012; Blakemore & Frith, 2005a; Bruer, 1999; Howard-Jones, 2010). Educational 
neuroscientists’ critique of the ‘early learning hysteria’ has already been discussed in previous 
chapters262, but in brief it can be noted that theories regarding synaptogenesis and synaptic 
pruning early in a child’s cognitive development are often misinterpreted. Not only do 
‘sensitive periods’ in a person’s life tend to be mistaken for ‘critical periods’ in the earliest 
year, but the notion that pruning (i.e. the cutting back) of neural connections is a normal and
crucial aspect in cognitive development also seems to be misapprehended. Some, such as 
Intempo (2014), have misunderstood the gradation of stimulation necessary for normal 
cognitive development, since it is exceptionally deprived environments lacking social and 
cognitive stimulations (not enriched environments) that are shown to significantly affect 
cognitive development (cf. Anderson & Della Sala, 2012; Blakemore & Frith, 2005a;
Howard-Jones, 2010). Intempo’s argumentation for early sensory stimulation to improve 
children’s academic skills does not correspond, therefore, with contemporary educational 
neuroscientific representations at the international and academic level. 
As well as misrepresenting contemporary educational neuroscientific theories, both 
Intempo and Memolife appear to use general and simplistic explanations. Another recurring 
tendency is argumentative leaps, in the explanations offered by Memolife (2014) and Intempo 
(2014), when the authors ‘jump’ directly from a statement regarding educational 
neuroscientific theory to conclusions at a more practical level. This is shown in the following 
extract from Memolife (2014) where VAK-learning styles are promoted:
Generally one can say that there exist three basic kinds of memory and learning: visual, auditory, and 
kinesthetic ... Research show that 37 % of the population is dominantly kinesthetic, 34 % dominantly
auditory and 29 % dominantly visual. It is also shown that children with kinesthetic preferences can 
often experience problems in schools and that adult kinesthetics are more likely to end up on a 
downward path in society (Memolife, 2014 [my translation]).
References to research that divides the population into these visual-, auditory- and kinesthetic 
per centages are not offered, nor is it clear whether the statement that people who are 
kinesthetic- dominant have academically and socially disadvantages, is Memolife’s own 
conclusion or if it is based on research. Nevertheless, the leap from accounts of VAK-learners 
to the assertion of kinesthetic disadvantage in society is presented without any further 
                                                          
262 See for instance page 247 and page 261. 
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explanation. A similar argumentative leap can be found in Intempo (2014) where it is stated in 
bold-face that “Good vocabulary gives great reading understanding and reduces drop-out 
from high school”. The statement provides neither references to research, nor any 
explanations of why good vocabulary can reduce drop-out. What further makes these general 
and simplistic accounts problematic is that both Memolife (2014) and Intempo (2014) tend to 
present their statement without any modalised markers (e.g. markers such as ‘can’, ‘may’, 
‘possibly’ etc.). Use of non-modalised phrasings leave statements closed for dialogue and thus 
the brain-based learning texts convey their messages with the appearance that ‘this is just how 
it is’ (cf. Fairclough, 2003).
Another strategy used by these two Norwegian brain-based learning industries is
frequent reference to favourable evaluations of the program being marketed. Memolife’s 
website offers links to television interviews and media articles on the positive effect of 
Memolife’s brain-training products (Memolife, 2014), whereas Intempo presents 
recommendations, experiences and video-interviews with some of the 200+ Norwegian pre-
schools that have bought Bravo games (Intempo, 2014). The problem is that the positive 
recommendations presented are either from customers, or from the main entrepreneurs of 
these brain-based learning industries themselves. Even if such recommendation can easily be 
taken at face value, they hardly offer unbiased and scientific assessment of these brain-based 
learning programs. This adds to the overall impression that the interest and motive for these 
brain-based learning industries to recontextualise educational neuroscience into their field is 
the construction of a seemingly ‘valid’ evidence base which, in turn, may help to sell learning 
products to teachers, parents, students, and others, who are interested in increasing their 
cognitive abilities.
To sum up, educational neuroscience is thus represented and incorporated into the 
Norwegian public field in different ways, ranging from pop-scientific debates, to more 
sensational news stories and ‘brain-based’ educational products (see table 8.1). A general 
feature of these public texts is their uncritical reading of educational neuroscientific topics 
which, in turn, is manifested in general and simplistic accounts and overly enthusiastic 
expectations of what brain science can achieve in education and other social settings. It is also 
worth mentioning that one cannot find a single reference to the international and academic 
discipline of educational neuroscience in any of the public texts analysed. 
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Regarding educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation at the public level in Norway, 
certain aspects can be mentioned. Firstly, literature searches for relevant public texts are more 
productive in comparison to literature searches conducted for the Norwegian academic field,
because the public search produced numerous relevant media articles and brain-based learning 
programs, in comparison to the sparse material from academic literature searches. This 
finding is interesting by itself, because it indicates that representations of educational
neuroscience are more prominent within the public sphere than within academia in Norway.
In comparison to the international situation, it can be noted that one finds a more even 
distribution at the international level, where educational neuroscientific representations are 
frequently presented in both academic and public fields (cf. chapters 6 and 7).
Despite this difference, my data suggests that there are numerous similarities between 
the way in which educational neuroscience is recontextualised and presented within the public 
field in Norway as compared to international public fields. For instance, Norwegian and 
international public texts are both fascinated with the brain and explanations given by brain 
scientists. In my corpora, brain science is given a key role in explaining social aspects, human 
qualities and/or behaviour. Many Norwegian and international public texts, moreover, tend to 
use attention-grabbing headlines, present their stories in non-modalised wordings, and giving 
simplistic presentations of complex (educational) neuroscientific topics. There is also a
tendency in international media to present the relation between the individual and his/her 
brain as something objectified, conflated, or mechanical263. Similar presentations can also be 
VHHQ LQ 1RUZHJLDQ PHGLD í IRU H[DPSOH LQ VHQWHQFHV OLNH “the right hemisphere prefers 
figures, drawings and illustrations” (Nydal & Asland, 2007) and “the frontal lobe keeps tabs 
RQ \RX´ +ROVW 	 +DQVHQ  í EXW PHFKDQLFDO DQG REjectified phrasings nevertheless 
appear to be less frequent than in the international texts. I will further argue that many 
Norwegian media texts make use of appropriation strategies, as they recontextualise aspects 
of the educational neuroscience discourse into their own media discourse. This is frequently 
done by using educational neuroscience to create fascinating stories, which are then ‘sold’ to 
a public audience264. Similarities like these can be seen across media discourses in general,
and thus this trait can be seen generic to both Norwegian and international media agencies, 
rather than specific traits found across scalar boarders. 
                                                          
263 As seen demonstrated in BBC (2013), Carlyle (2014), Hammond (2013), James (2014), The Guardian (2004), Whipple 
(2012), and Wighton (2007). 
264 This can for instance be seen in the Norwegian media texts Henriksen (2005), Knudsen (2010), and Yttervik (2012), and 
in the international media texts Carlyle (2014), James (2014), and Wighton (2007). 
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Recontextualisation of the educational neuroscience discourse to the public field is not 
only manifested in general and simplistic accounts of contemporary science, as more nuanced 
and critical media texts pertaining to education and neuroscience can also EH IRXQGíERWK
internationally and in the Norwegian public field. This is demonstrated by the range of more 
pop-scientific debates featured in media articles, such as discussions regarding smart drugs, 
warning about neuromyths, and debates concerning the use of natural scientific explanations 
in the social sciences265. The so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industry has also caught on in 
Norway (see table 8.1). As with international corporations, one can also find representations 
closely linked to neuromyths and edumyths in Norwegian businesses, in their so-called 
‘brain-basis’ for learning products and also in learning material targeted and sold to a public 
audience266. Even if the international brain-based learning industry is significantly larger than 
the one identified in Norway, the establishment of brain-based educational businesses is 
QRWHZRUWK\íSDUWLFXODUO\VHHQLQUHODWLRQWRWKHlack of focus on educational neuroscience in 
Norwegian academia. 
The Norwegian political field 
Findings from my analysis also show a recontextualisation of the educational neuroscience 
discourse to the political field in Norway. Literature searches were conducted in relevant 
research databases, such as the Norwegian government and Ministry of Education and 
Research, and various search criteria were used in internet searches in order to find texts 
relevant to recontextualisation within the political field. Of the relevant literature found a total 
of 7 texts were FKRVHQ IRU WKH ILQDOFRUSRUDíQDPHO\ the Official Norwegian Report about 
systematic education to all preschool children (NOU 2010: 8), Bjørnestad and Samuelsson 
(2012), Departementene (2013), three analysis by the Norwegian Ministry of Education and 
Research (2013a, 2013b, 2013c), and Backe-Hansen, Walhovd, and Huang (2014) (see 
appendix C for full reference list). It should be noted that some texts are literature reviews, 
reports or conference reports commissioned by the Norwegian government267, and some of 
their authors are therefore researchers and not (educational) politicians per se. I will 
nevertheless
                                                          
265 This can for instance be seen in the Norwegian media texts Byrkjedal and Misje (2013), Time (2012), and Ebdrup (2014), 
and in the international media text by Rose (2013).  
266 This can be seen in the Norwegian brain-based learning programs Memolife (2014) and Intempo (2014), and similarly in 
the international Brain Gym (2014), Kagan (2014), and Learning Rx (2014).   
267 Such as Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), Departementene (2013), and Backe-Hansen et al. (2014). 
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Table 8.1: Examples how different public texts represent educational neuroscience [my translation].
Norwegian pop-scientific articles Norwegian media articles Norwegian brain-based learning 
industry
“Brainwash: Norway has trusted in 
social scientists. We have believed 
that titles meant knowledge. Then 
a comedian comes along and 
shows us a different story: ... 
Norwegian scientists haven’t paid 
attention in class and are so 
unaccustomed with critique that 
some react with anger and 
threatens with lawyers” (Vassnes, 
2010).
“Neuro this and neuro that. It is 
time for humanists to retort the 
over-enthusiastic psychologist and 
brain scientists, says the British 
critic Raymon Tallis (sic.)” (Time, 
2011).
“We are in the middle of a 
revolution of knowledge and this 
fDVFLQDWHVPDQ\íIRUJRRGUHDVRQ
But it also leads to the emergence 
of some myths and that the 
presentation can become dubious, 
says Moser” (Time, 2012).
“Neuroscience is increasingly 
revealing more of the brain’s 
secrets. Education and educational 
policy have not taken this new 
knowledge into account, says 
professor Hermundur 
Sigmundsson” (Monsen, 2010).
³í(YHU\WKLQJ,VD\LVVFLHQWLILFDOO\
based. I look at what actually 
works; I do not have any other 
guiding principles. I ask that 
scientifically based knowledge is 
incorporated in schools, into 
classrooms, and is translated to 
educational practice”
(Sigmundsson cited in Monsen, 
2010).
³í(GXFDWLRQLVWVVKRXOGVWD\DZD\
from brain science. Brain science 
can only in a diminutive way tell 
us how we should arrange schools 
and pre-schools” (Ebdrup, 2014).
“Use the whole brain ... Many can 
benefit of making illustration of 
their curriculum texts, so called 
mind-mapping. We will then make 
use of the right hemisphere which 
prefers figures, drawings and 
illustrations. In this way, the whole 
load will not be on the left
hemisphere, which is a specialist in 
words, sentences and numbers” 
(Nydal & Asland, 2007).
“Jogging makes the brain bigger.
An area in the brain involved in 
memory and the ability to learn 
new stuff can become bigger if you 
tie on your running shoes”
(Knudsen, 2010).
“Teenagers have unfinished brains. 
They love speed, don’t manage to 
tidy their rooms, and they don’t see 
the consequences of their actions. 
They cannot help it. Their brains is 
in fact not finished” (Holst & 
Hansen, 2011).
“This area of the brain [frontal 
lobe] keeps tabs on you” (Holst & 
Hansen, 2011).
“New report concerning children: 
Considerable stress gives smaller 
brain. Prolonged stress and lack of 
care will simply give a child 
smaller brain and makes them 
losers in school, research show” 
(Yttervik, 2012).
“Brain scientists have found 
substantial differences between 
girls and boys and genders should 
therefore be divided in first grade, 
experts say” (Holterman, 2010).
“A Norwegian fish oil can help 
children with substantial learning 
difficulties and ADHD, numerous 
studies show” (Henriksen, 2005).
³0HPROLIHí7KH%UDLQ&OXE´
(Memolife, 2014). 
“The brain can be trained, just like 
the body, but with faster results”
(Memolife, 2014). 
“Double your memory, get better 
focus, become a master in mental 
calculation, or learn a new 
language at a fraction of standard 
phase” (Memolife, 2014).
Regardless if your aim is to learn a 
new language, become a leader at 
work, become a good speaker, or 
simply develop to become more 
content with yourself and others, 
then it is important to become 
friends with both hemispheres 
(Memolife, 2014). 
“The left hemisphere is of the 
academic and structured type, 
whereas the right hemisphere is 
more creative and artistic”
(Memolife, 2014).
Generally one can say that there 
exist three basic kinds for memory 
and learning: visually, auditory, 
and kinesthetic ...  Research show 
that 37 % of the population is 
dominant kinesthetic, 34 % 
dominant auditory and 29 % 
dominant visual. It is also shown 
that children with kinesthetic 
preferences often can experience 
problems in schools and that adults 
kinesthetics is more likely to end 
up on a downward path in society 
(Memolife, 2014).
“Investment in Bravo the three first 
years of a child’s life could give 
the child lifelong profit” (Intempo,
2014). 
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nevertheless consider the texts as political documents since they refer to guidelines and 
research questions generated by national politicians268.
The first question to be answered is to what degree educational neuroscience is 
recontextualised to the Norwegian political field. Findings from my literature search show 
some traces of a linkage between education and neuroscience here, although to a lesser degree 
than in the political field internationally. Two examples of a Norwegian political text found 
during the literature search are the Official Norwegian Report ‘Pupil’s learning in the school
of the future’ (NOU 2014: 7) and the Norwegian Government’s white paper on early 
intervention for lifelong learning ‘... no one left behind’ (St.meld. nr. 16, 2006-2007). The 
former text is based on international research reviews concerning “knowledge of how students 
learn and what characterises good education”, such as OECD’s report ‘The Nature of 
Learning’ (2010) and ‘National Research Councils: How People Learn. Brain, Mind, 
Experience, and School’ (2006) íERWKRIZKLFKDUHUHSRUWV WKDWDVVHPEOH³a wide range of
theoretical and empirical work, such as developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, 
neuroscience, and educational psychology” (NOU 2014: 7, p. 19 [my translation]). Similar 
traces of a linkage between education and neuroscience are also seen in the white paper from 
the Norwegian Ministry of Education where, with references to UNESCO’s report ‘Strong 
Foundations. Education for all’, it is stressed that: 
Learning is closely connected with development of connections (synapses) between brain cells. 
Formation of these connections occurs rapidly until the age of three. The amount of synapses levels out 
after this. The first three years is therefore the most important for brain development. Young children’s 
development is very sensitive with regards to undernourishment and malnutrition, neglect, and lack of 
stimulation. If basic needs are not met, it usually leads to consequences in adulthood. The environment 
DFKLOGLVUDLVHGLQíERWKWKHSK\VLFDODQGWKHHPRWLRQDOíLQIOXHQFHs brain development (St.meld. nr. 
16, 2006-2007, p. 57 [my translation]). 
When it comes to the texts in the final corpora, these political texts also show linkages to 
education and neuroscience. In discussing how such linkages are represented, it can first be 
noted that themes range from pre-school and kindergartens (NOU: 8 2010; Bjørnestad & 
Samuelsson, 2012), gender differences in educational achievements (Backe-Hansen et al., 
2014), child welfare (Departementene, 2013), and short reviews concerning linkages between 
education and neuroscience (Ministry of Education and Research, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). All 
                                                          
268 Again, see the methods chapter and appendix B-D for a comprehensive account on the literature search, selection 
criteria, and the critical discourse analysis.  
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these texts draw on neuroscience as a new perspective which can contribute to clarifying 
topics central to children, education, learning, and/or children’s cognitive development269.
Two of the research overviews commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Education and 
Research note how “new research within development psychology and neuroscience ... can be 
said to have revolutionised the perception of the youngest children in kindergartens”
(Bjørnestad & Samuelsson, 2012, p. 63 [my translation]), and how perhaps the most 
significant change in the knowledge base and perception of gender differences in school 
achievements “is an increased interest in possible contributions from a cognitive 
neuroscientific perspective” (Backe-Hansen et al., 2014, p. 3 [my translation])270. Five out of 
the seven political texts, moreover, emphasise that brain sciences can help to enrich 
educational research, as well as how insights from cognitive neuroscience appear to support 
numerous educational theories, rather than devalue them271. In the text ‘New connections’ by 
the Ministry of Education and Research (2013c) it is stressed how neuroscience can 
contribute to the improvement of schools, but also that what brain scientists have said about 
learning in school settings should already be familiar to teachers. What is new, it is argued, is 
that brain scientists offer a micro-perspective on aspects such as memory and learning. 
Accordingly, the following excerpt on memory is presented as an example of congruent 
perspectives between education and neuroscience: 
A central point regarding memory [in neuroscience] is that you remember best if you have numerous 
ways in to the relevant memory, numerous ways in to the specific cell connection. In practice, this 
means that knowledge that has been incorporated over time and which is connected to numerous events 
will be more easily recalled than knowledge that is quickly incorporated. This is why cramming272 the 
day before a test does not work that well (Ministry of Education and Research, 2013c [my translation 
and footnote]).
The text continues by explaining why it can be beneficial for educationalists to take such 
neuroscientific perspectives into account, arguing that knowledge about the brain, learning, 
and memory can aid educationalists in their preparation and understanding of learning 
practices (Ministry of Education and Research, 2013c). The focus is, however, not only on
                                                          
269 As seen in NOU 2010:8 (2010), Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), Departementene (2013), Ministry of Education and 
Research (2013a, 2013b, 2013c), and Backe-Hansen et al. (2014). 
270 Both of these research overviews are largely based on international research relevant for educational topics.   
271 This is explicitly seen in Departementene (2013), Backe-Hansen et al. (2014), Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), 
Ministry of Education and Research (2013b), and Ministry of Education and Research (2013c). 
272 ‘Cramming’ is in this respect meant in the educational sense of ‘memorizing a large amount of information in short time’ 
and is used as a translation for the Norwegian word ‘pugge’.  
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how educationalists can benefit by new perspectives from neuroscience, since emphasis also 
is put on reciprocal collaboration, wherein neuroscientists can learn from educationalists.  
Collaboration between different scholarly disciplines requires meeting places, but the distance between 
the disciplines is still great ... Educationalists and practical psychologists know little about how the 
brain functions, there are likewise numerous aspects of children’s learning we [neuroscientists] cannot 
say anything certain about ... But it is very useful for us to be challenged on new themes and on 
different ways of perceiving these things (Moser & Moser quoted in Ministry of Education and 
Research, 2013c [my translation]).
Although five out of the seven political texts explicitly state that neuroscience can help to 
enrich educational research, some texts also exhibit DQRSWLPLVWLF\HWFDXWLRXVíVRPHWLPHV
even an uncertain íVWDQGZLWKUHJDUGV WRZKDWQHXURVFLHQFHFDQFRQWULEXWH WRHGXFDWLRQ273.
This is seen in Backe-Hansen and colleagues’ (2014) literature review on gender differences 
in school achievements:
There is, however, a long stride to deduce from knowledge of normal variation in brains to interventions 
in schools. In my opinion, there is currently no well-founded cognitive neuroscientific basis for the
claim that surrounding girls and boys with different gender-specific educational resources will benefit 
them, their brains, or their school achievements. That being said, it can be beneficial for educational 
personnel to have basic knowledge about neural and cognitive development in order to understand and 
detect normal and deviant development in children (Walhovd, in Backe-Hansen et al., 2014, p.77 [my 
translation]).
The text excerpt seems to exhibit caution with regards to translating neurobiological theories 
into practices and interventions in schools. The text does nevertheless stress that basic 
knowledge of the brain and cognitive development can be expedient for educationalists, since 
the brain sciences offer new perspectives, which can help to “expand educationalists’ 
knowledge and understanding”. This view appears to be common within the Norwegian 
political texts analysed, as several texts emphasise how neuroscience can provide new 
perspectives on memory, learning, teaching, childcare, and/or children’s cognitive 
development274. Neuroscientific perspectives are, furthermore, often presented as something
which can help to enrich, rather than establish rules, IRUHGXFDWLRQDOUHVHDUFKíDQRWLRQZKLFK
is often followed by references to reciprocal collaboration and/or caution with regards to 
differences in educational and neuroscientific explanations275. Despite this approach, which 
                                                          
273 As seen in NOU 2010: 8 (2010), Backe-Hansen et al. (2014), and Ministry of Education and Research (2013c). 
274 As seen in NOU 2010:8 (2010), Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), Departementene (2013), Ministry of Education and 
Research (2013a, 2013b, 2013c), and Backe-Hansen et al. (2014). 
275 As seen in NOU 2010: 8 (2010), Backe-Hansen et al. (2014), and Ministry of Education and Research (2013c). 
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seems to resemble a cautious optimism toward the linkage of education and neuroscience,  
three out of the seven political articles make references to Heckman and his suggestions that 
early intervention for children’s cognitive development (particularly before the age of three) 
will lead to economic profit276 í D PRGHO ZKLFK has already been evaluated and deemed 
problematic, because it conveys certain representations that are not in accordance with 
contemporary educational neuroscience. More significantly, although all the political texts 
refer to themes closely related to the international discipline of educational neuroscience, not 
a single text mentions this international academic discipline by name. This aspect, in addition 
to other findings concerning educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to the political 
field, will be further discussed and critically reflected upon in the following sections. 
If one compares educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to the Norwegian political 
field with similar processes internationally, educational neuroscience is more established and 
PDQLIHVWHGZLWKLQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFDOILHOGWKDQZLWKLQ1RUZD\ías shown by the small 
number of Norwegian political texts in comparison to those from similar international 
searches. In addition, texts emerging from Norwegian literature searches are often literature 
reviews or reports authored by scientists but commissioned by Norwegian politicians, whereas 
international political texts often are written by policymakers themselves and/or by their 
political staff. Since educational neuroscience has, up until now, had a relatively small impact 
within Norway, this may explain why references to linkages between neuroscience and 
education/social sciences are more frequently found in analysis and commissioned literature 
reviews than in explicit policy-statements. Nevertheless, the fact that many of the Norwegian 
political texts are commissioned work written by scientists is significant, since this can clarify 
some of the differences found between the recontextualisation of educational neuroscience in 
the Norwegian and international political fields.
A second aspect when comparing Norwegian and international political texts is that
neuroscience in Norwegian political texts is often represented as a new perspective which can 
help WR LOOXPLQDWH DVSHFWV UHOHYDQW WR VRFLDO DQGRU HGXFDWLRQDO DVSHFWV í VXFK DV a child’s 
development in kindergartens (Bjørnestad & Samuelsson, 2012; NOU 2010: 8, 2010), aspects 
of children’s mental health and childcare (Departementene, 2013), gender differences and 
school performance (Backe-Hansen et al., 2014), and linkages of neuroscience and 
                                                          
276 As seen in NOU 2010: 8 (2010), Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), and Departementene (2013). 
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education/learning (Ministry of Education and Research, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). When 
referring to linkages between neuroscience and education/social aspects, authors of these 
political texts tend to refer to international research. However, despite frequent references to 
international academic fields, the academic discipline of educational neuroscience is never 
mentioned. Again, one can speculate whether lack of references to the international academic 
discipline of educational neuroscience is a deliberate choice, or whether it is attributable to 
lack of knowledge that such an international discipline exists. 
Thirdly, it can be noted that apart from international academic articles, many of the 
Norwegian policy documents refer to international documents from intergovernmental 
LQWHUHVW DFWRUV í SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH 2(&'277. This is perhaps not surprising, considering that 
international organizations such as the OECD, EU, and WTO are significant influences on the 
shaping of Norwegian educational policy (Karlsen, 2006). The OECD (for instance, in its 
comprehensive report ‘Understanding the Brain: The Birth of a Learning Science’ (2007) and 
‘The Nature of Learning’ (2010)) and EU (e.g. in ‘Neuroscience explains the impact of 
poverty on early brain development’ (2012)) positively link educational and cognitive 
neuroscientific perspectives in their policy directives. 
Many of the international documents also seem to link educational neuroscience with 
neoliberal argumentation278. Similar neoliberal connections are not found to the same extent 
LQ 1RUZHJLDQ SROLWLFDO WH[WV í EXW DJDLQ, this may be ascribed to the authorship of these 
reports, since a majority of the Norwegian political text are commissioned research reports. 
Another aspect worth mentioning is that almost all of the Norwegian political texts appear to 
present representations which are more in line with the ones found in the academic discipline 
RI HGXFDWLRQDO QHXURVFLHQFH í WKDW LV UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI QXDQFHG DQG PRUH µFDXWLRXV¶
accounts where reciprocal collaboration between neuroscience and education/social sciences 
is emphasised279. This is of note, since my findings indicate that three out of six international 
political texts have representations that do not correspond with representations from the 
academic level of educational neuroscience280, such as the UK Governmental teacher 
webpage, which argued for VAK learning styles (TeacherNet, 2007). Again, this variance 
may be due to the extent of political commissioned reports and research overviews found 
                                                          
277 As seen in Backe-Hansen et al. (2014), Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), and NOU 2010: 8 (2010).  
278 As seen in the international policy text Allen and Smith (2008), UK Government Office for Science (2012), TeacherNet 
(2007), and US Department of Education (2012).  
279 In the corpora this can be seen in Backe-Hansen et al. (2014), Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), Departementene 
(2013), Ministry of Education and Research (2013b, 2013c), and NOU 2010: 8 (2010). 
280 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), TeacherNet (2007) and US Department of Education (2012).  
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Table 8.2: Examples how different political texts represent educational neuroscience [my translation]. 
Text excerpt from the Norwegian political field 
 
“Experiences change the brain. The committee has been imparted basic knowledge about brain science, particularly 
concerning developments of children’s brains in their pre-school year. The brain’s structure and function are influenced by 
experiences, and experiences related to children’s activity in kindergartens do therefore play an important role in every 
learning process” (NOU 2010:8, p.23).
“The question is thus if kindergartens in the future should in greater extent make use of neuroscientific knowledge in order 
to aid better motoric, social, emotional, and cognitive development for disadvantaged children” (NOU 2010: 8, pp. 23-24).
“Heckman, the Nobel prize winner in economy, has in his research investigated relations between interventions in early 
childhood and later profit for the individual and for the society. Heckman says that early learning begHWVPRUHOHDUQLQJí
learning is a self-reinforcing process and gives a so-called “multiplication effect” ... This means that the later we implement 
learning interventions, the less effective and more expensive will such intervention be” (NOU 2010: 8, p. 131).
“Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev and Yaditz (2010) and Heckman, Pinto, Shaikh and Yavitz (2011) show that it is a 
statistic significant effect for both girls and boys when it comes to their participation in kindergarten activities, which 
means that the society can measure effect in form of economic profit when children get the opportunity to attend 
kindergartens” (Bjørnestad & Samuelsson, 2012, p. 30).
“There is in Dalli’s research overview much work that is relevant for contemporary kindergarten debate, but usually these 
are not directly linked to kindergarten’s activities. One example can be new research within development psychology and 
neuroscientific research which can be said to have revolutionised the perception of the youngest children in kindergartens 
... When it comes to research from developmental psychology the borderlines between childcare and learning has been 
removed and newer research argue that there are no divisions between these two perspectives. Emotional development 
appear today as a total necessity for cognitive development, nobody can learn without safe and stabile conditions” 
(Bjørnestad & Samuelsson, 2012, p. 63).
“New brain science support the knowledge that the brain’s development depends upon experience, and caregiver’s 
emotional involvement in the infant is crucial. Traumas in the first three years of a child’s life have therefore been shown to 
have particular damaging effect. The child adapts to neglect” (The Departments, 2013, p. 11).
“The conclusion was therefore that children in good shape have better ability to activate frontal and parietal brain regions 
which is important for abilities to control, maintain, and plan complex tasks related to cognitive control. These are essential 
skills for learning and academic performance in the classroom (Ministry of Education and Research, 2013a).
“During the last decades has the appetite for brain science significantly increased, also within the educational field. The 
authors mean that one should differentiate between two approaches to brain science. At the one hand are studies of the 
brain perceived as a source of knowledge which can enrich educational research. Knowledge from this research can be 
integrated with other research for what works within learning and education. On the other hand are brain science perceives 
as a source where one can extract guidelines and methods which further can be used directly in teaching. One example of 
this latter approach is methods for “brain gym” or “learning styles” which are sold as commercial products to schools” 
(Ministry of Education and Research, 2013b).
“Brain science can contribute to an improvement of schools. But what researchers insofar know about learning should be 
obvious for educationists, says Norway’s two leading brain scientists Edvard and May-Britt Moser ... Our view is that there 
is absolutely no harm using what one know about memory to optimise learning in school” (Ministry of Education and 
Research, 2013c). 
“This knowledge summary is an updating of a similar overview which was conducted by NOVA in 2008. Both times the 
Ministry of Education and Research was the commissioner. It has been interesting to investigate if there has happened 
alterations in the knowledge base and perception of gender differences in school achievements during the time that has 
ensued since the last review was written. Perhaps the most significant change that has occurred is an increased interest in 
which contributions a cognitive neuroscientific perspective can give. We have therefor also invited professor Kristine B. 
Walhovd, Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo, to write a distinct chapter with regards to this” (Backe-Hansen, 
Walhovd & Huang, 2013, p.3).
“There is, however, a long stride to deduce from such studies to implementation of knowledge of the brains normal 
variation to interventions in schools. In my opinion there is currently not a cognitive neuroscientific well-founded basis to 
claim that to surround girls and boys with different gender-specific educational facilitations will benefit them, their brain, 
or their school achievements. That being said, it can be favourable that educational personnel have basic knowledge about 
neural and cognitive development in order to understand and detect normal and deviant development in children (Walhovd 
in Backe-Hansen et al., 2013, p.77).
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within the Norwegian field, since scientists authoring political reports may be more 
predisposed to critical readings and cautious representations of themes concerning education 
and neuroscience than policymakers. 
Even if Norwegian political texts are more careful in their statements regarding topics 
pertaining to educational neuroscience, one can nevertheless find references – albeit in 
SDVVLQJ í WR WKHPXFK FULWLFLVHG WKHRULHV Rf Heckman and Perry in almost half of them281.
References to Heckman and Perry appear, as argued in chapter 7, to be a recurring intertextual 
feature when it comes to children’s cognitive development and early intervention within the 
international political and public field, despite critiques from the educational neuroscientific 
community (Gillies, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2014b). It is nevertheless of note that similar 
references also occur within Norwegian political texts. 
 
 
Ϋrecontextualisation of educational neuroscience in Norway 
What overall can be said as regards educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation over scalar 
borders is that the discipline has, insofar, had a lesser impact in Norway compared to an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQWH[W í DQ DVSHFW XQGHUVFored by the fact that none of the Norwegian 
academic, public, or political texts mention the international discipline of educational 
neuroscience, although topics concerning such cross-disciplinary work are nevertheless 
manifested in the Norwegian context. References are most frequently found within media, in 
Norwegian ‘brain-based’ learning industries, and within educational and social policy texts. 
The same cannot, however, be said of the Norwegian academic field. Not only does the 
academic field have significantly fewer references to educational neuroscience than the 
Norwegian public and political fields, but the paucity of academic texts pertaining to 
educational neuroscience also stands in stark contrast to the substantial number of texts and 
debates in international academic fields. In the following sections I draw attention to some 
critical discourse theoretical aspects of the way in which educational neuroscience is 
recontextualised to Norway. 
 
 
                                                          
281 As seen in the Norwegian texts Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), Departementene (2013), and NOU 2010: 8 (2010).  
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Where is the academic debate and educationalists’ engagement in the matter? 
The first issue I want to address is the lack of debate concerning educational neuroscience 
within academia in Norway. Whilst there are debates about a general and overarching linkage 
of natural sciences (viz. biological explanations) and social sciences amongst Norwegian 
academics, the specific linkage of education and neuroscience has so far received little 
attention. The few texts about educational neuroscience found in the academic field are 
articles published in minor scholarly magazines and not in renowned Norwegian peer-
reviewed journals. The inevitable question is therefore why there is so little focus on 
HGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQFHZLWKLQDFDGHPLDLQ1RUZD\íSDUWLFXODUO\FRQVLGHULQJWKDWWKHWRSLF
has already surfaced in Norwegian media, within policy documents, and also in the 
emergence of Norwegian brain-based learning industries. 
The relative lack of academic focus on educational neuroscience can be explained by 
the noticeable ‘gap’ between natural sciences and social sciences in Norway. Indeed, several 
RI WKH WH[W LQ WKH FRUSRUD í IURP WKH 1RUZHJLDQ DFDGHPLF ILHOG EXW DOVR Irom the public 
field282 íGUDZDWWHQWLRQ WR WKLV, using terms such as “two cultures” which can be found on 
different sides of “the big watershed” (respectively in Time, 2012, p. 23; Nielsen, 2011, p. 
293). Discussions, as previously noted, often centre on the nature-nurture debate, where social 
scientists in particular are criticised for not taking biological explanations into consideration 
in their research. Arguments frequently proffered in light of this are how one in Norway can 
find “a fear of biology”, “a futile either-or thinking”, “bio-naivety” and “biophobia” amongst 
educationalists, psychologists, and other social scientists283. The following excerpt from the 
text ‘Biophobia and biologism’ exemplifies such argumentation: 
Even if one acknowledges that development is caused by both nature and nurture, one chooses to focus 
on nurture only ... Within the academic world it is likely that biophobia is a relevant explanation for 
why so many academics and intellectuals are in opposition to, and know too little about, biological 
explanations ... What is often the case is that biophobia generates bio-naivety [i.e. lack of understanding 
of biology] (Kennair, 2008, p.19 [my translation]). 
In the literature review by Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012), a report commissioned by 
Norwegian policymakers, one also finds references to similar tendencies within the academic 
field in Norway. The Ministry of Education and Research specified that this report should be
                                                          
282 As seen in Ebdrup (2014), Egge (2012), Kennair (2008), Lindholm (2012), Ministry of Education and Research (2013c), 
Monsen (2010), Nielsen (2011), Time (2011), Time (2012), and Vasnes (2014).  
283 As seen in Egge (2012), Kennair (2008), Monsen (2010), and Vassnes (2010).  
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a review of the type of pre-school research found internationally, in comparison to Norway. 
Based on findings from their extensive literature review, Bjørnestad and Samuelsson (2012) 
conclude that such educational studies are chiefly conducted by educationalists in Norway, 
whereas internationally one finds a predominance of psychological research approaches 
together with contributions and new perspectives from developmental psychology and 
neuroscience. This emphasises that the Norwegian educational research community, in 
contrast to similar international research communities, tends to pay more attention to social 
and environmental aspects, as opposed to biological explanations, in their studies. This aspect 
is noteworthy, since it can help to clarify the lack of any prominent debate on educational 
neuroscience within the academic field in Norway. 
Educationalists’ HQJDJHPHQWíRUUDWKHUlack of engagement – is significant in the few 
Norwegian texts and debates which actually focus on educational neuroscientific linkages. 
Findings from my discourse analysis of Norwegian texts pertaining to educational 
neuroscience show how a majority of these articles are published by, or are based on 
interviews from, neuroscientists or (biological) psychologists. In fact, of the 16 texts about 
education and neuroscience in the Norwegian corpus, 11 texts are written by, or based on 
interviews from, neuroscientists and/or (biological) psychologists whereas only three are 
written by educationalists284. Moreover, a majority of the educationalists seem to be 
educational practitioners such as teachers and school leaders. Voices from educational 
theorists and researchers therefore seem to be lacking from the discussion, since the central 
topic in many of these texts is the linkage of education and neuroscience. As education in one 
way or another is an essential aspect of this, it is surprising how few educational theorists 
voice their perspectives on the matter. Again this finding is noteworthy, since it can clarify 
the significant lack of debate within the academic and educational field in Norway.
Critical discourse theories of dominant representations, normalisation, and slow 
discursive change are relevant here. These theories draw attention to how certain 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV ZLWKLQ D GLVFRXUVH FDQ EHFRPH GRPLQDQW í WKDW LV ZKHQ discursive
representations exist within a discourse as relatively unquestioned conceptions. If such 
representations are continuously repeated and reinforced by discursive regularities, and where 
                                                          
284 Of the 16 texts in corpora which explicitly talk of a linkage between education and neuroscience, only Bjørnestad and 
Samuelsson (2012), NOU 2010: 8 (2010), and Solli (2010) have perspectives from educational theorists. In 11 texts 
perspectives from neuroscientists or (biological) psychologists are presented, as seen in Backe-Hansen et al. (2013), 
Dehaene (2014), Departementene (2013), Ebdrup (2014), Egge (2012), Holterman (2010), Ministry of Education and 
Research (2013a; 2013c), Monsen (2010), Sund (2014), and Time (2012). The remaining two is a political text (Ministry of 
Education and Research, 2013b) and an interview of a brain-based education entrepreneur (Andreassen, 2014).  
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there is resonance between discursive ‘realities’, values, and institutions, dominant 
representations can become normalised. Representations, which remain normalised and 
relatively undisputed, contribute to sustaining the status quo in the discourse which, in turn, 
undergoes slow discursive changes. Dominant and relatively normalised representations can 
therefore be seen as significant influences, which shape and preserve how people perceive, 
think, and act within the world (Fairclough, 2010; Neumann, 2010). Parallels can, to a certain 
extent, be drawn from this and from the reluctance of Norwegian social scientists to take
biological explanations into consideration in their research. This point is even noted in one of 
the academic articles from the corpora: 
Some significant ideological arguments against biological perspectives have been established as 
unyielding truths within modern social sciences. These ideas do, as such, continually direct the 
DFDGHPLFDQG LQWHOOHFWXDOGHEDWHíERWK WKURXJK WKHGHEDWH¶V IRFXVDQG in what the debate is blind to
(Kennair, 2008, p. 11 [my translation]).
Kennair further argues that many social scientists should work to overcome their implicit
objections against biological perspectives, claiming that such attitudes impede important 
scientific developments: 
Because of this unsubstantiated critique [against biological perspectives], many scientists and theorists 
have been hindered in thinking certain thoughts and in researching certain themes íERWKGXH WR
direct censorship and because these ideas have been repeated uncritically over such a long period that 
many now assume them to be truths. This may have prevented academic developments within numerous 
disciplines (Kennair, 2008, p. 21 [my translation]).
I will claim that the tendency amongst Norwegian social scientists to neglect biological 
perspectives in social and educational matters is an intricate discursive process, which appears 
to have been sustained over a long period. One aspect of this process is the attitude of social 
scientists themselves, as research communities give the impression of being somewhat 
unenthusiastic in incorporating and exploring biological perspectives. I will, however, argue 
that it is unjust to ascribe the manifestation of ‘biophobia’ exclusively to social scientists, 
because discourses also have power, in virtue of their own self-sustaining structures and 
regularities. This power of discourse influences actors; often without these actors being aware 
of the intricate net of discursive structures with which they comply (cf. Fairclough, 2010; 
Neumann, 2010). Based on these critical discourse theoretical concepts, I suggest that certain 
NQRZOHGJHDQGWUXWKVíZKHUHLQVRFLDOVFLHQWLILFDVSHFWVDUHIDYRXUHGRYHUELRORJLFDORQHVí
may have become institutionalised over time within Norwegian social research discourses. 
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Institutionalisation of certain representations may also have become normalised, thus helping
to restrict certain ways of being, WKLQNLQJ DQG DFWLQJ ZLWKLQ VRFLDO VFLHQWLILF GLVFRXUVHV í
perhaps without social scientists being aware of the subtle influence of these discursive
structures. One example might be how predominance of a nurture-view in social aspects 
becomes established within a psychological or educational research community at a 
university. Discussions, research programs, studies, articles written and, indeed, university 
courses for new students are therefore likely to emphasise perspectives where nurture is 
preferred to nature. In point of fact, this is even emphasised by some texts in the corpus,
where university professors claim that students in education and psychology in Norway are 
not sufficiently exposed to courses or literature where biological perspectives are presented 
(cf. Kennair, 2008; Monsen 2010). Discursive processes of resonance can continue as these 
students become the new researchers, professors, and practitioners who, by virtue of being 
actors in the discourse, may also express preferences to nurture over nature in the way they 
think, speak, and act. Thus, if dominant nurture representations remain relatively uncriticised 
in this discursive feedback-loop, one may assume that biological explanations will gradually 
become marginalised within social scientific discourses. I do not imply that this is exactly 
what has happened within Norwegian social scientific discourses, although I suggest that the 
example clarifies how discursive powers operate. Opaque and self-reinforcing discursive
structures can occur, in accordance with critical discourse theories, and claims of ‘biophobia’ 
amongst Norwegian social scientists ought to be seen in a larger discursive matrix where the 
power of discourse is also ascribed a significant role.
Despite the power of discursive structures, it is important to remember that critical 
discourse theories also emphasise subjects’ actions and possibilities for discursive change. By 
resisting discursive conformities, by questioning the unquestioned, and by problematizing and 
crossing discursive boundaries, one can build foundation for new understandings and new 
ways of being and acting in the world (Fairclough, 1992, 2010)285. This discourse theoretical 
aspect supplements the process of discursive and social change and can also elucidate aspects 
of educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation process in Norway. Should Norwegian 
actors not be seen as active rather than passive subjects who surrender to discursive
recontextualisation processes? Cannot the augmented academic and pop-scientific debate 
concerning natural scientific explanation in social sciences witness of an active and dynamic 
problematization of discursive boundaries within and between the disciplines of biology, 
                                                          
285 For further elaboration see critical discourse theories presented in the emergence chapter, page 67-69. 
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education, neuroscience, and psychology in Norway?286 Moreover, do not the few emerging 
references to a linkage of education and neuroscience in Norwegian texts signal such a
transgression, as old discursive aspects are re-articulated and re-understood through cross-
discursive endeavours? If one further considers this discursive process in Norway in light of 
the emergence and development of educational neuroscience internationally (cf. chapter 5), 
one can see certain similarities. From my emergence analysis, it seems that the international 
development of educational neuroscience was instigated by a problematization of disciplinary 
borders between social sciences (viz. education and nurture) and natural sciences (viz. 
neuroscience, biology and nature) in the late 1800s í D SUREOHPDWL]DWLRQ DQG GLVFLSOLQDU\
reconfiguration which recurred in the 1950s and 60s, before peaking in the late 1990s with the 
establishment of the educational neuroscientific discipline. Even if one cannot find evidence 
for the establishment of educational neuroscience as a distinct academic discipline in Norway,
one can find several similar developmental traits with the international developmental 
process287. For instance, Norway had a prominent milieu of educational psychology and 
children’s cognitive development in the 1950s and 1960s, and one could also find a strong 
belief in ‘objective knowledge’ inspired by natural scientific modes of studies. In the 1970s, 
criticism emerged of the ‘positivistic stance’, though, as social scientific perspectives gained 
ground in education. In the 21st century, one can also see in Norway the establishment of a 
political ‘evidence-movement’ within the educational field, whereas one in the more 
academic sphere one finds a problematizing and transgressing of disciplinary boundaries 
between biology, psychology, neuroscience, and education, although the definitive emergence 
of an academic discipline of educational neuroscience has not yet occurred. Some national 
variation notwithstanding, it is apparent that the Norwegian development and 
recontextualisation of the educational neuroscience discourse bears significant resemblances 
to the discourse’s emergence internationally. 
However, when considering the impact and development of educational neuroscience in 
Norway it is important to bear in mind that the Norwegian context cannot be seen in isolation 
and that this, to a certain extent, must be seen as a re-contextualisation process. By this, I
mean that international discursive structures and actors are likely to influence Norwegian 
                                                          
286 Within an international context it is noted by Aldrich (2014) that debates about the importance of nature and nurture 
have entered a new era with the introduction of neuroscience and education. This underscores my argument that nature 
and nurture debates in Norway can be seen highly interlinked, and almost as an inevitable prelude to the education and 
neuroscience debate 
287 My discourse analysis does not include an emergence analysis of historical texts in Norway, but certain parallels can 
nevertheless be drawn with references to Norwegian educational history (cf. Telhaug & Mediås, 2003).  
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discourses, in accordance with concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity (cf. 
Fairclough, 1992, 2010). Educational neuroscience’s impact, emergence and development in 
Norway are therefore likely to have been, and continue to be, influenced by elements from 
international discourses of educational neuroscience. Indeed, this can already be seen in how 
certain international aspects of the linkage of education and neuroscience are manifested 
within the NorweJLDQFRQWH[WíVXFKDVVPDUWGUXJVEUDLQ-based learning industries, and how 
some literature reviews commissioned by policymakers look towards international research 
linking neuroscience and education. 
 
Reversed premises in the Norwegian debate 
Even if there is a lack of prominent academic debates about educational neuroscience within 
academia in Norway, this does not mean that discussions regarding such linkages are entirely 
DEVHQWíDVSUHYLRXVO\VWUHVVHG, discussions can be found in both pop-scientific media articles 
and in certain text published in scholarly magazines288. However, a significant proportion of 
this debate does not correspond with contemporary educational neuroscientific debates found 
internationally. I even suggest that the arguments for or against educational neuroscientific 
linkages in Norwegian debates appear to have become somewhat reversed in relation to the 
international discourse. This argument is based upon my analytical findings, which indicate 
that many of the texts which explicitly discuss linkages of education and neuroscience seem 
to i) either imply a top-down relation of neuroscience-over-education wherein neuroscientific 
explanations are often given predominance over educational theories289 and/or ii) perceive 
linkages between education and neuroscience to signify direct translations of neuroscientific 
theories into educational practices, as often seen in ‘brain-based’ educational products290.
Examples of the former are the texts by Egge (2012) and Monsen (2010). Both authors 
interview the biological psychologist Sigmundsson, who claims that biological research on 
“how the brain best learns” might provide a viable basis for practical interventions in schools. 
It further appears that both texts give biological and cognitive neuroscientific explanations 
predominance in aspects relevant to education, and the overall message is how such brain 
                                                          
288 Discussions about linking neuroscience and education can for instance be found in the media texts Ebdrup (2014), Time 
(2012), and Monsen (2010), and in the scholarly magazine texts Egge (2012), Solli (2010) and Sund (2014). 
289 As seen in the scholarly magazine texts by Dehaene (2014), Egge (2012), and Sund (2014), and in the media articles by 
Anreassen (2014), Holterman (2010), and Monsen (2010).  
290 As seen in the pop-scientific media article by Time (2012) and Ebdrup (2014). 
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scientific knowledge can help to change Norway’s “inadequate school system” (cf. Egge, 
2012; Monsen, 2010). By the same token, it is stated that:
Everything I say is scientifically based. I look at what actually works; I do not have any other guiding 
principles. I ask that scientifically based knowledge is incorporated in schools, into classrooms, and is 
translated to educational practice (Sigmundsson cited in Monsen, 2010 [my translation]). 
Even if Sigmundsson, in this example, argues for linking education with cognitive 
neuroscience, I suggest that representations such as this do not correspond with common ideas 
held in the contemporary international discipline of educational neuroscience. A central aim 
within the international and academic level is, as mentioned in previous chapters, to build 
reciprocal collaboration between the discourses of education, cognitive psychology, and 
neuroscience. This relates to awareness of disciplinary differences in levels of analysis, where 
emphasis is put on cautious approaches to linking neuroscientific and educational research in 
matters related to learning291. Many within the educational neuroscientific community
therefore resist top-down approaches, in which educational perspectives are made subsidiary 
to neuroscientific and biological explanations, because this is seen to undermine important 
steps in building balanced and equal collaboration. Norwegian actors who advocate for a 
linkage adherent to a top-down relation between neuroscience and education can therefore be 
seen to deviate from representations, views, and aims held by the international and academic 
level of the educational neuroscience discourse. 
It is not only certain Norwegian authors who argue for a linkage between neuroscience and 
education who appear to be in conflict with representations held by actors from the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO GLVFLSOLQH í LQFRQVLVWHQFLHV DUH DOVR IRXQG LQ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV IURP1RUZegian 
authors arguing against education and neuroscience. Two examples are the texts titled 
‘Educationalists should stay away from brain science’ (Ebdrup, 2014) and Time’s (2012) text 
on linkages between neuroscience and social sciences, where the final section is entitled 
‘Educationalists misunderstand’. Both texts emphasise different levels of analysis between 
the neuroscientific discipline and social science disciplines such as education, and that 
scientifically invalid conclusions can readily be drawn if one translates neuroscientific 
WKHRULHV XQFULWLFDOO\ LQWR HGXFDWLRQDO SUDFWLFHV í SHUVSHFWLYHV WKDW LV ZKLFK DOVR DUH
                                                          
291 As noted by for instance Ansari et al. (2012), Greenwood (2009), Mason (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), Ferrari 
(2011), and Varma et al. (2011) in previous corpora.  
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accentuated at the academic level of the international educational neuroscience discourse292.
However, even if both Ebdrup (2014) and Time (2012) seem to hold ideas similar to those of
the international discipline, they still seem to reject linkages between education and 
neuroscience on the premise that such an endeavour implies over-hasty and misjudged 
translations. There is, therefore, an inconsistency between the Norwegian debate and 
international debates on educational neuroscience. To be precise, both international and 
Norwegian authors take similar, cautious approaches as regards the linkage between 
education and neuroscience, and they both criticise approaches where neuroscience is too 
swiftly translated into practical instructions for (allegedly) improving education. The 
Norwegian authors nevertheless warn educationalists against neuroscience by saying “it is 
best if educationalists stay away from brain science altogether” (cf. Ebdrup, 2014). It is 
difficult to say whether these Norwegian authors use such remarks deliberately as an 
exaggeration in order to warn off educationalists until further developments in cognitive 
neuroscience can contribute to stronger linkages between education and neuroscience, or 
whether they are simply apprehensive and pessimistic about reductionistic approaches and 
neuromyths. Nevertheless, their approach appears to deviate from similar approaches and 
representations at the international discipline of educational neuroscience. Most significantly 
this is seen in how these Norwegian authors show wariness of linkages between neuroscience 
and education which also renders more cautious and reciprocal approaches to futile attempts. 
Overall, one can get the impression that much debate regarding linkages of education 
and neuroscience in Norway is based on premises which do not correspond with the principles 
held within the international academic discipline of educational neuroscience. Paradoxically, 
it appears, then, that some Norwegian authors who argue for linkages between neuroscience 
and education will not find support in the international discipline, whereas some Norwegian 
authors taking a more apprehensive stand against educational neuroscience have more in 
common with the views of the international and academic level of the discourse. Considering 
that none of the Norwegian texts in my corpus refer to the established international discipline, 
one can wonder if this difference in positions between Norwegian and international debates 
may be due to Norwegian actors’ lack of contact with the international and academic level of 
the educational neuroscience discourse. 
 
                                                          
292 As seen demonstrated in the text by Ansari and Coch (2006), Goswami (2008), Anderson and Reid (2009), and 
Christodoulou and Gaab (2009).  
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Implications Ϋd a summary of the chapter  
As a summary of the chapter, and in consideration of the ways in which educational neuro-
science has been recontextualised to Norway, there are four particular aspects and 
implications which I deem important to address. The first aspect is issues related to
reductionistic approaches to learning, the individual, and certain social matters. This issue is 
twofold, since on the one hand there is a tendency to hold a reductionistic perspective in some 
Norwegian social scientific fields, where natural scientific aspects, such as biology and 
neuroscience, are not taken into consideration in learning, individual emotion, motivation, 
social interaction, and other aspects central for education. On the other hand, one can find a 
reductionistic perspective when top-down approaches result in translations from cognitive 
neuroscientific theories directly down to recommendations for educational practice. It has 
already been noted how the majority of educational neuroscientific linkages found in the 
Norwegian corpora tend to be suggested as top-down perspectives where neuroscientists are 
posited as ‘superior mentors’ over educationalists293. This unbalanced relation is problematic 
in itself, because it can lead to a reduction or neglect of educational and social perspectives in 
aspects pertaining to education and learning. Further difficulties arise when actors with a top-
down approach suggest recommendations directly from neuroscientific or biological 
psychology theories to educational practice without taking educational perspectives into 
considerations. 
Examples of this are seen in Norwegian brain-based learning programs and in certain 
media texts and scholarly articles where brain science is used as argumentation for particular 
educational practices or learning techniques294. Not only are such recommendations at risk of 
neglecting essential insights and ethical considerations which educationalists can offer, but 
these recommendations are usually intended for learning settings in kindergartens, in families, 
and in schools where practices ultimately will influence children. The international discourse 
of educational neuroscience appears to emphasise the importance of cautious approaches and 
reciprocal collaboration precisely because of this, and both social and ethical aspects are 
highlighted when considering complex processes of learning. In fact, the international 
research community appears to be so cautious in its approach, that only a few practical 
                                                          
293 Traces of this can be seen in Andreassen (2014), Dehaene (2014), Ebdrup (2014), Egge (2012), Holterman (2010), 
Intempo (2014), Monsen (2010), Memolife (2014), Solli (2010), Sund (2014), and Time (2012). 
294 As seen in Andreassen (2014), Egge (2012), Holterman (2010), Intempo (2014), Monsen (2010), Memolife (2014), and 
Sund (2014).  
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implications have been suggested, as they find that “neuroscientific understanding is only just 
approaching the point where some limited educational implications and applications can be 
made that are of general significance to mainstream education” (Howard-Jones, 2010, p. 7). In 
comparison to this, Norwegian actors, in suggesting top-down views where neuroscience is 
directly translated to educational practices, are out of line with the views and values held by 
many within the international and academic educational neuroscience community. 
The second aspect addressed with reference to educational neuroscience’s 
recontextualisation in Norway is uncritical fascination with neuroscientific explanations. In 
previous chapters it was noted that international research indicates that neuroscientific 
explanations and brain images have an appealing appearance and, moreover, how particularly 
non-experts tend to judge explanations with neuroscientific information more favourably than 
explanations without such information. This ‘alluring appearance’ of neuroscience is further 
shown to enthral part of the international educational community, the public, and international 
popular culture (Hardiman et al., 2012; Pasquinelli, 2011; Weisberg et al., 2008). This is the 
case in Norway as well, and findings from my discourse analysis reveal numerous incidences 
in academic texts, in media stories, and brain-based learning products where authors or people 
interviewed appear to be fascinated by brain sciences, to mis-evaluate neuroscientific 
explanations, and/or to have unrealistic confidence in neuroscience and the social and 
behavioural aspects it can “explain”295.
For example do the texts ‘This is how the brain learn’ by Egge (2012) and ‘Music 
lessons improves learning’ E\ 6XQG  í ERWK SXEOLVKHG LQ VFKRODUO\ PDJD]LQHV IRU
HGXFDWLRQDOSUDFWLWLRQHUVDQGVFKRROOHDGHUVíSUHVHQWDFFRXQWVZKHUHDWRS-down approach is 
taken to the linkage of neuroscientific theories to educational practice. Considering that both 
articles are written by educationalists and that the topic at hand also is educational matters, it 
is surprising that neither of them offers any educational perspectives or digressions on the 
matter. This is understandable if these authors do not have any expertise in cognitive sciences 
and thus do not feel able to evaluate neuroscientific perspectives. Nevertheless, the topics 
discussed in both texts are elementary educational matters, which any educational 
practitioner, theorist, or school leader without difficulty could expound upon. The relevant 
educational, ethical, and critical perspectives seem to have evaporated in the sunny glory of 
                                                          
295 Traces of this can be seen in Andreassen (2014), Byrkjedal and Misje (2013), Egge (2012), Henriksen (2005), Holst and 
Hansen (2011), Holterman (2010), intempo (2014), Knudsen (2010), Lunde (2011), Memolife (2014), Monsen (2010), Nydal 
and Asland (2007), Sund (2014), Yttervik (2012). 
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neuroscientific explanations given by the brain scientists interviewed. This fascination with
neuroscientific explanations and lack of critical readings is noteworthy, but it must be stressed 
that similar tendencies are also found amongst non-experts in the international field. 
Nevertheless, when considering aspects pertaining to educational neuroscience in Norway one 
ought to bear in mind that there is a tendency (even if unintentionally) amongst non-experts to 
misevaluate information with neuroscientific explanation. 
Related to uncritical fascination of neuroscientific explanations is the third implication 
WR EH DGGUHVVHG í QDmely neuromyths and misinterpreted representations of educational 
neuroscience. The problem of misinterpretation of educational neuroscientific research has 
been discussed in previous chapters, where it was noted how simplification, generalisation, 
misunderstanding and misrepresentation of educational neuroscientific research can be 
manifested in academic, public, and political texts. The impact of such misinterpreted 
educational neuroscientific representations can differ, based on where and how a text is 
published and the number of its potential readers. If an educational neuroscientific 
misrepresentation is frequently repeated, it becomes a neuromyth, or an edumyth, thought to 
be true by many actors within the discourse (cf. chapter 7). When it comes to Norway, there 
are misinterpreted representations from the international and academic level of educational 
neuroscience, and even some neuromyths and edumyths, in many of the Norwegian texts296.
Examples of this are seen in how ‘the myth of three’ is manifested in some Norwegian texts 
(cf. Andreassen, 2014, Intempo 2014), the effect of Omega-3 on cognition (Henriksen, 2005), 
VAK learning styles (Memolife, 2014), and left- and right- hemispheric dominance 
(Memolife, 2014; Nydal & Asland, 2007). This is noteworthy, because not only can mis-
representations of educational neuroscientific research contribute to misunderstandings 
regarding the values and aims of the international discipline of educational neuroscience, but
also, frequent appearances of misrepresentations can also be manifested in the ways in which 
people understand concepts such as learning, the brain, and education. 
The last and, in my view, most important aspect of educational neuroscience’s 
recontextualisation in Norway is the implications of lack of academic debate and 
educationalists’ engagement in matters related to educational neuroscience. Throughout the 
discussion concerning Norwegian recontextualisation processes, I have repeatedly stressed 
how topics pertaining to educational neuroscience are more visible within public and political 
                                                          
296 For example in Andreassen (2014), Egge (2012), Henriksen (2005), Holst and Hansen (2011), Holterman (2010), Intempo 
(2014), Knudsen (2010), Memolife (2014), Monsen (2010), Nydal and Asland (2007), Sund (2014), and Yttervik (2012).   
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fields than within academia in Norway. Moreover, the few academic debates that do occur 
tend to be led by neuroscientists and (biological) psychologists, whereas educational theorists 
seem to be relatively absent from the debate. Based on critical discourse theories, and also by 
understandings resulting from my previous discourse analysis of educational neuroscience, I 
argue that this tendency in Norway has some significant implications. First of all, the lack of 
prominent educational neuroscientific debates within academia in Norway is important,
because it is within academic fields that one might expect to find more critical discussions
and considerations í DV RSSRVHG WR PHGLD WH[WV DQG EUDLQ-based learning products. When 
academic debates on educational neuroscience are missing, it is therefore also likely that 
critical consideration of educational neuroscience’s issues and possibilities will become 
marginalised within the Norwegian context. This is particularly problematic, considering the 
number of neuromyths, brain-based learning programs, and other misrepresented educational 
neuroscientific accounts, which have appeared in Norway over the past decade. Insights and 
perspectives from academic communities can act as an important counterweight in the 
Norwegian educational neuroscience discourse, so that discussions do not become dominated 
by uncritical readings and misrepresentations of educational neuroscientific research. By the 
same token I will also suggest that it is important for Norwegian educational theorists and 
researchers to get involved in the debate. Just as the voices of academics can provide a
counterweight to more uncritical readings of educational neuroscience, so can educational 
theorists provide a counterweight to top-down approaches where neuroscientific and 
psychological perspectives are given precedence over educational considerations. In turn this 
will contribute to an anti-reductionistic understanding of aspects relevant to learning and the 
individual child. Overall, and with reference to aspects of the educational neuroscientific 
debate internationally, it would give rise to more critical considerations and debate about 
educational neuroscience in Norway, if voices from neuroscientists, psychologists, 
educational theorists and practitioners were to be heard in the discourse. 
Apart from more academic debates and more engagement by educationalists, I also 
deem it important for Norwegian actors to look at the work of actors from the international 
academic discourse of educational neuroscience. This is because manifestations of education 
and neuroscience in Norway can, to some extent, be seen as a re-contextualization process. 
This implies that elements from the international discourse have had, and still have, an impact 
on how educational neuroscience is manifested within a Norwegian context. By the same 
token it must be emphasised that Norway is not a passive bystander in the recontextualisation
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of educational neuroscience. Even if certain recontextualisation processes occur by means of 
discursive structures (viz. the power of discourse), Norwegian actors are active subjects who 
translate and appropriate aspects of educational neuroscience into their own national context 
(viz. the power over discourse). Numerous examples of this have been provided throughout 
this chapter, covering both similarities and differences in the ways in which educational 
neuroscience is constituted over scalar borders. I will reason that in the process of re-
contextualisation, there are elements of discursive progression, in that actors can acquire 
knowledge and expertise from one discourse in order to influence or change discursive events 
in their own discourse. For instance, one can find numerous similarities in Norway and 
internationally in the ways in which educational neuroscience is represented, incorporated, 
and manifested in fields such as academia, media, brain-based learning industries, and 
amongst policy makers. However, the international discourse is in many ways more 
established than in Norway, which is seen in internationally outstanding research 
collaborations, and discussions regarding aspects which only recently have become themes of 
interest in Norway. Significant negotiations, considerations, and experiences have therefore 
ensued from the international discourse, such as ethical issues regarding educational 
neuroscience, difficulties with established neuromyths, criticism of Heckman’s model, issues 
related to reductionistic top-down approaches, issues and possibilities related to different 
levels of analysis, and other aspects regarding educational neuroscience. This is valuable 
knowledge for actors within the Norwegian context, although by arguing for the importance 
of looking towards the international educational neuroscience discourse, I do not imply that 
Norwegian actors should uncritically accept and adopt parts of the international discourse.
Norway has different traditions, policies, values, and other unique discursive structures,
which should not be reduced to international discursive conformities. What I therefore regard 
as essential is critical interaction in the recontextualisation process of educational 
neuroscience to Norway, wherein Norwegian actors enter into a dialogue with international 
educational neuroscientists. In this way, Norwegians can make use of knowledge and 
expertise from the international discourse, while at the same time making deliberate decisions 
for adopting and translating knowledge in order to adapt it for the unique context of the
Norwegian discourse. 
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Chapter 9 
Final reflections 
 
A central focus of my doctoral study has been to analyse and discuss the development and 
impact of the educational neuroscience discourse at different academic, public, and political 
levels. I have emphasised that educational neuroscience is a field in continual flux, changing 
both in response to discursive structures and actors’ strategic actions. But although I have, so 
far, examined the past and present development and impact of educational neuroscience, I 
have tried to avoid subjective and over-normative assessments FRQFHUQLQJWKHURDGDKHDGíLV
the project of linking education and neuroscience an important task worth pursuing, or is the 
endeavour a bridge too far? Indeed, I touched upon similar themes in previous chapters, but 
therein I have chiefly described and discussed findings from my critical discourse analysis.
This is because discourse analysis is performed in order to descriptively map out and critically 
reflect upon aspects of discourse, but a central canon of discourse analysis is that the analyst 
should be careful in presenting value-laden evaluations of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and ‘correct’ or 
‘incorrect’ discursive aspects í particularly if such assessments can be misunderstood as 
descriptive analytical findings. It is, by the same token, unrealistic to think that anyone can 
dedicate years to studying a discourse without having any personal opinions on the matter. 
This final chapter is therefore presented in order to separate my critical discourse analytical 
accounts from my more normative evaluations, which have been acquired and shaped 
throughout these years of studying educational neuroscience297. Moreover, considering that 
the discourse is likely to continue changing in the years to come, I find it essential to write 
down some thoughts with regards to the future development of the educational neuroscience 
discourse.
 
                                                          
297 It should be noted that some of the following views are also suggested by others (e.g. Varma et al. 2008; Samuels 2009; 
Beauchamp & Beauchamp, 2013), and other ideas can be seen to lie at a nexus of the educational neuroscientific 
endeavour. Such resemblance notwithstanding; the following commentaries are personal evaluations formed during my 
critical discourse analytical work of the educational neuroscience discourse.   
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The importance of anti-reductionistic approaches 
The first point I will stress for further developments of the discourse is the importance of 
collaboration between all the disciplines working at the interface of the educational 
neuroscience endeavour. This implies that there should not only be cooperation between the 
discipline of cognitive neuroscience and that of education. Aspects from cognitive psychology 
are also important; so are insights from sub-disciplines such as social cognitive neuroscience, 
critical neuroscience, cognitive psychology, psychology, educational psychology, educational 
theory, and pedagogy. These sub-disciplines can be located at the interface between 
neuroscience, psychology, and education, and I argue that allowance for such sub-disciplines 
in an educational neuroscientific model can help to moderate the idea of rigid disciplinary 
boundaries between the three respective levels of the brain, the mind, and the level of 
behaviour and the social. Moreover, and in line with critical discourse theories, these sub-
disciplines should also be seen to influence, and be influenced by, one another. For example, 
when new understandings of neurobiological functions in the brain are suggested in the field 
of cognitive neuroscience, this is also likely to influence understandings in the sub-field of 
social cognitive neuroscience. This new knowledge of how the brain works can further 
influence aspects at the level of the mind, and even at the level of behaviour. The model of 
educational neuroscience’s ordering may therefore be one of complex interdiscursive relations 
where none of the levels of analysis can be understood in isolation from the others. Such 
cross-disciplinary work may seem exceedingly far-reaching and excruciatingly demanding. 
But no one has suggested that work at the interface of educational neuroscience is simple. The 
work set out by the educational neuroscience discourse is highly complex, since it crosses so 
many OHYHOVRIDQDO\VLVíIURPPLFUR-biological aspects in the brain, to complex sociological 
aspects in the classroom. To succeed in this multifaceted project, one has to acknowledge that 
the task at hand needs to be approached from different angles, and that it is essential with 
collaboration between disciplines related to neuroscience, psychology, and education. 
This collaboration must also be reciprocal, because top-down approaches where some 
disciplines take a hierarchical, superior position are liable to obscure valuable insights from 
other disciplines. This means that neuroscientists should not see it as their goal to ‘inform’ 
educationalists; nor should educationalists shy away from biological explanations of learning 
and memory. Equal collaboration is of importance for further developments in educational 
neuroscience, I will argue, because findings from my discourse analysis show that numerous 
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academics fail in building reciprocal relationships, despite the fact that balanced cooperation 
is seen as an essential aim within the academic level of educational neuroscience. One can, for 
instance, find cases where educationalists ignore insights from the brain in matters related to 
learning, or some who even perceive neuroscience as a potential threat to the educational 
tradition298. The ways in which these apprehensive views are expressed vary from explicit 
disputes to neglect RIFRJQLWLYHDQGQHXURVFLHQWLILFIDFWRUVLQHGXFDWLRQDOPDWWHUVíWKHODWWHU
appears to be the case in Norway299. Explicit or implicit aversion notwithstanding, such 
subject positions towards new insights from cognitive and neuroscientific sciences are, in my 
view, exceedingly unhelpful, comparable to an ostrich with its head in the sand, rather than 
constructing collaborative forums in order to cultivate educational and social theories in phase 
with scientific progress. Concepts essential to education, whether learning, motivation, 
emotion, social interaction, or reading, can surely be addressed from social scientific 
approaches, but they also have a natural scientific underpinning and can accordingly be 
addressed by natural scientific approaches. To say otherwise is to disavow the role of biology 
in human nature, and hence to suggest a reduction of nature into aspects solely related to 
nurture.
However, there are not only actors who weaken reciprocal collaboration by ‘leaving 
out the brain’ in educational and social matters, because one can also find numerous instances 
where education is ignored in the work of educational neuroscience, whether by 
neuroscientists, psychologists, and even educationalists300. This not only occurs when 
theorists and researchers in the educational neuroscientific community neglect educational 
practice in their work, but it also occurs when psychologist and educationalists (whether
practitioners or theorists) become mesmerised by the ‘seductive appeal of neuroscientific 
explanations’ and consequently overlook significant insights from their own field. Top-down 
approaches, where educational perspectives are devalued in relation to more neuroscientific 
and cognitive scientific insights, are particularly seen at the academic level in Norway, when 
educational texts offer interviews with neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists on “how 
the brain best learns´íEXWwithout giving any reference to educational theories. Not only is 
this approach highly reductionistic, but this time it is educational and social explanations that 
                                                          
298 As seen in for instance Schumaker (2007) and Davis (2004). 
299 References to negligence of ‘the brain’ in educational text are inevitably more difficult to pinpoint to specific texts, but it 
is shown in findings (or rather lack of findings) from the literature search and critical discourse analysis in Norway. 
300 As seen in Dehaene (2014), Wilson et al. (2006), Carew and Magsamen (2010), Solli (2010), Egge (2012), and Sund 
(2014). 
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are reduced in importance in relation to the natural sciences. It is important for actors working 
at the interface of the educational neuroscience discourse to remember that education has a 
long history and a significant accumulated knowledge base on motivation, social interaction 
and communication, learning disorders, social inequality, teaching strategies, curricula 
designs, school organizations, educational leadership and, not least, social and individual 
ethical considerations. Researchers within the fields of cognitive neuroscience and cognitive 
psychology can gain much from listening to educationalistVíERWKWKHRULVWVDQGSUDFWLWLRQHUV
íEHFDXVHtheir knowledge can point out other perspectives and possible solutions which may 
not be obvious to neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists. Including educational 
knowledge also brings valuable perspectives concerning ethical, evaluative, practical, and 
individually or socially beneficial aspects. Whereas neuroscientists and cognitive 
psychologists often bring new insights into how we can organise and structure educational 
practice, it is educators who can give indispensable insights regarding how we should 
organise and structure educational practice. This vital difference between ‘what can be done’ 
and ‘what should be done’ does not solely depend on what science says is possible, but also 
on what in the long run is individually and socially beneficial. Even if the educational field 
does not move forward under a golden banner reading ‘science’, the educational profession 
should not be underestimated. Neglect of the educational side in work pertaining to 
educational neuroscience is therefore, in my opinion, highly problematic since it suggests a 
reductionistic view where concepts of nurture are subsumed to concepts of nature. 
In order to overcome obstacles in the discourse of educational neuroscience, it is 
important to continue encouraging anti-reductionistic approaches in work related to learning, 
individual cognition, social interaction, cognitive development, emotions, and other concepts 
of educational neuroscience. It must, however, be accepted that neuroscientists and cognitive 
psychologists often discuss aspects of educational relevance, such as what happens in the 
brain when we learn and why children with dyscalculia comprehend numbers differently. At 
the same time it must be acknowledged that the aim of cognitive science is not to replace 
social and educational perspectives, but instead that cognitive and neuroscientific knowledge 
are most valuable when they offer new and complementary perspectives of education. The 
same applies in reverse, because educational theorists, researchers, and practitioners in my 
view also hold essential social perspectives relevant to cognitive and neuroscientific concepts. 
There are, in other words, different levels of analysis, ranging from neurobiological analysis 
of learning to socio-interactional analysis of learning, and these different levels will address 
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and answer different question. No level excludes the other levels, nor is any level more vital 
than the others, but they can complement each other and together contribute to more 
comprehensive and holistic perspectives on topics such as learning. Engagement in reciprocal
collaboration between the disciplines of education, psychology, and neuroscience is, indeed,
one way of improving anti-reductionistic approaches. I concede that the task of shaping 
mutual and bi-directional bonds between the disciplines cannot be done overnight, because 
reciprocal collaboration implies acknowledging the importance of other disciplines in work 
pertaining to educational neuroscience. Moreover, reciprocal collaboration also necessitates 
awareness of differences between disciplines, such as differences in vocabulary, values, 
theories, methods, methodologies, practices, and philosophies. If one overlooks these 
dissimilarities, one may easily underestimate the traditions of individual disciplines. I 
therefore agree with many others within the educational neuroscience discourse, and argue for 
a cautious approach, in which one does not conflate the different levels of analysis. 
Educational neuroscience as a transdisciplinary field of study  
In accordance with arguments for anti-reductionist approaches and reciprocal collaborations 
between the disciplines, I will argue that much can be gained by perceiving educational 
neuroscience as a transdisciplinary endeavour. A transdisciplinary endeavour is different 
from both an interdisciplinary and a multidisciplinary understanding of a discourse, as it does 
not hold the view that educational neuroscientific work solely includes operating and 
combining knowledge at the crossing points between different disciplines301. Instead, 
transdisciplinarity encompasses a perception that new disciplinary knowledge is created in the 
merging and negotiation of discursive boundaries, as new knowledge and ‘new articulations’ 
arise from interactions within a new discursive group (cf. Fairclough, 2010; Samuels 2009). 
In other words: the novel discipline of educational neuroscience ought to be recognised as 
SUHFLVHO\ WKDW í D novel discipline in its own right, neither governed by cognitive 
neuroscience, psychology, nor by education, but instead developing through joint 
collaboration between these prior discourses (see figure 9.1 and my model in 9.2). Samuels 
(2009), della Chiesa et al. (2009), and Beauchamp and Beauchamp (2013) also argue for 
recognising educational neuroscience as a transdisciplinary phenomenon: 
                                                          
301 Even if authors within the educational neuroscience discourse talk of multidisiplinarity or interdisciplinarity, many 
appear to do so without necessarily grounding these notes on theories regarding different disciplinary connections.  
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What this means is that the type of knowledge being pursued here is not the sum of individual 
knowledges shared by experts or specialized groups (multidisciplinarity) nor the knowledge that is 
created at the intersection of established disciplines (interdisciplinarity), but a new kind of knowledge 
that arises from the interaction of diverse people within an entirely new group (transdisciplinarity) ...
What connects transdisciplinary participants is not a common theoretical perspective or methodology or 
epistemology, but a common issue to which all apply their own particular expertise with the goal of 
reaching a holistic understanding of the issue (Samuels 2009, p. 49).
I will argue that reductionist approaches can be avoided if one identifies educational neuro-
science as a transdisciplinary field emerging from the prior field comprising discourses of
cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education. The concept of trans-
disciplinarity implies that the discipline of educational neuroscience lies neither within the 
territory of cognitive neuroscience nor within the educational domain. With a 
transdisciplinary view, one also acknowledges the ongoing process where these prior 
disciplines together contribute to the development of a new field. This implies, as do critical 
discourse theories, (cf. chapter 5), that actors from different fields must negotiate and re-
articulate old discursive narrations so that they are compatible with the new transdisciplinary 
framework of educational neuroscience. This indicates negotiation and re-articulation of 
disciplinary knowledge, as well as negotiation with regards to new transdisciplinary positions, 
practices, values, goals, ethics, and ideologies. 
Bear in mind that my transdisciplinary model in figure 9.2 only covers disciplinary 
aspects of educational neuroscience’s academic level. Other and more overarching aspects of 
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the larger academic and scientific discourse can also affect any of these disciplinary levels. 
This has been shown in previous chapters, in how hegemonic struggles pertaining to 
educational neuroscience are related to similar struggles, which have been fought out in 
academia for decades. Some hegemonic struggles in the educational neuroscience discourse 
can therefore be seen as negotiations with more durable and institutionalised conflicts within 
academia (cf. Fairclough, 2010). Indeed, these interdiscursive relations are explicitly 
manifested by intertextual references, and in how the educational neuroscience debate 
frequently refers to representations of nature vs. nurture, biology vs. environment, and natural 
sciences vs. social sciences302. Intertextual and interdiscursive relations to a larger academic
discourse are perhaps rather obvious, but these relations are important when it comes to an 
understanding of how the educational neuroscience discourse changes in phase with the 
general scientific community. What is more, national and international political programs, 
economic considerations, influences from parents and families, public attention, media 
coverage, attention from so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industries, and other societal aspects 
are also relevant levels of analysis. All these discursive aspects can be seen to be included 
within a larger societal discourse and have, as shown in my recontextualisation analysis, 
VLJQLILFDQW LQWHUDFWLYH UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH HGXFDWLRQDO QHXURVFLHQFH GLVFLSOLQH í QRW RQO\ GR
societal factors influence the educational neuroscience discipline, but the academic level of 
educational neuroscience in turn affects the larger societal discourse. 
I therefore argue that a comprehensive model of the levels of analysis pertaining to 
educational neuroscience should encompass a multifaceted, dynamic, and interactive set of 
OHYHOVí LQFOXGLQJ OHYHOVZLWKLQ WKH WUDQVGLVFLSOLQDU\HQGHDYRXURIHGXFDWLRQDOQHXURVFLHQFH
(viz. education, psychology, and neuroscience), and levels between this transdiscipline and 
other overarching discourses (viz. the larger academic discourse and the larger societal 
discourse). Accordingly, I suggest the following model (figure 9.3). The model emphasises
that educational neuroscience as a transdiscipline cannot be understood in isolation and, 
hence, how one ought to strive for reciprocal and anti-reductionistic approaches both within 
disciplinary boundaries and between the academic, the public, and the political level of 
discourse.  
                                                          
302 Representations of the former are seen in Logan and Johnston (2007), and Gelman and Taylor (2010); biology vs. environment 
in Ansari et al. (2012), and Goswami (2008); and the latter in Cerulo (2010), Kraft (2012), Perkins (2009), and Willingham (2009). 
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Figure 9.3: My model of reciprocal relationships between different levels of analysis relevant for 
educational neuroscientific research.
I will furthermore argue that understandings of educational neuroscience as a trans-
disciplinary field of study also have practical implications for IXUWKHU GHYHORSPHQW í
particularly when it comes to the continuing establishment of academic courses and degrees 
in educational neuroscience. Numerous bachelor, master, and doctoral courses in educational 
neuroscience have been established internationally303, and I will argue that these university 
programs play an important role in shaping the present and the future of the educational 
neuroscience discourse. In line with my previous arguments I suggest that it will be most 
beneficial for the prospect of educational neuroscience if such university programs build upon 
a trans-disciplinary understanding of educational neuroscience. This implies that university 
degrees in educational neuroscience should endeavour to introduce new scholars to the field
emerging from disciplines of cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education, 
wherein knowledge from all three academics fields is mutually considered. Such 
transdisciplinary approach can prevent reductionistic understandings, since emphasis is on a 
novel field rather than a field with a preliminary basis in neuroscience, psychology, or 
education304.
In addition to distinct programs and degrees in educational neuroscience, I also think it
is highly important to offer courses pertaining to the linkage of the brain, mind, and education 
                                                          
303 Such as at Harvard University, Cambridge University, University of London, and University of Bristol. 
304 Also authors such as Berninger and Coring (1998), Ansari and Coch (2006), and Samuels (2009) argue for the importance 
of training researchers with competence in the field pertaining to education, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.   
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to students in the disciplines of cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and education. 
Educational studies ought to encompass themes in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, 
because this will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of aspects such as 
learning. Similarly, it is just as important to introduce new students in cognitive science to 
education, because cognitive scientists have much to learn from social and practical 
approaches to learning, memory, motivation, emotion, and social collaboration. In addition,
the introduction of transdisciplinary perspectives in education, psychology, and cognitive 
neuroscience can help to foster a common acceptance that the ‘human brain’ cannot be 
understood in isolation from our social environment, nor can human behaviour and cognition 
be separated from our brains.
It must be stressed that I am not saying that every neuroscientist, psychologist, and 
educationalist should have a degree in educational neuroscience; what I am saying is that 
every university department has a responsibility to equip students with the required 
knowledge pertaining to their respective field of study. This is because the discursive
structures and practices of an academic discourse are built around the enterprise of educating 
students, disseminating ideas, and demonstrating learning. Additionally, and even more 
importantly, the enterprise of academic discourses is knowledge creation (Hyland, 2009).
With reference to critical discourse theories on self-sustaining discursive regularities, an 
academic department is powerful in that it simultaneously regulates meaning-making, 
represents particular ways of perceiving the world, shapes social roles for students and 
academics, and, in addition, is an enterprise for creating knowledge itself. Actors within 
academic discourses are therefore essential to the future development of educational 
neuroscience, because these actors hold the power to shape disciplinary structures and the 
creation and maintenance of knowledge. An educational department, which completely
neglects to mention the brain in the course materials and knowledge presented to students, is 
liable to reproduce an unbalanced picture of education and learning. This is because an 
exclusive focus on the social aspects of, for instance, learning, fails to show how social 
aspects and behaviour also have crucial interactional links to the brain and to the mind. In 
turn, this neglect may be manifested in students’ perceptions of the world, as they do not 
recognise the complex nature of learning, emotions, education, and individual and social 
behaviour. As a critical discourse analyst, I cannot help but take a critical stand towards the 
retention of knowledge, whether this is a conscious or unconscious act, since how the world is 
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represented to students is likely to affect how students themselves represents, perceives, and 
acts in the world. 
At the moment, there are only a few universities around the world with specific 
courses on the linkage of education and neuroscience. I believe that establishment of new 
courses and degrees will be an important step in building more awareness within the discourse 
of educational neuroscience and between discourses in the related fields of education, 
cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Such efforts do more than contribute to an 
understanding of discursive differences and how to mutually collaborate in building 
transdisciplinary knowledge about educational neuroscience. More awareness amongst 
neuroscientists and teachers can also help to prevent neuromyths and misguided ‘brain-based’ 
programs, since understanding of the complex brain-mind-education link can create critical 
readers in topics pertaining to educational neuroscience. 
The importance of a philosophical grounding  
At the beginning of my dissertation, I claimed that the academic discourse of educational 
QHXURVFLHQFH KDV D VLJQLILFDQW GHILFLHQF\ í WKH GLVFRXUVH ODFNs an explicit philosophy of 
science for grounding its educational neuroscientific research305. One can get the impression 
that educational neuroscientific research is adrift either from philosophies of social sciences 
(viz. education) or from philosophies of natural sciences (viz. cognitive neuroscience). In 
short, the issue comes down to basic epistemology and ontology, as a linkage between 
education, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience challenges certain prominent 
philosophical understandings. In a relativist standpoint such as social constructivism, certain 
natural scientific premises like biological aspects of the living brain are inadequately 
considered, because social constructivism tends to focus on epistemological doctrines of 
social constructed understanding. If, on the other hand, one adopts a philosophical position of 
realism, social aspects such as meaning-making and underlying discursive structures are liable 
to be given less consideration than more existential aspects, such as neural biochemical 
processes in the brain. Educational neuroscientific research therefore often has divergent 
                                                          
305 A philosophical theme has already been noted in chapter 2, where I describe philosophical difficulties the discourse of 
educational neuroscience is facing. It is, however, a difference between attempting to tackle philosophical issues, such as 
the mind-brain dilemma and the philosophical issue of consciousness, and attempts to craft a basic philosophy of science 
apposite to educational neuroscientific research.  
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philosophical underpinnings, because the traditions of education, psychology, and cognitive 
neuroscience have different understandings of epistemological and ontological aspects of the 
world. This is problematic not only because philosophical issues are manifested within the 
discourse, but issues also arise because philosophical differences often imply differences in 
methods, theories and scientific values and aims.
I argue that the chief problem is that actors working at the interface of educational 
neuroscience tend to address educational neuroscience from a background in one of the prior 
disciplines, rather than addressing philosophical issues from a transdisciplinary framework. 
In other words, the philosophical ‘divide’ between the disciplines of education, psychology 
and neuroscience should not be bridged by reducing one or more of these disciplines to 
another. The solution is not, therefore, to alter educational philosophies, theories, and 
methods in order to make them compatible with naturalistic doctrines. I am, for example,
sceptical regarding extensive use of the so-called ‘gold standard’ method of randomised 
control trial (RCT) in education. This method originates from (natural) scientific 
methodologies pertaining to a specific type of clinical experiment, which seeks to measure 
and compare the outcomes of two or more clinical interventions (Jadad & Enkin, 2007), and 
is thus a method supposed to yield valid and rigorously scientific data (Slavin, 2002). In itself, 
the randomized control trial can be a valid method for evaluating certain aspects of education,
such as ‘effectiveness’ in using different reading methods. A problem, however, arises when 
it is claimed that randomized experiments are the best way of evaluating educational 
interventions and policies (cf. Slavin, 2002; Biesta 2007). By emphasizing only one kind of 
method in educational research, one risks limiting one’s view of the educational domain. Do
complex aspects of educational, such as children’s reading skills, only encompass what can be 
measured by randomized control trials? Do reading abilities not also encompass aspects of 
motivation, family influences, the classroom setting, the teacher’s strategy, aspects pertaining 
to dyslexia, and more clinical problems such as restricted eyesight? And what about other 
educational research, such as philosophical, historical or, indeed, critical discourse analytical 
studies; can one utilize a randomized control experiment in these studies? By restricting what 
counts as a ‘valid method’ to methods such as rigorously scientific randomized control 
experiments, one excludes significant aspects of the educational domain. Relating the 
example to educational neuroscience, I thus think that there is little to be gained by making 
the educational discipline conform to natural scientific expectations. Rather, I believe that the 
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quality of education and what it can contribute to educational neuroscience lies in the fact that 
it does, indeed, have different perspectives and different values than those of neuroscience.
My general argument is therefore simply that neuroscience will call for naturalistic 
approaches, just as society must be described in terms of social categories. But since 
educational neuroscience is, arguably, a new discipline emerging from a field of prior 
GLVFRXUVHV í DQG not a discipline rooted LQ HLWKHU RI WKH WUDGLWLRQV í , DUJXH WKDW LWV
philosophical underpinnings will also emerge through boundary transgression and negotiation 
between its prior discourses. A philosophy of science compatible with educational 
neuroscience must, as a consequence, go beyond the disciplines of education, psychology, and 
neuroscience and their respective philosophies of science, because transdisciplinary 
educational neuroscientific research attempts to combine both naturalistic and social scientific 
aspects of study. It is, therefore, necessary that the scientific philosophy transpiring from the 
field of prior discourses makes allowance for, but does not give pre-dominance to i) 
neuroscientific ideas where existence of real objects is essential and ii) central educational and 
social scientific premises wherein, for instance, the idea of underlying social and discursive
structures is essential.
In chapter 2, I argued that critical realism might provide a possible scientific-
philosophical grounding for the transdiscipline of educational neuroscience. A comprehensive 
account of possible links between critical realism and educational neuroscience is given in 
chapter 2, but to recapitulate, it can briefly be noted how critical realism acknowledges the 
importance of both the social and natural world, but without falling into disciplinary 
reductionism. Its essential tenet is that the world can be seen as ‘stratified’, since different 
mechanisms are ordered in diffeUHQW µOD\HUV RI QDWXUH¶ í LPSO\LQJ WKDW ORZHU JHQHUDWLYH
mechanism, such as biology and cognitive neuroscience, can explain phenomena without 
replacing higher levels, such as the level of the educational and societal. This non-reductive 
approach is further manifested in the critical-realist view on methods for studying different 
aspects of reality, as it is stressed that different research objects will demand different modes 
of study. A critical-realist perspective on educational neuroscience will accordingly stress the 
importance of not XVLQJQDWXUDOLVWLFPHWKRGVWRVWXG\WKHVRFLDOíQRUXVLQJVRFLDOPHWKRGVWR
study the natural í EXW UDWKHU of using transdisciplinary methods relating to different 
perspectives on the natural and social worlds. I therefore suggest that critical realism offers a
common scientific philosophical ground between education, cognitive psychology, and 
349 
 
cognitive neuroscience, without reducing any of the three disciplines to one another. A critical 
realist philosophy for the transdiscipline of educational neuroscience can furthermore be 
advantageous since it emphasises a critical, anti-reductionist, and elementary philosophical
understanding of learning, cognition, emotions, behaviour, individual development, social 
behaviour, and other topics relevant for educational neuroscience. 
Again, it must be stressed that critical realism is just my preliminary suggestion for a 
philosophy of science appropriate for educational neuroscientific research. More evaluation is 
required of the potential of, and issues related to, the connection of critical realism and 
educational neuroscience. Nevertheless, critical realism is an interesting philosophy of science 
in this context, since it poses some fundamental and critical questions as regards the issue of 
finding a philosophical foundation for educational neuroscience, which can be constructed by 
means of a reciprocal transdisciplinary endeavour from the field of prior discourses. 
Ideological undercurrents  
I also address the importance of being aware of political and ideological undercurrents. This 
issue is discussed in the hegemony chapter and the recontextualisation chapters, where it is 
noted that one can find certain traces of a neoliberal rationality within the political level of the 
educational neuroscience discourse. The neoliberal argument stresses that neuroscience can be 
seen as a new ‘science of learning’ which can serve as an evidence-base for education. It is 
further argued that by providing new insights into how SHRSOH OHDUQ í WKH PHFKDQLVP RI
OHDUQLQJíQHXURVFLHQFHcan provide answers to ‘what works’, effective classroom strategies, 
and how to improve students’ academic outcomes306. However, neoliberal rationalities from 
the political level also seem to influence the academic level of the educational neuroscientific 
discourse. Political and neoliberal influences can, for instance, be seen in the ways in which 
several academics, implicitly and explicitly, represent educational neuroscience in terms of 
how cognitive neuroscience “enables an evidence base for education” and “foundations of the 
new science of evidence-based education” which should “rest on rigorous forms of in-
laboratory and in-vivo evaluation”307.
                                                          
306 As seen in Allen and Smith (2008), Federal Register (2001), Government Office for Science (2012), TeacherNet (2007), US 
Department of Education (2010), and US Department of Education (2012).  
307 Respectively in Goswami (2008, p. 396), Tommerdahl (2010, p. 107), and in Pasquinelli (2011, p. 186). Also seen in texts 
by Ansari et al. (2012) and Carew and Magsamen (2011).   
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In light of this I argue that certain issues arise when the academic level of educational 
neuroscience is set in relation to neoliberal rationalities suggested by intergovernmental 
organizations and policymakers íSDUWLFXODUO\LIacademic actors are unaware of the implicit 
difficulties inherent in a neoliberal value system. I suggest that unconscious ideological 
adoption often appears to be the case, considering that numerous authors within educational 
neuroscience’s academic level exhibit traces of dual ideological perspectives. On the one 
hand, reciprocal collaboration is emphasised, as an argument for the importance of 
neuroscientific, cognitive, and educational perspectives when approaching complex process 
such as learning at the interface of education and neuroscience308. It is therefore a paradox 
that, on the other hand, the same educational neuroscientific community (perhaps 
unintentionally) echoes neoliberal rationalities. By adopting an instrumental and neoliberal 
focus on a rigorous ‘evidence-base’, ‘outcome measurements’, the ‘science of learning’, 
‘rigorous laboratory-research’ with ‘randomised controlled trials’, and research of ‘the 
mechanism of learning’, certain long-held traditions and values within education are 
contested. I will not repeat my argument in full here, as I have discussed it in previous 
chapters, but, in brief, the essential problem is not the use of some neoliberal representations 
per se íUDWKHUWKHSUREOHPLVWKDWQHROLEHUDOUDWLRQDOLWLHVDQGµEX]]ZRUGV¶DSSHDUWREHXVHG
by educational neuroscientists without them being aware of the underlying shift towards 
instrumental input-output measurement of education that this ideology represents. My 
suggestion for further development of the educational neuroscience discourse is therefore that 
academics should be wary of which ideological orientation they, perhaps unintentionally, 
adopt. By uncritically representing, adopting, and/or accepting neoliberal rationalities, one is 
at risk of undermining central aspects of the educational, social, and ethical side of the 
educational neuroscientific endeavour. I nevertheless think that the educational 
neuroscientific research community, by being a novel transdiscipline, has a significant 
opportunity to critically negotiate ideological perspectives that would benefit the educational 
neuroscientific research endeavour. 
                                                          
308 E.g. in Varma, McCanliss, and Schwartz (2008), Goswami (2009), Christodoulou and Gaab (2009), and Stein and Fischer 
(2011).  
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Media and the ‘brain-based’ learning industry’s reduction of the complex
The final aspect I want to address is public presentations, in which complex research on 
learning, cognition, the brain, the social, and the individual is misrepresented. Such 
(mis)representations are often found when educational neuroscientific research becomes 
appropriated by media and by the ‘brain-based’ learning industry, often resulting in 
neuromyths, edumyths, over-simplifications, and reduction to other simple narratives. In my 
analysis, I argue that misrepresentations of research can occur at several levels along
educational neuroscience’s line of transference, because actors from different fields are liable 
to interpret and re-present educational neuroscientific narrations in different ways. Factors 
such as technical research language, complicated methods of study (e.g. in brain images), 
problems separating correlation and causation, and ‘the seductive appeal of neuroscientific 
explanations’ do not help in this matter, as they further complicate transference of educational 
neuroscientific representations. 
Nevertheless, even if misrepresentation of research such as neuromyths and edumyths 
are challenging in that they distribute unscientific narrations, I also suggest that they pose a 
risk when it comes to their manifestations in public knowledge and social practice. The 
argument, which is based on findings from my recontextualisation analysis, is that these two 
fields repeatedly reduce both the learning process and the individual child to mechanical and 
instrumental conceptions. For example, the individual child is often conflated to properties of 
his or her brain, revealed in statements like “focus on activities that students’ brains enjoy 
doing” (Kagan, 2014) and “it is your sequential, time-oriented left hemisphere which tells you 
how to think” (Scholastic, 2014). Reduction of complex concepts is also seen in how 
cognition and learning are presented as something almost external from the learner, 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ OHDYLQJ SDUHQWV DFFRXQWDEOH IRU FKLOGUHQ¶V OHDUQLQJ í UHYHDOHG LQ VWDWHPHQWV
where cognition and the brain are described as ‘brainpower’ that can be ‘activated’, ‘tuned to 
perform optimally’, ‘boosted’, ‘generated’ or ‘switched on’ in order to “produce shiny, happy 
children”309. The problem with brain-based learning industries and the media’s 
misrepresentations of research concerning the brain, cognition, the individual child, and the 
learning process, is that these representations are liable to construct (unscientific) knowledge 
                                                          
309 As seen demonstrated in BBC (2013), Brain Gym® (2014), Carlyle (2014), James (2014), Kagan (2014), Starskills (2014), 
The Guardian (2004), Wighton (2007), and Whipple (2012). See table 7.1 and 7.2. 
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of reality. Considering that these texts have a rather substantial audience, misrepresentations 
are also liable to become manifested in discursive and social practices within the public field.
Genuinely, I do not think we will ever escape misrepresentations of research in the 
public sphere, because the ways in which academia and the public media operate stem from
two different cultures. However, I do believe that we can reduce the impact of such 
PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVíERWKZLWK UHVSHFW WRPHGLD DQG to brain-based learning industries. For 
instance, public actors should be more critical when reading, representing, and believing in 
narrations concerning education and neuroscience, acknowledging, as such, that one can 
easily can be persuaded by ‘glossy brain images’ and persuasive neuroscientific explanations. 
At the same time researchers must be better prepared to engage in public debates, in order to 
provide balanced counter-arguments to the more unscientific representations of educational 
neuroscientific research. Again, I think much benefit will come from awareness and focus on 
the complex discursive web of educational neuroscience and, hence, the complex line of 
transference which can be found therein.
Suggestions for further research
The discourse of educational neuroscience is still a novel field of study, and it thus makes a 
range of different research topics worth pursuing. Researchers and research groups studying 
topics connected to education and neuroscience have insofar often taken a practical path, for 
instance by investigating reading and letter processing through an educational neuroscientific 
approach. These studies are important in that they investigate concepts like reading, letter
processing, ADHD, dyslexia, dyscalculia, emotion, cognitive development, memory, and 
learning by a holistic and cross-disciplinary approach, contributing new perspectives to the 
transdiscipline of educational neuroscience. I will, however, argue that investigation of the 
educational neuroscientific field in itself is also highly important. The discipline, and 
discourse, of educational neuroscience is a rather novel field, and my critical discourse 
analysis has shown that there still are uncertainties, discussions, and confusions related to 
educational neuroscience’s narratives, relations, ideologies, values, approaches, practices, and 
other discursive structures. It would therefore be constructive if more knowledge concerning 
the consolidation and organization of the field itself could be suggested, so that a 
transdisciplinary framework for educational neuroscience might be more clearly manifested in 
its own right. In view of this, I will suggest that further discursive, theoretical, philosophical, 
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political, and macro-social studies of the educational neuroscientific field might be important. 
This must include anti-reductionistic and transdisciplinary approaches to studies, whether by 
working in reciprocal and cross-disciplinary research groups, or by following 
transdisciplinary tenets of study. In the following, I will briefly pinpoint some suggestions for 
further research, which might be beneficial for the further development of the educational 
neuroscience discourse.  
Further in-depth explanations of the educational neuroscience discourse  
In my doctoral study it has been necessary to be descriptive, since my aim is to elucidate the 
manifestation and impact of the educational neuroscience discourse at the academic, public, 
and political level of discoursH í ERWK LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ DQG LQ 1RUZD\ %\ FRYHULQJ WKH
discourse at such an extensive level, what is analytically gained in breadth is lost in depth. I 
suggest that a comprehensive and broad-reaching analysis is valuable, precisely because it can 
provide a basis for further in-depth analysis. What might be advantageous in this respect is 
that further in-depth research sets out to explain aspects of the educational neuroscience 
GLVFRXUVHíVXFKDVDVSHFWVRIdiscursive development, practice, or relations between different 
ILHOGV DQG DFWRUV í LQ OLJKW RI ODUJHU FRQWH[WXDO VWUXFWXUHV HJ SROLWLFDO DFDGHPLF VRFLDO
ideological, or historical structures). Such research might take different forms and use 
different modes of study, but a general tenet ought to be construction of knowledge relevant 
for the transdiscipline of educational neuroscience.    
Research concerning scientific philosophical groundings for educational neuroscience  
Throughout my dissertation, I have argued that the academic discipline of educational 
neuroscience is in need of a scientific philosophy adherent to a transdisciplinary framework. 
Even if some academics address philosophical issues such as the brain-mind dilemma or 
epistemological differences between education and neuroscience, few, if any, explicitly 
submit suggestions for a common philosophy of science for educational neuroscientific 
research. In fact, it appears that many working at the interface of education and neuroscience 
avoid addressing the philosophical underpinning of WKHLU UHVHDUFK DOWRJHWKHU í OHDYLQJ D
central scientific premise unaccounted for. I think this is a significant disadvantage, because 
unless a common philosophy of science is established, educational neuroscientific research 
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will continue to be cut off from either social scientific philosophies or natural scientific 
philosophies. In my research, I have addressed these questions and additionally proposed 
critical realism as a possible philosophy of science for the transdiscipline of educational 
neuroscience. The question needs further exploration, though, in order to investigate the 
abundant links between the transdiscipline of educational neuroscience and potential 
philosophies of science such as critical realism. 
Research on relations between educational neuroscience, policymakers, and interest actors 
When analysing educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation process, many interesting 
results are found with respect to the political level of discourse. Aspects have been mentioned
such as translation issues between policymakers and researchers, strategic actions for shaping 
educational policies, implications for curriculum design, ideological influences, and relations 
between national and international policymakers and intergovernmental interest actors. Again, 
I will emphasise that it would be valuable to research these aspects in more detail and to link 
discursive aspects with more contextual and macro-VRFLDO WKHRULHV í VXFK DV WKHRULHV Rf
ideology, intergovernmental influences, political organization, curriculum studies, and so on. 
An advantageous study in this respect might be to examine and explain the international 
influence of political ideologies with respect to the educational neuroscience discourse, or to 
analyse in more detail the ways in which educational neuroscientific research influence, or are 
manifested in, political initiatives. Details of these studies notwithstanding; research 
concerning relations between the academic level and the political lHYHOíwhether within or 
DFURVV QDWLRQDO ERUGHUV í FDQ help to illuminate a part of the educational neuroscience 
discourse which so far has received little critical commentary.
Further research concerning the Norwegian context 
Last, but not least, I regard it as crucial to conduct more research on the Norwegian context. 
Much research related to different aspects of the educational neuroscience discourse has been 
suggested at an international scale, but findings from my analysis show that similar research 
in Norway is negligible in comparison. This is, firstly, important due to the amount of 
neuromyths, edumyths, brain-based educational programs, and other misrepresentations of 
educational neuroscientific research, which flourish at the Norwegian public level. Secondly,
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a majority of the Norwegian academic texts that actually address the linkage between 
education and neuroscience, appear to do so by use of top-down and reductionistic 
approaches. I therefore argue that Norwegian studies on educational neuroscLHQFHíLWEHLQJ
literature reviews, critical commentaries, philosophical papers, practical research, or 
organizationDO VWXGLHV í are beneficial in that they can contribute to increasing awareness, 
attention, and critical consideration in Norway. 
One particular study that I suggest is essential with regards to Norway, and which can 
be seen as a continuance of this critical discourse analysis, is attention to the 
operationalisation of educational neuroscience at the Norwegian level. Such a study would,
more thoroughly, address how educational neuroscience is operationalised and manifested in 
social practice and investigate the knowledge and views held by actors within the discourse. 
In this respect it would also be interesting to investigate how Norwegian teachers, students, 
school administrators and/or other educational practitioners perceive and understand concepts 
related to educational neuroscience. What are their perceptions, opinions, and expectations 
with regards to the linkage between education and neuroscience? Research shows that 
educators in other countries are often targeted by ‘brain-based’ learning industries, and that, 
unfortunately, many misconceptions and neuromyths are manifested at the practical level of 
educational neuroscience (cf. Dekker et al., 2012; Hook & Farah, 2013). Is this also the case 
in Norway? By including in-depth interviews and/or quantitative surveys one could take this 
doctoral research to another level, by including the voices of educational practitioners in a 
critical discourse analytical study. This can contribute to a more complete picture of 
educational neuroscience’s recontextualisation to the Norwegian level, since here one would
also examine how educational neuroscience is manifested and operationalised at a practical
level in schools and classrooms. 
~
The discourse of educational neuroscience is a complex field of study, encompassing an 
intricate and interrelated network of discursive structures, relations, and practices within and 
between different discursive levels. At the academic level, one can find cross-disciplinary 
work where researchers at the interface of education, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience 
come together in order to address topics such as learning, reading, cognitive development, 
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dyslexia, dyscalculia, ADHD, emotion, and social interaction. Findings from my discourse 
analysis, however, show that the academic level of educational neuroscience has a rather 
unclear and ambiguous IUDPHZRUNíDQRWLRQZKLFKLVHYLGHQced by how different academic 
actors convey different understandings of, and take different approaches to, the educational 
neuroscience endeavour. Topics of educational neuroscience are additionally recontextualised
to other levels, such as the public and political level of discourse, and here one can also find 
varying understandings, approaches, and practices related to the linkage of educational and 
neuroscience.
It is important to note, however, that educational neuroscience is still developing as a 
discourse, and its structures, relations, and practices are therefore liable to change in the years 
to come. I therefore suggest that actors working at the interface of education, psychology, and 
QHXURVFLHQFH í EXW DOVR DW WKH LQWHUIDFH RI WKH DFDGHPLF SXEOLF DQG SROLWLFDO OHYHO RI WKH
disFRXUVHíKDYHDVXEVWDQWLDORSSRUWXQLW\WRQHJRWLDWHUH-articulate, and shape the discourse 
of educational neuroscience. This not only implies construction of educational neuroscientific 
knowledge per se, but also constructions of aims, values, research approaches, subject 
positions, practices, research assemblies, university programs, public forums, and arenas for 
dialogue with policymakers and other interest actors. As a final remark, I will conclude that in 
this discursive construction, much is to be gained by perceiving educational neuroscience as 
an anti-reductionist and transdisciplinary endeavour, where different actors strive towards 
better communication and critical readings in order to reduce translation inconsistencies 
within and between the academic, public, and political level.
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Appendix A  
GLOSSARY  
Academic discourse ía discourse which can be seen to encompass discursive structures, ways of 
thinking and using language, subject positions, relations, practices, and other discursive facets 
which exist in the academy. Hyland (2009, p. 18) further notes on the significance of the academic 
discourse, since it “is used to construct knowledge, disciplines and the professional careers of 
academics themselves … [T]hey are situated activities which regulate meaning-making in complex 
ways and represent particular social relations and ways of seeing the world”.
$FWLRQSRWHQWLDOían electric signal that is required for synaptic communication in the brain. Action 
potential moves from the cell body of a neuron, along the axon and to the synapse where neuro-
transmitters are released to other neurons. This is how information is transmitted from one neuron 
to other neurons.
Axon íWKHORQJVWHPH[WHnding from the body of a neuron and down which action potential travels. 
The terminals of axons contact other neurons at synapses. 
‘Brain-EDVHG¶ HGXFDWLRQ í an alternative and commercialised field where research regarding the 
brain, cognition, education, and learning are simplified/misinterpreted/misused in order to sell a 
learning product (viz. ‘brain-based’ learning industry).
&ULWLFDOGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLV &'$ía tradition within discourse analytical studies associated with 
Norman Fairclough. 
&ULWLFDOSHULRGísee ‘sensitive period’.
Critical realism (CR) ía philosophical approach associated with Roy Bhaskar, which describes the 
interface between the natural and social ‘worlds’. Critical realism is seen to combine 
‘transcendental realism’ (a general philosophy of science) and ‘critical naturalism’ (a specific
philosophy of human sciences). 
Declarative memory íRXUFDSDFLW\ WR UHFDOOPHPRULHV WKDWFDQEHGLVFXVVHG LQFOXGLQJ IDFWV IURP
textbooks, and episodic memories of what we have experienced. It does not include procedural 
memories such as how to ride a bicycle. 
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Discourse ía complex concept used to describe underlying structural dimensions, ways of thinking, 
language and text, relations, social roles, practices, processes, events, and other facets in a field. A 
discourse has relations to other discourses, it can be in constant change, and in discourse studies 
‘discourse’ must be seen as a variable analytical dimension rather than a fixed social concept. 
Dyscalculia í a ‘developmental disorder’ involving difficulty in acquiring mathematical skills. 
Dyslexia í a ‘developmental disorder’ involving difficulty in learning to read.
Educational neuroscience as an academic discipline í a relative novel academic project/field/ 
discipline. (It is disagreed whether or not educational neuroscience can be defined as a solitary 
discipline. Considering the increased extent of educational neuroscientific establishment during the 
last couple of years, I do throughout my dissertation call educational neuroscience an academic 
discipline). Educational neuroscience can be seen as a mediating field at the interface of education, 
psychology, and neuroscience. This academic project is known under different names, such as 
Mind, Brain, and Education and Neuroeducational Research.
Educational neuroscience as a discourse í educational neuroscience can, in line of a discourse 
analytical framework, be seen as a discourse. An overarching educational neuroscience discourse 
encompasses different levels of discourse, such as an academic level (see ‘educational 
neuroscience as an academic discipline’), a political level (e.g. encompassing the fields related to 
policy-makers and other intergovernmental interest actors), and a public level (e.g. encompassing 
the fields related to the media and the so-called ‘brain-based’ learning industry). 
EEG íelectroencephalography, a brain-imaging technique used to measure the electrical activity of 
the brain. 
Episodic memory í the ability to recall autobiographical events (time, places, etc.).
Epistemology í a term used in philosophies of science designating knowledge and understanding; 
“How we can know what exists”. 
Evidence í implying something which is presented in support of an assertion. The word can further be 
interpreted by use of a narrow definition or a broad definition. The narrow definition has a stronger 
notion in that evidence is that which provides direct proof of the truth. The broader definition, 
however, has a weaker notion of evidence in that it implies support for an assertion but does not 
rule out other possibilities. How the word ‘evidence’ is used and interpreted do also vary among 
different actors and different fields, as ‘evidence’ in a political setting can imply something 
different than ‘evidence’ used in neuroscientific research or in an educational setting.
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Evidence movement in education íduring the last decades, and particularly with the increase of the 
political and neoliberal ideology in education, there has been uttered request for ‘evidence’, 
‘evidence based practice’, and ‘evidence based education’ within the educational sphere. 
fMRI í functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a brain imaging technique used for 
measuring metabolic variations (blood oxygen levels) in the living brain. The method takes
advantage of the fact that neurons, like all other cells in the body, require energy in form of glucose 
and oxygen in order to perform their specialised functions. This energy supply is distributed via the 
blood circulatory system, and the more active a brain region is, the more oxygen and glucose are
made available by increase in blood flow to this particular area (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). By 
identifying these changes in metabolism and blood flow with fMRI (and also by PET scans),
researchers can identify brain regions that correlate with neural activity when subjects are engaged 
in cognitive tasks.
,GHRORJ\ í a set of conscious or unconscious ideas. Fairclough (2010) understands ideologies to 
involve the representation of ‘the world’ from the perspective of a particular interest (which may be 
operationalised in ways of acting and interacting, in identities, ‘ways of being’ and in practices). 
Ideology is accordingly connected to ‘meaning in the service of power’. In discursive and textual 
analysis one should be cautious when saying that something, or someone, is ideological, because 
this would need to be based upon a complex social scientific analysis of the relationship between 
beliefs, identity, action, power relations and so on (Fairclough, 2003). What one can identify with 
more ease in textual analysis, though, is if certain representations bear resemblance to ideological 
rationalities (since this does not make claims of a person’s underlying conscious or unconscious 
actions). 
Impact í in this study ‘impact’ is used in the sense of ‘an influence’ or ‘an imprint’ of something, and 
not in a more strong sense of ‘a marked and causational effect’ of something. 
Long-term potentiation (LTP) íthe brain area hippocampus appears to play a key role in memory 
and a central aspect here is long-term potentiation (LTP). LTP indicates the process of long-term 
strengthening of a synapse, which is of interest because changes in synaptic strength between 
neurons are the most likely mechanism for learning and memory. When it comes to the process of 
LTP, it is shown that N-methyl-D-asparate (NMDA) receptors are located on the dendritic spines 
of postsynaptic neurons that show LTP. It is further known that glutamate, the major excitatory 
transmitter in the hippocampus, can bind with NMDA receptors and this makes glutamate relevant 
with regards to LTP (Gazzaniga et al., 2009).
0%(íthe abbreviation for the research association Mind, Brain and Education. 
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1HROLEHUDOLVP í neoliberalism as an ideology has a long history in economics and its ideas are 
inspired by renowned economics such as Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman.
During the last decades neoliberal ideology has had a renaissance amongst politicians and policy-
makers in many countries, and also private and public service sectors have become affected by the 
neoliberal market agenda. In this respect it has been noted that “neo-liberalism is a political project 
for the reconstruction of society in accord with the demands of an unrestrained global capitalism”
(Fairclough, 2000, p. 147). The field of education is no exception, as it has experienced
transformation in structures and practices under titles of ‘new public management’. These changes 
are related to the increased attention given to education as we entered the ‘age of human capital’ in 
the 80s, where knowledge and innovation became important forms of capital in modern economics.
1HXURP\WKV í translation of (neuro)scientific findings into misinformation regarding the brain, 
education, learning, etc. One can also use the term ‘edumyths’ when educational research is 
translated into misinformation. 
Neuron í a cell type in the nervous system which is responsible for processing neural information.  
Ontology ía term used in philosophies of science designating existence and reality; “what exists”. 
PET-VFDQíposition emission tomography (PET) is a brain imaging technique. PET-scan, as well as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), is set out to measure metabolic variations in the 
brain. See also fMRI.
Sensitive peULRG í a period of time during which we display a heightened sensitivity to certain 
environmental stimuli and develop in particular ways due to this experience. 
6\QDSWRJHQHVLVíthe formation of synaptic connections between neurons. 
Synaptic plasticity í changes in the patterns of connectivity between neurons and, hence, the ability 
of synapses to modify the efficiency by which they communicate information.
7UDQVGLVFLSOLQDULW\ í a merging of discourses where new disciplinary facets (i.e. knowledge, 
practices, etc.) emerge from the field of ‘prior discourses’. Transdisciplinarity is therefore 
something more than a combination of disciplines in form of multi- or interdisciplinarity, in that it 
encompasses the construction of new knowledge rather than the sum of old knowledge from 
different disciplines. 
Working memory íWKHDELOLW\WRUHFDOODQGWHPSRUDULO\PDLQWDLQLQIRUPDWLRQLQFRQVFLRXVQHVV
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Appendix B  
EMERGENCE: Four-step evaluation list for inclusion or exclusion of 
texts in the corpus 
1st stage: General literature search in e-library, per-reviewed databases, and grey literature
Relevance based on keyword searches and screening of titles and abstract:
- Texts relevant to educational neuroscience
- Texts relevant to the emergence concept
- Texts relevant to the academic level of the discourse
- Written texts mainly
- Texts in English 
- Searches with different keywords: 
o (education* neuroscience*)
o (education* brain*)
o (learning* brain*)
o (learning* neuroscience*)
- Searches with different criteria (timespan, most cited, certain journals, different Boolean operators, etc.)
- Searching additional and relevant texts by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Searching additional ‘grey literature’ by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Focus on monument text and cruces in the discourse
A total of 123 553 hits showed up in this stage, and 7 303 of these were screened.
131 texts went through to the next stage
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2nd stage screening:
Relevance based on topic, title, and potential in scope:
- Title of the article
- Year published
- Author
- Where was the text published
- Document type (political report/book etc.)
- Topic keywords
- Language
- How was the text found (web search / reference follow-up)
- Search words
- Date search conducted
- Traces of educational neuroscience’s emergence?
- Is the text relevant as regards discursive concept of emergence?
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion 
A total of 131 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 79 texts went through to the next stage
3rd stage screening:
Relevance based on topic after reading abstract/full text:    
- Does the text have explicit traces of the emergence of educational neuroscience?
- Does the text link education and neuroscience/brain science?
- Does the text bring anything new to the discourse? 
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion 
- Additional notes
A total of 79 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 24 texts went through to the next stage
4th screening:
The third stage screening was the actual critical discourse analysis of the 24 texts in the corpus for analysing the 
emergence of educational neuroscience. All the 24 texts where read thoroughly in this stage, and a separate and 
more detailed data extraction sheet for the analysis was used. To see the complete data extraction sheet used in 
the final critical discourse analysis of the 24 texts in the corpus, see appendix D.
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HEGEMONY: Four-step evaluation list for inclusion or exclusion of 
texts in corpus 
 
 
1st stage: General literature search in e-library, per-reviewed databases, and grey literature:  
Relevance based on keyword searches and titles:
- Texts relevant to educational neuroscience
- Texts relevant to the hegemony concept
- Texts relevant to the academic level of the discourse
- Written texts mainly
- Texts in English 
- Searches with different keywords, e.g.: 
o (education* neuroscience* nature* nurture*)
o (education* neuroscience* biology* sociology*)
o (learning* brain* nature* nurture*)
o (education* neuroscience* bridge* gap*)
- Searches with different criteria (timespan, most cited, different Boolean operators, etc.)
- Searching additional and relevant texts by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Searching additional ‘grey literature’ by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Focus on monument text and cruces in the discourse
A total of 2 082 hits showed up in this stage, and 1 146 of these were screened.
107 texts went through to the next stage
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2nd stage screening:
Relevance based on topic, title, and potential in scope:
- Title of the article
- Year published
- Author
- Where was the text published
- Document type (political report/book etc.)
- Topic keywords
- Language
- How was the text found (web search / reference follow-up)
- Search words
- Date search conducted
- Traces of debate/struggle/negotiation pertaining to educational neuroscience?
- Is the text relevant as regards discursive concept of hegemony? 
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion 
A total of 107 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 65 texts went through to the next stage
3rd stage screening:
Relevance based on topic after reading abstract/full text:
- Does the text have traces of hegemonic relations?
- Does the text bear signs of debate, conflict, and/or struggle?
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion 
- Additional notes
A total of 65 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 29 texts went through to the next stage
4th stage screening:
The third stage screening was the actual critical discourse analysis of the 29 texts in the corpus for analysing 
educational neuroscience’s hegemonic relations. All the 29 texts where read thoroughly in this stage, and a 
separate and more detailed data extraction sheet for the analysis was used. To see the complete data extraction 
sheet used in the final critical discourse analysis of the 29 texts in the corpus, see appendix D.
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RECONTEXTUALISATION ACROSS STRUCTURAL BOARDERS:  
Four-step evaluation list for inclusion or exclusion of texts in the corpus 
1st stage: General literature search at the internet, library catalogues, e-databases, and grey literature: 
Relevance based on keyword searches and titles:
- Texts relevant to educational neuroscience
- Texts relevant to recontextualisation over structural boarders
- Texts relevant to the public and political level of the discourse
- Written texts mainly
- Texts in English 
- Internet searches with different keywords: 
o education, neuroscience
o classroom, learning, brain, neuroscience
o brain-based education 
o Brain-based learning
- Specific searches at different internet portals (BBC, OECD, TLRP, the Royal Society, Brain Gym)
- Searching for books (internet portals) and library catalogues (e.g. for ‘brain-based’ learning industry)
- Searching additional and relevant texts by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Searching additional ‘grey literature’ by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Most cited (cf. texts witch have/have had the most impact on the recontextualised field)
- Focus on monument text and cruces in the discourse
A total of 364 740 739 hits showed up in this stage, and 1 979 of these were screened.                           
127 texts went through to the next stage
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2nd stage screening:
Relevance based on topic, title, and potential in scope e.g:
- Title of the article
- Year published
- Author
- Where was the text published
- Document type (political report/book etc.)
- Topic keywords
- Language 
- How was the text found (web search / reference follow-up)
- Search words
- Date search conducted
- Traces of educational neuroscience being recontextualised to the public/political field?
- Is the text relevant as regards discursive recontextualisation? 
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion
A total of 127 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 77 texts went through to the next stage
3rd stage screening: 
Relevance based on topic after reading abstract/full text, e.g.:
- Is the text explicit showing trace of recontextualisation of educational neuroscience across 
structural boundaries to the public or the political level?
- Which field?
- Which country? (UK, USA, International)
- Is the text relevant as regards recontextualisation of educational neuroscience?
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion 
- Additional notes
A total of 77 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 27 texts went through to the next stage
4th stage screening: 
The third stage screening was the actual critical discourse analysis of the 27 texts in the corpus for analysing the 
emergence of educational neuroscience. All the 27 texts where read thoroughly in this stage, and a separate and 
more detailed data extraction sheet for the analysis was used. To see the complete data extraction sheet used in 
the final critical discourse analysis of the 27 texts in the corpus, see appendix D.
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RECONTEXTUALISATION ACROSS SCALAR BOARDERS:  
Four-step evaluation list for inclusion or exclusion of texts in the corpus 
1st stage: General literature search at the internet, library catalogues, e-databases, and grey literature: 
Relevance based on keyword searches and titles:
- Texts relevant to educational neuroscience
- Texts relevant to recontextualisation over scalar boarders to Norway 
- Texts relevant to the academic, public, and political field in the Norwegian level of the discourse
- Written texts mainly
- Texts in English or Norwegian
- Internet searches with different keywords: 
o Pedagogic, education, neuroscience, brain science [Pedagogikk, utdanning, nevrovitenskap, hjerneforskning]
o Classroom, learning, brain, neuroscience [Klasserom, læring, hjerne, nevrovitenskap]
o Education, brain, learning [Utdanning, hjerne, læring]
o Pedagogic, brain, learning [pedagogikk, hjerne, læring]
- Specific searches at different internet portals (NRK, Dagbladet, VG, Kunnskapsdepartementet etc.)
- Searching for books (internet portals) and library catalogues (e.g. for [utdanning, nerovitenskap])
- Searching additional and relevant texts by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Searching additional ‘grey literature’ by cues given in citations and reference lists.
- Most cited (cf. texts witch have/have had the most impact on the recontextualised field)
- Focus on monument text and cruces in the discourse
A total of 452 849 hits showed up in this stage, and 3 716 of these were screened.
203 texts went through to the next stage
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2nd stage screening: 
Relevance based on topic, title, and potential in scope:
- Title of the article
- Year published
- Author
- Where was the text published
- Document type (political report/book etc.)
- Topic keywords
- Language (Norwegian/English)
- How was the text found (web search / reference follow-up)
- Search words
- Date search conducted
- Traces of educational neuroscience being recontextualised to the Norwegian academic/public/
political field?
- Is the text relevant as regards discursive recontextualisation to Norway?
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion 
A total of 203 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 108 texts went through to the next stage
3rd stage screening: 
Relevance based on topic after reading abstract/full text, e.g.:
- Is the text explicit showing trace of recontextualisation of educational neuroscience across 
structural boundaries to the public or the political field in Norway?
- Which field?
- Is the text relevant as regards recontextualisation of educational neuroscience in Norway?
- Reason for inclusion/exclusion 
- Additional notes
A total of 108 texts were evaluated in this stage, and 31 texts went through to the next stage
4th stage screening: 
The third stage screening was the actual critical discourse analysis of the 31 texts in the corpus for analysing the 
emergence of educational neuroscience. All the 31 texts where read thoroughly in this stage, and a separate and 
more detailed data extraction sheet for the analysis was used. To see the complete data extraction sheet used in 
the final critical discourse analysis of the 31 texts in the corpus, see appendix D.
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(Ordered chronologically after year published) 
Donaldson, Henry H. (1895). The Growth of the Brain: A Study of the Nervous System in Relation to Education. 
London: Walter Scott, Ltd.
Halleck, Reuben P. (1896) The Education of the Central Nervous System. A study of foundations, especially 
sensor and motor training. New York: The Macmillan Company, Ltd.
Thorndike, Edward L. (1923). Educational Psychology, Volume 1. The Original Nature of Man, New York: 
Teacher College, Columbia University. 
Epstein, Herman T. (1974), ‘Phrenoblysis: Special brain and mind growth periods. II. Human mental 
development,’ in Developmental Psychobiology, Vol. 7, Issue 3, pp. 217-224.   
Marshall, Louise H. & Magoun, H. W. (eds.) (1975). ‘Neuroscience Now: Education, Manpower and 
Opportunities’, in Experimental Neurology, Vol. 49, No. 1, Part 2, pp. IFC-68.
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in Experimental Neurology, Part 2. Neuroscience now: education, manpower, and opportunities. Vol. 
49, No. 1, Part 2, pp. 1-10. 
- Shooter, Eric M. (1975). ‘Introductory Remarks’ in Marshall, L. H. & Magoun, H. W. (eds.) (1975). 
Neuroscience Now: Education, Manpower, and Opportunities, in Experimental Neurology, Vol. 49, 
Issue 1, Part 2, pp. 13-14. 
- Shooter, Eric M. & Magoun, H. W. (1975). ‘Survey of Manpower and Teaching in Neuroscience: 
Concepts and Issues’ in Marshall, L. H. & Magoun, H. W. (eds.) (1975). Neuroscience Now: 
Education, Manpower, and Opportunities, in Experimental Neurology, Vol. 49, Issue 1, Part 2, pp. 33-
59. 
Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Bennett, Edward, L. (eds.) (1976). Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press.1
- Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Bennett, Edward, L. (1976a). «Preface» in Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Bennett, 
Edward, L. (eds.) (1976). Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
pp. ix-x.
- Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Bennett, Edward, L. (1976b). «Introduction: Prospects for Application of 
Research on Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory» in Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Bennett, 
Edward, L. (eds.) (1976). Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
pp. xi-xiii.
                                                          
1 This book is a collection of conference papers from a conference in Asilomar, California, in 1974. Due to the extent of text 
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ о ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŽƌǇ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
summary.  
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- Rozin, Paul (1976). «The Psychobiological Approach to Human Memory» in Rosenzweig, Mark R. & 
Bennett, Edward L. (eds.) (1976) Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory. Cambridge: The MIT 
Press. pp. 3-48. 
- Rutledge, L. T. (1976). “Synaptogenesis: Effects of Synaptic Use” in Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Bennett, 
Edward L. (eds.) (1976). Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory. Cambridge: The MIT Press. pp. 
329-339. 
- Rosenzweig, Mark R. (1976). “Conference Summary” in Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Bennett, Edward L. 
(eds.) (1976). Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory. Cambridge: The MIT Press. pp. 593-600. 
Chall, Jeanne, S. & Mirsky, Allan F. (eds.) (1978). Education and the Brain. The Seventy-seven Yearbook of the 
National Society for the Study of Education, Part II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.2
- Chall, Jeanne, S. & Mirsky, Allan F. (1978a). “Editors’ Preface” in Chall, Jeanne, S. & Mirsky, Allan 
F. (eds.) (1978). Education and the Brain. The Seventy-seven Yearbook of the National Society for the 
Study of Education, Part II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. xi-xviii.
- Chall, Jeanne, S. & Mirsky, Allan F. (1978b). “The Implications for Education” in Chall, Jeanne, S. & 
Mirsky, Allan F. (eds.) (1978). Education and the Brain. The Seventy-seven Yearbook of the National 
Society for the Study of Education, Part II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 371-378.
Vellutino, Frank R. (1979). ‘Review of ‘Education and the Brain by Jeanne S. Chall: Allan F. Mirsky’’, in The 
Reading Teacher, Vol. 32, No. 7, pp. 864-866.
Sylwester, R., Chall, J.S., Wittrock, M.C. & Hart, L.A. (1981). ‘Educational Implications of Recent Brain 
Research’, in Educational Leadership, Vol. 39, Issue 1, pp.6-17.
Peterson, Rita W. (1984). ‘Great Expectations: Collaboration between the Brain Sciences and Education’, in The 
American Biology Teacher, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp.74-80.
Thompson, Richard F. (1986). ‘The Neurobiology of Learning and Memory’ in Science, Vol. 233, No. 4767, 
pp.941-947.
McGuinness, Diane (1987). ‘Review of ‘The Brain, Cognition, and Education by Sarah L. Friedman; Kenneth A. 
Klivington; Rita W. Peterson’ in American Journal of Education, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp. 116-119.
McCall, Robert, B. (1990). ‘The Neuroscience of Education: More Research Is Needed Before Application’, in 
Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 885-888.
Bruer, John T. (1997). ‘Education and the Brain: A Bridge Too Far’, in Educational Researcher, Vol. 26, No. 8, 
pp. 4-16.
Byrnes, James P. & Fox, Nathan A. (1998a). ‘The Educational Relevance of Research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience’, in Educational Psychology Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 297-342.  
Berninger, Virginia W. & Corina, David (1998). ‘Making Cognitive Neuroscience Educationally Relevant: 
Creating Bidirectional Collaborations Between Educational Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience’, in 
Educational Psychology Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 343-354.  
                                                          
2 This yearbook is a collection of neuroscientific papers from NSSE’s project on ‘Education and the Brain’. Again, due to the 
extent of this text only the most relevant chapters have ďĞĞŶ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ о ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŽƌǇ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
yearbooks closing summary chapter. 
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Appendix D 
EMERGENCE: Data extraction sheet for the critical discourse analysis  
Discourse analysis:
What are the main themes/the narrative of the text? .................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
How is the relationship between education and neuroscience represented? .............................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Any issues or problems addressed in this document? ................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
What are the proposed arguments/’results’ (of the problem stated)? ........................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
How is the text ‘justifying’ its particular view of ed.neuro/the world?.....................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
Which discursive position can the author seem to have? .........................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Are any other ‘main parts of the world’ mentioned? E.g. social, media, political - cf. recontext.?
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any gaps in knowledge, areas of new research needed or novel ideas in the article? (can 
often be detected in the summary) ............................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
What are the key sources/relevant references cited for this text? ..............................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Number of pages: ....................... Journal impact factor?  ...............................................
How should the text be ranked in order of importance? Is it a monument text? (1-5) .............................
Other:..........................................................................................................................................................
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Emergence: 
Any traces of the emergence and development of educational neuroscience?...........................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Is the text new or is it building on existing, old ideas? ..............................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any interdiscursive or intertextual statements? .........................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
What external discourses are drawn upon and how are they combined in new articulations? .................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Is there any evidence of crossing of discursive boundaries? ...................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any notions in the text of changes in social practice, social agents, organisations and so 
forth? ........................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Has any emergence strategies been used? .................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Where can one locate this text within the field of prior discourses? .........................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Which web of relations can one find within and between this text and other texts (e.g. texts in the 
discourse of education, psychology, neuroscience, medicine, cognitive science etc.)?............................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Can this text/work be regarded to significantly have developed the discourse? .......................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Other: .........................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
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Critical discourse analysis: 
What is the ideology of this text? ..............................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
What is the author’s political, ideological, theoretical, methodological position? ....................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any ‘taken for granted’ truths, premises, key ideas in the text? ................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
What are the key epistemological and ontological grounds for the discipline? ........................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Other: .........................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Hegemony: 
Any traces of hegemony in the discourse of educational neuroscience? ...................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any traces of power in the text? .................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Power: in what way can the language in the text be directive for a certain reality? ..................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Power: in what way can the text’s language be directive for social action? ............................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Which particular perspective/positions are available within the text and how can it be located in the 
overall discourse of educational neuroscience? ........................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Other: .........................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Recontextualisation: 
Any traces of recontextualisation in the discourse of educational neuroscience? ..................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Other: .........................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
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HEGEMONY: Data extraction sheet for the critical discourse analysis  
Critical Discourse Analysis:
Text: ..........................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
Number of pages: .................................... Journal impact factor?  .......................................................................
How should the text be ranked in order of importance? Is it a monument text? (1-5) ............................................
Main topic of the text: ...............................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
How is the relationship between education and neuroscience represented? ...........................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any ‘taken for granted’ truths, premises, key ideas in the text? ...............................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
How is the text ‘justifying’ its particular view of ed.neuro/the world?.....................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Which particular positions/perspectives are available within the text and how can it be located in the overall 
discourse of educational neuroscience? .....................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Which discorsive position can the author seem to have? ........................................................................................
What is the author’s political, ideological, theoretical, methodological position? ..................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
What are the key epistemological and ontological grounds for the discipline? ......................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
What general knowledge/representations are accepted? How concretely or abstractly, specifically or generally, 
are they represented? .................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
What general knowledge/representations are problematized? How concretely or abstractly, specifically or 
generally, are they represented? ................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
How are the complexities of reality reduced and condensed, what aspects of those parts of the world that are 
represented are included (and given greater or lesser salience) or (significantly) excluded?
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
What available alternative discourses/narrations are significantly not drawn upon? ................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Other:...........................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
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Hegemony: 
In the text, are there any traces of hegemonic relations pertaining to the discourse of educational neuroscience? 
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any notions of discursive struggle (e.g. dialogue, negotiation and conflicts)? .......................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any traces of strategies to naturalise certain ideologies, narrations, practices etc.? / Do any set of 
discourse conventions implicitly embody certain ideologies? ................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any traces of strategies to denaturalise certain ideologies, narrations, practices etc.? 
...................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................
Successful or failing strategies? Is there resonance between values, representations, and practice in the 
discourse? Is the feedback-loop closed or open? ......................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any conflicts which especially can be seen as negotiations with more durable and institutionalised 
levels of social reality and social structures? ............................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Does it seem that any narratives are hegemonic in the text? (can this be due to discursive struggle/ 
dialogue/negotiation?) ...............................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Are there any traces of power in the text? .................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Power: in what way can the language in the text be directive for a certain reality? ................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Power: in what way can the text’s language be directive for social action? .............................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Other: ........................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
Recontextualisation: 
Any traces of recontextualisation in the discourse of educational neuroscience? ..................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
Other: .........................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
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RECONTEXTUALISATION ACROSS STRUCTURAL BOARDERS:               
Data extraction sheet for the critical discourse analysis  
Critical Discourse Analysis:
Text: ......................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
Number of pages: .................................................... Type of text:  .........................................................................
Main topic of the text: ................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Recontextualisation: 
Across which structural boundaries has educational neuroscience been recontextualised in this text? 
Media Policy-makers Other: ................................
Brain-based progr. Other interest actors ...........................................
How can the text be seen as a recontextualisation of the educational neuroscience discourse? (traces of dissemination 
of ed.neuro to this public/political field) .............................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
How is educational neuroscience represented? (with cautious optimism/overly enthusiasm, as an issue/solution/argument etc.) 
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
What general knowledge/representations are accepted? How concretely or abstractly, specifically or generally, 
are they represented? ..................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
How is educational neuroscience representation articulated? ............................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
How can educational neuroscience be seen re-articulated within/set in relation with the old public/political field? 
(c.f. crossing of discursive boundaries) ......................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
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Notes re the text’s presentation of educational neuroscience: ..................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Which interest groups/agents in educational neuroscience does the text represent? ............................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Why do they have an interest in educational neuroscience? ..............................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
What is the relation between the agents of the academic educational neuroscience discourse and the agents in the 
respective public/politic field? ......................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
How can the discourse (and practices) of educational neuroscience be seen internalised within the particular 
field? ...........................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Any traces of ‘colonisation’ of educational neuroscience into this field? ...........................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Any traces of ‘appropriation’ of educational neuroscience into this field? ..........................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Noteworthy quotes from the text: ...................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Other: .........................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
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RECONTEXTUALISATION ACROSS SCALAR BOARDERS:             
Data extraction sheet for the critical discourse analysis 
Critical Discourse Analysis:
Text: ......................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
Number of pages: .................................................... Type of text:  .........................................................................
Main topic of the text: ................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Recontextualisation: 
To which field in Norway can educational neuroscience be seen recontextualised to in this text? 
Media Policy-makers Other: ................................
Brain-based progr. Academia ...........................................
How can the text be seen as a recontextualisation of the educational neuroscience discourse? (traces of dissemination 
of ed.neuro to this public/political field) .............................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
How is educational neuroscience represented? (with cautious optimism/overly enthusiasm, as an issue/solution/argument etc.) 
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
What general knowledge/representations are accepted? How concretely or abstractly, specifically or generally, 
are they represented? ..................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
How is educational neuroscience representation articulated? ............................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
How can educational neuroscience be seen re-articulated within/set in relation with the old academic/public/
political field in Norway? (c.f. crossing of discursive boundaries) ...............................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
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Notes regarding the text’s presentation of educational neuroscience: .......................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
Why do actors in this academic/public/politic field in Norway have an interest in educational neuroscience?
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
What is the relation between the agents of the international academic educational neuroscience discourse and the 
agents in the respective Norwegian field? …………………………...............................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
How can the discourse (and practices) of educational neuroscience be seen internalised within the particular 
Norwegian field? .........................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Any traces of ‘colonisation’ of educational neuroscience into this field? ...........................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Any traces of ‘appropriation’ of educational neuroscience into this field? ..........................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Noteworthy quotes from the text: ...................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
Other: .........................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
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